



Corruption and mental health

Evidence from Vietnam

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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jeboCorruption and mental health: Evidence from Vietnam[☆]Smriti Sharma^a, Saurabh Singhal^b, Finn Tarp^{c,*}^a Newcastle University & IZA, United Kingdom^b Lancaster University & IZA, United Kingdom^c University of Copenhagen, Denmark

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ABSTRACT

While there is substantial corruption in developing countries, the costs imposed by corruption on individuals and households are little understood. This study examines the relationship between exposure to local corruption and mental health, as measured by depressive symptoms. We use two large data sets – one cross-sectional and one panel – collected across rural Vietnam. After controlling for individual and regional characteristics, we find strong and consistent evidence that day-to-day petty corruption is positively associated with psychological distress. Our results are robust to a variety of specification checks. Further, we find that the relationship between corruption and mental health is stronger for women, and that there are no heterogeneous effects by poverty status. An examination of the underlying mechanisms shows that reductions in income and trust associated with higher corruption may play a role. Finally, using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, we also provide suggestive evidence that a recent high profile anti-corruption campaign had significant positive effects on mental health. Overall, our findings indicate that there may be substantial psychosocial and mental health benefits from efforts to reduce corruption and improve rural governance structures.

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1. Introduction

Corruption is widespread in developing countries and there is universal agreement that corruption needs to be addressed to achieve inclusive economic growth (Olken and Pande, 2012). Reflecting this concern, combating corruption is a target under the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the gamut of costs imposed by corruption on individuals is little understood. In this paper, we assess the relationship between petty corruption and mental health in a developing country.

Being a victim of petty corruption can affect mental health for a variety of reasons. First, in low-income countries, harassment bribes represent a form of regressive income tax and are usually a non-trivial part of one's income, especially for

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poorer households. For instance, using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, Bai et al. (2019) find that even within countries, smaller firms pay higher bribes as a proportion of their income. Bribes therefore worsen economic conditions, and income loss has been shown to be detrimental to one's mental health (Adhvaryu et al., 2019; Christian et al., 2019).¹ Second, the element of arbitrariness and uncertainty in bribe payments (the target, frequency and size of bribe) also creates anxiety, and can be particularly damaging for poor households.²

Third, harassment bribes induce feelings of helplessness and disenfranchisement as access to essential services such as health, education and public administration is dictated by the bribe-seeker who is a corrupt public official. This erodes trust in local governance and accountability structures, and/or reduces social capital in communities, thereby worsening mental health (Tavits, 2008). Finally, experiences of corruption may also reduce one's returns to labour effort through expropriation of resources, induce pessimistic beliefs about oneself, and lead to adverse mental health. de Quidt and Haushofer (2019) argue that this could also result in a 'depression poverty trap'.

Using first-hand cross-sectional and panel data collected across rural Vietnam, we find consistent evidence that day-to-day petty corruption is positively associated with psychological distress as measured by CES-D, a standard depression index. We find that a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 7–12 percent increase in the CES-D index and a 20–24 percent increase in the likelihood of exhibiting severe symptoms of depression. These results are robust to controlling for several individual and community characteristics and a number of other checks. We also address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias using the test outlined in Oster (2019). The main mechanisms through which corruption appears to affect mental health are a loss of income and decline in trust. Worryingly, we also find the negative association between corruption and mental health to be stronger for women. We also examine the effects of anti-corruption efforts on mental health. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary launched an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign in 2016, which resulted in several high-profile arrests and disciplining of government officials. Exploiting variation in exposure to corruption at the start of the campaign, we provide suggestive evidence that this anti-corruption campaign had positive effects on mental health.

This paper contributes to two broad strands of research. The first is the literature examining the effects of corruption. Most studies have documented costs of corruption on economic growth, investment, provision of public goods, and firm profitability and innovation (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Paunov, 2016; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; O'Toole and Tarp, 2014). However, only a few recent studies exist that have examined the link between corruption and mental health. Using cross-country data from Europe and Africa, these papers find a negative association between society-level and directly experienced corruption and indicators of mental wellbeing (Gillanders, 2016; Van Deurzen, 2017).³ Our study uses individual and household-level data from one country and allows us to control for common influences at either the household or the village level. This is an improvement over other studies that pool data from a variety of countries and can only control for common country-level factors, which are not sufficiently disaggregated. This study is also the first to examine the potential effects of anti-corruption efforts on mental health. In doing so, it contributes to a nascent literature studying the effects of anti-corruption policies (e.g., Avis et al. (2018); Xu and Yano (2017)).

Secondly, we contribute to the emerging literature on the causes of poor mental health in developing countries. Poor mental health and associated disorders are an important component of the disease burden in developing countries (WHO, 2017). Those with mental health problems are less likely to engage in the labour market and have lower labour productivity (Frijters et al., 2014). Previous studies have found negative effects of economic shocks such as exposure to financial crises, jobs and income loss, and lack of access to social protection on mental health (e.g., Adhvaryu et al. (2019); Baird et al. (2013); Friedman and Thomas (2008); Marcus (2013)). Similarly, other socioeconomic conditions such as conflict and crime have also been found to adversely affect mental health (Dustmann and Fasani, 2016; Singhal, 2019). Studies also show that poverty or material deprivation affects cognitive bandwidth and functioning (Mani et al., 2013; Schilbach et al., 2016). Given that government corruption is distinctly higher in poorer countries, the poverty-cognition link could be exacerbated by corruption, thereby imposing a cost on mental health in developing countries.

Vietnam provides a relevant context for this study. Since the initiation of the *Doi Moi* reforms in 1986, Vietnam has made impressive gains in economic and social well-being, headlined by a dramatic fall in poverty (McKay et al., 2018). However, the reforms (privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, etc.) that shifted the economy from a state-led one to one relying on the private sector, also likely had some negative side effects. First, the country ranks among the most corrupt and least transparent in the world. The main forms of corruption in Vietnam are grease money to provide basic tasks or services, the illegal privatisation of state property, and the selling of state power. The first, i.e., petty corruption for accessing basic public goods and services, is the most dominant and visible (Bai et al., 2019). In 2017, Vietnam was ranked 107 out of 180 countries on Transparency International's index of perceived corruption in the public sector and had a score well below the average. Corruption is also an important part of the cost of doing business (Gueorguiev and Malesky, 2012; Rand and Tarp, 2012). For instance, Gueorguiev and Malesky (2012) show that 35 percent of Vietnamese businesses paid bribes

¹ By worsening the supply of public goods such as access to healthcare, corruption, due to misallocation of resources, may also lead to poorer physical and mental health (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008; Dincer and Teoman, 2019).

² Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (1997) argue that the uncertainty characterizing corrupt transactions could also be of first-order importance in deterring investment.

³ There is also some work showing that corruption negatively affects life satisfaction and happiness (Sulemana et al., 2017; Tavits, 2008).

to compete for government procurement contracts, 23 percent paid bribes to expedite business registration, and 70 percent paid bribes during customs procedures.

Second, improvements in the Vietnamese health sector have not kept pace with the needs of the rapidly growing economy, and mental health has not been a priority area. While prevalence of mental disorders is not estimated to be disproportionate to those in other neighbouring countries (Vuong et al., 2011), there is unequal access to mental healthcare services and primary care providers are inadequately trained (WHO, 2006; Giang et al., 2010). Results of this study can help inform policy regarding the allocation of resources for mental healthcare.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and the empirical specification. Section 3 presents the main results and Section 4 describes additional analyses of heterogeneity, underlying mechanisms, and the effects of the anti-corruption campaign. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.

2. Data and estimation strategy

2.1. Vietnam social capital study

The first dataset was collected as part of an experimental study (Vietnam Social Capital Study, VSCS henceforth) conducted in May–June 2017 in 56 rural communes across 22 provinces in the Red River Delta (in northern Vietnam) and Mekong River Delta (in southern Vietnam) (see Markussen et al. (2020) for details). Fig. A1 in the online Appendix depicts the survey provinces. We obtained listings of households in the communes, and the study team contacted the households to advertise the study and to encourage participation. Two sessions with 12 subjects each were organized in each commune, leading to a sample of 1344 subjects.

After the experiments, enumerators conducted individual face-to-face interviews with all subjects to complete a post-experiment questionnaire. This collected information on background characteristics such as age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status and asset ownership.

As part of the post-experiment questionnaire, respondents were presented with statements to elicit individual exposure to and experiences of corruption in the public sector at the local government level with specific reference to bribery to obtain land titles, to get a government job, to receive medical treatment etc.⁴ Respondents were asked how much they agreed with each of the six presented statements on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘agree completely’, 2 meant ‘somewhat agree’, 3 meant ‘disagree’ and 4 meant ‘disagree completely’. We recode responses to each statement as 1 if the subject indicates agreement (i.e., agree completely or somewhat agree) and 0 otherwise, and then construct the individual-level corruption index as the sum of the responses to these six statements. We standardize the corruption index (by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation) and use that as our key explanatory variable.

To measure mental health of the respondents, the questionnaire also included a module on the Center for the Epidemiological Studies of Depression scale (CES-D). The original CES-D scale consisting of 20 items was developed by Radloff (1977) as a screening tool to measure depressive symptoms and a number of epidemiological studies show that it strongly predicts clinical diagnoses of depression and anxiety disorders (Weissman et al., 1977). We use the modified 10-item short-form version developed by Andresen et al. (1994).⁵ This version of the CES-D has been shown to have good psychometric properties in a variety of contexts (Andresen et al., 1994; Björngvinsson et al., 2013; Boey, 1999; Kilburn et al., 2018).

Respondents were asked to indicate how often they had certain feelings in the last week on a 0–3 scale - “never (0 days in a week)”, “sometimes (1–2 days of the week)”, “often (3–4 days of the week)”, and “all the time (5–7 days of the week)”. A higher CES-D score reflects poorer mental health. We use the CES-D scale to construct two dependent variables. First, we use the composite score of the 10 questions (ranging from 0 to 30). Second, the cutoff of 10 (out of a maximum of 30) has been recommended as an indicator for the presence of significant depressive symptoms (Andresen et al., 1994; Björngvinsson et al., 2013; Boey, 1999). We use this threshold to construct a dummy variable, “severe depressive symptoms, that takes the value 1 for CES-D scores greater than or equal to 10, and 0 otherwise. This latter measure of mental health has been used widely in other studies (e.g., Angeles et al. (2019); de Quidt and Haushofer (2019); Singhal (2019)).

We exclude a small number of subjects with missing responses to the depressive symptoms module, the corruption statements, or the socioeconomic characteristics. This results in a sample of 1318 respondents in the VSCS.

2.2. Vietnam access to resources household survey

The second data we use are the 2016 and 2018 waves of the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS hereafter). The VARHS is a long-running panel survey of almost 3500 rural households conducted every second year since

⁴ These statements are listed in Table A1 in the online Appendix. These statements were taken from a summary indicator of the quality of governance titled ‘Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index’ (PAPI). This index is constructed annually from surveys conducted across Vietnam, to measure the performance of central and local governments in governance, public administration and public service delivery. Results from list experiments conducted to elicit people’s experiences of corruption show trends similar to those using the battery of six statements (CECODES et al., 2019).

⁵ CES-D short-form questions are provided in Table A2 in the online Appendix.

2006 in 12 provinces across Vietnam (see [Ayala-Cantu et al. \(2017\)](#) for details). Fig. A2 in the online Appendix depicts the survey provinces. Mental health is measured in the VARHS 2016 and 2018 waves using the 10-item CES-D index. The CES-D is only administered to the primary respondent of the household, i.e., the household head or his/her spouse in most cases. With these data, we also construct the composite CES-D index score as well as the “severe depressive symptoms” dummy variable as the outcome variables.

With regards to corruption, all households that reported operating at least one non-farm enterprise are asked how large a cost corruption imposed on their enterprise. The responses are on a 4-point scale where 1 meant “very large”, 2 meant “large”, 3 meant “small” and 4 meant “no effect”. For ease of interpretation, we construct a continuous measure of “corruption costs” by reverse coding these responses to range from 0 to 3 where 0 indicates “no effect” and 3 indicates “very large” effects. In the regression analysis we use the standardized version of this corruption measure as the explanatory variable.

Finally, we use a balanced panel, only keeping households that operate a household enterprise in both rounds. This yields a sample of 956 observations across both rounds. We discuss concerns related to attrition in [Section 3.2](#).

2.3. Estimation strategy

We use OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between corruption and mental health in the VSCS data using the following equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Corr}_{ij} + \sum_{l=2}^K \alpha_l X_{ij} + v_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where, Y_{ij} is the outcome measure for individual i residing in commune j . The two outcomes are the composite CES-D score and the “severe depressive symptoms” indicator, as measured in the first dataset. The coefficient α_1 captures the association between corruption experiences (Corr_{ij}) and mental well-being. X_{ij} includes individual-level controls such as age, gender (takes a value 1 for female), education (takes a value 1 for those who have completed high school), marital status (takes a value 1 if married), ethnicity (takes a value 1 for the ethnic majority Kinh), poverty status (takes a value 1 for those classified as poor by the government), and household’s asset ownership. In addition, we include commune fixed effects (v_j) to account for common factors that affect all individuals within a commune (such as infrastructure, ethnic composition). Finally, ϵ_{ij} corresponds to a random error term. We allow for arbitrary correlation at the level of the commune by clustering the standard errors at the commune level.

In the estimations above, we do not make claims of causality. While we have controlled for all common commune-level factors and several individual-level observables, there may be individual-level unobserved factors that could influence mental health and be related to corruption experiences (e.g., household structure). Similarly, the OLS estimate of α_1 may also be biased due to reverse causality if respondents with poorer mental health are more likely to recall the incidence of corruption. We attempt to reduce this bias by using the VARHS panel data to estimate the following household fixed effects model:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CC}_{it} + \beta_2 T_t + \sum_{l=3}^K \beta_l X_{it} + \eta_i + v_{it} \quad (2)$$

where, Y_{it} is the mental health of the primary respondent in household i at time t . CC_{it} is the self-reported cost of corruption on the household enterprise at time t , and the parameter of interest is β_1 . The vector X_{it} includes respondent characteristics such as gender (takes a value 1 for female), age, marital status (takes a value 1 if married), education (takes a value 1 for those who have completed primary school), poverty status (takes a value 1 if the household is classified as poor by the government authorities), and indicator variables to control for time-varying household exposure to the following shocks in the preceding two years: natural disasters (floods, droughts, etc.), pest attacks, and health shocks (death or illness of a household member). All household-specific time-invariant characteristics are captured by the household fixed effect, η_i . By conditioning on household fixed effects, we are only exploiting within-household variation in the burden of corruption to estimate the relationship with mental health. Moreover, this strategy eliminates regional effects that are unlikely to change over the two-year survey period (e.g., access to healthcare) and are potentially correlated with both mental health and corruption. We also control for any unobserved country-wide macroeconomic conditions at the time of the surveys using year fixed effects (T_t). v_{it} is an idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard errors at the household-level to allow household responses to be correlated over time.

One may be concerned about the interpretation of results as both mental health and corruption measures are self-reported. First, if measurement error in the dependent variables is random, then it will only reduce the precision of the estimates, without biasing the results. Second, if there is random error in the explanatory variable or if there is a general tendency to under-report corruption, then the results will be biased towards zero. Furthermore, to the extent that the reporting bias is constant over time, the household fixed effects used in [Eq. \(2\)](#) would account for it. Still, measurement error could be a concern if it is correlated with respondent characteristics. We discuss this further in [Section 3.2](#).

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive statistics

Summary statistics of the VSCS dataset are presented in Table 1. Fig. A3 in the online Appendix presents the distribution of the CES-D scores for the analysis sample. The Cronbach's α of the CES-D inventory – i.e., how closely related a set of items are as a group – is 0.66, which indicates a reasonably high level of internal consistency. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average score on the CES-D is 5.05 for the sample and 12 percent of the sample exhibits severe depressive symptoms.

Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the corruption indicators, the key explanatory variables. Agreement with the various indicators of corruption differs across the measures. We find that 37 percent of the sample believes that bribes are required to get a government job. A correspondingly high percentage of respondents believe that bribes are required in the health and education sectors (32 and 25 percent, respectively).

Finally, Panel C shows summary statistics for the other covariates used in the analysis.⁶ Overall, the sample of subjects is well-balanced in terms of gender with 52 percent of subjects being female. The average age is around 38 years while 81 percent were married. Approximately 54 percent of the sample had completed high school education. On average, households these subjects belonged to owned 9 out of 16 assets listed in the questionnaire.⁷ Around 8 percent of them were classified as being poor according to the government authorities. Ninety-three percent of the sample belonged to the Kinh majority ethnic group.⁸

Summary statistics of the VARHS data are presented in Table A4 of the online Appendix. We find that for the balanced panel of households that operated non-farm enterprises in 2016 and 2018, mental health improved and the costs of corruption declined over time. The average score on the CES-D declined by 22 percent from 6.94 in 2016 to 5.42 in 2018. Similarly, the proportion of households exhibiting severe depressive symptoms fell by 38 percent from 0.26 in 2016 to 0.16 in 2018. Correspondingly, the average costs of corruption index fell 28 percent from 0.5 to 0.36 during the same period. While *prima facie*, the decline in corruption costs may have contributed to decline in the CES-D index, other factors such as a decline in the incidence of health shocks and poverty over the same period may also have played a role in the improvements in mental health. As discussed later in Section 4.3, the government also started an anti-corruption campaign which may also be a contributing factor. Therefore, to isolate the relationship between corruption and mental health, we undertake regression analyses that allow us to control for a host of other factors.

We graphically examine the association between corruption and mental health using the VSCS dataset in Fig. 1. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the relationship between corruption and CES-D index and with likelihood of severe depressive symptoms respectively. Both figures show a clear positive relationship, indicating that psychological stress increases with corruption.

3.2. Regression analyses and robustness

Table 2 shows the key results of the paper using the VSCS dataset. The dependent variable in column 1 is the CES-D index. In column 2 the dependent variable is an indicator for severe depressive symptoms. As shown in both columns, corruption is positively and significantly associated with the mental health index. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the corruption index increases the CES-D score by 0.6 units, and the likelihood of severe depressive symptoms by 2.4 percentage points. Given a sample mean of 5.02 for the CES-D index and 12 percent for severe depressive symptoms, this translates into a 12 percent and a 20 percent increase, respectively.

These results are robust to the inclusion of controls in columns 3 and 4. We also find that females have lower mental health relative to males. This is supported by global evidence on the female mental health penalty (WHO, 2017) and other studies in Vietnam (Giang et al., 2010; Leggett et al., 2012). We also find that individuals from poor households report significantly lower mental health. This is in line with a large emerging literature that finds income losses to worsen mental health, and that cash transfers and other social security schemes improve mental health (Angeles et al., 2019; Baird et al., 2013; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016).

The results in Table 2 are also robust to a number of sensitivity checks. First, we address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias using the approach of Oster (2019). In the lower panel of Table 2, we report δ , i.e., the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that would be required to fully attribute our results to omitted variable bias. The absolute values of δ are high and exceed the cutoff value of 1 indicating that it is unlikely that unobserved factors are that much more important than the observables included in our specification. Further, assuming

⁶ Table A3 in the online Appendix shows the means of the observed characteristics of the VSCS sample and those of the rural population of the same 22 provinces as computed from the Vietnam Household and Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2016. We find that the two samples are quite similar though the VSCS experiment subjects are more educated. That there is positive selection based on education into participation in such experiments has also been shown in other work.

⁷ The questionnaire elicited whether households owned each of the following assets: bicycle, black and white TV, colour TV, scooter/motorcycle/moped, landline telephone, mobile phone, electric fan, radio/stereo, pump set, refrigerator, computer/laptop, internet access, washing machine, cooler/air conditioner, car/truck/van, and flush toilet.

⁸ There are 54 officially recognized ethnic groups in Vietnam. The Kinh, the ethnic majority, constitute around 85 per cent of the population. The ethnic minorities largely reside in the Central Highlands and the Northern Uplands, and are therefore, slightly underrepresented in this sample.




Fig. 1. Relationship between mental health and different levels of corruption. Notes: Authors’ illustration based on the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) data. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥ 10 .

Table 1
Summary statistics.

	Mean	SD
Panel A: Mental health outcomes		
CES-D index	5.02	3.71
Severe Depressive Symptoms	0.12	0.32
Panel B: Corruption variables		
Officials divert funds for private benefit	0.16	0.37
Bribes for land titles	0.28	0.45
Bribes in hospitals	0.32	0.47
Bribes to school teachers	0.25	0.44
Bribes for construction permits	0.20	0.40
Bribes for govt. jobs	0.37	0.48
Corruption index	1.59	1.77
Panel C: Control variables		
Female	0.52	0.50
Age	38.74	10.59
Kinh	0.93	0.25
Completed High School	0.54	0.50
Poor Household	0.08	0.27
Number of assets	9.04	2.60
Married	0.81	0.39
Observations	1318	

Notes: This table is based on the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) data. The maximum possible score on CES-D index is 30. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥ 10 . The maximum number of assets is 16. Poor household is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor by the government. Kinh is an indicator variable for the ethnic majority group.

that unobservables matter as much as observables, the bias-adjusted treatment effect (β) are similar to the coefficients in the controlled regressions (setting maximum R-squared at 1.3 times the R-squared from the regressions that control for observables). These statistics rule out the concern that unobservables may be driving our results.

Second, we check whether the results are driven by a particular component of the mental health index. Results in Table A5 in the online Appendix show that exposure to corruption is significantly related to eight of the ten components.

Third, we also check the robustness of the result to a principal component analysis of the CES-D questions, where we retain the first component. Using the standardized value of this component as the dependent variable, we once again find exposure to corruption to be significantly related to lower mental health (β (s.e.) = 0.19(0.03)).

Table 2
Corruption and mental health: VSCS data.

	CES-D Index (1)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (2)	CES-D Index (3)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (4)
Corruption index (z-score)	0.603*** (0.101)	0.024** (0.011)	0.621*** (0.096)	0.028** (0.011)
Female			0.620*** (0.163)	0.052*** (0.018)
Age			0.017 (0.012)	0.003** (0.001)
Kinh			-0.237 (0.683)	0.013 (0.060)
Completed High School			0.192 (0.217)	-0.002 (0.018)
Poor Household			0.817** (0.373)	0.067* (0.036)
Number of assets			-0.090 (0.056)	-0.007 (0.005)
Married			-1.314*** (0.305)	-0.089*** (0.027)
Commune Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oster test: δ	-59.562	-11.092	-57.834	-7.794
Oster test: β	0.652	0.027	0.677	0.033
Mean of dep. var.	5.02	0.12	5.02	0.12
N	1318	1318	1318	1318

Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥ 10 . Poor household is an indicator variable for respondent's household being classified as poor by the government. The lower panel reports δ and β based on the test prescribed by Oster (2019), with maximum R-squared set at 1.3 times the R-squared from the regressions using controls. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Fourth, we check if the results are sensitive to the construction of the corruption index (Table A6 of the online Appendix). Instead of recoding the six corruption statements into binary indicators, we use the corruption statements on the original 1–4 scale where 1 indicates complete disagreement and 4 indicates complete agreement. The index is then formed by summing all responses and ranges from 6 to 24, and then standardized. In columns 1 and 2, we find that corruption continues to be significantly associated with poorer mental health. It is also possible that our results are driven by some respondents who report high levels of corruption. To check for this, we construct a corruption dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports any level of agreement with any of the corruption statements and 0 otherwise. This binary measure also mitigates concerns about the endogeneity of lower mental health and corruption. This is because one channel of reverse causality arises from the possibility that people with worse mental health may report a higher level of agreement with the corruption statements than they would have otherwise. The dummy variable should minimize this particular problem as it measures corruption experience in a binary manner. Once again, we find that our results are robust to this reclassification of the corruption measure (columns 3 and 4).

Fifth, we have so far assumed that all dimensions of corruption have a similar relationship with mental stress. We now relax this assumption by considering each of the six corruption measures individually in Tables A7 and A8 in the online Appendix. All six corruption measures are associated with an increase in the CES-D index (Table A7). Similarly, in Table A8 we find that 4 out of the 6 corruption measures are significantly associated with an increase in the probability of severe depressive symptoms.

Further, we corroborate our findings using an alternative data set (VARHS) and estimation strategy. We use a balanced panel of households that operated a household enterprise in 2016 and 2018 and apply a fixed effects model (Eq. 2) outlined in Section 2.3 to estimate results exploiting within-household variation in exposure to corruption over time. The main explanatory variable is a standardized measure of the intensity of the costs of corruption. The results using these data and estimation strategy are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. We find that a 1 standard deviation increase in the costs of corruption is positively associated with a 0.45 unit increase in the CES-D index score (or a 7.2 percent increase over the sample mean). In column 2 we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in severe depressive symptoms. Given a sample mean of 21 percent, this translates into a 23.8 percent increase. These results are fairly similar to those noted above in Table 2.

We also construct a variable that takes a value 1 if the household reports any costs of corruption and use that as the explanatory variable in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. These results show that corruption reduces mental health at the extensive margin as well. Using the Oster (2019) method mentioned above, we once again find that unobservables are unlikely to play a role in explaining these results (lower panel of Table 3).

Table 3
Corruption and mental health: VARHS Data .

	CES-D Index (1)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (2)	CES-D Index (3)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (4)
Corruption costs (z-score)	0.453** (0.197)	0.050** (0.020)		
Corruption dummy			0.920** (0.378)	0.088** (0.041)
Household controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oster test: δ	6.187	8.993	7.489	10.446
Oster test: β	0.394	0.047	0.822	0.082
Mean of dep. var.	6.18	0.21	6.18	0.21
N	956	956	956	956

Notes: This table uses the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥ 10 . Corruption costs index ranges from 0 to 3. Corruption dummy is an indicator for Corruption costs > 0 . Controls include respondent's age, gender, primary school completion, marital status, household poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. The lower panel reports δ and β based on the test prescribed by Oster (2019), with maximum R-squared set at 1.3 times the R-squared from the regressions using controls. Standard errors clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

As a robustness check, we estimate an alternative specification allowing for non-linear province-time trends to capture other omitted time-varying shocks and find our results continue to hold (Table A9 in the online Appendix).⁹ We also check if time-varying unobservables correlated with household baseline characteristics are driving the results by including interactions of year dummies with household's poverty status in 2016 and ethnicity as additional controls. The results reported in Table A10 in the online Appendix show that our primary results are robust to including these terms. Together, these findings show that there is strong consistent evidence that corruption is associated with an increase in mental stress.

As we use a balanced sample from the VARHS, one may be concerned that exposure to corruption is related to attrition from the VARHS panel data. For example, if households that were most exposed to corruption in 2016, either stopped operating the enterprise in 2018 or dropped out of the VARHS altogether, then we may be underestimating the true relationship between corruption and mental health. Conditional on operating an enterprise in 2016, we examine whether corruption is associated with attrition in 2018, using a linear probability model. Results reported in Table A12 in the online Appendix show that attrition either due to exit from survey or ceasing to operate an enterprise are not systematically correlated with corruption.¹⁰

Finally, we discuss the issue of reporting of corruption. To the extent that the tendency to misreport corruption is time-invariant and varies by households, this is accounted for by the household fixed effects in Eq. 2. However, the reporting bias in corruption could also be time-varying and correlated with household baseline characteristics. The results reported in Table A10 of the online Appendix show that this is unlikely to be a concern.

Further, we saw in Table A4 that corruption had declined between 2016 and 2018. An important change that occurred between these waves was the 2016 national anti-corruption campaign (discussed in Section 4.3). Such a campaign could have improved the reporting of corruption by households, even though the incidence of corruption may not have changed. The campaign by making corruption salient could also reduce the *incidence* of corruption by making public officials more reluctant to ask for bribes. Studies have found disciplining effects of anti-corruption audits wherein such audits increase the officials' perceived electoral and legal costs of engaging in corruption (e.g., Avis et al. (2018); Colonelli and Prem (2019); Olken (2007)). Given that we notice a fall in corruption between 2016 and 2018, this implies that even if it is the case that the campaign resulted in improved reporting of corruption, the incidence of corruption must have declined sufficiently such that on the whole, we still observe a decline in corruption. Once again, this suggests that our results are unlikely to be explained by measurement error.

4. Additional analyses

4.1. Heterogeneity

In this section, we examine if different individuals' responses to corruption in terms of their mental health are different. The two aspects we focus on are gender and poverty status of respondents. We further examine whether there are distributional effects such that individuals at different parts of the mental health distribution are affected by corruption to varying extents.

⁹ We also check the importance of household fixed effects by replacing them with province fixed effects in Eq. 2. We find that the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 (Columns 1–4 of Table A11 in the online Appendix).

¹⁰ Results using the unbalanced panel are qualitatively similar and available in columns 5–6 of Table A11 in the online Appendix.

Table 4
Corruption and mental health: Heterogeneity.

	CES-D Index (1)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (2)	CES-D Index (3)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (4)
Corruption index (z-score)	0.354** (0.155)	0.022 (0.015)	0.613*** (0.096)	0.027** (0.011)
Corruption index*Female	0.501* (0.251)	0.011 (0.023)		
Corruption index*Poor			0.097 (0.361)	0.008 (0.037)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Commune Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	5.02	0.12	5.02	0.12
N	1318	1318	1318	1318

Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥ 10 . Controls include age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Poor is an indicator variable for respondent's household being classified as poor by the government. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

As women tend to be primary caregivers in households, they are often in the position of seeking essential services for themselves, the young and the elderly in their families. Women's dependence on these public services where corruption is rife can have more debilitating effects on them as compared to men. Further, female-owned firms are also more susceptible to corruption and bribery (Ellis et al., 2006).¹¹ In addition, it is possible that the gender dummy picks up other unobserved differences (for instance, in preferences and personality) correlated with gender. For example, gender differences in locus of control (i.e., whether one believes one's life outcomes are determined by their own actions or luck/fate) are an important factor contributing to the gender gap in mental health (Churchill et al., 2020). A more internal locus of control – wherein one believes that one's outcomes are determined by one's own actions – can serve as a psychological buffer against negative external shocks (Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016).

In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we check for differences in the relationship between corruption and mental health by gender. We find that the effect of corruption on the CES-D index is greater for females as compared to males (column 1) but this is not so for the severe depressive symptoms indicator (column 2). This is consistent with other evidence that shows that females' mental health is more susceptible to external shocks (Dustmann and Fasani, 2016).

Next, we examine whether the mental health of individuals from poor households is differentially affected by corruption. As noted in Section 1, corruption reduces the access of the poor to public services such as health and education when they cannot afford to pay bribes. Corruption also exacerbates poverty by channelling public investments from service delivery in essential sectors toward other areas. Corruption can also compound the negative relationship between income/wealth and mental health, as the poor may not have access to mitigation strategies as the rich do. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we find that the poor who are more exposed to corruption have lower mental health, but the results are not statistically significant.

Finally, using the VSCS data, we examine whether there are distributional impacts such that individuals at different points of the mental health distribution are differentially affected by corruption. We do this by estimating quantile regressions. The estimates reported in Fig. 2 show that relationship between corruption and mental health is relatively stable along the distribution of the CES-D index. Further, we find the coefficients to be significantly smaller compared to the OLS estimates only at the 10th percentile of the mental health distribution, i.e., those with better mental health. The corresponding regression results are presented in Table A13 of the online Appendix.

4.2. Examining mechanisms

We use the VARHS data to explore three pathways (household enterprise revenue, social trust and self-belief) through which exposure to corruption may affect mental health. For this, we use the household fixed effects model in equation 2 where we replace mental health with the mediating variables. Thus, we exploit within household variation in exposure to corruption over time to identify the relationship between corruption and mental health via various channels. Results are presented in Table 5.

First, we examine whether the relationship between corruption and mental health is mediated by the effect of corruption on the (log) revenue of household enterprises in the preceding 12 months (in real June 2017 prices). In column 1, we find that increase in corruption is associated with a significant decline in enterprise revenue.

Second, corruption may also erode trust in local institutions and/or reduce social capital in communities (Banerjee, 2016). The VARHS asks respondents whether 'most people are basically honest and can be trusted', with answers ranging from 1

¹¹ The 2015 Vietnam Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Survey of 2648 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) shows that while 48 percent of female-led SMEs reported paying a bribe, only 40 percent of male-led firms did so (see Brandt et al. (2016) for survey details). This gender gap is statistically significant (p -value < 0.001).




Fig. 2. Corruption and mental health: Quantile regression analysis. *Notes:* This figure shows results from quantile regressions of mental health on corruption using the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) data. The OLS results are overlaid for comparison. All regressions include control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 and commune fixed effects. .

Table 5
Corruption and mental health: Pathways .

	Log Ent. Rev. (1)	Trust (2)	Locus of Control (3)
Corruption costs (z-score)	-0.088* (0.050)	-0.077** (0.037)	-0.070 (0.084)
Household controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	12.08	2.96	11.70
N	956	956	956

Notes: This table uses the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. Controls include respondent's age, gender, primary school completion, marital status, household poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Household enterprise revenue is reported in '000 VND and is in real June 2017 prices. Standard errors clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.

(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), such that a higher value indicates higher levels of trust. Results in column 2 show that an increase in corruption is significantly correlated with a decline in trust.

Third, corruption, by reducing returns to one's labour effort (via expropriation) can adversely affect one's belief in the ability to control one's destiny, as proxied by locus of control. Previous research has found a higher or more internal locus of control to be associated with better mental health (Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016; Churchill et al., 2020). Our measure of locus of control is constructed based on responses to four statements ('I feel hopeless in dealing with problems in life'; 'what happens to me in the future mostly depends on me'; 'I have little control over things that happen to me'; 'there is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life'). Responses were on a 1–4 scale, where a higher score indicates a more internal locus of control. We construct an index by summing up the responses to these four statements. Results in column 3 show that an increase in corruption is associated with a decline in locus of control, although this is not statistically significant.

4.3. Effects of recent anti-corruption efforts on mental health

In this section, we assess the impact of the CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong's 2016 anti-corruption campaign on mental health using the VARHS data. The campaign resulted in the arrests of several high-profile government officials, executives of state enterprises, and others in the private sector (Le, 2017; Meyers, 2018). Between January 2016 and August 2018, it is estimated that 56 government officials were disciplined over corruption and 500 individuals prosecuted and sentenced in 40 corruption cases (Hoa, 2018). Several new rules have been put in place to prevent government officials from misusing their power (Reuters, 2019). Observational reports suggest that this campaign has reduced corruption (Hoa, 2018; Hiep, 2019).

We posit that provinces that had higher corruption prior to the campaign received relatively greater scrutiny during the anti-corruption drive, and therefore households residing in these provinces would potentially benefit more compared

Table 6
Anti-corruption campaign and mental health .

	CES-D Index (1)	Severe Depressive Symptoms (2)
High corruption*Post	-1.907* (1.057)	-0.149 (0.108)
Wild bootstrap p – value	0.08	0.12
Household controls	Yes	Yes
Household Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of control dep. var.	6.39	0.20
N	956	956

Notes: This table reports results of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy described in Section 4.3 using the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥ 10 . *High corruption* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the average reported corruption in the province is above the sample median in 2016. *Post* is an indicator for the post-treatment period of 2018. Controls include respondent's age, gender, primary school completion, marital status, household poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Standard errors clustered at province level are reported in parentheses. The *Wild bootstrap p – values* are according to the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure of Cameron et al. (2008). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

to those in provinces with lower corruption. In their study of anti-corruption crackdowns on local governments in Brazil, Colonelli and Prem (2019) also show that audits had larger effects in more corrupt areas. We exploit this variation in the exposure of households to use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach, where we compare the difference in mental health of affected and unaffected households before and after the campaign. The panel regressions take the following form:

$$Y_{ipt} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{High corruption}_p * \text{Post}_t + \gamma_2 T_t + \sum_{l=3}^K \gamma_l X_{ipt} + \eta_i + \omega_{ipt} \quad (3)$$

where Y_{ipt} is the mental health of the primary respondent in household i residing in province p at time t , and T_t and η_i are year and household fixed effects, respectively. As the anti-corruption efforts started in 2016, we consider 2018 to be the post-treatment period (captured by the indicator variable Post_t). High corruption_p is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the average reported cost of corruption by households in the province in 2016 is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The “High Corruption” dummy is time invariant and thus absorbed by the household fixed effects (η_i) and Post_t dummy is absorbed by the year fixed effects (T_t). The coefficient on the interaction term, γ_1 , estimates the impact of the campaign. We cluster the standard errors (ω_{ipt}) at the level of the province. Since we have few clusters (12 provinces), we also report the p-values for our parameter estimates using the *wild bootstrap – t* procedure (Cameron et al., 2008).

The results presented in Table 6 show that the anti-corruption campaign significantly improved mental health. Column 1 shows that, relative to households in provinces with low corruption, the CES-D index of household residing in high corruption provinces significantly decreased by 1.91 units due to the campaign. Given the control mean of 6.39, this translates into a 30 percent improvement. The effect on the severe depressive symptoms indicator is in the same direction but not statistically significant (*wild bootstrap p – value* = 0.12).

We discuss two important caveats. First, the common trends assumption of the DID method requires the treatment and comparison groups to be on similar trajectories prior to the anti-corruption campaign. We are unable to assess this assumption of the DID methodology as we only have mental health information in one pre-treatment wave of the VARHS data. Second, another assumption of the DID analysis is that of non-interference, i.e., that the treatment status of an observation does not affect the outcomes of other observations (also referred to as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption or SUTVA). In the context of our analysis, this may be violated if greater scrutiny in high corruption provinces led to a shift of corruption activities to the low corruption provinces.¹² Such spillovers would imply that the mental health in control provinces would be lower than otherwise. By narrowing the gap in the CES-D index between treatment and control provinces, this could lead to an underestimate of the overall effect of the anti-corruption program. Overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that the anti-corruption campaign had meaningful positive effects on mental health. While this analysis is preliminary in nature, the results are interesting and merit further research.

¹² The differential effects appear to be driven by an improvement in ex-ante high corruption provinces: the average corruption index in High corruption provinces falls from 0.63 to 0.38 between 2016 and 2018. The index in low corruption provinces moves from 0.28 to 0.33 in the same time period.

5. Conclusion

This paper contributes to the limited literature examining the linkages between corruption and mental health. First, using a cross-sectional sample of over 1300 respondents across 22 provinces in rural Vietnam, we find strong evidence that day-to-day petty corruption is positively associated with psychological distress. Second, we find similar results from a panel data of non-farm household enterprise owners from 12 provinces in rural Vietnam. These results are also robust to a variety of other checks. While our study does not make a definitive claim of causality between corruption and mental health, the robustness of our results indicates that daily stress factors like corruption are important determinants of mental health in developing countries.

We also find that the relationship between corruption and mental health is stronger for women. Given that women are often marginalised and have limited access to mental health services, this indicates that concerted efforts to insulate women from corruption can have large payoffs. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that welfare of children is closely associated with the psychological well-being of their caregivers, who more likely to be women. This implies that improving mental health of women can have broader impacts on society by limiting intergenerational transmission of poor mental health.

Fighting corruption remains high on the current policy agenda of the Vietnamese government, as evidenced by the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched by CPV General Secretary in 2016. While reductions in economic costs and inefficiencies have long been recognized as the potential benefits of efforts to mitigate corruption, the findings presented here suggest that there may be large gains in mental health as well. To that end, we recommend rigorous evaluations of psychosocial interventions in poor institutional settings.

Conflicts of Interest

We declare that we have no conflicts of interests of any kind related to the article Corruption and mental health: Evidence from Vietnam which is being submitted herewith.

Supplementary material

Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:[10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.008).

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