The constitutive nature of values, images and principles in the European Union

Manners, Ian

Published in:
Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy

Publication date:
2006

Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA):
Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity – and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority. (Romano Prodi 2000: 3)

The quote from Romano Prodi serves several purposes in this chapter – first and foremost it illustrates the extent to which the President of the European Commission’s understanding of the EU was clearly located in the notion of a European model, rather than the naked pursuit of European interests. But it also tells us something about the nature of Prodi, his speechwriters, and the shared self-understandings of the Commissioners and their cabinets. The speech talks not of the EU, but of Europe; it talks not of ‘own interests’, but of being here to share interests; it talks not of utopia, but of horrendous experiences; it talks not of expediency, but of principles; and finally it talks not of majoritarian politics, but of a consensual model. So for those behind the speech, the European model is spoken of as part of a European understanding of self, history, principles, and politics.

Whether this is hyperbole, rhetoric, contested discourse, or simply a speech, what is important is that the EU’s relations with the ‘wider world’ are self-evidently informed by a series of values, images and principles (VIPs) which are not unimportant. What I wish to do in the rest of this chapter is to follow Sonia Lucarelli’s conceptual introduction with a more conceptual discussion of the values and principles which constitute the EU as a ‘hybrid polity’ (Manners 2002: 240). My more constitutive discussions of European values and the principles within the EU will serve as a useful foundation for Knud Erik Jørgensen’s following chapter on theorising VIPs in foreign policy. My chapter will first engage in a multiperspectival discussion of constructions of ‘Europeanness’ from the five perspectives of economics, society, the environment, conflict, and politics. Second, I will describe what I have observed to be nine constitutive values
and principles within the EU, ranging from the liberal democratic (such as peace, liberty and democracy) to the social democratic (such as equality, solidarity and sustainable development). Finally I will discuss the ways in which these values and principles constitute the EU as a hybrid polity and contribute to co-existing and competitive EU self-images.

Ultimately it may be that any claims to the uniqueness (and potential superiority) of European values run the risk of ending up as vacuous and meaningless as the ‘Asian values’ debate. During the debate many argued that respect for authority and an emphasis on community were responsible for the Asian economic boom of the 1980s and 90s (see discussions in M. Thompson 2001; Dittmer 2002; and Wiessala 2002). In contrast, ‘Western values’ of moral decay and excessive individualism (including democracy and human rights) were argued to be responsible for relative Western economic decline during the same period. Some even went as far as to argue that it is possible to contrast the ‘European way of thinking’ as Cartesian with the ‘Asian way of thinking’ as holistic (Servaes 2000: 58–59). However, it is quite clear that these sorts of arguments based on elite discourses are used by some Asian governments as ‘pretexts for resisting calls for democracy and human rights’ and that we must look at ‘who has the power to determine such values and definitions’ (Kyi Aung 1995: 11–12). Hence, as Catarina Kinnvall argues, we need to understand both the issues of culture and context in order to make sense of “the message of authoritarian leaders concerning so-called ‘Asian values”’ (Kinnvall 2002: 9).

**European perspectives**

After five hundred years of internationalising trade patterns, fifty years of superpower domination, and at least thirty years of globalising sociocultural practices, are there any distinctively European perspectives on life? In this first section, I will attempt to identify what I consider socially constituted shared European perspectives that provide the cultural context in which a discussion of the EU must sit.

With the cautionary tale of ‘Asian values’ foremost in our minds, we can now turn to the question of considering five general European perspectives without falling into the trap of allowing elite discourses to subvert universal rights and values (such as democracy and human rights in Asia). The obvious difficulties of differentiating between supposed Western perspectives and those of Europe make this a difficult task. The countries of the developed world, in particular members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), share far more than they disagree on. However, I believe it is possible to make an argument for European perspectives that are capable of differentiating Europe from countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In order to do so, I will compare and contrast Europe and the world from the five perspectives of economics, society, the environment, conflict, and politics (see Buzan 1991; Manners 2000b and 2006). As part of this comparison, Figures
2.1–2.7 compare aggregate data from the EU 25 states, weighted by population, with the 10 most populous countries in the world (plus Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Only the 13 most populous EU states are illustrated in the figures.

**Economic perspective**

European economic perspectives are generally characterised by reference to ‘solidarity’ – the belief in a social market economy characterised by income redistribution, government intervention, and stakeholder capitalism (Hutton 2002: 343). Many observers argue that the European economy is focused on ‘socially-regulated economic governance’ (Burgoon 2001: 62). This European capitalism is built on ‘a sounder foundation of social acceptability. . . . [in which] income transfers and guarantees of European social security systems can be defended as a politically necessary insurance against discontent and social instability’ (Strange 1998: 111–112). European economic solidarity involves government intervention and expenditure, rather than simple regulation. It also involves a commitment to tackling economic inequalities, including those caused by regional disparities and structural economic change.

As Figure 2.1 illustrates, average levels of economic solidarity, measured in terms of inequality and poverty reflect this European social market economy.

While average GDP per capita in the EU remains among the highest in the world (with Luxembourg having the highest), Figure 2.1 suggests that European economic solidarity is reflected in relatively low levels of inequality and poverty. Among the developed world, average EU inequality is higher than that of Japan and Canada, but lower than the US, New Zealand, and Australia. In comparison, average EU relative poverty levels are the lowest in the developed world.

Clearly there is considerable divergence between EU states, in particular between the relatively wealthy small European trading states (Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands), and the relatively impoverished new EU member states (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia). However, such simple dichotomies do not explain the differences in European economic solidarity. The degree of relative inequality is largely determined by the difficulties in coming to terms with the new European economy. Hence Europe’s most equal states are those that have adapted most readily to the new economic realities of post-Cold War Europe (Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium). In comparison, Europe’s most iniquitous states are those that have faced tremendous economic challenges in post-Cold War Europe (Portugal, Estonia, Italy, and the UK). In contrast, the level of relative poverty is more clearly determined by the socio-economic structures of the country. Hence, higher levels of relative poverty are to be found in those states with greater structural imbalances (Italy, the UK, Estonia, and Ireland), than those with more fair socio-economic structures (Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden).
However, the argument that Europeans share a socially constituted economic perspective is still valid – Europeans relate their high levels of development to the achievement of economic solidarity; they value their low levels of inequality because they believe them integral to their high levels of development; and as a result Europeans cherish the lowest relative poverty levels in the developed world. This sharing of beliefs about development, equality and relative wealth contributes to Europe seeming fairly different to much of the world.

Figure 2.1 Average levels of inequality and poverty

*Note:* Inequality index – Gini index measuring inequality over the entire distribution of income or consumption. A higher number indicates greater inequality. Relative poverty – percentage of population living below 50% of median income.

*Source:* UNHDR: 150–151; 188–191
Social perspective

European social perspectives are also characterised by reference to ‘solidarity’ – the belief in a European social model encompassing social legislation, social welfare and social infrastructure investment. Although most authors agree that there is no one ‘European social model’ there is a strong argument that high levels of spending, broad social programmes and considerable employment protection are found across Europe (Kleinman 2002: 57–58; and Gough 1998: 90). Additionally, ‘a solidaristic wage policy’, ‘detailed social security provisions’, and ‘good social investment in human and social infrastructure capital’ are all seen to be part of these European social models (Schulten 2002: 173; CMLR 1993: 445; and Gough 1998: 90). European social perspectives are located in ‘a certain normative core of social liberalism [which] still provides a formative background for social solidarity’ (Habermas 2003a: 10). These observations lead to the argument that ‘social legislation is one of the few fields in which Europe is a real world leader’ (CMLR 1993: 445).

As Figure 2.2 illustrates, average levels of social solidarity, measured in terms of percentage of GDP spent by the government on education, health and the public sector reflect this European social welfare commitment.

Figure 2.2 suggests that average EU public expenditure on social welfare is the highest in the world. European social solidarity is reflected in high levels of public-sector education, health, and welfare provision. Among the developed world, average EU public expenditure on education and health is below that of New Zealand, Canada, and the US, and broadly comparable to that of Australia and Japan.

There appears to be considerable divergence between EU states, in particular between the relatively developed welfare states of Northern and North-Western Europe (Denmark, Sweden, France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, and Finland), and the developing states of Eastern Europe (Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). Although relatively high levels of public expenditure in Poland and Greece, and relatively low levels of public spending in Ireland, suggest that geographical differences are not so very important in this respect.

Although there are differences, the argument that Europeans share socially-constituted social perspectives is still valid – Europeans believe in high levels of public sector expenditure because of the importance they give to social solidarity; they value some of most extensive public education and health systems in the world (shared with other industrialised countries) because they deem them integral to their commitment to social solidarity and development; and as a result Europeans cherish some of the highest literacy rates and longest life expectancies in the world (UNHDR 2004: 139). This sharing of beliefs about education, health and social welfare contributes to Europe seeming noticeably different to much of the world.

Environmental perspective

European environmental perspectives are characterised by a commitment to a more ‘sustainable development’ – an attempt to reconcile economic growth with
protection of the environment in both the short and long term (Baker 1997: 91). European environmental sustainability includes the mainstreaming of environmental issues into economic, development, and social policies, as well as legal commitments to the ‘precautionary principle’ (Baker 1997; Bäckstrand 2001; Usui 2003). Such progressive legalisation has extended to including environmental protection in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as extraterritorial environmental measures by the EC (Desgagné 1995; Hedemann-Robinson 2000).

Figure 2.2 Average levels of education, health and other social expenditure

*OECD members only for ‘Other social expenditure’

Sources: UN Human Development Report 2004: 202–205; and OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004
As Figure 2.3 illustrates, average levels of environmental sustainability, measured in terms of GDP per unit of energy use, ecological footprint, and CO₂ emissions reflect this European commitment to sustainable development:

Figure 2.3 suggests that average EU levels of energy use are among the more efficient in the world. Amongst the ten largest countries in the world, Bangladesh, Brazil and Japan have higher levels of GDP per unit of energy use. As

![Figure 2.3: Average levels of energy use, ecological footprint and CO₂ emissions](image)

*Note:* Energy use – GDP per unit of energy use (PPP US$ per kg of oil equivalent). A higher figure indicates a more efficient use of energy in the economic activity of the economy (UN Human Development Programme 2004: 207–210).

Ecological footprint – the total area required to produce the food and fibres consumed, sustain energy consumption, and provide space for infrastructure (1 hectare of average biological productivity per person). A higher figure indicates a larger footprint, and thus a less sustainable lifestyle (WWF 2004: 24–31).
expected, the average EU ecological footprint and CO₂ emissions are higher than those of the developing world, but are lower than those of the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the emissions of Russia.

Again, there is significant divergence between EU states, largely dependent on a combination of relative level of development, urbanisation, and latitude (i.e. mean air temperatures). Thus relatively developed member states, such as Italy, Denmark and Ireland, have higher levels of GDP per unit of energy use, whereas relatively developing member states, such as Estonia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have lower levels of GDP per unit of energy use. Urbanised Luxembourg and rapidly developing economies such as Estonia and Ireland have the largest ecological footprints and the highest levels of CO₂ emissions, compared to rural and less energy-dependent Latvia and Lithuania which have smaller footprints and lower CO₂ emissions.

Despite these divergences, it is still the case that Europeans share socially-constituted environmental perspectives – Europeans value more efficient levels of energy use because of their history of industrialisation and urbanisation; they believe in lowering their ecological impact and CO₂ emissions because this is integral to their ideas about achieving more sustainable lifestyles in densely populated Europe. This sharing of beliefs about energy use of sustainability, together with relative ecological impact and CO₂ emissions, contributes to Europe seeming sustainably different to much of the world.

**Conflict perspective**

European conflict perspectives are characterised by a commitment to a more ‘sustainable peace’ – resolving both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict (Manners 2005). European sustainable peace involves addressing the structural causes of conflict through extensive development aid policies and support for bottom-up, local development programmes that tackled the roots of inequality such as health, education, and infrastructure. In contrast, European states also contribute significant amounts of resources to military research, technology and forces, in particular through participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This uneasy compromise between peaceful development policies and interventionist military capabilities is further complicated through long standing European participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. This compromise has been demonstrated in the complexities of the three most visible military interventions involving European forces in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

As Figure 2.4 illustrates, average levels of military expenditure and UN peacekeeping forces reflect this European commitment to sustainable peace:

Figure 2.4 suggests that the average EU military expenditure is above that of most of the world, but significantly below that of the five militarised states of Pakistan, Russia, the USA, China, and India. The average contributions by EU member states to UN peacekeeping operations is significantly smaller than those of Nigeria, Bangladesh, Australia, and Pakistan, but greater than those of most
of the developing world, in particular the insignificant contributions of China and the USA.

As expected, there is considerable divergence between the EU states, depending on historical experiences and recent security concerns. The level of military expenditure is largely determined by historical experiences such as colonial empires providing the foundations of large forces for UN Security Council members France and the UK, or neutrality ensuring small forces in Ireland, Austria and Malta. More recent security concerns in Greece ensure

---

**Figure 2.4** Average levels of military expenditure and UN peacekeeping forces

*Note: Military expenditure – 2002 public spending on military resources as a percentage of GDP (UN Human Development Programme 2004: 202–205). Peacekeeping – 2003 UN peacekeeping forces per 1,000 military personnel (Kaldor et al 2004: 286–290).*
that it has the highest level of military expenditure in the developed world. In contrast, the contributions to UN peacekeeping forces are determined by a mixture of factors, including neutral internationalism (Ireland and Austria), NATO-driven capabilities (Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), and more liberal internationalism (Portugal and the UK).

Once more, the argument that Europeans share socially-constituted conflict perspectives is still valid – Europeans believe in contributing to extensive development aid programmes and maintaining relatively high levels of military preparedness at the same time because of historical experiences of addressing the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict; they value participating in UN peacekeeping missions as integral to their internationalist commitment. This sharing of beliefs about contributions, capabilities, and commitments contributes to Europe seeming principally different to much of the world.

**Political perspective**

European political perspectives are characterised by ‘cosmopolitical supranationality’ – the belief in multilayered politics shaped by a vibrant international civil society, more equal rights for women, the pooling of sovereignty, and supranational law. European cosmopolitical supranationality involves the recognition that domestic politics and international politics are deeply interdependent. It also reflects the post-war birth of cosmopolitan Europe as a reaction to the modern Europe of nation-states (Beck 2003; Habermas 2003a). The pooling of sovereignty within Europe has made all European states, and especially EU members, far more accepting of post-national politics in the 21st century (Rabkin 2000; Ward 2003). The cosmopolitical perspective reflects this interplay between the solidarist activities of civil groups and the supranational legal structures above the state, or as Pascal Lamy put it, ‘the notion of cosmopolitics describes a new world that is coming into being. . . . More generally, cosmopolitics may simply be about thinking globally and acting locally’ (Lamy 2004a: 13 and 20; see also Cheah and Robbins 1998; and Archibugi 2003).

As Figures 2.5–2.7 illustrate, average levels of cosmopolitical supranationality, measured in terms of density of international civil society, the empowerment of women and participation in cosmopolitan international law reflect these European political perspectives.

As Figures 2.5–2.7 suggest average EU cosmopolitical activity is among the highest in the world. The average density of European international civil society is greater than most of the world, with only Australia, Canada and New Zealand close. The average level of women’s empowerment is higher in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US than in the EU, although five EU states have higher averages than Australia (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Belgium). The average number of significant international laws ratified by EU member states is the highest in the world, with only New Zealand, Australia, and Brazil relatively close.
Clearly there is considerable divergence between EU states, depending on the level of development, and entry into international society. The density of international civil society is largely determined by the entry and participation in international society, with recently independent states having the lowest density (Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia for example) and internationalist states such as Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands having the highest density (although the presence of EU institutions in Belgium and Luxembourg has a huge impact). The degree of women’s empowerment is largely determined by level of development, but in addition the Northern European states have achieved the highest levels in the world (for example, Sweden). In comparison, less developed states such as Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, and even Greece have lower levels of women’s empowerment. Finally, the number of ratified cosmopolitan international laws is determined by the entry and participation in international society, led by 13 European internationalist states with 31 ratifications, traced by the

![Average density of international civil society](image)

**Figure 2.5** Average density of international civil society

_Note: International civil society organisational density is the number of internationally-oriented non-governmental organisations (in 2003) per million population (Kaldor et al 2004: 297–302)
more recently independent states of Latvia (26), Estonia (27), Czech Republic (28), and Poland (28) tracked.

However, the argument that Europeans share socially-constituted political perspectives is still valid – Europeans enjoy dense and active international civil societies partially because of their relatively internationalised public spheres; they value higher levels of women’s empowerment integral to their higher levels of development (particularly in Northern Europe); and they believe in actively

Figure 2.6 Average levels of women’s empowerment

Note: UNDP Gender Empowerment Measure based on women’s participation in politics and professional employment, and female income ratio (UN Development Programme 2004: 221–224). * No data for France.
participating in cosmopolitan international law in ways which make Europe seem significantly different to much of the world.

This combination of five European perspectives constitute the cultural context within which EU relations with the rest of the world are conducted. It is important to note that statistical data proves nothing but might illustrate something. Figure 2.8 illustrates how this interface between the ‘star’ of Europe and the ‘circle’ of the world could be represented.

Figure 2.7 Average number of international law treaties ratified

Note: International law treaties ratified include eight ILO labour rights conventions, ten human rights instruments, seven humanitarian laws, and six environmental treaties. The highest number possible is 31.

European Union values and principles

Article I-2: The Union’s values

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and the principle of equality between women and men prevail.

Article I-3: The Union’s objectives

4. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

As Articles I-2 and I-3 of the Constitution for Europe illustrated, over the past fifty years the EU has developed a series of constitutive values and wider objectives in the world. I have elsewhere identified nine norms that, I will now argue, are constitutive of the EU as a hybrid polity and as part of its international identity in world politics (Manners 2000a: 32–34; 2002: 242–243; Manners and Whitman 2003). Clearly, as the values identified in Article I-2 are shared with the world’s liberal democracies, I will clarify particular EU interpretations of these constitutive values. In contrast, the wider objectives
promoted in Article I-3 are more specific to the way progressive social democracy is constitutive of the EU. In both cases I shall suggest how values are translated into principles guiding EU policies.

**Sustainable peace**

The first EU value is peace – Robert Schuman’s opening words on 9th May 1950 provided the historical *raison d’être* for European integration; ‘world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.’ Reiterated again in the preambles of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), and the Treaty on European Union, Article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe was to establish peace as the EU’s primary objective: ‘1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.’

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of *sustainable peace* (see Manners 2005). As discussed under European conflict values above, the EU approach to conflict prevention emphasises addressing the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war ‘becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. The EU policy emphasis is placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue, and enlargement as part of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. However, the EU’s growing civil and military operational capacity also has a *sustainable* peace mission with its focus on ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Article I-41, Constitution for Europe).

**Social liberty**

The second EU value is liberty – freedom within a social context. Liberty, similar to the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights, was codified as founding principles by the revised article 6 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union after the Amsterdam summit in 1997. The Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union adopted at the Nice European Council in December 2000, and incorporated into the Constitution for Europe develops the EU understanding of liberty. Title II of the Charter sets out 19 freedoms, starting with Article II-6: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person’.

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of *social liberty*. Liberty within the EU operates within a distinctive socio-legal context. Thus, liberty is always just one of several rights held alongside other, equally important, values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. Therefore, within the EU *social* liberty is circumscribed by the need to ensure that other values are not compromised by unwarranted freedoms, such as anti-social behaviour, hate crimes, inflammatory speech, and pornography. The wider implications of EU
social liberty are significant, not least in references to ‘protection of children’s rights’ as a foreign policy objective, as EU extraterritorial legislation on ‘sex tourism’ illustrates.

**Consensual democracy**

The third EU value is democracy – the promotion of a particular form, organisation and philosophy of political life. The participation and requirements of democracy have been a constitutive value of the EU since its birth, with Schuman arguing in the French National Assembly in 1948 that ‘we intend to prepare for its [Germany’s] admission to a peaceful, democratic organisation of European nations’.

Thus, from the inception of the ECSC until 1970, democracy was the membership condition of the EC. This value was clarified in the 1970 Luxembourg Report which stated that a ‘united Europe ... must assemble democratic states with freely elected parliaments’. Following the end of the Cold War and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a new Europe, the EU was far more explicit in the promotion and requirements of democracy for membership (Copenhagen Criteria 1993), for development aid (Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development 1991; conditionality clauses 1995), and in its foreign policy provisions.

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of consensual democracy. Consensual democracy is the operating principle within the majority of EU member states and includes proportional representation electoral systems, coalition governments, and power sharing amongst parties. Similarly, the EU itself is a consensual form of polity, with PR and power sharing in the European Parliament, non-majoritarian voting in the Council (either Qualified Majority Voting or unanimity), and power sharing amongst all the member states. The EU has helped to spread consensual democracy into Central and Eastern Europe as part of the transition and accession processes.

**Associative human rights**

The fourth EU value is human rights – one of the most visible and promoted values of the post-Cold War era. Alongside democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights was made explicit in the December 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on ‘European Identity’ (Manners and Whitman 1998: 236). Within Europe, human rights law had been progressively developed through the European Convention on Human Rights, and the interpretations of the European Court of Justice during the 1960s and 70s, culminating in the 1977 joint declaration recognising human rights as general principles of law. The 1980s saw the European Parliament being particularly proactive in advocating human rights, while the renegotiations of the Lomé Conventions provided the first examples of human rights promotion, finally enshrined in the 1989 Lomé IV Convention. By the 1990s, similar to democracy, human rights were given
prominence in the Treaty on European Union (first through article F; then article 6) and are now promoted through conditionality clauses in enlargement and development policies.

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of *associative* human rights. *Associative* human rights include both individual human rights and collective human rights. These are *associative* because they emphasise the interdependence between individual rights such as freedom of expression and collective rights such as the right of association. The associative nature of EU human rights has developed since 1973 through the 1986 Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on Human Rights and the 1991 Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development. All of these documents emphasise the universality and indivisibility of these *associative* human rights with *consensual* democracy, *supranational* rule of law, and *social* solidarity (see also Article III-292, External Action general provision, Constitution for Europe).

**Supranational rule of law**

The fifth EU value is the rule of law – the political foundations provided by just legal systems and equal protection for all. The rule of law is seen to be essential for ensuring the stability and success of the other liberal-democratic values of liberty, democracy, and human rights. Hence, these four values are to be found promoted through development aid, CFSP, and the Copenhagen membership criteria, amongst others. The Constitution for Europe sought to ensure that the rule of law continued to be promoted in external action and international relations, but with additional references to ‘the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Article I-4).

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of *supranational* rule of law. As suggested under European political perspectives above, the EU principle of the rule of law is supranational in three senses – communitarian, international, and cosmopolitan. First, the EU principle of communitarian law promotes the pooling of sovereignty through the *acquis communautaire* – the supranational rule of law within the EU. Second, the EU principle of international law encourages participation by the EU and its member states in supranational law above and beyond the EU (Manners and Whitman 2003: 399). Third, the EU principle of cosmopolitan law advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals (Manners 2002: 241).

**Inclusive equality**

The sixth EU value is equality – the legal prohibition of discrimination together with proactive policies to promote equality. Equality has recently become one of the most promoted constitutive values discussed here, moving from a relatively narrow focus on preventing discrimination based on nationality to the far
broader and prominent value of equality in Article I-2 of the Constitution for Europe. In the 1990s, the focus of equality expanded beyond nationality to include equality between men and women (TEC article 2), protection of minorities (Copenhagen Criteria), and ‘action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ (TEC article 13).

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of a more inclusive, open ended and uninhibited understanding of which groups are particularly subject to discrimination. Hence, the Constitution for Europe included references to the prohibition of discrimination ‘based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’ in Article II-81 (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, emphasis added). One weakness with the implementation of this principle is the extent to which discrimination based on nationality is still widespread in a majority of member states. This is particularly true of employment practices in consensual societies that promote homosociality (Roper 1996).

**Social solidarity**

The seventh EU value is solidarity – the promotion of the social economy, the social partnership, and social justice within the EU, and in relations with the developing world. Alongside the values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, social solidarity has been emphasised as a value in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration, 1986 Foreign Ministers Declaration, 1991 Council Resolution, 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, and the Constitution for Europe. The Charter of Fundamental Rights makes these principles explicit with its Title IV on solidarity, including workers, family, health and social security rights.

The particular EU interpretation of this value is the principle of social solidarity. The extensive understanding of social solidarity became clear as the objectives of Article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe referred to ‘balanced economic growth, [and] a social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’, combating ‘social exclusion’, as well as promoting ‘social justice and protection’, inter-generational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and between) member states. The principle of social solidarity goes beyond inner-EU relations to inform and shape EU development and trade policies as Article I-3 also illustrates when it refers to the Union’s contribution to ‘solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty’.

**Sustainable development**

The eighth EU value is sustainable development – a commitment to ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland 1987: 5). This commitment, and the difficulties of reconciling economic and environmental interests, has evolved slowly since the initial 1972 declaration by heads of member states on Europe’s environment (Baker 1997: 92). The December 1988 Declaration on the Environment, the June 1990 Declaration on the Environmental Imperative, and the Treaty on European Union all contributed to the codification of the value of sustainable development in the Fifth Action Programme on the Environment and Sustainable Development (Manners 2000b: 77).

The particular EU interpretation of this value involves an emphasis on the duel problems of balance and integration. The EU principle of sustainable development is intended to provide a balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis: ‘it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development’ (preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and ‘shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth’ (Article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe). In parallel, the principle also involves the integration, or mainstreaming, of sustainable development into the policies and activities of the Union (Articles II-97 and III-119 of the Constitution for Europe). The EU seeks to promote these principles of sustainable development beyond Europe through its enlargement, development, trade, environmental and foreign policies (Articles I-3 and III-292 of the Constitution for Europe).

Good governance

The ninth EU value is good governance – the provision of open, participatory and democratic governance without creating hierarchical, exclusionary and centralised government. Good governance is the most recent value to develop within the EU, specifically reflecting its external promotion through enlargement and development policies, and the concerns of internal accountability and democracy within the EU. The value has its origins in the dual concerns for encouraging stable institutions through the accession process (1993 Copenhagen Criteria) and the international spread of human rights, democracy and development through good governance (1991 Council Resolution).

The particular EU interpretation of this value emphasises quality, representation, participation, social partnership, transparency and accountability in ‘the democratic life of the Union’ (Constitution for Europe). The EU principle of good governance has two distinctive elements that have both significant internal and external consequences – the participation of civil society and the strengthening of multilateral cooperation. Since the Commission Presidency of Romano Prodi, 1999–2004, significant emphasis has been placed on the promotion of good governance through the participation of civil society in order to encourage openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate democratic participation (Articles I-47 and I-50 of the Constitution for Europe). In parallel, the unilateral invasion of Iraq has ensured that member states have strengthened their commitments to the promotion of ‘an international system based on
stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ (Article III-292 of the Constitution for Europe).

The complex interaction of these nine values and principles is constitutive of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world. Figure 2.9 illustrates the pyramid of the EU values and principles motivating and mediating the Union’s external actions.

**European Union self-images**

To conclude the chapter I would like to reflect on three views that help to characterise the complex and often contradictory European Union self-images, as constituted by the five European perspectives and nine EU values and principles. I think it is important to note the extent to which these three views reflect European ‘co-integration’ (a mixture of intergovernmental cooperation and supranational integration) through which ‘the EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance which transcends Westphalian norms’ (Manners 2000b: 28; 2002: 240). The first article of the Constitution for Europe, Article I-1 ‘Establishment of the Union’, reflected this intertwining of cosmopolitan politics (a union of citizens), supranational politics (a union of states) and state politics (member states confer competence) thus:

Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.
In order to capture this hybridity I will call these three views state Europe, supranational Europe, and cosmopolitan Europe. State Europe is a self-image of the EU as being constructed from liberal-democratic member states who choose to confer competence on the Union. Taking a positive view, the self-image of state Europe is one where member states are the bearers of Kantian civil constitutions and thus democracy, as well as French republican values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité. However, taking a negative view, the self-image of state Europe is one where the EU is viewed as being responsible for ‘the decline of European nation-states as principles of economic and political organisation’:

The project of European unification has in fact triggered a wave of reactions that are simultaneously anti-European and racist. As Stuart Hall put it, the great resistance against European union, as well as American suspicion of it, is a defensive response to a process of effective overcoming of the very idea and reality of European nation-states.

(Griffin and Braidotti 2002: 11)

Supranational Europe is a self-image of the EU as a union of states representing the Kantian pacific federation (foedus pacificum), as well as the supranational incarnation of European identity:

A complex set of deeply historical values issuing from the Greco-Latin synthesis, a constellation of ideas about the rights and obligations of human beings that emerged from the Renaissance, and a set of politico-moral principles that served as the motor for the American and French Revolutions.

(Burgess 2002: 467)

Zygmunt Bauman refers to supranational Europe as being driven by the ‘logic of local retrenchment’ in which the EU ‘stems the tide’ of globalisation by ‘reconstructing at the Union level the legal-institutional web which in the past held together the “national economy” within the boundaries of a nation-state’s territorial sovereignty – but no longer does’ (Bauman 2004: 136).

Cosmopolitan Europe is a self-image of the EU as a union of people promoting the Kantian cosmopolitan rights of hospitality to strangers, common rights to the earth’s surface, and universal community (Kant 1991: 105–106). In this respect the cosmopolitan self-image is one in which the EU constitutes a decisive break with all previous political and legal history:

Cosmopolitan Europe was consciously conceived and launched after the Second World War as the political antithesis to a nationalistic Europe and the physical and moral devastation that had emerged from it. Cosmopolitan Europe was founded as something that struggles morally, politically, historically, and economically for reconciliation.

(Beck 2003: 33–34)
In contrast to the logic of local retrenchment in supranational Europe, Bauman describes cosmopolitan Europe as being driven by the ‘logic of global responsibility’ in which the EU seeks ‘lasting and truly effective solutions to the planet-wide problems . . . through the renegotiation and reform of the web of global interdependencies and interactions’ (Bauman 2004: 137).

Figure 2.10 illustrates these three self-images, and the political beliefs which differentiate them.

European Union self-images lie somewhere among the views identified above. State Europe has a tendency to promote a state-centric worldview often characterised by pluralist approaches towards the rest of the world. As Knud Erik Jørgensen explains in the next chapter, pluralists believe that a diversity of states constitute international society. The relationships between Europe and the UN are a good example of state European self-images – a desire to develop international society sometimes hindered by ‘national interests’. Supranational Europe has a tendency to promote regional integration as a worldview sometimes characterised by the prioritisation of European concerns in relations with the rest of the world. The debates and concerns over the creation of a ‘fortress Europe’ serve as a good example of the complexities of a supranational European self-image. Cosmopolitan Europe has a tendency to promote globalism as a worldview that may be characterised by ‘the role of the European Union as a promoter of norms which displace the state as the centre of concern’ (Manners 2002: 235–236). This globalist outlook towards ‘solidarism’ (an emphasis on universalist rights) is sometimes weakened by the international legal framework which tends to be dominated by ‘pluralism’ (an emphasis on particularist rights, usually held with respect to the state). The role of Europe in negotiating international legal instruments such as the WTO, the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court all serve as examples of a cosmopolitan self-image.

![Figure 2.10 European Union self-images](image_url)
All five European perspectives, and nine EU values and principles, can be discerned as playing a constitutive role in shaping the EU as a hybrid polity, as well as EU self-images and EU relations with the rest of the world. Hence, EU values and principles such as democracy, liberty, and equality are to be found in the common practices of the EU member states. EU values and principles such as peace are to be found in the supranational practices of the Union itself. EU values and principles such as human rights, sustainable development, and social solidarity are to be found in the cosmopolitan practices of the EU hybrid polity in world politics. Finally, EU values and principles such as the rule of law and good governance are to be found in the combination and interaction of these three EU self-images – state, supranational and cosmopolitan.

Finally, I will end with a simple but critical warning – any and all of the values and principles discussed in this chapter are not uniquely European, and neither is Europe. Claims I have made about relative EU attachment to a particular combination of values and principles largely reflect fairly recent (post-World War, post-Cold War) practices and constructions that can be undone as quickly as they have been achieved. Furthermore, as Edward Said and Shirin Ebadi have spent their lives reminding us, all human beings share universal values such as human rights, justice, and dignity, as participants in the building of the perpetual peace of humanity, something we should never forget (Triggs 2003, UNHDR 2004: 23).