Using cultural criminology to think differently about war and terrorism

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In recent years, cultural criminology has established something of a foothold in Brazil (Ferrell, 2012; Ferrell and Hayward, 2013; Hayward and Young, 2015; de Carvalho, 2010; de Carvalho et al, 2011). But what exactly is ‘cultural criminology’? Above all else, it is a theoretical, methodological, and interventionist approach to the study of crime and deviance that places criminality and its control squarely in the context of culture, i.e. it views crime and the agencies and institutions of crime control as cultural products – as creative constructs enmeshed in complex processes of meaning-making. Attentive to the realities of a deeply unequal world, cultural criminology strives to highlight how power affects the upwards and downwards construction of criminological phenomena: how rules are made, why they are broken, and the deeper implications of these processes. Because of its deliberately broad focus, the interests of cultural criminology are not easily summarized, but by way of a general introduction we can say that they include inter alia situated and symbolic meaning (e.g. Ferrell, 1996); existential and phenomenological aspects of offending space (e.g. Katz, 1988, Lyng, 1990); place and the (cultural) geography of crime (e.g. Hayward, 2004, 2012); subcultural and post-subcultural analysis (e.g. Ferrell and Sanders, 1995; Ilan, 2015); vicissitudes of power, resistance and social and state control (e.g. Presdee, 2000; Hayward and Schuienburg, 2014); the ‘crime-consumerism nexus’ (e.g. Hayward, 2003; Hayward and Smith, 2017); ‘deviant leisure’ and related forms of environmental harm (e.g. Brisman and South, 2014; Ferrell, 2013; Smith and Raymen, 2016); and the mediated construction of crime and punishment (including the commodification of violence and the marketing of transgression) (e.g. Rafter, 2000; Brown, 2009; Hayward and Presdee, 2010).

Alongside these now well-established areas of engagement, the last decade or so has also seen cultural criminology develop a more sustained interest in the ongoing socio-economic transformations and fluctuations precipitated by neo-liberalism and associated modes of hyper-capitalism. In part, this broader position has been a response to the criticism emanating from the radical left of the discipline that cultural criminology lacks ideological ballast and therefore is not political enough. But equally this greater emphasis on the wider political consequences of crime and control is the consequence of a very deliberate attempt by cultural criminologists to develop a thoroughgoing ‘cultural criminology of the state’ (e.g. Burrows, 2013; Cunneen, 2010; Hamm, 2007; Klein, 2011; Linnemann et al., 2014; Morrison, 2006, 2010; Wall and Linnemann, 2014a). Initially, this body of work focused largely on countering the state-centric discourse surrounding the various “wars” on drugs, gangs, and crime, and the mass incarceration machinery that follows in their wake (see e.g. Kraska, 1998; Ferrell, 2003; Wall and Linnemann, 2014b; Linnemann, 2016; Schept, 2016). More recently, however, it has also

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2 For a response to this argument, see Hayward (2016) and Ferrell (2007).
extended into the geo-political realm. In this chapter, in a bid to further introduce the fast-developing field of cultural criminology to a Brazilian audience, two new areas of research associated with the cultural criminology of the state will be outlined: the criminology of war, and the criminological analysis of terrorism and other forms of sub-state violence.

**Cultural Criminology and War**

Do we really need ‘a criminology of war’ - or for that matter a sociological account of counter insurgency? Is it not the case that human rights violations or breaches of military convention that take place in conflict situations are already covered by the rigours of international humanitarian law and an array of treaties ratified by international comity? What if anything can criminology bring to the table? Let us attempt to answer such questions by considering the long short war in Iraq.

Among the many classified documents and reports handed to the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks by the US soldier Bradley Manning was a digital file containing cockpit gun-sight footage from two US Army AH-64 Apache helicopters. The classified footage shows one of the helicopters opening up with a 30mm cannon on a group of (predominantly unarmed) Iraqis, including two employees of the news agency Reuters. Inevitably, all in the group are cut to pieces. Moments later when a van arrives to assist the victims, it too is strafed by helicopter canon fire; inside the van another three unarmed men are killed and two children seriously wounded. Although painful to watch, the video is important for any number of reasons (not the least of which is the insight it provides into the nature of communication that takes place between military personnel when assessing such situations – a mix of efficient military-speak, wisecracking, and self-congratulation). For our purposes, though, what is of most interest is the public response to the video after it went viral via WikiLeaks. The incident was immediately condemned around the globe, with many commentators quickly classifying the attack as a “war crime”. But were these impassioned claims of illegality justified? The short answer, as any military lawyer will tell you, is ‘no’. Despite all the noises made in the media and elsewhere about the “proportionality” of the attacks, or the “reasonable certainty” of the target’s hostility, from a legal perspective, there is nothing about the Al-Amin al-Thaniyah airstrike that technically contravenes the laws of war as currently configured.

If International humanitarian law is not capable of moving beyond state-deferential definitions of criminality, or as the lawyer and author Chase Madar (2012) more provocatively puts it, is ‘less concerned with restraining military violence than licensing it’, then how are we to make sense of the airstrike at Al-Amin al-Thaniyah - or for that matter, drone strikes against ‘enemies of the state’, genocidal campaigns, or the systematic regimes of torture that take place in ‘dark sites’ and ‘off book’ prisons in states the world over?

Such questions have concerned radical and critical criminologists for decades. For critical criminologists, the stated goal has been to extend criminology’s critical ontology so that the discipline no longer relies solely on a state-deferential definition of crime (e.g. Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1970; Chamblis 1989, Green and Ward, 2000, 2004; Morrison, 2006). In recent years, this position has been finessed – quite often as a result of debates surrounding the in-built political dimension of knowledge production within criminology (Hillyard et al, 2004) - by scholars associated with the ‘social harm’ perspective (e.g. Hillyard and Tombs, 2004; Hillyard et al, 2005; Coleman et al, 2009). Proponents of this approach argue that when national and international legalistic approaches to crime are invalid, it becomes necessary for criminology to widen its horizons beyond the legal realm, and think of acts such as state violence, ecological destruction, or cross-border pollution not simply in terms of whether or not rules have been broken, but as *social and physical harms*. While it must
be stressed that the social harm perspective has definitional problems of its own, it is clearly a useful tool for thinking about the state as an enabler of violence both within and beyond its own borders. Indeed, a number of critical criminologists have already undertaken studies of the state’s actions during the Iraq war and subsequent military occupation (Kramer and Michalowski, 2005; Kauzarlich, 2007; Whyte, 2007, 2010).

This is useful work, but as a cultural criminologist I am also aware of its limitations. Specifically, by training critical attention solely on the entity of the ‘state’ (either as ideological expression or overarching structural apparatus of power), these accounts have a tendency to ignore the fact that state power, whether exerted in a war zone or as part of a covert ‘black operation’, is in the main implemented at ground level by highly-committed, indeed often zealous, individuals who are all-too-willing to undertake what military personnel or secret service operatives call the ‘wet stuff’ (see Goldhagen, 1996), i.e. house-to-house shake downs, rendition, torture, and search-and-destroy missions. Here I believe cultural criminology can be very useful, not only as a better way to analyse the blurred dynamic between the laws of war and the on-the-ground-realities associated with its prosecution, but as a means to provide a deeper and more meaningful understanding of the frailties of the human condition in terms of its susceptibility to perversion or corruption in extreme circumstances (Cushman, 2001: 82).

Consider again the situation in Iraq. One of the striking features of the war was the sweeping legislative upheaval enacted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the US Government in order to administer the occupation. By passing legislation such as Presidential Executive Order 13303 (which afforded US civilian and military personnel immunity from prosecution under Iraqi Law), and FRAGO 242 (which instructed US coalition personnel not to intervene to stop acts of violence carried out by Iraqis on Iraqis), the CPA essentially went some way toward creating what legal scholars call ‘a state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005). In doing so, the CPA made it extremely difficult for International humanitarian lawyers to prosecute the human rights abuses or coercive state practices undertaken during the Iraq War. At a practical level the US government was essentially allowing its soldiers and private contractors to circumvent, if not completely divorce themselves from, key international doctrines such as the Geneva Conventions governing the provisions made for civilians and detainees within international conflicts. In some parts of Iraq, the result in effect was prosecution-free, state-sanctioned violence. But even though the State (through the guise of the CPA) had created the legal conditions by which cities like Baghdad and Fallujah essentially became “free fire zones”, it was still human actors, functioning within small group dynamics, that were pulling triggers, kicking down doors, and beating and torturing prisoners – just as it was previously under Saddam Hussein’s despotic regime, and just as it is today as members of Islamic State go about their business in the Levant, destroying Christian churches and executing civilians for what they perceive to be violations of Sharia It is here that cultural criminology can help, by stressing the importance of human experience and agency in the conduct of a war, insurgency, and counter insurgency (see Morrison 2004; Cottee 2011).

As has been well documented, in conflict settings and war zones, participation in mass violence and military killings is contingent upon the relationship that individuals and groups have with their immediate social and situational environment (Browning, 1992; Tanner, 2011). In post-invasion Iraq, for example, this relationship was one often highly conducive to coercive state practices and acts of brutality. Indeed, for some critical criminologists, the CPA’s maladroit efforts to govern post-invasion Iraq were simply a reflection of the structural motivations for invading the country in the first place. From the ‘shock and awe’ bombing strikes that started the campaign to the civic meltdown that occurred after Saddam Hussein was toppled, the chaos of post-invasion Iraq bred a culture of ‘strike-first’ hyper aggression that
shaped the ‘collective identity’ and ‘small group dynamics’ of those tasked with prosecuting the war at street level.

When placed in the subcultural context of actors involved in the Iraq War, we can see this process taking place, through a combination of the immunity from prosecution granted to coalition personnel, and the enemy-focussed counter insurgency. These two factors contributed to the construction of normalised deviant behaviour, such as the torture and abuse of detainees, the excessive use of force towards civilians at checkpoints and extrajudicial killings by coalition forces and PMCs [private military contractors], as acceptable conduct within the counter insurgency… this process contributed to the capacity for those involved in this violence, to continue to conduct themselves in this manner, without seriously questioning the legitimacy of their actions, or the ramifications for their victims (Burrows, 2013: 235-236)

Likewise, following the Syrian uprising of 2011, and the civic chaos experienced in parts of Northern Iraq following the collapse of Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia government, Jihadist fighters associated first with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and then the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State thrived in the climate of fear and sectarian violence that characterized the surrounding environment at that time; meeting violence with violence and out-brutalizing their prior brutalizers.

And so a cultural criminology of war begins to emerge. As the above quote suggests, it draws together the macro influence of structure (in the form of governance and ideology) with more mid-level theories of subculture and ‘learnt transgression’; a combination that also allows for an analysis of how state crimes and mass killings can be ‘neutralised’ by both the state and the collective forces involved in human rights violations (Hamm, 2007). However, no cultural criminological analysis would be complete unless it included the third element of the original triadic framework on which cultural criminology is founded: a micro-level understanding of the experiential and phenomenological dynamics that compel one actor to engage in transgressive violence and another in the same socio-cultural setting to desist. Here, cultural criminology draws on the small subterranean literature in sociology and military history that powerfully illuminates the sensations and emotions associated with war and combat (see Cottee 2011, for a useful cultural criminological introduction; Gray, 1959; Hedges, 2002; Wright, 2004). Consider, for example, the following quote from Sebastian Junger’s brilliant micro-sociological study of combat, War (2010), in which he attempts to explain the allure of firefights for US infantrymen serving in Afghanistan:

War is a lot of things and it’s useless to pretend that exciting isn’t one of them. It’s insanely exciting. The machinery of war and the sound it makes and the urgency of its use and the consequences of almost everything about it are the most exciting things anyone engaged in war will ever know. Soldiers discuss that fact with each other and eventually with their chaplains and their shrinks and maybe even their spouses, but the public will never hear about it. It’s just not something that many people want acknowledged. War is supposed to feel bad because undeniably bad things happen in it, but for a nineteen-year-old at the working end of a .50 cal during a firefight that everyone comes out of okay, war is life multiplied by some number that no one has ever heard of. In some ways twenty minutes of combat is more life than you could scrape together in a lifetime of doing something else (Junger, 2010: 144-45)

In the next section, I will explore this synthesis of macro, meso, and micro elements in more detail in relation to the debates surrounding terrorism. For now, however, let us continue by setting out in practical terms what a constitutive cultural criminology of war might look like.
To help with this task, I draw upon and augment Daniel Burrows’ (2013) recent multidimensional, cultural criminological analysis of state crime in the Iraq War. Building on Hayward’s (2011) appreciation of the interconnectivity of macro, meso, and micro processes within cultural criminology, and thus mirroring the approach set out above, Burrows outlines a number of ‘theoretical tropes’ that he asserts are essential for constructing an integrative and inter-disciplinary approach to understanding state crime (in war). Paraphrasing Burrows, they could be summarised in the following way: First, the need to situate the criminological analysis of war within a broad historical dynamic. For example, no analysis of the Iraq War is viable without considering Iraq’s problematic history - both in terms of Saddam’s reign of terror (Makiya, 1998) and the longstanding ethnic divisions that characterise the country - or the similarities between the United States past and present counter insurgency techniques (see Klein, 2007; Hamm, 2007), not to mention the long history of violent US and European intervention in the affairs of the Middle East. Second, a general recognition of the limitations of international humanitarian law and the need to develop broader conceptualizations of social and personal harm that better identify and make visible the brutalities and atrocities - both big and small - that occur in war zones. Third, the readiness to engage with existing macro, structural analyses associated with the discipline of Politics and International Relations that view the military actions of States as expressions of national security interests and particular economic objectives. Put bluntly, as the global security scholar Doug Stokes has asked (2009: 91): would the Middle East have been subject to so many interventions, Western-backed coups and US-backed authoritarian regimes if the principal export of the region was not oil but avocados? Fourth, the culture underpinning military action and its aftermath must be carefully analysed, especially in cases where temporary sovereignty is established and a counter insurgency campaign is waged. In particular, emphasis must be trained on how meso-level cultures and subcultures – be they statist or increasingly corporate (Lea and Stenson, 2007; Welch 2009) in origin - create and valorise forms of learnt behaviour that are technically and normatively prohibited and undesirable. Fifth, no criminology of war can be complete without a focus on the micro-experiential attractions and emotional allure of combat and its associated ‘wet’ activities. In particular, we need to focus attention on how the dangers, risks, and excitements of war can shape small group affinity/identity and provide individuals with a sense of meaning that transcends the norm. As Chris Hedges argues in his brilliantly insightful and disturbing book War Is a Force Which Gives Us Meaning, this is perhaps the primary appeal of conflict:

Even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. Trivia dominates our conversations and increasingly our airwaves. And war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause’ (2002: 3).

To this, I would add the issue of (toxic) masculinity. This can be factored into any of the six areas, but seems especially important when considering the nature of ‘meaning’ associated with war’s emotional and experiential attractions. Sixth, and finally, to understand how the mainstream media frames state-sanctioned violence by, on the one hand, legitimating and celebrating narratives of war and conquest and, on the other, marginalising other forms of state crime from popular discourse.

This sixth dimension – the role of media, images, and popular discourse – is one of particular potency and importance. In February 2003, for example, at the insistence of the Bush administration, the Guernica tapestry (a huge copy of Picasso’s 1937 painting of the Nazi bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War) was first covered, then removed, from the
Security Room of the United Nations Building in New York City. Apparently, the fabric of war’s horrors was no longer an appropriate backdrop for Colin Powell and other US diplomats to make media statements urging the case for the invasion of Iraq. What the neo-conservatives pulling the strings of the Bush administration knew only too well was that, when it comes to wielding power on the late modern global stage, image management is as important as battlefield management. Or to put it another way: the play may be flawed, but there’s no excuse for not properly dressing the set.

Had he been around today, Guy Debord would surely have smiled. The guiding light of the Situationist International forty years ago, Debord declared then that, if capitalist accumulation was to continue unchallenged, it would require new forms of state control that held ‘mastery over the domain of the image’. His argument was simple: as the state ramps up its involvement in the day-to-day lives of its citizenry through ‘the colonization of everyday life’, the control of images – especially via so-called ‘perpetual emotion machines’ like the television – becomes ever more vital to the maintenance of the capitalist social order. Yet this gives rise to a paradox: the more the state relies upon the image, the more it is vulnerable to image manipulation.

So back to today’s on-going War on Terror: In an article on America’s reaction to the attacks of 9/11, the Retort Collective argued that ‘a state that lives more and more in and through a regime of the image does not know what to do when, for a moment, it dies by the same lights. It does not matter that “economically” or “geopolitically” the death may be an illusion. Spectacularly, it was real. And image-death – image-defeat – is not a condition that the state can endure’ (Retort Collective, 2004: 20). This is not simply a retreat to Jean Baudrillard’s world of ‘hyper spectacle’ – something that the Retort Collective are keen to avoid. Rather, it is a call for a clearer understanding of the geo-political interaction between the symbolic and the material – a line of inquiry that, no doubt, a radical interventionist like Debord would have welcomed. As the Retort Collective make clear, ‘No one level of analysis – “economic” or “political”, global or local, focusing on the means of either material or symbolic production – will do justice to the current strange mixture of chaos and grand design’ (2004: 7). We must strive instead for modes of critique that merge these domains, combining images and analysis as tools to ‘vulnerablize’ the state and challenge its hegemony over the ‘realm of the image’. This may sound abstract, but consider again the Apache airstrike at Al-Amin al-Thaniyah. Without the visceral gun-sight video footage, this event would surely have passed unnoticed into history. Just another anonymous US intelligence report; one of several hundred thousand reports uploaded to the Internet in the WikiLeaks ‘War Logs’. This one, however, stood out. It stood out precisely because it was an image. It stood out precisely because its visual power made the event seem real. The unexpurgated video footage did indeed therefore have the power to ‘vulnerablize the state’; irrespective of what international humanitarian law ultimately had to say about it.

In an interesting article entitled ‘Toward a cultural criminoology of war’, Josh Klein (2011) shows how ‘elite military criminal action’ depends on the ‘partial ideological “enlistment” of the public’, and thus the ‘indirect involvement of otherwise law-abiding citizens in international crimes’ (ibid, 86-87). Klein uses public opinion data to illustrate how tendencies associated with counterinsurgency war - belligerent nationalism, chauvinism, nativism, out-group hating – are ideologically legitimated at home through various popular cultural forms manipulated by political elites and associated media bias. Yet, if public opinion can be manipulated by the propagandistic nature of television coverage, including “embedded” journalists and officially-approved war footage, it can also be swayed, ‘limited’, and morally undermined by images that starkly highlight the disjuncture between state-centric news
reporting and elite military criminality - the media criticism that followed in the wake of the scandal over the photos of Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse being perhaps the most obvious example.

And so we see the value of the image as a means of checking state power in today’s multi-mediated world. It is an approach that is as viable in a war zone as it is in a commuter zone. For example, whether it’s the photographing and videotaping of crowds and individuals at political demonstrations and protest marches, or the deployment of miniaturized uniform and helmet-mounted personal video cameras by beat officers, the power of the image is not something that the State and its agents can ever fully own or control. Far from it - the force of the image, the power and spectacle of the visual is simply too multidimensional. Images permeate the flow of cultural meaning in any number of ways, and just as they can be used to serve the military and other branches of the State apparatus, they can also be used to critique and undermine it. Hence, heavy-handed police arrest practices are now routinely combated by citizens with cameras, while organisers of political demonstrations often deploy their own videographers (and increasingly drones fitted with aerial cameras) to monitor potential abuses by the State. As with the case of the Al-Amin al-Thaniyah airstrike, as state agents seek to control or possess an image for its own purposes, another group can steal it and subject it to a cultural hijacking and a radical reversal of meaning.

At this point, most criminologies of war, or for that matter most liberal left critiques of state militarism, tend to come to an abrupt end, content simply to ‘give the state a good kicking,’ offer some progressive suggestions, and then move on. But this is not the approach of cultural criminology. To return again to the Iraq War and its aftermath - and thus to the various theoretical tropes that underpin our exploratory cultural criminology of war – I would argue that it was an intellectual failing of many commentators not to (at least) acknowledge the complexity of the events surrounding the occupation and the insurgency that followed. However badly the case for ‘regime change’ in Iraq was presented by the inept Bush-Cheney administration (or for that matter the Blair government in the UK), and irrespective of one’s overarching position regarding the merits and demerits of military intervention, one must not lose sight of the fact that, after the original target was toppled – Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime – a new and very dedicated enemy emerged to combat the Coalition occupation. It was an enemy whose ranks were swollen by non-Iraqi fighters who poured across the border, not just from Syria and Jordan, but from ostensible allies of the US/West such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – thousands of foreign fighters even travelled to Iraq from the UK and other EU states with large Muslim populations. Downplayed and even excused by certain prominent thinkers on the left (the American filmmaker Michael Moore stating that the Iraqi “resistance” was the equivalent of the Revolutionary Minutemen; while the British-Pakistani journalist Tariq Ali urged solidarity with the “insurgents”), was the fact that what groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq were resisting was not simply the Coalition, but democratization, a new constitution, and the newly-acquired power of the Iraqi Shia. Moreover, the immediate intention of AQI and the Sunni insurgents was not just to destabilize Iraq, but very precisely to create the stability of a theocratic Islamic Sharia state – an ideological position that eventually spawned Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s repressive Islamic State. In a rush to critique American and British militarism, too many commentators thus misunderstood the nature of the jihadi resistance in Iraq, construing it, falsely, as an essentially anti-imperialist movement.

In sharp contrast, any emerging cultural criminology of war would recognize the plurality and complexity of motivations behind war and insurgent (and counter-insurgent) activity and importantly that these motivations must not be misconstrued for polemical-political purposes (i.e. because foreign jihadists in Iraq were, in addition to killing civilians, targeting American soldiers, that they must be anti-imperialists - on the contrary, they were imperialists of the first order in their desire to recreate a global caliphate). Moreover, a cultural criminology
of war needs to recognize that any comprehensive account of why men and women engage in warfare must acknowledge the non-rational or irrational aspects of war-making, and especially the role of religion in this (something generally played down by luminaries of the left such as Naomi Klein and Noam Chomsky). Religion must not automatically be collapsed into politics and must be recognized as a powerful shaping force in itself. Cultural criminology is uniquely attuned to capture the potent appeal and allure of religious or theistic violence and the promise of transcendental bliss and heroic validation it offers (see Cottee, 2014). Indeed, it is to this very subject that I now turn.

**Cultural Criminology and Terrorism**

As the boundaries between crime, terrorism, state criminality, and sub-state conflict continue to blur – with ‘narco-terrorism’, illegal drone-strike assassinations, international financing for terrorist organisations, organised weapon trafficking, the opaque distinction in certain regions between hard-core insurrectionists and local criminal gangs -- the need for criminology to improve its dialogue with disciplines such as international relations and terrorism studies becomes ever-more acute. In this section I attempt to lend weight to this process by drawing on recent developments in terrorism studies so as to develop a tentative cultural criminology of terrorism. As a stand-alone discipline, terrorism studies is not without its problems. In particular, it is blighted by longstanding ideological schisms and scrapped over by a host of competing factions, from realist to anti-realist, orthodox to post-structural. My goal in this chapter is not to offer a broad overview of the field and its controversies; but instead to select a couple of key recent developments within terrorism studies that might best meet the needs of cultural criminology -- and especially the type of macro, meso, and micro approach outlined in the previous section.

One recent movement that has obvious application is the sub-field of ‘critical terrorism studies’ (CTS). Pushed forward by the herculean efforts of a small but determined group of scholars (e.g. Gunning 2007; Jackson 2007; Jackson et al 2009), CTS has carved out an impressive, if at times controversial, niche for itself within the broader discipline of international relations. Comparing CTS with cultural criminology, it’s clear that there are some striking similarities. To start, both subfields have established themselves as intellectual and theoretical counterpoints to many of the traditional orientations that inform their host discipline, and both proceed from the premise that there is an *in-built political dimension to knowledge production within their master subjects*. Put another way, each subfield is concerned that mainstream approaches to terrorism/crime are simply attempts to uphold and reify the political and economic ‘status quo’— that is, the existing power structures and socio-historical circumstances that constitute and define the respective problems in the first place. This challenge to what one might describe as state-centric disciplinary norms precipitates three further commonalities. First, both subfields express concern that putative ‘problem-solving’ approaches skew the respective discipline’s research agenda by over-emphasising obvious epiphenomenon at the expense of larger, more complex issues -- obvious examples being the heavy focus on the psychological motivations of Islamic suicide bombers rather than rigorous analyses of Middle Eastern history/politics/religious ideology in mainstream terrorism studies, and the prioritization of street-level surveillance by government criminologists at the expense of any substantive concern with corporate or white-collar crime. Second, both CTS scholars and cultural criminologists are highly critical of the way rational choice theory (RCT) has been...

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3 Critical terrorism studies is not without its critics, see for example, Horgan and Boyle (2008); Weinberg and Eubank (2008); and Joseph (2011) for thoughtful analyses.
taken up and utilised within their disciplines. Gunning (2009: 167), for example, worries that RCTs of terrorism overly stress the strategic ends/interests of militant groups, ‘with little reference to ideology, ideas, or identity’. Third, both subfields are concerned about the way purportedly ‘objective’ quantitative data increasingly operate as a ‘scientific’ façade fronting the public presentation of their respective disciplines (see Raphael, 2009: 50-51, 56-57; Sluka, 2009: 144).

These shared lines of critique are part of the reason why both cultural criminology and CTS are keen to subject their respective fields to multidisciplinary influence. Practically speaking, this manifests itself in CTS’s call for terrorism studies to engage more fully with disciplines such as anthropology (Sluka 2009), Middle East area studies (Dalacoura 2009), media studies (Jackson 2005), migration studies, gender studies (Sylvester and Parashar 2009), social psychology, and social movement theory (Gunning, 2009). Cultural criminology, meanwhile, has sought to engage with inter alia cultural geography, visual sociology, media and film studies, cultural anthropology, philosophy, genocide and war studies, and cultural and youth studies. Inevitably, much of this desire for intellectual pluralism can be attributed to the emphasis both place on meaning and the contested (cultural) construction of their particular objects of study - a position that no doubt provides succour to critics who see both sub-disciplines as overly discursive and lacking in materialist rigour. Yet, given the evolving nature of both terrorism and criminality, a strong emphasis on meaning and definitional ambiguity is arguably a strength when developing alternative explanations and advancing new conceptual frameworks. Consider, for example, David Kilcullen’s (2009) concept of the ‘accidental guerrilla’, a term used to describe the blurred boundaries in conflict settings between committed insurgents and self-interested local tribesmen, or the contested accounts of who (or indeed what) actually constitutes the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. Moreover, when it comes to developing analyses of state power - or, for that matter, of terrorist organisations that wish to confront and destabilize state power - based around the type of micro, meso, and macro framework outlined above, then an interdisciplinary focus is essential. Most obviously, whether it’s cultural criminology’s call for an enhanced visual criminology, or CTS’s keenness to appropriate content analysis and other methodological modes of ‘textual revelation’ from media studies, both subfields stress the multi-level influence of the media, whether as a tool for disseminating terroristic propaganda, or as a way of averting attention from the effects of so-called ‘state terrorism’ (Blakeley, 2009). Similarly, a shared interest in cultural anthropology also demands that ethnographers working in this area link their ‘ground up’ accounts with macro and meso-level theory. Jeffrey Sluka (2009: 153), for example, points out that, ‘anthropologists have made, and continue to make, a major contribution to CTS and our understanding of terrorism by studying it both as an empirical reality and political and cultural construction’. Likewise Ranstorp asserts that ‘cultural anthropology can provide a deeper granulated perspective into communicative aspects and symbolism’ of terrorist action (2009: 32; Sluka, 2008).

But enough conceptual talk about a disciplinary fusion of CTS and cultural criminology; what might a cultural criminology of terrorism actually look like? Most importantly, as already suggested, it must be capable of functioning at the macro, meso, and micro level. It must, as Martha Crenshaw famously put it, synthesize structural factors with an analysis of group dynamics, ideological influence, and individual incentives and personal motivations (Gunning, 2009: 166). It must also, as already stated, be open to interdisciplinarity – because this really is the only way to ensure a truly comprehensive understanding of how macro, meso and micro explanations impact on each other. So, for example, when we look at the econometric data on structural poverty that produces Palestinian support for Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam military brigades, we must also apply visual methods to analyse how martyr posters and billboards on
the streets of Gaza reproduce and cultivate a bizarre culture of street-level celebrity that aggrandises suicide bombing and other forms of *istishahad*. (And to think that some terrorism scholars claim there’s nothing intrinsically new or distinct about terrorist activity today). Similarly, when we (rightly) pose the geo-political question about whether Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries would have been the subject of so many US-backed interventions if their primary export was not oil but avocados, we should not end our analyses there. Instead, we must embark on further anthropologically and situationally attuned forms of research into local (micro) level considerations such as the particular techniques employed by occupying forces when patrolling unfamiliar neighbourhoods and gathering dynamic intelligence, or for that matter the pre-existing religious/sectarian schisms that might constitute the on-the-ground spatial reality of those neighbourhoods in the first place. Such a multi-dimensional approach to the study of terrorism closely mirrors cultural criminology’s approach to the study of criminality (i.e. one that conceptuallyises certain transgressive behaviours as attempts to resolve internal psychic/individual conflicts that are spawned by the wider environmental or structural conditions associated with late modernity). In what follows I offer for discussion a multi-level interpretation of contemporary Islamic Jihadism that nicely synthesises macro, meso, and micro level concerns. I recognise, of course, that numerous other forms and theatres of contemporary terrorist activity exist. However, it is terrorist activity associated with radical Jihad that is overwhelmingly the most prominent and potent contemporary manifestation, and hence I have selected it for discussion.

There is much that could be said about macro matters and terrorism. Many commentators, for example, (wrongly) account for the rise of Islamic terrorism by recourse solely to broad structural factors. It is a line of logic that has also long been a centrepiece in the U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, which includes the adjunct programme “War on Poverty” in an effort to reduce terrorism’s pool of support and recruitment (cited in Atran, 2004). However, even though it is a fact that most Islamic terrorists are certainly not suffering from economic deprivation (Gurr, 2007), it can still be conjectured that support for radical Islamism will be especially acute among those whose legitimate opportunities for achieving personal or community fulfilment are severely limited. Hence, renewed support for the extremist Muslim Brotherhood in today’s Egypt, or the increased recruitment to the Mahdi Army in post-invasion Iraq. This line of argument is the stock-in-trade of much orthodox terrorism studies. But as the social anthropologist Scott Atran and others have pointed out, such blunt structuralism does not account for why some individuals are drawn to adopting radical positions, while others reject violence and destruction. Likewise, the recent phenomenon of the ‘lone wolf terrorist’ (Spaaij, 2011; Michael, 2012) is also difficult to explain through a structural lens. At this point, it is important to augment macro analyses of Islamic terrorism by blending background problems (such as structurally-imposed poverty and social exclusion) with both meso-level (subcultural and ideological) and importantly micro-level (subjective and existential) triggers. The following account of a repugnant Islamic terrorist act that took place on the streets of Holland does precisely this.

In reviewing Ian Buruma’s book *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*, the criminologist Simon Cottee makes a number of interesting points; chief among them is the way Cottee uses subcultural criminological theory to augment Buruma’s biography of van Gogh’s murderer, the 26-year-old Moroccan-Dutchmen, Mohammed Bouyeri. Cottee’s starting point is Al Cohen’s 1955 subcultural classic, *Delinquent Boys: the Culture of the Gang*. Simply stated, Cohen’s aim was to understand how the delinquent street gang functioned, and why it is ‘distributed as it is within our social system’ (1955: 18). Among other observations, Cohen identified the “negativistic” quality of delinquency, remarking that the values of the gang are not merely at odds with the values of
‘respectable society’, they are a direct ‘inversion’ of them: ‘the delinquent subculture takes its norms from the larger culture but turns them upside down.’ This ‘reaction-formation’ establishes ‘a set of status criteria [“toughness”, “defiance” etc.] in terms of which the boy can more easily succeed… enabling him to retaliate against the norms at whose impact his ego has suffered’ (ibid, 168). As Cottee suggests: ‘The delinquent gang, then, is created to resolve the problem of status frustration among working-class boys. It is a collective “solution” to a structurally imposed “problem”’ (2009: 1126).

Returning to Murder in Amsterdam, Buruma claims that Bouyeri can be understood via similar psychosocial processes, specifically those of status-frustration and identity-confusion. His ambitions and aspirations blocked at every turn, Bouyeri’s life as a second-generation Muslim-immigrant in the Netherlands, was, as Buruma documents, a catalogue of failures and disappointments that made him at times resentful and angry.4 This status-frustration was intensified by Bouyeri’s identity-confusion - his double alienation from both the culture of his parents and the culture of mainstream Dutch society. Buruma’s portrayal of Bouyeri – following Magnus Enzensberger – is of a “radical loser”, someone who cannot ‘bear to live with themselves’, and (like Cohen’s gang members) wants to bring the rest of the community down with them. Yet, as Cottee infers from Buruma’s biography, figures like Bouyeri ‘can never entirely rid themselves of the suspicion that their predicament is self-inflicted, that they themselves are responsible for their humiliation, and they do not merit the esteem they crave’ (2009: 1127). It is at this point Cottee suggests that, like the delinquent gang for working class Americans, the subculture of jihadism serves ‘as a “solution” to the problems that young second-generation Muslim immigrants face in the advanced secular societies of the West: problems specifically bound up with status and identity’:

The jihadist subculture not only provides a potent vocabulary for expressing outright contempt for “Western” values – values that humiliatingly scorn and mock the jihadist, since they cannot live up to them; it also confers a heroic status upon its members, and legitimates violent revenge against the sources of their frustration. Moreover, it provides them with a powerful sense of identity, and an unambiguous and infallible guide for negotiating their lives in the face of the vertiginous array of choices and possibilities and temptations that advanced Western societies have to offer… Seen in this light, the roots of jihadism lie not in Islam, but in how Muslim men respond to personal feelings of failure over who or what they are. This does not mean that the ideology of violent Islam is causally unimportant: on the contrary, it provides the justifying and exculpatory narrative that enables jihadists to overcome civilised moral constraints. Buruma clearly recognises this, and gives the ideology its due causal weight as a device for harnessing and unleashing murderous rage. But he also recognises that jihadism has its roots in the subjective emotional experiences of the actual jihadists. (ibid)

In this important quotation, Cottee shows us how macro-level background problems bring about meso-level subcultural and ideological reactions. But although problematic, this relationship alone does not a terrorist make – for that, as I have argued elsewhere (Cottee and Hayward, 2011), we must also engage in a micro level analysis of terrorism.

At the micro level, cultural criminology has its roots in the dynamic nature of (individual) experience, as exemplified by the phenomenology of Jack Katz, the subterranean naturalism of David Matza, and the micro sociology of Erving Goffman. The goal of these scholars was to unearth the enigmatic human emotions and existential drives behind different modes of criminality. This interest in emotional behaviour was useful because it helped wrest

4 See relatedly Young (2007, chapter 8) for a related cultural criminological analysis of terrorism, the dialectics of ‘othering’, and life ‘inside and outside the First World’.

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the emotions back from the realm of psychopathology, but it also cemented the notion that emotions are situationally responsive and socially contingent; as Wayne Morrison (1995) suggests, emotions are ‘stimulated by cultural interpretation, and enjoyed or down-played in social interaction’. Cultural criminology has continued this tradition but importantly augmented it by balancing this focus on existential motivations with a concern for essential background factors (Ferrell, 1992: 118-119; Young 2003; Hayward, 2004: 152-166). Consider in this regard Mark Hamm’s (2013) concept of “the searcher”. Studying a number of terrorist attacks planned and instigated by ex-prisoners, Hamm became interested in a growing group of young men who had converted to radical forms of Islam whilst incarcerated in U.S. prisons. Overwhelmingly, the prisoners in his sample had previously been involved in both street gangs and/or prison gangs. Hamm concluded that their recent conversion to radical Islam was simply the next stop on the subcultural train, and that this latest ‘search for spirituality’ could be explained as an attempt ‘to interpret and resolve discontent’. These incarcerated jihadists, he concluded, have been “searching for a narrative” all of their (often chaotic) lives. In other words, whilst one needs to give the ideology of jihad its due causal weight as a device for harnessing and unleashing violence, one must also recognise that Western jihadism has its roots in the subjective emotional experiences of the actual jihadists. This line of argument can be expressed in another way. Traditional terrorism research has overwhelmingly tended to focus on two questions (1) how terrorists act; and (2) how terrorists think. In doing so, it has typically neglected a very important third question: how do terrorists feel? By adopting this focus, terrorism studies has prioritised ideology and instrumentality at the expense of emotionality. Thankfully, a second development in the field has emerged that prioritises the micro-level analysis of terrorism and thus addresses this shortcoming (see Atran, 2010; Post, 2005; Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Cottee, 2009; Wright-Neville and Smith, 2009; McBridge, 2011). Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward (2011) advance the possibility that terrorism is, or can be, as much an existential as a political phenomenon and that part of what makes it attractive as a behavioral activity is its allure as a life-mode or way of being. Drawing their empirical data from a range of disciplines such as war studies, sociology, criminology, and psychology, and subjects such as contract killing, street robbery, combat and terrorist biographies, they proffer three ‘terrorist (e)motives’ (the ‘e’ referring to existential): desire for excitement, desire for ultimate meaning, and desire for glory. Although terrorism is indisputably a political act, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that it also involves violence, and as such it ‘involves the deliberate infliction of physical harm or injury on human beings. To put it more strongly, terrorist acts are purposively designed to explode human bodies and tear limbs apart and shred flesh. Terrorist organizations consist of people whose primary aim is to orchestrate and carry out these acts. Terrorism is bloody, destructive and brutal; and terrorists are professional killers, the agents of physical harm and destruction. In order to properly understand terrorism, it is essential to fully recognize this - that terrorists are not just political agents, but also violent agents. This raises the possibility that part of the motivation behind terrorism lies in the various emotional experiences or sensual attractions associated with doing violent acts. Preeminent among these is excitement’ (Cottee and Hayward, 2011: 996).

DESIRE FOR EXCITEMENT:

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This logic was explored earlier in this chapter in relation to the allure of combat as articulated by the likes of Sebastian Junger and Chris Hedges. The question I now pose is: ‘are terrorists similarly enthralled and seduced by the mad excitement of violence?’ Drawing on Cottee and Hayward’s framework, I believe that at least some of them are -- something substantiated when one takes the time to read the autobiographical statements of actual terrorists.

In Memoirs of an Italian Terrorist, the author and former member of the terrorist group Brigate Rosse, who identifies himself only as “Giorgio” (presumably his nom de guerre), recalls an episode in which he shot a handgun at the police during a demonstration. Giorgio describes the moment just after he discharged his revolver: ‘I wasn’t even slightly afraid; I was running easily, with no effort. There was something behind me that I was running away from, but it wasn’t fear. My only thought was to reach the rest of the demonstration. But while I was running, one step after the other, my throat tightened with a secret, private feeling: I felt like laughing, smiling, jumping into the air’ (Giorgio, 2003: 79). Similarly emotive experiences are recalled by Michael Baumann, a leading member of the German June 2nd Movement, in his autobiography Terror or Love?: ‘We got the molotovs out of the car and threw them at the Springer trucks. That was really good... A lot of crazy shit happened that night: you got energy from it, a real high. Of course it was good too because there was a lot of humor, and that turned a lot of people on too’ (Baumann, 1979: 41).

Returning to contemporary Islamist terrorism, Aukai Collins, a former international jihadist and informer to the US government, is even more forthright on the pleasures of violent combat. Describing his first firefight against Russian troops in Chechnya, he writes: ‘As we ran I felt the blood coursing through my veins with every heartbeat, felt every breath I took, felt the sweat run down my face. I’d never felt so alive. This was real. There wasn’t any other way than this’, concluding later, ‘In Chechnya I’d loved to walk point and had even lost my leg to it, but here I was again. Most fools love war until they experience it. On that day I realized that I was among the strange few who knew war and loved it nonetheless’ (Collins, 2006: 72, 203). Such personal commentaries suggest that

the excitement of violence derives in part from its emotional intensity and the heightened state of consciousness which this produces. Because of its dangers and risks, violence reawakens and arouses our senses, delivering that convulsion of adrenaline which makes it so compellingly attractive, even addictive’ (Cottee and Hayward 2011: 969).

Add to this the excitement and enhanced sense of self that stems from the clandestine activities associated with terrorism, such as recruiting willing accomplices, planning the attack, avoiding detection, gathering illegal information on bomb-making or weaponry, even the drama and adventure of travelling overseas, and it’s clear that terrorism provides limitless opportunities for an elevated, and emotionally-charged mode of being.

For the likes of “Giorgio”, Michael Baumann, Aukai Collins, and a number of other terrorists who have left behind traces of autobiography (see e.g. the 1,500-page manifesto of the Norwegian terrorist, Anders Breivik; and Sandberg (2013) for a commentary), terrorism and excitement are inextricably linked. Moreover, and here we return to the broader social theoretical territory evoked above by Morrison and Mark Hamm’s concept of “the searcher”, this search for excitement is frequently bound up with a search for ontological security. Put differently, if, as Michael Baumann suggest, terrorists are indeed “yearning for something”, then perhaps we should also consider the possibility that much terrorist ideology is simply an
exculpatory narrative used by individuals to both justify their acts and provide a further sense of *existential meaning*.

**DESIRE FOR ULTIMATE MEANING:**

In addition to existential certainty, the terrorist group also provides its members with a sense of *ultimate meaning*: that is, the feeling that one is an active participant in a cosmic battle to defend the sacred... In defending the sacred, one experiences something larger than him- or herself, a meaning that gloriously soars above and renders insignificant one’s own often frivolous and banal personal concerns. One experiences an ultimate meaning and purpose for which to live and even die’ (Cottee and Hayward, 2011: 973).

Given that the vast majority of terrorists operate in groups, cells and insurgent militias, service to the sacred necessarily involves the defence of both the cause (Islam, the Nation, the Oppressed) and one’s comrades. This latter concern is especially important in that it highlights the issue of group fidelity and the satisfaction derived from dedicating one’s life to an ideological calling or brotherhood. Again, a parallel with military combat is instructive. We know from historical studies (such as those conducted on the Nazi soldiers who “stubbornly fought to the end”) that what typically galvanizes combat troops is not abstract notions of nationhood or political ideology, but the more personal and emotional ties that bind soldiers as friends and comrades. This sense of fierce commitment to each other has been described by Sebastian Junger in his book *War* as not just the deep affection forged in combat, but a form of love (Junger, 2010: 239). Might this focus on the emotions of frontline combat troops also tell us something about terrorist group dynamics? (Lest we forget, countless terrorists have throughout history defined themselves as soldier combatants in a ‘just war’ against an evil adversary). After all, like combat soldiers, terrorists often function as part of a tightly-knit unit; on joining the organisation they are stripped of their status and asked to give up aspects of their previous lifestyle; and most importantly, they are asked to make a commitment that could result in death and destruction. Such comparisons, as Cottee and Hayward suggest, bear serious examination:

Research on the motivations behind terrorism tends to focus on the role of the negative emotions and terrorists in this literature are commonly portrayed as pitiable figures: humiliated, frustrated, alienated, angry or hateful. These portrayals, in the specific cases to which they are applied, may well be valid. But it is also possible that in yet other cases terrorist actors may be animated by *positive* emotions, such as love, solidarity and compassion. Perhaps it is morally troubling to suggest that terrorists are activated by love, in the same way that it is morally troubling to describe them as courageous. But it may well be empirically valid in specific cases, and deserves greater exploration as a possible source of terrorist motivation. It may also help bring into focus one of the core existential attractions of terrorism: namely, violent struggle and self-sacrifice in service to the sacred’ (2011: 975).

**DESIRE FOR GLORY:**

Contributing to an Internet forum on August 7, 2006, the American jihadi Omar Hammami, wrote: ‘Where is the desire to do something amazing? Where is the urge to get up

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6 For example, in their research on Palestinian suicide terrorism, Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg (2003) suggest that altruism, in conjunction with fatalistic despair, is a significant motive for Palestinian suicide terrorists.
and change yourself - not to mention the world and other issues further off? Stop sticking to the earth and let your soul fly!\textsuperscript{7} Such statements provide a striking example of Cottee and Hayward’s third ‘terrorist (e)motive’ - the desire for glory, or more specifically, the idea of terrorism as an identity project, a deeply flawed form of self-affirmation. The thinking here is that terrorists may be using violent, revengeful ideological narratives to give dramatic expression to their sense of who they are and what they aspire to be. Might it not be the case then, for example, that, ‘part of what makes terrorist groups attractive is the scope they offer their members to define or remake themselves as heroic figures, belonging to an exalted elite’? In recent years, a number of terrorist scholars have begun to develop this line of argument specifically, but not exclusively, in relation to suicide bombers and Salafi-jihadists (see for example Oliver and Steinberg (2005); Sageman (2010); Kruglanski et al (2009); and relatedly Juergensmeyer (2001)). Cottee and Hayward draw on such work to argue that at least some of the appeal of travelling to places such as Syria, Somalia, and the Yemen in a bid to wage international jihad in the name of Allah and the restoration of the Caliphate, is the opportunity to become an elevated righteous warrior, a heroic figure in a cosmic struggle. Suicide bombers similarly feel a sense of ennoblement:

From the moment they accept their mission to the moment they carry it out, the suicide bomber experiments with and actively takes on a new identity as a holy warrior and martyr-in-waiting. Thus, intriguingly and paradoxically, in doing a suicide mission the suicide bomber is simultaneously engaged in an act of self-destruction and an act of self-recreation’ (2011: 976).

Perhaps the most important statement on such matters, though, has been made by Marc Sagemen who controversially applies the label “terrorist wannabes” to young men drawn in by jihadi propaganda:

They dream about becoming heroes in this ‘War against Islam,’ modelling themselves on the seventh century Muslim warriors that conquered half the world and the Mujahedin who defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Many hope to emulate these predecessors by fighting in Iraq against coalition forces. Their interpretation, that the West is involved in a ‘War against Islam,’ is just a sound bite and has little depth to it. People bombing Western cities and volunteering for Iraq are not interested in theological debates but in living out their heroic fantasies. (Sageman, 2010: 31)

As Sageman suggests, the key to understanding the behavior of many of today’s jihadis is to be found not in how they think but in how they feel – especially about themselves and their place in the world. In other words, rather than simply repeating the approach followed by many terrorism scholars (and now many criminologists working on terrorism) and seeking to normalize the terrorist agent, the more urgent task is to humanize him. For as I mentioned above, at the end of the day it is people that plant bombs and behead prisoners, and therefore it is essential we understand the personal and interactional variables that compel individuals and groups to undertake terrorist violence. It may be an unpalatable thought, but there is a warped creativity associated with many terrorist acts (Hughes, 2011), just as there is an exuberant, carnivalesque element to systematic violence and barbarism. Not recognising this, and instead continuing to view the perpetrators of these acts simply as cognitive ciphers, is an intelligence failing indeed.

\textsuperscript{7} Quoted in Elliott (2010).
CONCLUSION: POSSIBILITIES AND PROVOCATIONS

Today’s world of international conflict is fast changing and complex, wracked by such problems as the unfettered development of private military power (Balko, 2014) and the dangerous revival of interest in orthodox religious doctrines that run against the grain of enlightenment and reason (Cottee, 2014). As such, it becomes all the more important that we develop a criminology capable of understanding the social havoc that such developments cause. In doing so, we must always remain vigilant when critiquing the processes by which war crimes are defined and constructed, and state power is attained and enforced. But equally we must also guard against the tendency to focus only on the existing power structures and socio-historical contingencies that constitute state power, lest our analyses become blunt or one-dimensional. On the contrary, as I have stated throughout this chapter, our approach to this field of study is constituted from the macro, micro and meso levels in an on-going process of intellectual cross-fertilization in which each level incorporates something of the other, informs the other’s development, and so becomes more than any level could singly.

Thankfully, this process is already well underway, as cultural criminologists from around the world undertake their own multi-level syntheses of state, war, and terrorism-related concerns. From Wayne Morrison’s (2004, 2006) use of photographs and paintings to uncover the truth behind criminology’s studied neglect of genocide and state crime in modernity, to Tyler Wall’s (2013; Wall and Monahan, 2011) research on drone surveillance and other M.O.U.T (military operations in urban terrain) technologies now being used by domestic police forces, to the growing body of work on walling, rampart construction, and the interlocking systems of fortification associated with today’s divisive inter and intra state territoriality – a virulently process underway everywhere from Baghdad to Botswana, from the West Bank to West Hollywood (Caldeira, 2001; Davis, 2005; Lara, 2011; Zeiderman, 2013; Brown, 2010; Hayward, 2012: 453-55). But these are just the opening salvos in what must be a longer and wider-ranging campaign, not least because there is so much to be studied. Torture, the systematic rape of civilian women by military personnel, the use of social media by terrorists and insurrectionists, the staged performativity of Jihadi beheadings, the list goes on. As criminologists, we have no choice but to study such phenomena.

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