

## Security Expertise after Securitization: Coping with Dilemmas of Engaging with Practice

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### ***Abstract***

The end of the cold war saw several security analysts pose the question of whether academic security analysis was “actually part of the solution or part of the problem”, contributing more to the manufacturing of insecurity and threats than it did to ‘de-securitizing’ contemporary politics. A normative dilemma was formulated: “how to write or speak about security, when security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs, and so forth”. Analysts have shown, for instance, how the discipline of strategic studies helped construct the language of nuclear politics and define its universe of the thinkable. 1990s constructivists sought to show that the end of the cold war was influenced by the proliferation of new strategic thought, and contemporary empirical studies stress how security professionals manufacture insecurity. Given this evidence it seems a dangerous business to do security research. The sharp distinction between theory and practice - which left theory in an ivory tower detached from the world of practice - is replaced by a ‘field of power’ encompassing theory-practice-policy. In this field, questions of the potential political role of the analyst become central. But, how to be a security expert in the face of the ‘normative dilemma’? Answers to this question have been almost absent from debates. Problematizations of the role of the analyst have become widespread, but solutions have been scarce. This paper tries to fill this gap by developing three positions/practices available to the security analyst ‘after securitization’. These are; first, the notion of the ‘organic intellectual’ based on (Neo-) Gramscian thought; second, the concept of the ‘collective intellectual’ developed from the work of Bourdieu; and third, the vision of an ‘ironist’ inspired by the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey . The paper introduces the core dilemmas analysts face, and proceeds to discuss the different answers the three ideal types suggest. Equipped with these ideal types, the security intellectual will have tools to contemplate his/her position towards the world of practice and un-intended securitization may be minimized.

***Keywords:*** Security expertise; Intellectuals; Practical reflexivity; Gramsci; Bourdieu; Rorty

## 1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War saw several security analysts question whether academic security studies was 'actually part of the solution or part of the problem' Did security analysis produce more insecurity and new threats? Or did analysts take part in 'de-securitizing' contemporary politics? These questions remain highly relevant in the field of security. Historical studies have documented how deeply the discipline's history is intertwined with security politics, and have clarified that neither Cold War history nor the development and 'disciplinaryization' of security studies can only be meaningfully understood if investigated together/in parallel. Throughout the Second World War, close links between government, civilians and academics were formed. Within the new and unprecedented context of the nuclear stand-off there was considerable interest, especially in the United States, in bringing to bear social scientific analysis for the policies of the Cold War (Grey 2009). The development of the Prisoner's Dilemma in game theory by the RAND Corporation – a model which seemingly fitted nuclear scenarios and their modelling well - is just one well-known example of this trend. Another major invention consisted in models derived from economics to enable defence systems and planning (Smoke, 1975: 290–93). Security studies contributed to the development of operations research and logistical techniques. In other words, security studies helped construct the language of nuclear politics and define its universe of the thinkable (e.g. Klein 1994).

Moreover, the entanglement between analysis and policy was not just a post-world war II phenomenon. For some scholars the end of the Cold War was directly related (if not even caused) by the proliferation of new strategic thought by expert communities (Risse-Kappen 1994, Adler 1992). Also the study of contemporary issues – such as the securitization of migration (Bigo 2002, 2007), the contemporary human security discourse (Gaspers 2005), European Union Security and Defence policy (Mérand 2008) or transatlantic security (Villumsen 2008) – reveal heavy integration of security theory and practice.

There is thus ample evidence for intensive exchanges between academics and security practitioners on various levels and in different points in time. It seems safe to conclude that contributions by security scholars make a difference to public policy-making in all its stages (agenda-setting, formulation and implementation) including the constitutive level. Hence, the much-debated 'gap' between theory and policy, which the discipline of International Relations (IR) is often so concerned about (George 1994, Eriksson and Sundelius 2005) is to a large extent a misrepresentation. Rather than living a quiet life on one side of a gap, security scholarship is an active player in a field of security which encompasses both theory and practice. This fact begs us to ponder about the *consequences* of academic practices rather than mourn the detachment and irrelevance of ivory tower scholarship.

A range of studies argue that scientific knowledge and scholarly policy interventions can have hazardous consequences: they risk contributing to the escalation of violence, discrimination, exclusion or marginalization and legitimizing cuts in individual liberty. Further, they potentially limit policy options and hinder adequate problem solving. These consequences are neither always intended, nor steerable.

Recent scholarship has responded by arguing that this might be avoided if more reflexive modes of research replace objectivism and technical-rational epistemologies and methodologies. As a contribution to this debate, for instance, Huysmans (2002a), suggests that reflexivism/constructivism inevitably leads security scholars into a normative dilemma: How security can be studied if it risks producing securitization processes one wants to criticize and avoid.

Constructivist research practices help identify and problematize the interplay between academia and politics and the ensuing conceptualization of the nature of scholarship as an inescapable *factor* in the (social) construction of reality. However, they do not present a solution to the problems of un-intended consequences, nor do they factor scholarship in as a situated *actor* in social reality. A dilemma has been formulated, but how to actually master this dilemma remains understudied.

In this paper we attempt to fill this void. We suggest that everyday problems of scholars - such as the normative dilemma - require scholars to take a stance that can be described as 'practical reflexivity'. The notion of practical reflexivity highlights (in contrast to other notions of reflexivity), that reflexivity should take other aspects into consideration than immediate practices of research. Practical reflexivity directs our attention to the positioning of an actor towards others in (everyday) practice and the consequences such a position may have, e.g. for unwanted securitization. Hence, the reach of reflexivity is extended beyond the realm of the scientific field and not restricted to practices of research (questioning assumptions, pre-conditions and power relations).

The notion of practical reflexivity is central for our argument, but in itself it does little to master the normative dilemma as well as other dilemmas. Ways of practicing reflexivity and positioning the security researcher need to be identified. We suggest that ideal types for engaging with practice, which can be condensed from political philosophy and social theory can assist us in this regard. Three of these ideal types which consider scholarship both as a factor and as an actor in the construction of the social, will be introduced and discussed in the following: That is, first, the notion of the 'organic intellectual' based on (Neo-)Gramscian thought; second, the concept of the 'collective intellectual' developed from the work of Pierre Bourdieu; and third, the vision of an 'ironist', inspired by Pragmatist philosophy, notably John Dewey and Richard Rorty. We argue that these three provide us with productive outlines of how to practice practical reflexivity and interrogate the positioning of the academic. These three

lines of reasoning are already familiar to security studies debates and are explicitly or implicitly employed by security studies scholars. Gramsci's organic intellectual has been embraced by scholars such as Ken Booth and Wyn Jones. Bourdieu's thoughts are visible in the work of e.g. Huysmans (2002b) and Williams (2007) and his vision of the collective intellectual can be said to have been employed by the case collective (C.A.S.E. 2006). Traces of the pragmatists' ironist can be found in the writings of proponents of securitization theory (see section 4). Yet, while these thoughts have already influenced security studies practice, the underlying understandings of practical reflexivity and the positional consequences following from it have never been fully developed and researched. With the discussion in this paper, we intend to equip the security studies scholar with tools to better that situation. With a range of ideal types which can work as a systematization of how the scholar is positioned vis-à-vis the world of practice we hope to contribute to heightened practical reflexivity and an ensuing minimization of un-intended securitization.

The article is structured as follows. Section two sets the scene for discussing policy involvement in the field of security. We discuss why we should be especially concerned about reflexivity towards self-positioning in this field. We suggest that there is a broad agreement in philosophy and social theory that practical reflexivity is constitutive of critical and/or ethically responsible scholarship, notably among the authors that contemporary critical security studies draws on. The need for reflexivity has been widely acknowledged. Yet, (with minor exceptions) scholars have either seen reflexivity as referring to practices of research alone (limited to questions of methodology, epistemology or ontology). Or they have merely argued for reflexivity from a detached epistemological viewpoint without suggesting how it might be implemented and practiced.

We proceed in section three in discussing what we consider to be the crucial issues that require reflexive thinking. We identify a number of dilemmas that the security analyst faces. While there are many difficulties involved in the relation between academia and society, we suggest focusing on four especially pertinent dilemmas, which can be dubbed the *truth dilemma*, the *autonomy/relevance dilemma*, the *(non-)steerability of knowledge dilemma*, and the *security dilemma 2.0*. We suggest that these are 'dilemmas' in the sense that they present the researcher with the choice of two (or more) alternatives (or 'horns'), neither of which are favourable<sup>1</sup>. We thus understand the dilemmas as thorny problematiques escaping

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<sup>1</sup> Oed.com defines a rhetorical dilemma as: "A form of argument involving an adversary in the choice of two (or, *loosely*, more) alternatives, either of which is (or appears) equally unfavourable to him". See also the discussion in Booth and Wheeler 2008:3-4.

easy solutions. While these problematiques will differ over distinct spatio-temporal situations, and hence require tailored solutions, we should nonetheless seek more general directions and guidelines enabling us to identify fitting practices across contexts.

To develop such guidelines and practices we turn in section four to social theory and introduce and discuss what we call three ideal types for developing practical reflexivity. As mentioned, we discuss the organic intellectual, the collective intellectual and the ironist. We briefly introduce the three, discuss their underlying understanding of the relation between science, society and politics and address how they (might) suggest approaching the identified dilemmas. We conclude by suggesting that the three can be understood as a spectrum of choices for the researcher. A case can be made for both eclectically choosing tools across the three, and for the selection of one ideal type. Either way, we argue, practical reflexivity is advanced.

The reflexive ideas implied by these three lines of thought will not be institutionalized or widely practiced in the near future. As we summarize in section five, the responsible scholar can, however, incorporate as a minimum a range of reflexive questions in her everyday expert life. We sum up by suggesting some of those questions.

## **2. (Critical) Security Studies and Practical Reflexivity**

What we know today as critical (contemporary) security studies (or New European Security Theory - NEST) is a project launched as a critique of the state-centrism of traditional security studies, its objectivist understanding of security, and the close ties between security studies and security agencies. Roughly fifteen years after the publication of seminal volumes, such as *On Security* (Lipschutz 1995) or *Critical Security Studies* (Krause and Williams 1997) the critical or constructivist ‘rebellion’ is (at least in Europe) well institutionalized in the academic landscape (with the protagonists holding professorships or running their own institutes), and has (together with the broader movement in social science) managed to turn constructivist and reflexive ideas into acceptable (intelligible) research (signified by publications in leading journals such as *International Studies Quarterly* or the *European Journal of International Relations* and by major research grants e.g. from the EU). Moreover, some of the lead protagonists are widely recognized as experts and involved in several policy processes (e.g. Keith Krause, Didier Bigo).

It could be argued, that to some degree critical security studies scholars have become what they once criticized and rebelled against. Yet, such a claim would be misleading because scholars still aim at maintaining a high degree of reflexivity (e.g. Krause and Jütersonke 2005). This is clearly signified in the ongoing research practices of the first generation, as well as their students and followers – the second generation (C.A.S.E Collective 2006). First and second generation scholars continue to interrogate the assumptions, power effects and exclusionary tensions of contemporary security fields by relying on reflexive research methods such as discourse analysis and philosophical reasoning.

However, there seems to be a considerable gap in the reflexive practice of the critical security studies sub-discipline. Scholars do engage in reflexive practices of researching. Yet, they hardly ever contemplate the position of their own sub-discipline and its actors towards politics, bureaucracy, society and the media. There is certainly some awareness for the need to be reflexive towards the position of the discipline in its practical environment. This reflexivity is, however, seldom practiced on a collective level or made explicit in publications or presentations.

Such an observation is surprising in at least two regards: Firstly, criticizing the political practices of security studies scholars was crucial in the establishment of critical security studies and its identity. The academic movement has seemingly forgotten some of the lessons learnt in criticizing the policy involvement by ‘traditionalists’ and has refrained from using it to be reflexive on the own policy contributions. Secondly, the major theoretical sources and inspirations on which the critical security studies project draws – such as the works of authors such as Heidegger, Foucault, Habermas or Bourdieu – all agree that reflexivity towards the positioning of research is constitutive of critical and ethically responsible social science.

In the following we first briefly review how the critique of traditional security studies involvement unfolded and, second consider arguments for practical reflexivity from some of the current philosophical/theoretical origins of the critical security studies project.

### 2.1. *Critique of traditional security studies’ policy involvement and research practices*

Security studies institutionalized itself as a merger of several disciplines such as military history, law, economics, or psychology, and was a response to the problem of ordering a post-World War II world. What Wæver and Buzan (2007) dub the “Golden Age of Security Studies”, saw research that was both theoretically innovative (for instance the development and application of rational choice or cybernetic approaches), and directly used in policy planning. Yet, since this golden age, security studies faced

recurrent waves of criticism, which directly address issues of the political consequences of security scholarship. The majority of such critique came in two versions: one external and one internal.

First, the models and applications developed by traditional security studies scholars were conceived as a crucial factor for understanding policy failure. For instance, the violent escalation of the Vietnam War based on cybernetic modelling was taken as an indicator of the problematic role of analysts, and security studies scholars were held (partly) responsible for the failure of the policies and strategies. This critique came primarily from the outside of security studies and led to the establishment and strengthening of alternative projects such as peace research (see e.g. Guzzini 2004; Guzzini and Jung 2004). Secondly, in the late 1980s a distinct critical perspective established itself inside the security studies project, making critique endemic. This critical movement can be seen as part of a larger trend in the discipline of IR.

The idea of a critical social science as a distinct practice and the meaning of 'being critical' in both IR and security studies were arguably established by the seminal articles of Robert Cox (1981) and Richard Ashley (1987). Both articles continue to be widely cited and form part of the core curriculum of IR and security studies. Both authors argued that reflexivity makes critical research practice distinct, and suggested that this entails reflecting on the assumptions and social position of scholarship. Ashley criticized scholars for being participants in a field, sharing the assumptions of politicians and relying on a technical-instrumental rationality which divided the world into an inside/outside the state. For Ashley, critical scholarship was therefore a practice of questioning theoretical assumptions and rationalities on the one hand, but it also meant to question in which field of meaning the scholar participates and how he relates to this field. Cox argued in a similar vein that the divide between what he called "problem solving theory" and "critical theory" can be seen in the degree of reflexivity towards the researcher's own standpoints and assumptions.

"It is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problemsolving theory accepts as its parameters."  
(Cox 1981:129)

The critical movement implied two moves of differentiating between critical and other research. Firstly critical research was understood to be more reflexive towards the process of theorizing, and secondly,

critical researchers were conceived as those who can step outside of (do not participate in) the field of meaning occupied by policymakers.

Security studies scholars followed this line of reasoning. As is a well-known story, this firstly meant questioning the notion of national security; broadening and widening the concept, and turning the actions making something a matter of security into an object of investigation. Furthermore, the practices of (traditional) security studies practitioners were turned into an object of investigation by e.g. securitization theory. And indeed it was argued that scholarship stands in a constitutive relation to policy-making as it provides the knowledge and vocabulary of security politics.

With the critical movement scrutinizing more and more the role of knowledge and language in the constitution of security, the critique of security expertise followed logically. Academics, scholars, analysts or experts are in contemporary security studies conventionally conceptualised as securitizing agency. With the work of scholars drawing on field analysis such as Didier Bigo (2002, 2007), the focus has moved to the collaborations between experts and security bureaucracy. (Experts largely defined as actors based in organizations authorized by knowledge, such as think tanks or the analytical units of international organizations.) To Bigo and those relying on his work, bureaucracies and experts weave a common field of meaning and constitute the main parts in the machinery of securitization. While the initial case has been the securitization of migration, this type of critique of technocratic modes of policy-making is becoming more widespread, expanding for instance to the study of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In sum, the notion of reflexivity became crucial in the renewal of security studies in at least three regards. It was the main device to winnow out ‘critical’ from other approaches to security; it presented the tool to study and to criticize the role of (traditional) security academics as actors in politics; and it allowed a focus on the role of knowledge as a factor in security practice. Overall, critical security studies scholars claimed reflexivity for themselves, while they saw a lack of such thinking in the work on security of others.

## 2.2. *Reflexivity and Social Science*

As ethno-methodologist Michael Lynch (2000) rightfully reminds us, reflexivity is not limited to science and is neither an academic virtue nor a source of privileged knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Instead, it is a core feature of

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<sup>2</sup> “Reflexivity is not an epistemological, moral or political virtue. It is an unavoidable feature of the way actions (including actions performed, expressions written, by academic researchers) are performed, made sense of and incorporated into social settings. In this sense of the word, it is impossible to be unreflexive.” (Michael Lynch 2000: 27)

acting and crucial in any form of social knowledge. In this sense it is impossible to be un-reflexive (Lynch 2000). The argument of critical security scholars, hence, needs to be understood as an argument for distinct forms of reflexivity.

If we turn to the notions of reflexivity that are employed in critical security studies, then these can be summarized as originating in post-linguistic turn thinking. These notions of reflexivity centrally entail a consideration of the contingency of meanings and vocabularies *and* a questioning of the social positioning of scientific projects and its consequences. From a linguistic turn perspective, we can refer to reflexivity – in contrast to reflectivity<sup>3</sup> -- as the process of questioning the pre-conditions and assumptions of our actions. It is to ask what knowledge conditions action. Generally, for theorists this means to be sensitive to the limits language and structures of meaning pose on thinking and acting. In rejecting a foundationalist understanding of language and emphasising its historical and contingent character, reflexive thinking entails the deconstruction of discourse that provide subject positions and pre-conditions action.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, knowledge is not exclusively a discursive phenomenon. Meaning is provided in and through practice. In their reception of linguistic turn theorizing, IR as well as security scholars have often sidelined this aspect (Neumann 2002, Pouliot 2008, Villumsen 2008). If practice is a crucial source of meaning and knowledge, reflexivity requires a focus that goes beyond discourse and considers practice. To highlight the importance of practice, theorists speak of ‘practical reflexivity’. Practical reflexivity considers the importance of representations (structures, discourses and systems of meaning), but emphasizes that any knowledge only becomes intelligible in its enactment in practice. Hence reflexivity entails not only a questioning of abstract pre-conditions, assumptions or taken-for-granted rules underlying actions (discourse), but is centrally a critical examination of practice and how one practice relates to the other. Cunliffe and Jun (2005: 227) provide a valid summary of such a notion of reflexivity: “In particular, it means engaging in the reflexive act of questioning the basis of our thinking, surfacing the taken-for-granted rules underlying organizational decisions, and examining critically our own practices and ways of relating with others.”

Especially the issue of ‘relating with others’ has been largely absent from the critical security studies project. A quick look at the sociology of knowledge may help remedy this. Overall, sociologists of

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<sup>3</sup> ”Reflection is traditionally defined as a mirror image—an objectivist ontology based on the idea that there is an original reality we can think about and separate ourselves from.” (Cunliffe and Jun 2005:226)

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Laclau and Mouffe (1985).

science study the practices of science and how they ‘hang together’ with social settings and interests. Some thinkers have focused on how science contributes to the construction of society *tout court* (Giddens), while others have highlighted how the interconnectedness of theory and reality risks creating bias in the research results. The works of Karl Mannheim and Ludwik Fleck belong to this debate, as does the more recent work of Giddens<sup>5</sup>, Bhaskar, Bourdieu and Latour. Latour, for instance, argues that the *production of truth* is tied to a web of practice or an *assemblage* (Latour 1987; 2005; Schatzki 2002). In this web of practice, scientists reduce uncertainty about their results by employing traditional scientific practices (statistics etc.), but also by creating relations with laypersons and politicians who become involved and interested in the results. The production of truth is, thus, a process in which social relations play a role. Bhaskar offers another example; his take on the science/society relationship is condensed in the title of his book *From Science to Emancipation* (Bhaskar 2002). Science holds the promise of the “elimination of unwanted and unnecessary determinations” (Bhaskar 2002: 172). Science can help (socially) engineer problems away. It can help eliminate “all the structures of oppression which are currently hurtling the planet into crisis and into the very real possibility of an early demise” (Ibid.: 173).

Pierre Bourdieu provides a particularly useful account of the role of science and the concept of practice. He holds that science and its object of study are reflexively connected and that social reality is organised in fields. “...Bourdieu takes the conventional argument that science has a ‘feedback effect’ on social reality a step further. In his work he insists heavily on the role played by academia in the (re)production of social hierarchies” (Leander 2002: 605). In making this argument, Bourdieu argues for practical reflexivity. :

"Practical reflexivity can take on its full force only if the analysis of the implications and presuppositions of the routine operations of scientific practice is taken further into a genuine critique (in Kant's sense) of the social conditions of possibility and the limits of the forms of thought that the scientist ignorant of those conditions unwittingly engages in his research and which, unknown to him, that is to say, in his place, perform the most specifically scientific operations, such as the construction of the object of science." (Bourdieu, 2004: 90)

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<sup>5</sup> Giddens argued that a process of structuration whereby actors are both structured by – and help reconstruct – the structure of social life, lay at the heart of modernity. Social scientists’ analyses could contribute to the construction of social reality through a process of “double hermeneutic” (Giddens 1984: 374). Giddens zoomed in on the relationship between lay and scientific language. “...there is a constant ‘slippage’ from one to the other involved in the practice of the social sciences” (Giddens 1984: 374). Hacking (1999) calls this process the ‘looping-effect’: the categories we use for classifying/naming people interact with their self-conception (see also Guzzini 2005).

Practical reflexivity provides us with a concept which has at its centre the relation of scientific knowledge production practices towards other practices. It suggests that reflexivity is a much richer challenge than a questioning of theoretical/research procedures. Reflexivity entails the questioning of what constitutes scientific practice, and how the many practices of the scientist, ranging from classical questions of theory, epistemology and methodology to funding, teaching, writing, presenting, or advisory practices relate to the world of practice.<sup>6</sup> This points in exactly the direction we want to push the debate on reflexivity in IR and security studies, and will therefore function as a stepping stone in this paper: That reflexivity should take into account both knowledge as a factor and knowledge as an actor – and that these two dimensions should always also be directed against one’s own research and social position

### 2.3. *The State of the Debate in Security Studies*

Rightfully it can be said that contemporary Security Studies are widely based on post-linguistic turn theorizing. In what way have researchers incorporated the notions of reflexivity sketched above? As is well documented in recent state of the art articles and contemporary textbooks on security studies, scholars have widely adopted ideas of reflexivity. Yet, reflexivity has been narrowed down to reflexivity towards theory and methodology. There is much debate on concepts, definitions, ontology and epistemology. There is much debate and research on scientists once they have been objectified and become the ‘others’. Suggestions or observable acts of questioning the own position, the ‘self’ and the position of science in society seem less part of the core curriculum.

In other words, the practices of scholars not seen as affiliated to the critical security studies project remain a constant object of research. The debate on the positioning the critical security studies project appears limited to some suggestions in introductions or concluding sections of monographs (Wyn Jones 2001, Campbell 1992, Buzan, Wæver and Jaap de Wilde 1998), Huysman’s 2002a article and a debate organized around an article by Johan Eriksson (Eriksson 1999; Goldmann 1999; Wæver 1999; Williams 1999).

The main focus of these contributions has been twofold: Firstly, the question of which discourses scholarship should address/contribute to and which fields of meaning scholars should relate to. And secondly, the question of whether and how scholar’s can take responsibility for their actions. Phrased otherwise, the debate is not only relatively restricted in terms of time and (publication) space devoted,

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<sup>6</sup> For an overview of theorizing on reflexivity and practical reflexivity see Schlichte 2007.

but also fairly abstract and normative, rather than empirically grounded or contextualized as referring to distinct problematic situations.

The debate on which discourses critical security scholarship should address or which actors scholars should relate to, has largely focused on whether scholars should address ‘those in power’. Scholars such as Wyn Jones, Booth or Bigo suggest that the primary target of security scholars expertise should be NGO or media representatives to encounter hegemonic understandings of security issues. Wyn Jones (1999: 6) has called for eschewing ‘the temptations of seeking the ears of soldiers and statesmen’ altogether and instead focusing on the development of counter-hegemonic positions linked to emancipatory social movements. Scholars, affiliated with the Copenhagen school’s version of securitization, rather intend to assist policymakers in reflexive practice with the objective of increasing responsible decision-making. Here the interplay between more radical outsider forces and scholars directly addressing policymakers is highlighted. Change from such a position usually comes about through the interplay between anti-establishment/radical/extra-parliamentarian challengers that move the boundaries of the possible and the rearticulation of ‘reasonable’ analysis and praxis by those who in the most general sense are part of the elite (see Wæver 1989).<sup>7</sup> In this line Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998: 34–35, 204–206) argue that three options are open to the analyst who wishes to avoid sustaining or deepening the securitization process: (1) the analyst can stop speaking about the threat and hope that this will work as a desecuritizing process, avoiding the adoption of the agenda of the securitizing actor; (2) the analyst can divert attention to another threat; and (3) the analyst can contribute to a different interpretation of the threat being securitized through the analysis.

In this section we discussed why there is a need for reflexivity, and what kinds of reflexivity researchers in the security studies field have incorporated in their practice. As we demonstrated, there has been wide critique on the role and consequences of researchers in political practice. Yet this critique did not translate in a more widespread routine of questioning the position of researchers (in their own practices). Critical approaches to security have remained relatively silent about the role and the place of the researcher in the political process, too often confining their position to a series of general statements about the impossibility of objectivist science.

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<sup>7</sup> The only empirical study so far, which does not differentiate between critical and non-critical security scholars suggests that international organizations are the prime collaborator of academics, while media comes in second (Mallin and Latham 2001).

### 3. Dilemmas

Practical reflexivity is at the heart of constructivist, critical and ethically responsible scholarship. We suggested that contemporary security studies have practiced this kind of reflexivity in its full spectrum only in reference to their predecessors, traditional pre-1990s security studies. Reflexivity on own practices have been sparse and remain on the level of abstract reasoning or vague proposals. In other words security studies have been more concerned about the foreign ‘Other’ (traditional security studies) than about the ‘Self’.

In this section we ponder about a range of practical problems that require reflexivity (Huysman’s formulation of the normative dilemma being one of them). Our perspective is based on a constructivist and critical ‘theory of practice’ (e.g. Schatzki et al 2001). A theory of practice perspective foregrounds practical reflexivity and suggests that academics are connected in multiple ways with other types of agency. Further, science is first and foremost considered a social practice (Büger and Gadinger 2007). In the context of this article, this means that academic *and* security practice are interpreted as ‘fields of practice’. How these fields ‘hang together’ (interact) and relate to other fields therefore becomes a central research question for a practice theory (Büger and Villumsen 2007).

Apart from building on practice theory, we also base our discussion on results from (practice-theoretical) investigations in science studies. Science studies, a discipline only seldom recognized in security studies and IR (Wæver 1998, Büger and Gadinger 2007, Büger 2007), has made several observations which are relevant for security studies. Crucially, these are the identification of a series of dynamics - such as the demystification of the sciences, the failure of policy-oriented sciences to live up to its promises, new trends in education policy (e.g. new managerialism and privatization), the professionalization of the sciences, and a more general transformation of contemporary societies (e.g. medialization or globalization).<sup>8</sup> These major transformations in the relation between the field of science and other fields have a bearing on the relationship between the theory and practice of security.

On the basis of this perspective, we identify and discuss a set of ‘thorny dilemmas’ or ‘problematiques’ in the following. These escape easy solutions, but are of high relevance and require attention beyond merely stating them. In addition to formulating the dilemmas, we shall therefore argue that distinct coping strategies are needed. We end the section by summarizing the challenges for coping strategies that follow from the issues raised in this section (see table 1). This summation enables us to formulate demands for the ‘ideal types for engaging with practice’ we present in section four.

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<sup>8</sup> See the useful overview of these tendencies in Gibbons et al (2002) and Weingart (2001).

### 3.1. *The truth dilemma*

When Foucault (1980: 126-127) announced the passing of the ‘universal intellectual’ who “spoke on and was acknowledged the right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice” he gave a voice to the dilemma which we dub, in lack of a better term, the “truth dilemma”.

Scientific authority has since modernity rested on a notion of the truth. Scientists are the representatives of the factual. Yet if a social science discipline, such as major parts of critical security studies (notably those drawing on different versions of post-structuralism) maintains that truth is not a meaningful concept and embraces relativist notions, how can a scientist successfully intervene in the world of practice in any meaningful way? Given the place of science in society will the researcher not always have to rely on a status as the representative of truth to gain an authoritative voice, or even be heard?

The ‘truth dilemma’ thus consists in whether anyone is interested at all in analyses that do not claim to speak the truth? Do policymakers even care to listen when a researcher is not speaking in the name of truth? And - as the other horn of the dilemma - given that the public authority of science relies precisely on the idea of science speaking in the name of truth, how can scholars cope with a situation where they cannot claim to speak the ‘truth’ but are forced to do so by their exoteric communities? What strategies are left for the intellectual when universality and truth no longer function as a platform from where to speak ‘truth to power’, but where it is still demanded by the world of practice?

### 3.2. *The autonomy/relevance dilemma*

Autonomy is often seen as a prerequisite for producing knowledge that is not ‘tainted’ by various forms of interests (political, economic, status). But autonomy can lead to detachment and thus to a secluded life of irrelevance. The ivory tower is the often-mentioned picture of autonomous research with no relevance for the world of practice. So how to stay autonomous while at the same time increasing relevance?

If we take Bourdieu’s notion of a field as a starting point, scientists belong primarily to the scientific field and their scientific capital produced and accumulated in that field is not necessarily valued highly in other fields. In fact, Bourdieu held that science formed part of the most powerful class in society, but as a dominated sphere (Fisher 1990; Bourdieu 1988). There is thus a link between science and society, but according to Bourdieu, it is one of domination.

When an analyst seeks to intervene in say the security field, he has to adapt to the rules and power constellations dominating that field. He may try to convert his capital into valued capital in the field, but he does so at the risk of devaluing his standing in the scientific field where autonomy and ‘disinterestedness’ is still valued highly. The scientist thus risks a cross-pressure and loss of status when engaging with different fields.

This cross-pressure also concerns the extent to which not only the status of the researcher is involved but also the concrete research practices: to what extent does seeking relevance mean that research questions and methods are being altered by the interaction with the world of practice? Autonomy is to a certain extent a necessary precondition for conducting solid academic research, and deliberations with clients may undermine this autonomy.

### 3.3. *Non-steerability of knowledge dilemma*

Knowledge travels. But it does not travel as a coherent package insensitive to local contexts. Translation and interpretation is an integral part of the voyage of knowledge (Giddens’ (1984) double hermeneutic; Hacking’s (1999) looping effect). The more knowledge is recognized in a wider setting and the more it is adopted in local contexts, the more it carries the possibility/risk of being changed, misinterpreted or used against the initial intention of the researcher.

While an author can establish himself as an authority for a certain type of knowledge within what has been called the scientific field (Bourdieu 2004), the further the knowledge travels, enters new fields, the less the author and his community will be able to maintain authority and thus steer the interpretation and application of the findings. In other words, a powerful position in the scientific field does not necessarily translate into a powerful position in the field of politics, for instance. Non-steerability of knowledge is thus a problem of increasing degrees when knowledge leaves the scientific field and enters e.g the field of security (more on this below).<sup>9</sup>

This dynamic raises the question of the reach of the researcher’s responsibility. If scholars lack the capacity to steer the use of their knowledge and consequences cannot be anticipated, how can they take responsibility for that knowledge? To take it to the extreme, should one also be responsible for “that majority of the readings and usages that are misunderstandings?” (Wæver 1999: 336). Given the impossibility of directly steering interpretation and usage – especially when knowledge travels beyond the scientific field - a careful balancing is necessary between relevance and responsibility. For starters,

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<sup>9</sup> Wyn Jones (1995: 308) holds, however, that even if terms like common security and collective security “become debased in the usage of governments and military services, enough of the residual meaning survives...”

reflexive thinking and anticipation of consequences are required as an integral part of the research process.

But does this mean, like e.g. Aradau (2004) seems to argue, that if the right theoretical choices are made then a theory is ‘safe’? We would argue that although reflexivity at the level of meta-theory is important – in fact it is a prerequisite for critical theory - no theory will ever be ‘safe’ and that the most important – and hitherto overlooked – issue when it comes to increasing responsible scholarship lies not in nitty-gritty meta-theoretical issues but in practical reflexivity. To quote Ole Wæver at some length:

“What has become main-stream post-structuralism – especially in the UK – often ends up as a strange attempt to make one’s theory safe, to guarantee that it is politically ‘good’. But that can in my view never be achieved at this level. Only at two other levels: by engaging with concrete political struggles. And when doing this reflecting on whether your theory allows you to do this and thus how to shape a theory that enables the best political action. One might add a third layer, where you similarly reflected on meta-theory but then linked action-wise through the two previous levels, and this is so far not what happens.” (Wæver, unpublished manuscript 2009: 22)

Non-steerability of knowledge is a dilemma that involves no easy solutions. Either we stop producing knowledge (when it is not there, it does not need to be steered), or we steel our choices with practical reflexivity and hope for the best.

### 3.4. *The security dilemma 2.0*

As argued under the previous dilemmas, science and politics are related: When knowledge travels outside the bounds of the scientific field, the steerability of the knowledge decreases. And when researchers try to engage with the world of practice, their status and scientific standards may be under pressure.

What can be called the security dilemma 2.0 builds on these arguments, but stresses the process called securitization: The Copenhagen School of security theory argues that when employing the word ‘security’ something is done. Security is a label that risks spinning political processes out of control and leads to the legitimization of extreme measures (Buzan et al. 1998).<sup>10</sup> Following from this argument, Huysmans (2002a) formulated a normative dilemma of writing security: “How to write or speak about

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<sup>10</sup> This means that we use the term ‘security dilemma’ in a different way from the perception-based concept of Herz (1950). For a discussion see also Booth and Wheeler (2008).

security, when security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the *securitization* of migration, drugs, and so forth" (Huysmans 2002a: 43). The process of securitization did, in other words, not only apply to practical politics, but also to the research process.

The central question then becomes: When studying security, how does one avoid contributing to a process that may spin out of control? Is it possible to make security theory 'safe'? Or is the best alternative to stay silent? And – as the other horn of the dilemma – how can we legitimize *not* studying security and refrain from pointing to instances in which political processes are bordering on securitization (for example the coupling of immigration and security).<sup>11</sup>

If the securitization argument is accepted, the truth-dilemma, the non-steerability of knowledge dilemma and the autonomy/relevance dilemma may reach new highs when applied to the field of security. It is indeed a risky business to do security analysis in a world of securitization!

To take an example, which we have analysed in detail elsewhere (Büger and Villumsen 2007), the (benevolent) Democratic Peace Thesis underwent a securitization in the 1990s and ended up supporting both military interventions in the Middle East and NATO restructurings. Several contextual issues concerning practical reflexivity assisted in making the theory applicable and accepted in security politics. But the basic process of labelling something as a security issue spun consequences out of the realm (probably) not anticipated by the researchers.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.5. *Summary: Thorny Dilemmas*

The four problems discussed are core issues in the relation of academics to society. The problems are dilemmas in the sense that they present the researcher with the choice of two (or more) alternatives (or "horns"), neither of which are favourable<sup>13</sup>. Truth cannot be rejected and embraced at the same time, one cannot be relevant and maintain autonomy, any utterance has consequences, silence is no option and de-securitization moves may be securitizing.

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<sup>11</sup> Cp. the discussion on desecuritization in e.g. Wæver 1995.

<sup>12</sup> Cp. the discussion on academic responsibility Ish Shalom 2009

<sup>13</sup> Oed.com defines a rhetorical dilemma as: "A form of argument involving an adversary in the choice of two (or, *loosely*, more) alternatives, either of which is (or appears) equally unfavourable to him".

**Table 1: Four Dilemmas**

<b>Truth Dilemma</b>	<b>Autonomy/Relevance</b>	<b>Non-steerability of knowledge</b>	<b>Security Dilemma 2.0</b>
Poststructuralist notion of truth versus expectance from exoteric community	Autonomy in the production process as a validity marker of results/truth can marginalise relevance.	Knowledge has a life of its own and cannot be steered versus silence is not an option	Normative dilemma (Huysmans) How do avoid contributing to securitization? - versus how do we legitimate not studying security?
How do we preserve trust in knowledge when not claiming (universal truth)	Relevance can mean changed research practices or conclusions (cross-pressure)	Silence as an option?	Is silence an option?
What validity measures do we use? – and how do we communicate them to the world of practice?	Autonomy can mean that we are not ‘being heard’. We stay in the ivory tower.	Scientists have no power in political practice (i.e. they cannot correct misuses)	Voice/silence can both have alarming consequences.
Are experts traders in truth – or are they traders in the possible in complex situations?	Autonomy can mean that we do not help ‘those who suffer’	Scientific facts can be mobilised by practitioners	Benign research can turn out disastrous when coupled with the word security
	Relevance may entail that the researcher gets absorbed in a doxic understanding of the practice studied. (how do we remain critical?)	Responsibility of researcher yes/no?	All other dilemmas are exacerbated if we accept the validity of the security dilemma version 2.0
		Can a theory be ‘safe’ if it has the ‘right’ theoretical underpinnings?	

To speak of dilemmas is to suggest that there are no solutions to these problems. Yet, identifying them is a way to trigger reflexivity in everyday practice. The relevance and detailed character of these problems will differ over different actors, and distinct spatio-temporal situations, so the problems are not only intractable but also vary in their concrete expression. If there is variance and no “solution”, how may we be able to cope with them? While much will hang on individuals probing and experimenting, we suggest in the following to structure reflection around a set of what might be called ‘ideal types’ which can produce a set of common guidelines for researchers. Guidelines will not be translatable directly into practice, and even if institutionalized in one way or the other would not condition action. But with this set-up, we hope to provide a structure to the discussion on practical reflexivity for the future. In the succeeding section we discuss three ideal types.

#### 4. Organic, Collective and Ironic Coping Strategies?

Social theory is not short of proposals of what reflexivity may mean and how the philosopher may relate to society. In this section we discuss three of these proposals and suggest that we can treat them as ideal types of how to conceptualise of the relations between academia and society: (Neo-)Gramscian versions of the Organic Intellectual, Bourdieu's Collective Intellectual, and Rorty's Ironist. Overall, the intent of all three models is to increase *reflexivity* - though they understand different things by it: The goal of the Organic intellectuals is emancipation from hegemony; the goal of the Collective Intellectual is debunking *doxic* understandings through solid empirical research; and the goal of the Ironist is to enable public problem-solving through ironic interventions.

We discuss these three (and not others) for several reasons. First, they are all practice-theoretical and grounded in relational understandings of society and the political process. This provides us with the possibility of reviewing existing attempts to understanding the intellectual beyond philosophical meta-points and abstractions. Second, they consider knowledge as a collective phenomenon instead of as the property of individuals. Third, they take a stand on how the intellectual should and can *engage* with society. Fourth, all three are sensitive to how knowledge can work as power in various ways. Fifth, they have all been introduced in Security Studies literature<sup>14</sup>, but neither has a systematic discussion of them been carried out and nor have they been compared or contrasted in any systematic manner.

We discuss the three proposals in outlining their take on the intellectual; his/her relationship to social order; their theoretical underpinnings; and discuss what coping strategies to the dilemmas identified in section 3 they outline.

##### 4.1. *Organic Intellectual*

To Gramsci, "All men are intellectuals [...]: but not all men have in society the *function* of intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971a: 140; italics added). What matters is therefore the *function* intellectuals have in society; "... which is directive and organizational, i.e. educative, i.e. intellectual." (Gramsci 1971: 151). Through an educational and directive function, the intellectual carries potential for changing the social order<sup>15</sup>. But intellectuals come in two versions: The traditional and the organic intellectual. Traditional intellectuals consider themselves as "freefloating thinkers" (Wyn Jones 1995: 305) but are in fact "the

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<sup>14</sup> A broad, and oversimplified sorting suggests Booth and Wyn Jones: organic intellectual, Paris people: collective intellectual, Copenhagen: ironic intellectual.

<sup>15</sup> The Marxist inspiration is clear. Gramsci talks about the working class, the peasantry, the dominant class and a superstructure.

dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government." (Gramsci 1971a: 145).

In opposition to these stands the organic intellectual. He is *situated* within a certain structure of interests and can help overthrow or challenge existing power structures *from within* that structure. Gramsci holds that one should look "...in the ensemble of the system of relations in which [...] intellectual] activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within *the general complex of social relations.*" (Gramsci 1971a: 139, italics added). By focusing on this complex, intellectual activities of a non-traditional, organic kind will come into focus.

The organic intellectual can function as an emancipatory force in (a class) society by laying bare overlooked power relations and class truths disguised as common sense. The path to this emancipation lies in education and the construction of an "alternative intellectual-moral block" (Gramsci 1971b: 641). But the division between organic/traditional intellectuals is not stable. In the process of emancipating a social group, organic intellectuals seek alliances with traditional intellectuals in order to be more successful: "One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971a: 142).

Gramsci's thoughts are developed within a Marxist-inspired universe where the dominant structures are defined by economic forces that can be overthrown through organisation in "The Party". This leaves a clear moral obligation on the shoulders of the organic intellectual as the primary function of change/emancipation: "The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence (...) but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, 'permanent persuader', and not just a simple orator" (Gramsci 1971a: 140-41). The organic intellectual needs to act in the interest of the oppressed.

Similar thoughts can be found in neo-Gramscian work such as Robert W. Cox's insistence on forces of resistance (Millennium Symposium 1999: 395), Wyn Jones' (1995) work on issue-specific social movements and Ken Booth's call for moral, utopian realism and attention to "the hitherto unseen casualties of the structures of international relations" (Booth 1994: 11; 1997: 99): The individual victims of strategic thought which have been silenced by a structure of the world which has been created by an overemphasis on the importance and moral superiority of the state, and the inescapability of international anarchy. The analyst "can do something, however little" (Booth 1994: 19):

"We can work harder. We can write a letter. We can send a donation. We can join. We can be counted. We can treat people differently. We can spread networks of community.

We can change our lectures. We can speak up when it is inconvenient for us to do so. We can encourage. There is always something which can be done” (ibid.: 19-20).<sup>16</sup>

The intellectual is a central figure in Gramscian thought. The focus on the organic intellectual turns attention to a bottom-up perspective in which the ‘have-nots’ can seek emancipation through homegrown specialists. Links with traditional intellectuals adds an alliance with the people in power to the intellectual’s tool box. Practical strategies are education and building alliances.

Using the organic intellectual as a model for the critical security expert could entail seeing security as a *power struggle of truths* in which the power of another ‘truth regime’ is desirable<sup>17</sup>. Booth would argue that changing the focus from state security to human security could be one such desired truth regime, while Martin Shaw (1993) argued for society as the primary referent object of security. But this does not escape the truth dilemma: Is the organic intellectual necessarily speaking in the name of truth by pointing to the oppressed, the silenced? If not, how do we cope with the notion that analysts *per definition* are seen to speak in the name of truth when directing attention to e.g. human security? And how does the organic intellectual determine that one truth is *morally superior* to another and thus mobilize his academic status behind it?<sup>18</sup>

The Gramscian organic intellectual was tied closely to an economically defined interest group – a class – whose emancipation was the project of the intellectual. Whose interests will the intellectual be safeguarding today when actively engaging in world politics in the way that Booth prescribes? Is the intellectual autonomy cast overboard in this call for practical engagement, while the relevance with relation to specific politically defined problems is heightened?

When the analyst engages actively in political questions, the objective aura of expert statements are put under pressure. But by gaining a position in a political struggle, the analysts might be able to direct his/her arguments to specific audiences also belonging to the political struggle. To take an example of a

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<sup>16</sup> Paul D. Williams (2001: 79-83) summarizes the political role of intellectuals in relation to a particular audience in four processes: reflection; interpretation; construction visions of possible futures; and devising of political practices.

<sup>17</sup> A comparison with Benda’s *La Trahison de Clercs* reveals this as a classic clash-line in studies of the role of the intellectual. Benda called for intellectuals detached from society and committed to searching for – and having privileged access to – *the truth* (Benda 1927).

<sup>18</sup> Compare with Adorno’s critique of Marxism. Adorno’s solution was “unrelenting negativity” and to “provide a note of dissonance and dissent”. His hope was that his philosophy would be picked up like a message in a bottle in the future because there was no hope of change in his present (Wyn Jones 1995: 306-307).

practice along these lines, Booth (1994: 11) describes how powerful it felt the first time he wrote a letter for Amnesty International (AI). It was a turning point of dimensions which let him focus on the individual – and a perfect stranger – in security.

The organic intellectual strives for the better securitizations. Hence a position is taken, that if the securitization is in the interest of the community whose emancipation the analyst wants to support, it is to be embraced. Not surprisingly, scholars relying on the organic intellectual have become fond of (and indeed were key in developing) the concept of human security.

The political *function* of the intellectual carves out a specific way of engaging with practice: finding the oppressed, the overlooked, the silenced, often involves engaging in a contemporary political struggle with structured (party-)political clash-lines. This reduces the intellectual to a politician. This was what Benda called *La Trahison de Clercs*: the treason that consisted in becoming increasingly involved in practical political life. At the heart of Benda's critique lay an assumption that universal values existed across time and space and that the intellectual should always refer to these.

Booth and Wyn Jones's ways of replacing Gramsci's economic structure with an intellectual structure in International Relations may prove a way out of turning the intellectual into a politician. By focusing on the structuring effects of theory, the intellectual can engage with practice through academic debates, and by teaching students new ways of seeing the world etc. (See e.g. Wyn Jones 1995: 313-314).<sup>19</sup> The focus of the organic intellectual can stay tied to academic arguments, even if the moral goal is facilitating emancipation for certain groups and practices such as joining AI is also a recognised practice for the academic. For this purpose, Wyn Jones (1995: 309) formulates a set of 'deeply subversive questions' which CSS pose or should pose: What is security? Who is being secured by the prevailing order? Against what? Who *should* we focus on instead and how can their security be attained? These questions can guide future engagements with practice.<sup>20</sup>

So if we leave the classical Gramscian version of the organic expert and follow Wyn Jones (1995), Booth (1994; 1999) or Burawoy's (2007) translation of the organic intellectual in sociology, a path for critical security approaches may lie in constantly turning the structures of domination on their heads: by inviting scholars working in (academically) dominated places to speak; by writing on subjects which are

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<sup>19</sup> Booth's own suggestions for engaging with practice stays at the political level, however (join Amnesty International etc.).

<sup>20</sup> In this sense, an organic intellectual approximates Foucault's specific intellectual who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing 'regimes of truth' (Wyn Jones 1995: 312).

silenced; by constantly speaking for the underprivileged (whatever that may mean in a given time or space).<sup>21</sup>

#### 4.2. *Collective Intellectual*

Opposed to the interest-focused vision of the organic intellectual as an emancipator, the collective intellectual formulated by Pierre Bourdieu argues for a *certain way* of doing research in academic circles. By carrying out research in a particular way, the academic can contribute to society.

Overall, expert status is produced in a specific field according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu 2004). It is through status in the scientific field that the intellectual gains a standing and is accepted as an expert. Through this status a meeting between theory and practice can be produced (Callinicos 1999: 99). This places the intellectual in a position where acceptance in the scientific field is a prerequisite for gaining ‘a place from where to speak’ in the overall power structure of a society including the practice/policy world. Status in the academic field can thus function as an important power resource for the intellectual.

This finding could lead one to believe that science occupies a strong position vis-à-vis the world of practical politics and that the potential for academically driven change is big. But according to Bourdieu, “...intellectuals...occupy a dominated position in the field of power” (Bourdieu 1993: 125). Intellectuals often reproduce the *doxic* understandings of power relations and therefore risk ‘consecrating’ the existing power structure. This seems to echo Gramsci’s critique of how the traditional intellectual reproduces domination. But in fact it also places the optimistic vision of ‘class intellectuals’ or interest-driven intellectuals with emancipatory potential in a more structural argument about the dominated place of *science per se* in society. Not only interests ‘out there’ are dominated – science is also seen as structurally dominated by practice.

Gramsci and Bourdieu differed in the confidence they had in academic sociology. Gramsci saw academic sociology as upholding domination, whereas Bourdieu realized the danger of that, but devised a way to be a public intellectual on the basis of a specific research strategy which could bolster the position of the intellectual. He carved out two different positions for the sociologist to take: the *cynical* and the *clinical* role. “A cynical sociology makes use of its knowledge in order to make its own strategies more effective, while a clinical sociology uses its knowledge of social laws to challenge them

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<sup>21</sup> Compare with the division of intellectuals in the Trilateral Commission’s report: responsible, serious and constructive “technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals” and subversive and dangerous “value-oriented intellectuals” (Chomsky 1982).

effectively” (Schinkel 2003: 70; see also Bourdieu 1998b: 5-6). The first role is similar to the interest-driven role described above, while the clinical role is closer to the critical role we are attempting to specify in this article. Bourdieu argued that the scientist could not “keep aloof, far from the conflicts in which the future of the world is at stake” (Schinkel 2003: 70). He therefore argued that clinical sociology should form the basis of the craft of sociology, in other words, “...reflexivity matters not only for good science but for progressive politics” (Leander 2002b: 606).

As an attempt to meet the double need of gaining acceptance in the scientific field and of building a challenge to existing power structures through clinical sociology, Bourdieu emphasised the importance of the ‘collective intellectual’ and challenged the idea of intellectual work as solitary, original and inspired (Lenoir 2006: 25). Instead, he created collectives which contributed to cumulative research - e.g. the Centre de Sociologie Européenne (Bourdieu 2004: 108)<sup>22</sup>. The defining feature of the collective was *its agreement on the sociological method to be pursued*. Instead of grounding the scientific enterprise in a specific interest-driven setting, or in a solitary quest for individual careers, what held a collective together was its shared commitment to a specific scientifically recognised method and a prerogative of challenging social laws<sup>23</sup>.

Within IR, Pouliot (2007) has proposed a similar way forward for what he calls the ‘constructivist style of reasoning’ (Pouliot 2007: 361). His argument can be seen to follow the overall Bourdieusian argument that agreement on methodology can bring intellectuals together and produce knowledge in ways ‘every bit as rigorous as the canons of mainstream claim to be’ (ibid.) Through the method of ‘subjectivism-with-an-O’ (ibid.: 359) postfoundationalist (ibid. 362) constructivism can find common ground while remaining agnostic to what is ‘really real’ (ibid.: 363).

Conceptualising of a community of researchers as the hallmark of validity and quality suggests a way to solve the truth dilemma discussed above. The scientific authority can be upheld by pointing to the shared, recognised method. This also meets the demand of the exoteric community (see dilemmas above).

The collective intellectual also meets the demand of building a stronger position ‘from where to speak’ (truth) to power. The strong community thus helps preserve autonomy in research practices, whereas the prerogative of challenging social laws could be read as a quest for relevance. The dominated

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<sup>22</sup> In 1995 Bourdieu founded the group *Raisons d’agir* which was more directly political.

<sup>23</sup> There is a strong focus on the structuring effects of the nation state in Bourdieu’s work. This has led him to argue that intellectuals cannot legitimately lay claim to a perspective that transcends the constraints of particular national fields (Miller 2003).

position of science in society, however, pulls in a direction where relevance risks becoming a 'legitimising stamp' on doxic practice.

There is no guarantee that the knowledge produced by the collective can be steered when it leaves the scientific field. Relations with practitioners are not necessarily strong for the collective intellectual – the focus is on the scientific community in a specific national field. Bourdieu argues for example that “texts such as mine, produced in a definite position in a definite state of the French intellectual or academic field, have little chance of being grasped without distortion or deformation in the American field” (Bourdieu 1997: 450). There is also the problem that a research community may in fact exclude types of knowledge, which could have been of relevance (academically or politically), by steering it too rigorously. A further dimension to the steering dilemma is discussed by Villumsen (2008) and Büger and Villumsen (2007) in which the mobilization of theory/science statements is found to have been mobilized by political practitioners which have no relation to the scientific field.

The collective intellectual faces the same problem as the organic intellectual when it comes to directing attention to overlooked referent objects and practices: there is a risk of securitizing anew. But the collective intellectual sees it as one of his/her primary tasks to unmask doxic practices, so pointing to new referent objects may in fact follow logically from this expert role.

The collective intellectual's prerogative of challenging social laws may lead to more securitization. Relations with the world of practice are (often) weak and steering knowledge is therefore difficult. The theory behind the collective intellectual may see the social world in an overly structured light which would lead researchers to focus primarily on domination within the confines of a nation state<sup>24</sup>. There is a risk that other types of knowledge are excluded and a new power/knowledge nexus is established. But the idea of a collective of intellectuals that shares a common understanding of constructivist method helps meet the truth dilemma of critical experts: By referring to a shared, recognised method, the intellectuals may be able to meet the demands of the exoteric communities. Through a shared commitment to a particular 'style of reasoning' (Hacking 1982; Pouliot 2008) the research community

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<sup>24</sup> Miller (2003: 555) concedes, however, that Bourdieu did not see political or economic structures of domination as “simply co-extensive with national borders”.

can seek to validate constructivist truths while still challenging common sense and thus build a platform from where to speak to power.<sup>25</sup>

#### 4.3. *The Ironist*

The model we dub the ‘ironist’ involves four core moves: 1) a revised understanding of scientific practice as ‘inquiry’, 2) science as an activity of political problem solving, which seeks to maximize its relations with society and political processes rather than minimizing them, 3) the idea of an ironic style of reasoning in public policy and 4) the use of aesthetic forms of knowledge representation, notably for public understanding of science. The two former ideas are best understood in reading the work of John Dewey, while the latter two have been well formulated by Richard Rorty.

In essence these moves lead to an understanding of the security expert in which the truth dilemma is addressed by an ironic stance towards any truth claim (including the expert’s own), foregrounding practical problems and justifying science by its problem solving capacities, aesthetic representations are added as an additional layer of public intervention; the relevance/autonomy dilemma is rejected as being a dilemma; the steerability problem is addressed through irony towards the own knowledge claims, and the securitization problem is addressed by the continuing questioning of whether security is the mean to solve a public problem.

Pragmatists following Dewey’s work, interpret scientific knowledge as one form of social knowledge among others. Basing philosophy in scientific practice, it is suggested that science is not primarily ‘knowledge’ but a specific form of problem-solving practice drawing on a distinct mindset and refined and expanded problem-solving procedures. This practice and mindset is usually grasped with the term ‘inquiry’. Dewey distinguished between ‘controlled’ and ‘uncontrolled’ experience and understood science as an activity controlling experience. Inquiry begins with an indeterminate situation, which is “disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendency, obscure, etc” (Brown 2009:153). Inquiry starts with the desire to respond to such a situation (ibid.) and aims at transforming the indeterminate situation into a “problematic situation”, and then into a specific “problem” to be coped with. Inquiry is thus an activity that transforms an indeterminate situation into a determinate problem. The objective of inquiry is to master this specific problem. The scientific habit of coping with problems, Dewey saw as an ideal type for making policy. Policy starts with the creation of an unsettled public which are affected by the (unintended) consequences of (private) action. Policy becomes

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<sup>25</sup> An example of a collective intellectual practice is Keith Krause’s centre in Geneva “Small Arms Survey” and the group of researchers surrounding Didier Bigo.

necessary to regulate these consequences. In other words, for Dewey policy works in a similar way as inquiry (Brown 2009:153). An indeterminate situation negatively affecting associations of people is turned by (political) representatives into a determinate situation and into specific problems for which a policy intervention is designed. For Dewey, hence, the more the design of a policy intervention is based on the refined and expanded problem-solving procedures of inquiry, the better will policy master the problem. Thus scientific expertise is crucial for good policies, yet good policies require the participation of other actors than scientific organizations. Inquiry is a practice not limited to scientists. Scientific organizations are, hence, only one (yet, important) source of problem-coping knowledge and policymaking requires to integrate other sources of knowledge. In this sense, and given Dewey's specific understanding of scientific practice, the idea of policy-making departs considerably from a technocratic model (Brown 2009:147, 154).

From an understanding of science as inquiry, a different momentum for legitimizing science in public policy arises. Rather than a justification centred on truth, it revolves around *techniques* provided by science. Justification for the authority of science is based on the capabilities of translating situations in problems and providing tools of coping with problems.

Neo-pragmatists have picked up this notion of inquiry and suggested that a primary tool for problem coping is "language". While consideration of the contingency of language is the crux about any linguistic turn idea, Pragmatists foreground the importance of language and representations in coping with problems. Based on such an idea Richard Rorty advanced the thought that all types of accounts (scientific and other) should acknowledge that there is nothing to refer back to besides social practice, and that all accounts therefore have equal standing as *narratives*. Relying on Thomas Kuhn's idea of normal and revolutionary science, Rorty sees his liberal ironist as one anchored in a revolutionary context (Rorty 1979: 6). Knowledge produced by the liberal ironist is incommensurable with normal science, but cannot (and should not necessarily) replace normal science. Instead, what we have come to know as normal science only amounts to one specific type of narrative, which needs to be seen in competition with other (as of yet scientifically less recognised) accounts.

From this starting point, Rorty defines the liberal ironist as *liberal* in the sense that cruelty is thought to be the worst thing we do, that suffering should be countered, and that solidarity is something to hope for; and as *ironist* because the researcher faces up to the contingency of his own central beliefs: Everything is historicised, turned on its head and countered – including his own firmest ideas (Rorty 1989).

Practically, the liberal ironist nourishes understandings of the 'other' as 'one of us', and sees the 'strange sufferer' as a 'fellow sufferer' (Rorty 1989: xvi). By telling stories of them *and* us, the contingency of

divisions are brought to the fore. To Rorty, this signifies a turn against theory and towards the narrative. Rorty joins Dewey in that scientific knowledge is best disseminated through the arts. Ideas are effective not as bare ideas, but because they have imaginative content and emotional appeal. Through ethnography, journalist reports, comic books, docudrama and especially novels, stories of the other can be advanced (ibid.)<sup>26</sup>. No firm theoretical conception of solidarity or method can thus take the place of narratives that connect the present with the past and with utopian futures<sup>27</sup>.

This seems to represent a break with the vision of the collective intellectual, where emphasis was put on agreement on method as a platform from which to relate to practice, and with the Gramscian organic intellectual, who worked from the idea of a hierarchy of interests. The ironist has no preferred method and no firm grip on interests. A constant questioning of self and other, and a radical take on the equality of scientific and other types of method take away the possibility of creating a privileged role for science in the Bourdieusian sense, and seems to stand in the way of formulating a common method with which critical intellectuals can relate to society. So where does this leave the critical intellectual? Rorty's way forward is to actively acknowledge that the stories we tell in security studies relate to non-scientific works in a play of social practice. By engaging with non-scientific audiences and by publishing other than scientific products, creating art, blurring the genres of science and fiction (what Bruno Latour (1996) dubs "scientifiction"), we may be able to work against undesired securitizations. By agreeing that a contingent mindset coupled with a desire to think of new futures will suffice as common platform, an ironic collective can be constructed. The reflexive consciousness for contingency of the liberal ironist, as Andreas Reckwitz (2003) interprets it, leads us to a different type of engagement with political practice. Rather than encountering one truth with others, it involves the continuous questioning of any claim to authority or truth (including the researchers own). While a statement can be presented as a truth claim, such a claim can be formulated in a way that it unravels the paradox of any reference to truth (Krumm 2003).

Such a view has maybe been best expressed in security studies by advocates of the Securitization approach. As Wæver (1999: 334) summarizes the political function of his work: "The securitization approach points to the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this -- or of not doing it?"

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<sup>26</sup> Compare this with our discussion of Ludwik Fleck in the first C.A.S.E. Collective article.

<sup>27</sup> Rorty places great emphasis on the need for being constructive, and not only deconstructive. Imagining new futures thus plays a big part in the practices of an ironic expert.

The ironist is a type suggesting a fairly different way of coping with the dilemmas. As discussed, the truth dilemma is addressed in that the analyst is asked to work towards demonstrating the contingency of any truth claim. To do so the analyst faces either the difficult task of speaking in a language of truth in a way that the own claim or the claim of others appears for those listening as paradoxical and contingent, or and this is the second suggestion experiment with more aesthetic forms of representing his knowledge. An essay that blurs science and fiction or that presents a parable might a genre to engage in. Or, for instance, the curation of an exhibition on the problems of securitizing migration might be a promising way to prove with the ideas of alternative genres.

As the notion of inquiry stresses, pragmatism does not see autonomy for science as a precondition for scientific practice. This is because, firstly, no superiority is given to the narratives scientists tell in contrast to other narratives. Secondly, because pragmatists see science the justification of science as based in its problem coping capacity. To provide tools, such as vocabularies, for addressing public problems the analysts as inquirer requires to be related to politics and publics as close as possible.

The ironist addresses the problem of non-steerability only indirectly. Basically it is suggested that the analyst should strive to guarantee that any knowledge, any narrative needs to contain contingency and should not be fixed nor stabilized to a degree that it could be misused in a different context than intended. In extension also the security dilemma 2.0 is addressed as the security analysts is asked to challenge any (narrative) ties between the concept of security and a phenomenon, and strive for a situation in which the relations between security and other ties remain weak. For instance a discourse such as human security should be embraced from such a perspective, not necessarily because it is a meaningful understanding of security, but exactly because it is a vague and rather meaningless concept of security. Phrased otherwise, while the organic intellectual would argue in favour of the better notion of human security, to encounter unwanted securitizations, the ironist, would maximize and minimize all sorts of security claims inherent in the concept to highlight its paradoxical nature and to guarantee that it remains so.

#### 4.4 *Summary*

Taken together, the visions of the organic intellectual, the collective intellectual and the ironist all point to problematiques relevant for being a critical security expert. We summarize them in table 2 below.

**Table 2: Comparing Expert Figures**

	<b>Organic intellectual</b>	<b>Collective intellectual</b>	<b>Ironist</b>
<b>View of the expert</b>	All men are experts  Those who function as experts are: traditional, and organic intellectuals	The sociologist can be cynical or critical  The cynical sociologist uses critique to his own advantage. The critical does not	Equality of scientific and other types of methods.  The expert is a function in society and crucial for good policy
<b>View of the social world</b>	Divided into classes. Superstructure can help emancipate classes through organic experts who make alliances with traditional experts	The world is structured in fields. Doxic understandings uphold domination. The critical sociologist can help reveal this	The social world is constructed and upheld through language and practice  The other is part of us
<b>How can you be critical?</b>	Through education and communication. Through 'the Party'  Neo-Gramscians: participate in e.g. Amnesty International, teach new world views to students	Collective research efforts can solidify results. Through a common method, the sociologist can claim validity and thus aim to reveal doxic practice	The narrative replaces the theory  The intellectual can use other means than publishing academic texts. E.g. movies, theatre plays, novels, online networks etc.  Put things differently – e.g. with humour  Produce alternatives, utopias, new futures
<b>Does the researcher have a moral obligation?</b>	Emancipation of the oppresses/ minimize suffering	Reveal doxic practice and symbolic violence (without it being to your own advantage)	Resist reproduction of structures (them/us narratives)  Advance solidarity  Produce utopias

A common goal of challenging dominating truths is met through different conceptions of interests, methods and contingency. Some shy away from institutionalising the critical project, whereas others see it as a prerequisite for being heard. Some see the fight for certain interests as the main project of being critical, whereas others see the challenge in itself as the goal. Together they give us a sense of the joys and pitfalls of engaging with society as a critical intellectual. And, importantly, they add a dimension of practical reflexivity to the debate about critical security expertise today.

## 5. Conclusion

The goal of a critical intellectual is not only to observe, but also to actively open spaces of discussion and political action, as well as to provide the analytical tools, concepts and categories for possible alternative discourses and practices. However, as we have argued, there are no clear guidelines for the critical security researcher and no assessment of the impact of scholarship on practice – or vice versa.

**Table 3: Expert Figures and how they respond to the dilemmas**

	<b>Organic intellectual</b>	<b>Collective intellectual</b>	<b>Ironist</b>
<b>Truth dilemma</b>	A power struggle of truths replaces a universal truth.	An approximation of truth is produced through validation in a scientific community and a shared method. This meets the expectations of the exoteric community.	Games of truth are joined. The analyst counter-caricatures any truth claims by pointing to its contingency (including his own) in an ironic style
<b>Autonomy/Relevance</b>	The organic intellectual produces relevance; the traditional intellectual can validate with autonomous standing.	The collective provides a stronger place from where to ‘speak truth to power’. Connections with practice not necessarily strong.	The idea that good science requires autonomy is rejected. There only should be ‘relevant science’. Yet, inquiry requires considerable resources.
<b>Non-steerability of knowledge</b>	The intellectual is part of the political process and can seek to steer knowledge by the closer proximity to political practice.	No guarantee of steering knowledge when it leaves the scientific field. Clear national/field boundaries of knowledge – beyond this translation can be ‘distorted’	Any knowledge claim requires to be continuously questioned, despite those which visibly lead to solidarity.
<b>Security Dilemma 2.0</b>	The intellectual risks (seeks?) to securitize new referent objects. I.e. positive securitizations	New referent objects will be securitized (follows logically from the obligation to unmask doxic understandings)	Continuously interrogates in public whether securitization is the right way to solve problems of the public.

The ideal types discussed do not provide solutions, but have exemplified dimensions of reflexivity, and practices that can be taken as inspiration to experiment with different ways of reacting to the dilemmas. Thinking about the dilemmas, experimenting with new forms of elite and public engagements present a way to routinize practical reflexivity in the contemporary security studies project. We can only join in supporting Bourdieu’s claim that practical reflexivity needs to be institutionalized to develop its full power. Bourdieu holds that:

"The sociologically armed epistemological vigilance that each researcher can apply on his own behalf can only be strengthened by the generalizing of the imperative of reflexivity and the spreading of the indispensable instruments for complying with it; this alone can institute reflexivity as the common law by the field, which would thus become characterized by a sociological critique of all by all that would intensify the effects of the epistemological critique of all by all." (Pierre Bourdieu 2004: 91)

Following from the discussion in this paper and Bourdieu's call for an institutionalisation of practical reflexivity, we would like to end this paper with a set of questions for the critical security scholar. Practical reflexivity will not be easily institutionalized in the near future. Nonetheless, we suggest that these questions can help structure reflexion on how to cope with the dilemmas outlined in this paper. Silence and refraining from engaging with practice is not – should not be – an option.

Critical Security Studies has developed a very fine-tuned set of tools for addressing the philosophical and discursive side of reflexivity – and we salute that. But as we argued, practical reflexivity on the own position vis-à-vis the field of practice has been largely absent and this may lead to an under-emphasis of the dilemmas we discussed in chapter 3. The questions below are therefore particularly guided toward enhancing practical reflexivity so as to enhance the chances of minimizing counterproductive results (however the researcher defines those).

**Question 1: What space am I studying?** The first question that should pop into the critical researchers mind is *by whom* the practical field which is being studied is inhabited. With all those inhabitants the researcher will set up a relation of some sort (such as ignoring, encountering or allying with them). Which practitioners, which technical agencies, which part of a population, and not least: which other academic practices occupy the space being researched? This is inherently a question with an empirical answer and the answer is likely to spur different strategies for engaging with the field – also depending on which ideal typical relation the researcher himself sees between science and society. Don't forget to map yourself in this empirical exercise.

**Question 2: How is the field of study constituted?** Following from the answers to the first question, the next question becomes one of what signifies the field: are truth claims being made from various sides? And with what weight (meaning, do other actors seem to be listening to these claims?) Do the truth claims seem to benefit some and harm others?

Following from this, are there any platforms 'from where to speak' open to interventions from critical scholarship? Can that platform be filled by conventional practices, or is there space for more radical

interventions? These reflections will impact on how the research may be validated before dissemination.

**Question 3: Who do I want to address and how?** The field of study in question will be inhabited by different types of actors, all of whom will be attentive to different types of communication. Some fields of practice are best reached with solid (Bourdiesian) collective research volumes, whereas others will be open to aesthetic forms of communication à la Rorty. The audience will to a large degree determine the success of the intervention.

One might say that the claim of the intervention diminishes when one moves away from more conventional research practices to the more novel (Gramscian and Rortian in this paper). The audience should therefore be carved out before making a decision on the publication outlet and style. There is no use in addressing a conventional status-quo audience with a computer game-style conclusion. Here, a more dialogical relationship (Czarniawska 2008) or a consultancy situation will probably do a better job. Alliances with existing actors (e.g. a think tank or a famous artist) in the field of study may also be an option. These can strengthen the position from where the knowledge is being diffused (but will of course impact on the autonomy and truth claims made).

**Question 4: Can autonomy be preserved?** Following a decision on who and how to engage with a field of practice, the next question naturally becomes – will it be possible to preserve academic autonomy? Should this be negotiated with the audience (in e.g. a contract specifying the limits to interventions in conclusions) or can it be signalled in other ways? This should also entail the question in what way autonomy is actually needed to achieve the relations and effects wanted.

**Question 5: Can the knowledge be steered – and does it have to be?** Also following from the reflection on who the researcher wants to address, concerns about the extent to which knowledge can be steered will arise. If addressing a field of practice with Rortian communication, how can the knowledge be steered? And does knowledge have to be steered – or is ‘opening up space’ and *not a particular space* a goal in itself? Reflection on the goal of the intervention is thus pivotal to (partial?) success of engaging with practice.

Following from the constitution of the field and the actors inhabiting the field, reflections on a strategy of silence may also be a (better) option if knowledge cannot be steered due to strong pulls in one direction in the field of practice.

**Question 6: Who wants a *Besserwisser*?** Most people are experts at what they do. So consider both communication strategies, goals and target audiences in light of a piece of what might be called lay wisdom: Nobody likes to be talked down to: “form and tone need to be attended to” (Czarniawska 2008: 135). This may sound paradoxical in light of the fact that our profession somehow revolves around exactly ‘knowing better’. But with a practice theoretical point of departure – and in light of the discussions of our three ideal types – time has perhaps come to consider the possibility that other actors in our fields of study actually know what they are doing. They just know it in a different way.

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