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Nonparametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences

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Abstract

This paper provides a revealed preference characterisation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting which is designed to be applied to readily-available expenditure surveys. We describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the leading forms of the model and also study the consequences of the restrictions on preferences popularly used in empirical lifecycle consumption models. Using data from a household consumption panel dataset we explore the prevalence of time-inconsistent behaviour. The quasi-hyperbolic model provides a significantly more successful account of behaviour than the alternatives considered. We estimate the joint distribution of time preferences and the distribution of discount functions at various time horizons.

Key Words: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, revealed preference.

JEL Classification: D11, D12, D90.

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1 Introduction

This paper derives a revealed preference characterisation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting based on expenditure survey data. We show how to use it to evaluate alternative dynamic consumption models and to recover the joint distribution of time preferences. We carry out a substantive application using a large, nationally representative expenditure survey.

For behavioural economists, the fact that a revealed preference condition exists, showing that the hyperbolic model has inherent empirical content which is not driven by auxiliary parametric assumptions, is a helpful result. It means that, despite its great flexibility, the model is falsifiable, and hence meaningful in the Samuelsonian sense, in a manner comparable to the classical utility maximisation model. In particular, the fact that our results apply to observational data on realised non-durable expenditures in which the researcher can neither rely on nor exploit any of the standard “tells” for hyperbolic behaviour (for example the use of commitment devices such as purchases of hard-to-liquidise durables, or the availability of data on (unrealised) future consumption plans) shows that the ability to detect, measure and recover hyperbolic preferences is not just confined to the lab or to field experiments or to other similarly rich, though arguably artificial or small-stakes, decision-making environments.

For applied theorists interested in the empirical implications of models, the results here help to further extend revealed preference methods beyond simple neo-classical models. This is of interest because revealed preference theory usually exploits some self-consistency property in the individual’s behaviour. The hyperbolic model, however, explicitly implies realised choice behaviour that is inconsistent in some respects. Nonetheless we show that it is possible to characterise the model using only realised choices and without requiring knowledge of the agent’s plans.

Applied empirical economists interested in modelling expenditure survey data will find in this paper a set of simple empirical procedures which will allow them to check whether behaviour is consistent with hyperbolic discounting and to recover the joint distribution of time preferences and the distribution of discount functions at different time horizons. We also provide easy-to-apply metrics which can be used to evaluate the empirical performance of alternative intertemporal models.

The assumption of exponential discounting with its constant discount rate is parsimonious since it allows a person’s time preference to be summarised as a single parameter. It is also relatively easy to work with since it makes the strong prediction that the consumer’s intertemporal preferences are time-consistent. However evidence has accrued which indicates that people often do not behave in a time-consistent manner and in fact have a tendency towards present bias. As a result the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model has been put forward as

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1 Samuelson (1947, p.4) famously defined a meaningful theorem as a hypothesis about empirical data which could conceivably be refuted.

2 Price-quantity data are consistent with the hypothesis that they were generated by a rational consumer with well-behaved preferences if, and only if, they satisfy the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). See below.

3 See Frederick et al (2002) for a survey of the empirical literature. Samuelson foreshadowed precisely this in his original article, writing: “Actually, however, as the individual moves along in time there is a sort of perspective phenomenon in that his view of the future in relation to his instantaneous time position remains
an alternative form which can incorporate present bias into preferences. Strotz (1955-1956) considered non-exponential discounting and Phelps and Pollak (1968), and then Elster (1979) studied the, now firmly established, $\beta\delta$ form. Laibson (1997,1998) and Harris and Laibson (2001) in particular have analysed the implications of this form extensively. The model has now been widely adopted and applied to describe a range of phenomena from the role of illiquid assets as commitments (Laibson (1997)), the excess sensitivity of consumption to income and the retirement savings puzzle (Laibson (1998)), the simultaneous holding by households of high pre-retirement wealth, low liquid assets and high credit-card debt (Angeletos et al. (2001)), labour supply and welfare programme participation (Fang and Silverman (2009)), procrastination in a number of contexts (Fischer (1999) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001), addiction/habit formation(O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000), Gruber and Koszegi (2001), and Carrillo (1998)), information acquisition (Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Benabou and Tirole (2002)) and the Phillips curve (Graham and Snower (2008)).

Experimental tests of inconsistency in consumption choices include dynamic inconsistency, over short periods, of choices over irritating noises and squirts of juice and soda (Solnick et al. 1980; McClure et al. 2007; Brown, Chua, and Camerer, 2009); and on longer timescales Read and van Leeuwen (1998) identify dynamic inconsistency between choices over snack foods made one week apart. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) document demand for deadlines for class-room and work assignments, a potential sign of commitment demand for dynamically inconsistent individuals. As Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015) point out, neither exercise allows for precise recovery of discounting parameters, nor links present bias and commitment demand. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) employ monetary discounting measures and link them to take-up of a savings commitment product. Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan (2010) use disproportionate effort response on paydays to make inference on dynamic inconsistency and link this behaviour to demand for a inferior daily wage contract.

The consensus seems to be that, compared to the exponential model, quasi-hyperbolic discounting better fits the evidence on individuals’ intertemporal behaviour. Indeed, Frederick et al (2002, p361) conclude that “the collective evidence ... seems overwhelmingly to support hyperbolic discounting”. Nonetheless, there are some more recent experimental designs and studies whose findings have not unambiguously supported hyperbolic discounting (for example Andersen et al (2014), Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2010)). Recent work by Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015) and Augenblick and Rabin (forthcoming) consider real effort choices which allow for the detection of present bias and sophistication. Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015) find no evidence of present bias with respect to monetary discounting for small-stakes decisions. However they do find present bias in decisions concerning real effort.

In this paper we study quasi-hyperbolic consumption behaviour from a revealed preference perspective in the manner of Samuelson (1948), Houthakker (1950) and Afriat (1967). Rather than describing the implications of the theory in terms of shape-restrictions on unobserved,
and therefore to-be-estimated, structural equations (Euler equations for example), revealed preference methods use systems of inequalities which depend neither on strong functional form assumptions nor on the behaviour of unobservables. Statistical error terms and special assumptions about the functional form of the economic model may be added but it is not an essential requirement of the approach. The classic example of this approach is the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), which is a necessary and sufficient condition for the standard utility maximisation model with competitive linear pricing. GARP exhausts the empirical content of the utility-maximisation model. In this paper we are, in essence, asking whether there is a GARP-like condition for the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model which only requires data on realised expenditures, spot prices and interest rates.

Any intertemporal consumption model with many goods and time separable preferences incorporates GARP as a necessary condition. For revealed preference tests of intertemporal allocation models to have any power over and above testing for GARP, we need to make strong assumptions. The principal assumptions made in this study are that agents have perfect foresight and have a single asset that can be used to borrow or lend at the same real interest rate which is, moreover, observed by the econometrician. The requirement for such strong assumptions arises since the nonparametric Afriat conditions for expenditure and discounted price data that satisfy GARP generate a time series of marginal utility of expenditures which can take any (positive) values. With exponential discounting this series is required to be constant (Browning (1989)). If we allowed for uncertainty, then any path for the marginal utility of expenditure can be rationalised with exponential discounting by invoking suitable unobserved income or wealth shocks. Similarly, if we allowed for an unobserved nominal interest rate (which includes the possibility of liquidity constraints) then we can always choose an interest rate series such that these marginal utilities are constant over time.

The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we derive necessary and sufficient revealed preference conditions for a number of related models. These are based on a dataset consisting of expenditures on a number of goods and services, their corresponding nominal prices and the interest rate. We first derive the conditions for a “sophisticated” quasi-hyperbolic consumer who is aware that their future self may have different preferences over consumption profiles, but who is not assumed to be able to pre-commit to a consumption plan. We show that the conditions consist of two elements: within-period preferences over goods must satisfy GARP whilst inter-temporal behaviour is characterised by the evolution of a parameter which captures the marginal utility of discounted lifetime wealth. This provides a useful diagnostic: researchers can disentangle violations caused by unstable preference over goods from violations caused by non-hyperbolic inter-temporal choices. We note that the assumption that the discount factor is less than or equal to one is material – without it the hyperbolic model we study is content-free relative to any time-separable intertemporal model. We also provide

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4Given a dataset of price and quantity bundles (denoted \( p_t \) and \( c_t \), respectively, where \( t \) indexes the observation) we say \( c_t \) is directly revealed preferred to a bundle \( c \) (written \( c_t R^0 c \)) if \( p_t' c_t \geq p_t' c \). We say \( c_t \) is revealed preferred to \( c \) (written \( c_t R c \)) if there is some sequence of observations \( r, s, t, ..., v \) such that \( c_t, R^0 c_s, c_t, R^0 c_t, ..., c_t, R^0 c \). In this case, we say the relation \( R \) is the transitive closure of the relation \( R^0 \). The dataset is said to obey GARP if \( c_t R c \) implies \( p_t' c_t \leq p_t' c \). There is also an equivalent linear-programming condition which can be checked very efficiently. We discuss this further below.
several related results: we explore the number of observations required to reject the model; the recovery of time-preferences; the empirical special case where a single composite consumption good is assumed to be observed and the theoretical case in which preferences are assumed to be in the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion family which comprises (amongst others) exponential utility, power utility, and therefore iso-elastic utility as special cases. We then provide a set of parallel conditions for a model of a “naive” individual who is a hyperbolic discounter but wrongly assumes that his future selves will simply fall into line with the consumption plan which he maps out. Finally we provide an observational equivalence result, given our set of observables, between the sophisticated and naive models.

In section 3 we carry out a substantive empirical application using a large, nationally representative expenditure panel survey: the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares - ECPF). The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey of Spanish households which interviews about three thousand households every quarter and in which it is possible to follow a participating household for up to eight consecutive quarters. Given our theoretical results apply to an environment in which both discounted prices and income are known to the agent, we select our period and sub-sample to study in order to make this assumption empirically relevant. Specifically, we look at data from a period spanning 1985 to 1997 and focus on the sub-sample of the ECPF composed of couples in which the husband is in full-time employment in a non-agricultural activity and the wife is out of the labour force. As we show empirically, discounted prices were highly predictable over this period – the rate of change of commodity prices was very stable and variations in the interest rate were modest so that, once discounted, the paths of log-discounted prices are almost perfectly linear. At the same time, the selection of a sub-sample with both stable employment and household composition aims to substantially control for income uncertainty. It also minimises the effects of any non-separabilities between consumption and leisure which the empirical application does not otherwise allow for.

We examine the non-durable expenditure behaviour of the survey households for consistency with various forms of quasi-hyperbolic discounting as well as exponential discounting. By treating the data for each household as a separate short time-series, we are able to do so whilst allowing for the maximal degree of preference heterogeneity. We note that, since it contains an extra free parameter compared to the standard exponential model, the hyperbolic model necessarily can fit the data no worse than the exponential model. We consider this issue in some detail and provide methods for comparing the empirical performance of these models on the basis of their predictive and informational content.

We show that, even making careful allowance for the extra degree of freedom, quasi-hyperbolic discounting provides a significantly more successful account of behaviour than the standard exponential model. We show that the prevalence of hyperbolic behaviour is sensibly correlated with a number of household attributes and choices related to long-term behaviour such as owner occupation, smoking and health expenditures. We also note a non-linear association with total household expenditure which we use as a rough approximation to the overall resources in the household. As these grow, the prevalence of hyperbolic behaviour
declines albeit at a declining rate. We then use the conditions for the model to estimate the joint distribution of time-preferences. The average value of the exponential factor in the sample is close to 0.96, whilst the hyperbolic discount factor is lower: around 0.84. We find considerable evidence of heterogeneity in discount rates between households. We conclude by providing an estimate of the distribution of quasi-hyperbolic discount functions at various time horizons.

In section 4 we offer some conclusions and discuss avenues for further work.

2 Conditions for the Quasi-hyperbolic Consumption Model

We are interested in the empirical implications of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model for a finite dataset of interest rates, spot prices and purchases of goods for a mortal, self-aware individual who knows the future course of prices and interest rates but who has no ability to commit to their consumption plans. Our data consists of a vector of transactions for $K$ market goods in each period, their corresponding prices and the interest rate (denoted $c_t$, $p_t$ and $r_t$ respectively, where $t$ indexes the observation) for an individual household over time.

We make the natural assumption that we will only have data on an individual for part of their life. That is, we assume that the agent lives for $T + 1$ periods $\{0, ..., T\}$ but that we only observe a contiguous subset of periods denoted by $\tau \subset \{1, ..., T\}$, rather than their entire lives. We will denote the number of observations by $|\tau|$ and members of the set of observations by $t$. Where some arguments require discussion of the terminal period $T$ we make it clear that this period is not necessarily observed and that $\max\{\tau\} \leq T$.

2.1 The sophisticated individual

We take what we consider to be a standard version of the quasi-hyperbolic consumption model in which the individual is cast as a composite of temporal selves indexed by their respective periods of control over the consumption decision. During their period of control, self $t$ inherits the current level of total wealth\(^5\) $A_t$ and chooses a consumption bundle for period $t$, such that

$$\rho_t c_t + \Sigma_t = \Delta_t$$

where we denote everything in discounted terms, so $\Delta_t = A_t / \prod_{i=1}^{t} (1 + r_i)$, denotes discounted wealth and $\rho_t^k = p_t^k / \prod_{i=1}^{t} (1 + r_i)$, denotes discounted prices. Discounted savings are denoted $\Sigma_t$. Self $t + 1$ then inherits wealth equal to $\Delta_{t+1} = \Sigma_t$. The game continues, with self $t + 1$ in control. We assume that in the final period of life $\Sigma_T = 0$.\(^6\) The payoff for the $t$’th player of this game is

$$U(c_t, c_{t+1}, ..., c_T) = u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{T-t} \delta^i u(c_{t+i})$$

\(^5\)That is, current financial wealth plus discounted future earnings.

\(^6\)This is without loss of generality over $\Sigma_T \geq 0$ since the lifetime budget can always be defined accordingly.
where \( u \) is a concave, continuous and differentiable instantaneous utility function, \( \delta \) is the standard exponential discount factor and \( \beta \) is the additional discount term that the quasi-hyperbolic model introduces.

The sophisticated hyperbolic model is a non-cooperative game between the temporal selves, and a rigorous derivation of necessary conditions is provided in Harris and Laibson (2001). For our purposes it suffices to use the following Lemma to motivate what follows and to characterise the implications of optimising behaviour in this model using the first order condition on the equilibrium path (see Harris and Laibson (2001)).

**Lemma 1.** (Harris and Laibson (2001)). On the equilibrium path:

\[
\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_k^t} = \delta^{-t} \lambda \rho_k^t \prod_{i=1}^{t} \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \rho_i^k \frac{\partial c_i^k}{\partial \Delta_i} \right) \right]^{-1} \quad \forall k, t
\]

and the corresponding Euler equation is

\[
\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_k^{t+1}} = \delta \frac{\rho_k^t}{\rho_{t+1}^k} \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \rho_{t+1}^k \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right) \right] \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_k^{t+1}} \quad \forall k, t
\]

where \( \lambda \) is a strictly positive constant (the marginal utility of discounted lifetime wealth), \( \beta \in (0, 1), \delta \in (0, 1] \) and \( \partial c_k^t / \partial \Delta_t \) is the marginal propensity to consume the \( k \)th good out of current discounted wealth.

**Proof.** See the Appendix. \( \square \)

Both expressions are slight multi-good generalisations of those in Harris and Laibson (2001)\(^7\) and readily reduce to those in Harris and Laibson (2001) if we consider a single consumption good, no inflation and a fixed interest rate. These expressions simplify to the standard exponential discounting case if we were to allow \( \beta = 1 \), but our characterisation focuses on the strict hyperbolic case where \( 0 < \beta < 1 \). The object

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \rho_{t+1}^k \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right)
\]

is the period \( t + 1 \) marginal propensity to spend out of wealth. We denote this by \( \mu_t \). We assume that demands are normal and therefore \( \mu_t \in (0, 1) \) (except in the last period of life where it equals one and all remaining wealth is consumed).

Following Browning (1989) we define what it means for the model to rationalise the data as follows.

\(^7\)Note that in deriving the first order condition and the Euler equation we follow the heuristic method of Harris and Laibson (2001) - that is we simply make the necessary assumptions regarding the smoothness/differentiability of demands wherever possible. As Harris and Laibson (2001) show, the same results can be derived under less benign conditions. Readers are referred to their paper for a rigorous derivation to which we have nothing to add.
Definition 1. The sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data \( \{ \rho_t, c_t \}_{t \in \tau} \) if there exists a locally non-satiated, differentiable and concave instantaneous utility function \( u(\cdot) \) and constants \( \lambda > 0, \beta \in (0, 1), \delta \in (0, 1], \mu_T = 1 \) and \( \{ \mu_t \in (0, 1) \}_{t \in \tau \setminus T} \) such that

\[
\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t} = \lambda \rho_t^k \prod_{i=1}^t \frac{1}{[1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i]} \quad \forall k, t
\]

This says that the data are consistent with the theory if there exists a well-behaved instantaneous utility function, the derivatives of which satisfy the sophisticated hyperbolic first order conditions (or equivalently the Euler equation) on the equilibrium path. If such a utility function exists, and we know what it is, then “rationalisability” means that we could precisely replicate the observed choices of the consumer. If we were to set \( \beta = 1 \) then this definition would simplify to the rationalisability definition given by Browning (1989) for the exponential discounting model. Our main result in this paper is the following:

Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent.

1. The sophisticated hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data \( \{ \rho_t, c_t \}_{t \in \tau} \).
2. There exist numbers \( \{ u_t, \lambda > 0, \delta \in (0, 1], \Psi_t \}_{t \in \tau} \) such that

\[
u_s \leq u_t + \lambda \prod_{i=1}^t \frac{1}{[1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i]} \quad \forall s, t \in \tau
\]

\[
\Psi_0 = 1, 1 < \Psi_{t-1} < \Psi_t \quad \forall t \in \tau
\]

3. There exist numbers \( \{ \tilde{u}_t, \tilde{\Psi}_t \}_{t \in \tau} \) such that

\[
\tilde{u}_s \leq \tilde{u}_t + \tilde{\Psi}_t \prod_{i=1}^t \frac{1}{[1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i]} \quad \forall s, t \in \tau
\]

\[
\tilde{\Psi}_0 = 1, 1 < \tilde{\Psi}_{t-1} < \tilde{\Psi}_t \quad \forall t \in \tau
\]

Proof. (1) \( \Rightarrow \) (2): Let

\[
\Psi_t = \prod_{i=1}^t \frac{1}{[1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i]}
\]

(with \( \Psi_0 = 1 \)) and rewrite the first order condition for sophisticated hyperbolic discounting in vector notation giving

\[
\nabla u(c_t) = \lambda \prod_{i=1}^t \frac{1}{[1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i]} \rho_t
\]

Note that \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) and \( \mu_t \in (0, 1] \) \( \Rightarrow 1 < \Psi_{t-1} < \Psi_t \) \( \forall t \neq 0 \). Concavity of the instantaneous utility function gives

\[
u_s \leq u_t + \nabla u(c_t)'(c_s - c_t) \quad \forall s, t \in \tau
\]
Substituting in the first order conditions gives

\[ u(c_s) \leq u(c_t) + \lambda \frac{\Psi_t}{\delta^t} \rho_t^t (c_s - c_t) \]

and thus the data satisfying sophisticated hyperbolic discounting implies being able to find real numbers \( \{u_t, \lambda > 0, \delta \in (0, 1], \Psi_t \}_{t \in \tau} \) such that inequality (2) and condition (3) are satisfied.

(2) \( \Rightarrow \) (3): We can normalise the inequalities in (2) by \( \lambda \), i.e. if the inequalities in (2) are satisfied then so are:

\[ \tilde{u}_s \leq \tilde{u}_t + \frac{\Psi_t}{\delta^t} \rho_t^t (c_s - c_t) \quad \forall s, t \in \tau \]

where \( \tilde{u}_t = u_t / \lambda \) \( \forall t \in \tau \). Now define \( \tilde{\Psi}_t = \Psi_t / \delta^t \), then \( \Psi_0 = 1 \Rightarrow \tilde{\Psi}_0 = 1 \). Since \( \delta \in (0, 1] \) then \( 1/\delta^t - 1 < 1/\delta^t \) so we also have

\[ 1 < \Psi_{t-1} < \Psi_t \quad \forall t \neq 0 \Rightarrow 1 < \tilde{\Psi}_{t-1} < \tilde{\Psi}_t \quad \forall t \neq 0 \]

i.e. condition (H).

(3) \( \Rightarrow \) (1): By Afriat’s Theorem, the data satisfying the inequalities in (4) is equivalent to the existence of a well-behaved utility function \( u(c) \) and constants \( \{ \tilde{\Psi}_t > 0 \} \) \( t \in \tau \) such that

\[ \frac{\partial u(c_t)}{\partial c_t^k} = \tilde{\Psi}_t \rho_t^k \]  

(6)

Now set a \( \delta \) defined by

\[ \delta > \max \left\{ \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \right\} \quad \forall t, t + 1 \in \tau \]

Since \( 1 < \tilde{\Psi}_{t-1} < \tilde{\Psi}_t \), we can always choose \( \delta \leq 1 \). Now for all \( t \in \tau \) define

\[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\delta} \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \]  

(7)

Note that, since \( \delta > \max \left\{ \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \right\} \), then

\[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\delta} \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} < 1 \]

Rearranging equation (7) and solving recursively gives:

\[ \tilde{\Psi}_t = \tilde{\Psi}_0 \prod_{i=1}^{t} \frac{1}{1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i} \quad \forall t \in \tau \]

Now we can set \( \lambda = \tilde{\Psi}_0 \) and substitute into equation (6) to give

\[ \frac{\partial u(c_t)}{\partial c_t^k} = \lambda \frac{1}{\delta^t} \rho_t^k \prod_{i=1}^{t} \frac{1}{1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i} \quad \forall t \in \tau \]
This gives us the definition of *rationalise* in Definition 1, since our choice of $\delta$ ensures that 
\[(1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1}) < 1\] which means that we can always find $\beta \in (0, 1)$ and $\mu_{t+1} \in (0, 1]$ to satisfy the definition.

Condition (2) of Proposition 1 is, as noted in the proof, a system of Afriat-type inequalities. They provide a helpful point of connection with the literature and, in particular, with the standard Afriat inequalities which correspond to GARP (see Varian, 1982) and those which correspond to the exponential model (Browning, 1989). GARP is equivalent to the existence of a sequence of a set of constants \(\{U_t, \lambda_t\}_{t \in \tau}\) which satisfy the linear inequalities

\[U_s \leq U_t + \lambda_t p'_t(c_s - c_t), \quad \lambda_t > 0, \quad \forall s, t \in \tau\] (8)

where the constants $U_t$ represent utility levels at the $t$'th observation and $\lambda_t$ represents the marginal utility of income. The standard Afriat inequalities as presented in (8) are defined in terms of *spot prices* and not discounted prices, as intertemporal behaviour is not relevant in the canonical atemporal model where per-period income is exogenous. However, if a dataset of spot prices and demands \(\{p_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau}\) satisfy GARP, then so will the corresponding dataset of discounted prices and demands \(\{\rho_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau}\). This is because the discounting of the spot prices does not affect relative prices within periods and the demands themselves are fixed - thus the budget constraints are effectively identical whether prices are discounted or not; they are simply expressed in different units.

Subject to satisfying the Afriat conditions, the atemporal model allows the $\lambda_t$ terms to take any strictly positive values. In the exponential discounting model the discounted marginal utility of expenditure is smoothed and, under perfect foresight, is constant over time. This translates into a special case of the atemporal Afriat conditions in which the sequence \(\{\lambda_t\}_{t \in \tau}\) is set such that the discounted marginal utility of lifetime wealth is constant and $\lambda_t := \lambda/\delta^t$ (see Browning (1989)). Thus we can see that the conditions for the hyperbolic model replaces these terms with the sequence \(\{\lambda \Psi_t/\delta^t\}_{t \in \tau}\) where the $\Psi_t$ terms must be *increasing* over time.

We note that this has the *opposite* implication for consumption paths to precautionary saving. A precautionary motive will depress current consumption compared to an otherwise equivalent exponential discounter with perfect foresight. For the sophisticated hyperbolic discounter the simplified Euler equation can be written as

\[\lambda_t = \delta \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \lambda_{t+1}\]

and since $1 < \Psi_{t-1} < \Psi_t \ \forall t$, this implies

\[\lambda_t < \delta \lambda_{t+1}\] (9)

These Afriat inequalities can be used to construct a continuous and concave piecewise linear rationalising utility function as $u(c) = \min_{t \in \tau} \{U_t + \lambda_t p'_t(c - c_t)\}$. Mas-Colell (1978) showed that, as long as the Afriat inequalities have a solution, then, as the number of observations grows, the sequence of rationalising utility functions constructed in this way get arbitrarily close to recovering the true preferences of the consumer.
Since an exponential discounter would set the terms on the left and right-hand sides of (9) equal, this implies that (with diminishing marginal utility) the sophisticated hyperbolic discounter will always consume more today than the otherwise equivalent exponential discounter. Thus the lifetime consumption path of the self-aware hyperbolic discounter will always decline more (increase less) than the otherwise equivalent exponential discounter whereas precautionary saving has the opposite effect. In fact the sophisticated hyperbolic consumer looks like an exponential consumer who is subject to a savings constraint – they would like to save more but cannot.

Except for the requirement that the \( \tilde{\Psi}_t \) terms increase over time, condition (2) in Proposition 1 is the same as the standard Afriat inequalities which correspond to GARP. Therefore, clearly a necessary condition is that the data pass GARP. The implication that the within-period data satisfy GARP is essentially a consequence of the inter-temporal separability in the model. Since weak separability is necessary and sufficient for the second stage of two-stage budgeting\(^9\) the intertemporal separability of the model means that, however the consumer decides to allocate expenditure across time, expenditure \textit{within} each period is allocated across goods according to the maximisation of stable within-period (instantaneous) preferences over goods. Thus we should expect the GARP condition to arise simply from inter-temporal weak separability and stable within-period preferences, and it is the requirement \( 1 < \tilde{\Psi}_{t-1} < \tilde{\Psi}_t \) that is the additional implication arising from hyperbolic discounting.

A few further remarks on Proposition 1 are in order. First, for data of the kind we consider, these conditions, being both necessary and sufficient, are \textit{sharp}; they exhaust all of the empirical implications of the model of interest and they apply to all specific instances of sophisticated hyperbolic models that satisfy the general properties we have stated.

Second, like all revealed preference type characterisations, it is exact: because the model is deterministic there should be no random variation in the choices the consumer makes and therefore the individual either passes the condition or does not.\(^{10}\) We return to this point in our conclusions.

Third, the conditions in Proposition 1 (3) are computationally very straightforward to check empirically\(^{11}\). The theoretically more fundamental conditions as formulated in Proposition 1 (2) look difficult to implement because they are non-linear in unknowns: even though we could normalise by \( \lambda \), the \( \Psi_t/\delta^t \) term remains. The reformulation into condition (3) is more useful empirically as this \textit{is} now a linear program and it is, therefore, very easy to check whether the conditions can be satisfied by a given dataset. The reformulation is possible since, if we have a sequence of positive numbers \( \{ \Psi_t \}_{t \in \tau} \) which is increasing over time, then, as long as \( \delta \in [0,1) \), the sequence \( \{ \tilde{\Psi}_t := \lambda \Psi_t/\delta^t \}_{t \in \tau} \) will also consist of increasing, positive numbers. In particular, this means that in order to test the model we can set \( \delta = 1 \) and \( \lambda = 1 \) and run

\(^{9}\)Preferences over a group of goods (e.g. those consumed within a certain period) are said to be weakly separable if the marginal rates of substitution between the goods within the group are independent of consumption of commodities outside of the group, for example consumption in \textit{other} periods. See Gorman (1959).

\(^{10}\)Measurement error is, of course, a potential source of apparently random variation in behaviour. It can be incorporated into a revealed preference approach using the ideas in Varian (1985).

\(^{11}\)We are very grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments prompted us to see this and allowed us to drop some alternative, but more opaque, conditions.
a linear program.

Fourthly, the restriction that $\delta \in (0, 1]$ is material; if we were to allow consumers to prefer future to present consumption, then the condition in expression (H) would be lost and the model would only require GARP. In principle there is no reason why individuals might not value the future more than the here-and-now, however there is little empirical support for it: Frederick, et al’s (2002) review of the empirical evidence finds that $\delta \in (0, 1]$ in all studies irrespective of the time horizon considered.

We now offer three further simple results concerning (i) the rejectability of the model, (ii) the special case where there is one aggregate consumption good and (iii) the recovery of aspects of the model. We begin with the number of observations needed to detect a violation.

**Corollary 1.** Assuming that the demand and prices data satisfy GARP, the sophisticated hyperbolic discounting model could in principle be rejected with only two periods of data.

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

Plainly the model could be rejected with just two observations because that is all that is required to reject GARP. Nonetheless the result shows that, even assuming the data satisfy GARP, violations of the conditions can still be detected with just two observations. Of course the ability to detect violations of the conditions in Proposition 1 is (weakly) increasing in the number of observations.

Another useful aspect of the conditions is that they imply a natural way of distinguishing between failures of the model which are caused by instability of consumption-preferences and failures which stem from intertemporal behaviour. The researcher can first test without restricting the $\{\tilde{\Psi}_t\}_{t \in \tau}$ sequence to be increasing as a necessary condition and rule out the former, before adding the (H) restriction on the $\{\tilde{\Psi}_t\}_{t \in \tau}$ sequence to test the intertemporal conditions.

Many applications of inter-temporal consumption models use data on a single aggregate consumption good so we now consider a one-good world. For such data the GARP requirement for efficient within-period allocation across goods is not directly relevant (although we do note that time-separable rational preferences over goods within each period are required for the construction of an economically meaningful consumption aggregate/index number in the first place (Gorman (1959)) and the conditions in Proposition 1 simplify to the following where $K = 1$.

**Corollary 2.** The following statements are equivalent.

1. The sophisticated hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data $\{\rho_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau}$.
2. The data satisfy the conditions: $(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \Rightarrow (\rho_s - \rho_{s+h}) > 0$ for all $s, s + h \in \tau, h \geq 1$; and $(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}$ for all $s < t < t + j < s + h \in \tau$.

---

12See the discussion in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.

The conditions in part (2) of Corollary 2 have an intuitive meaning which sheds some light on Proposition 1. The first part shows that when consumption is rising it must be the case that discounted prices are falling. This is essentially a Law of Demand type result in an inter-temporal context. The second part of the conditions says that if consumption increases between periods $s$ and $s + h$, the relative price change $\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}$ must be less than the price change across any interval $t$ to $t + j$ within $s$ to $s + h$ where consumption decreases overall. This is a weaker condition than the exponential model which would require $\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}$ to be less than $\frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}$ regardless of whether $t$ to $t + j$ was contained within $s$ to $s + h$ or not. Proposition 1 could be used to derive similar conditions in the multiple good case, but the presence of vectors of demands and prices means that consumption is not a scalar that can be “cancelled out” as it can be in the one-good case. Thus the conditions would be couched in terms of price and quantity index numbers. The important difference is that in the multiple goods case, the counterpart of part (2) of Corollary 2 is only a necessary condition for sophisticated hyperbolic discounting, but not a sufficient condition. In the one-good case it is both necessary and sufficient since, if it is satisfied then this gives us the strictly increasing path for $\tilde{\Psi}_t$, and the construction of a rationalising utility function follows easily since GARP is trivially satisfied in the one-good case. This can be seen in the proof in the appendix.

Our third result concerns the recovery of the discount terms in the model.

**Corollary 3.** If the data satisfies Proposition 1 then for the exponential discount factor

$$\delta \in \left( \max_{t,t+1 \in \tau} \left\{ \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}} \right\}, 1 \right]$$

And for the hyperbolic discount factor, given the choice for $\delta$, we have

$$\beta \in \left( 0, \frac{1}{\delta} \min_{t,t+1 \in \tau} \left\{ \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}} \right\} \right]$$

Proof. See the Appendix.

The bounds in (10) and (11) depend on the parameters returned from the linear program, and these might not be unique. This is not a problem since, if the linear program in Proposition 1 (3) has a solution then we can, instead, very efficiently and accurately determine the lower bound for the discount factor (denoted $\bar{\delta}$) using The conditions in Proposition 1 (2) and a standard binary search algorithm over $\delta$ to immediately bound the discount term $\delta \in [\bar{\delta}, 1]$. For the bounds on $\beta$, we embed the linear program in a nonlinear minimisation to find the feasible solution to the linear program with the minimal $\tilde{\Psi}_t/\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}$.

We also show in the proof of Corollary 3 that (10) and (11) have easy-to-construct approximate counterparts based on observables. These provide bounds on the discounting parameters

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13We assume that aggregate consumption is a normal good.
which usefully restrict the values over which we have to search:

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta & \in \left( \max_{t, t+j \in \tau} \left\{ \left( \frac{\rho'_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} \right\}, 1 \right) \forall \rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0 \\
\beta & \in \left( 0, \frac{1}{\delta} \min_{t, t+j \in \tau} \left\{ \left( \frac{\rho'_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} \right\} \right) \forall \rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0
\end{align*}
\]

As noted above, the conditions in Proposition 1 exhaust all of the empirical implications of the sophisticated hyperbolic model that satisfies the general properties we have stated. The conditions are different (and more lenient) to those for an exponential discounter. This is in interesting contrast to the main previous result on the empirical distinguishability of hyperbolic and exponential discounters with standard consumption data of Laibson’s (1998). In that paper, the result is that in a standard lifecycle/savings model with infinite horizon and iso-elastic (constant relative risk aversion) preferences, the consumption profile of an exponential discounter and a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter are empirically indistinguishable. This is because, with iso-elastic preferences, each period’s consumption function is linear in assets for both the exponential and hyperbolic discounters. And so, as the time horizon goes to infinity, the consumption rule for the hyperbolic discounter converges to stationary equilibrium just as it would for the exponential discounter. The hyperbolic discounter consumes a larger proportion of assets in equilibrium than the otherwise equivalent exponential discounter and, to an empirical investigator, both look like exponential discounters, one with a higher discount rate than the other.

Since our results, which relax the iso-elastic assumption, diverge from this finding of empirical indistinguishability between exponential and hyperbolic behaviour, it may be of some interest, therefore, to consider the kinds of additional requirements which particular special instances of the model imply for us. We have, thus far, only assumed concavity of the within-period utility function, but, for example, applied work on lifecycle consumption and saving very commonly use an iso-elastic form for the instantaneous utility function, and so it may be useful to ask if restrictions like this have any additional implications for our results.

Our strategy for identifying such implications is based on using the inequalities in (2) which can be manipulated to tell us that, if we have observations such that \( \rho'_t c_t > \rho'_t c_{t+j} \) and \( \rho'_s c_s < \rho'_s c_{s+h} \) (where \( t+j \) and \( s+h \) denote chronologically later observations than \( t \) and \( s \) respectively), then this restricts the discount factor in the following manner:

\[
0 \leq \left( \frac{\Psi_{s+h} \rho'_{s+h} (c_s - c_{s+h})}{\Psi_s \rho'_s (c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h} \leq \left( \frac{\Psi_{t+j} \rho'_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\Psi_t \rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} \leq 1
\]

remembering that the definition of \( \Psi_t \) implies \( 1 < \Psi_{t-1} < \Psi_t \) \( \forall t \neq 0 \) with \( \Psi_0 = 1 \). Inequality (12) allows us to exploit restrictions on the consumption function, and in particular the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, which will introduce empirical implications for the sophisticated model beyond GARP. For example, if we observe \( \rho'_t c_t > \rho'_t c_{t+j} \) and
\[ \rho'_t c_s < \rho'_s c_{s+h} \] along with the following:

\[
\left( \frac{\rho'_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho'_{t} (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} < \left( \frac{\rho'_{s+h} (c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho'_{s} (c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h}
\] (13)

then in order for there to be a \( \delta \) that satisfies (12) it must be that

\[
\left( \frac{\Psi_{t+j}}{\Psi_t} \right)^{1/j} > \left( \frac{\Psi_{s+h}}{\Psi_s} \right)^{1/h}
\]

which, in turn, implies some restriction on the marginal propensity to spend out of wealth terms, namely:

\[
\max \{\mu_{t+i}\}_{i=1,...,j} > \min \{\mu_{s+g}\}_{g=1,...,h}
\] (14)

Thus to find further restrictions for the model we need to characterise the circumstances under which requiring \( \max \{\mu_{t+i}\}_{i=1,...,j} > \min \{\mu_{s+g}\}_{g=1,...,h} \) also leads to a restriction on observable behaviour.

In the general case, a restriction on the derivative of a within-period expenditure function (i.e. on \( \mu_t \)) at one point does not tell us anything about the shape of the rest of this function and therefore does not have any implications for observed expenditure. Similarly the assumption of concave instantaneous/within-period utility does not meaningfully restrict the marginal propensity to consume out of current income. As a consequence the quasi-hyperbolic model can rationalise a wide range of behaviours (up to the additional structure implied by \( \delta < 1 \)). However, if we restrict ourselves to cases where the expenditure function is linear in all periods then requiring \( \mu_t > \mu_s \) would have some implications for observable behaviour. Because discounted assets decline over time, then when \( t < s \) it must be the case that \( \Delta_t > \Delta_s \). In this case, if the expenditure function is linear in all periods, then requiring \( \mu_t > \mu_s \) would imply \( \rho'_t c_t > \rho'_s c_s \), i.e. that within-period expenditure declines between periods \( t \) and \( s \).

Denote the instantaneous indirect utility function by \( v(\rho, y) \) where \( y \) is total within-period expenditure. Let \( v' \) denote \( \partial v/\partial y \) and so on for higher derivatives. We can show (see the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix) that the expenditure function \( y_t (\Delta_t) \) for the sophisticated hyperbolic model is linear in all periods if the ratio of the coefficient of prudence to the coefficient of risk aversion\(^{14}\) (absolute or relative) is constant. This class includes, for example, the whole of the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) family of utility functions which comprises (amongst others) exponential utility, power utility, and therefore iso-elastic utility as special cases. This leads us to the following proposition:

**Proposition 2.** If the sophisticated hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data \( \{\rho_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau} \) for an agent with an instantaneous utility function such that \( v'''/ (v'')^2 \) is constant, then the data \( \{\rho_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau} \) satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1 and \( \forall \{t + i\}_{i=0,...,j}, \{s + g\}_{g=0,...,h} \in \tau, t < s, t + j \leq \)

\(^{14}\)That is \( v'''/ (v'')^2 \)
s and h ≥ 1: \( \rho_t' c_t > \rho_{t+j}' c_{t+j} \), \( \rho_s' c_s < \rho_{s+h}' c_{s+h} \) and

\[
\left( \frac{\rho_{t+j}' (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t' (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} < \left( \frac{\rho_{s+h}' (c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho_s' (c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h}
\]

(RS)

imply that \( \max \{ \rho_{t+i}' c_{t+i} \}_{i=1,...,j} > \min \{ \rho_{s+g}' c_{s+g} \}_{g=1,...,h} \).

Proof. See the Appendix.

The intuition for the restricted sophisticated model (RS) is best understood in a one-good-world setting with a one-period difference in the dates at which consumption is observed \((j = h = 1)\) where it implies that if consumption decreases between periods \( t \) and \( t + 1 \) but increases between chronologically later periods \( s \) and \( s + 1 \), and prices fall more (or increase less) between periods \( t \) and \( t + 1 \) than between \( s \) and \( s + 1 \), then it must be the case that spending in period \( t + 1 \) is bigger than in period \( s + 1 \). Such behaviour is, of course, ruled out entirely in the exponential model: looking at inequality (12) and remembering that the exponential model is a special case in which \( \Psi_t = 1 \) \( \forall t \), then in the one-good case we would obtain \( \rho_{s+1}/\rho_s \leq \delta \leq \rho_{t+1}/\rho_t \) and so having \( \rho_{t+1}/\rho_t < \rho_{s+1}/\rho_s \) is a violation of the model. Indeed, with exponential discounting, if consumption increases between any two periods then it must also increase between any other two periods with a larger (smaller) price fall (increase) otherwise no \( \delta \) exists that can satisfy the model. In the unrestricted sophisticated hyperbolic model this behaviour may be allowed since there is the possibility of having \( \Psi_{t+1}/\Psi_t > \Psi_{s+1}/\Psi_s \) and therefore \( \mu_{t+1} > \mu_{s+1} \) to satisfy inequality (12). But if we restrict preferences to those which give linear expenditure functions, then \( \mu_{t+1} > \mu_{s+1} \) implies \( \rho_{t+1}' c_{t+1} > \rho_{s+1}' c_{s+1} \) and so seeing \( \rho_{t+1}' c_{t+1} < \rho_{s+1}' c_{s+1} \) is a violation of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting.

2.2 The naive individual

So far we have only considered sophisticated consumers who understand that their future selves will have different preferences to their current self. We now look at the case of an individual who is a hyperbolic discounter but wrongly assumes that his future selves will simply fall into line with the consumption plan which he maps out. The literature (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) describes this as naivety and means by this that the current self knows themselves to be a hyperbolic discounter with an inclination for immediate gratification, but believes that future selves do not have present-biased preferences and will behave as exponential discounters with \( \beta = 1 \). That is, in period \( t \) they maximise

\[
u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{T-t} \delta^i u(c_{t+i})
\]
but believe that in periods \( \varsigma = t + 1 \ldots T - 1 \) their future selves will maximise

\[
u(c_\varsigma) + \sum_{i=1}^{T-\varsigma} \delta^i u(c_{\varsigma+i})
\]

The implications for the first order conditions and Euler equation of individuals who behave in this way are given in the next Lemma.

**Lemma 2.** On the equilibrium path:

\[
\frac{\partial \nu}{\partial c_k^t} = \lambda \frac{\rho_t^k}{\delta} \Omega_t \quad \forall k, t
\]

where \( \Omega_0 = 1, \Omega_{t-1} < \Omega_t \). The corresponding Euler equation is

\[
\frac{\partial \nu}{\partial c_k^t} = \delta \frac{\rho_t^k}{\rho_{t+1}^k} \frac{\Omega_t}{\Omega_{t+1}} \frac{\partial \nu}{\partial c_{t+1}^k} \quad \forall k, t
\]

where \( \lambda \) is a strictly positive constant and \( \delta \in (0, 1] \).

**Proof.** See the Appendix. \( \square \)

Lemma 2 shows that the equilibrium conditions for the naive individual are structurally very similar (and mathematically identical) to that of the self-aware hyperbolic discounter, where \( \Psi_t = \prod_{i=1}^t (1/\sqrt{1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i}) \) is now replaced by the sequence of constants \( \Omega_t \). We have denoted this parameter with a different symbol as \( \Omega \) does not have the same interpretation as \( \Psi \). As the naive discounter believes he will follow today’s plan tomorrow, he always underestimates how much tomorrow’s self will consume. Thus \( \Omega_t \) is merely a balancing term, devoid of meaningful economic content, which makes the naive first order condition and Euler equation equalities rather than inequalities, whereas \( \Psi_t \) relates closely to the marginal propensity to consume out of remaining assets, of which the sophisticated discounter is fully aware. Paralleling Definition 1 we describe the requirements for rationalisability below.

**Definition 2.** The naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data \( \{r_t, p_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau} \) if there exists a locally non-satiated, differentiable and concave instantaneous utility function \( u(.) \) and constants \( \lambda > 0, \delta \in (0, 1] \), and \( \{\Omega_t\}_{t \in \tau} \) such that

\[
\frac{\partial \nu}{\partial c_k^t} = \lambda \frac{\rho_t^k}{\delta} \Omega_t
\]

\[
\Omega_0 = 1, 1 < \Omega_{t-1} < \Omega_t
\]

for all \( k \) and \( t \).

We then have our main result concerning the naive discounter which is that, perhaps surprisingly\(^{15}\), the sophisticated and naive hyperbolic discounting models are observationally equivalent:

\(^{15}\)Papers that hypothesise that observed behaviour distinguishes sophistication from naivety generally need
Proposition 3. The naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data \(\{p_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau}\), if, and only if, the sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting model rationalises the data.

Proof. See the Appendix.

Thus, without further restrictions (which we will consider below), sophisticated and naive hyperbolic discounting models are nonparametrically indistinguishable given our observables.\(^{16}\)

It is important to note that this does not mean that two individuals with identical instantaneous utility functions, discount factors and budgets and facing identical prices one of whom is a naive hyperbolic discounter and the other a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter would have identical lifetime consumption paths, but it does imply that the difference between them are of degree rather than of kind. What it says is that if, as is usually the case, all we observe is standard consumption and discounted price data over a period of time, then the nonparametric empirical implications of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting and naive hyperbolic discounting for these data are identical. Since the first order conditions for the naive hyperbolic discounter are observationally identical to those of the self-aware discounter, the parallels of Corollaries 1 to 3 also apply to the naive hyperbolic discounter, as does the observation that the lifetime consumption path of the naive discounter will always decline more (increase less) than the otherwise equivalent exponential discounter.

Some examples of this are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows simulated consumption paths for a simple ten period model with CRRA preferences. We have kept the exponential discount rate at unity and discounted prices constant (i.e. zero real interest rate) so that an exponential discounter would simply equalise consumption across periods. For the lower relative risk aversion parameter of 0.7, consumption is brought forward more than for the higher level of 1.5 for both the sophisticated and naive types. For lower relative risk aversion the sophisticated discounter front-loads consumption more than the naive discounter, and this reverses as relative risk aversion decreases (although the paths are very similar when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 1.5, but the naive discounter does start at a slightly higher level than the sophisticated discounter).

As with sophisticated behaviour, we can ask what further functional restrictions on the naive discounter would give rise to additional empirical restrictions. As the unrestricted sophisticated and naive models are identical, the strategy here will be the same as in the sophisticated case, since \(\Psi_{s+h}/\Psi_s\) and \(\Psi_{t+j}/\Psi_t\) in inequality (12) are simply replaced with some kind of committed upfront costs. For example, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) in an analysis of gym membership, find there are people who choose a flat monthly fee and then use the gym so little that their per-gym visits cost more than would a ten-visit pass, something which a sophisticate (who recognises they will not use the gym enough in the future) would not do.

This result is in stark contrast to the claim in Fang and Wang (2015, Proposition 2) which suggests that naivety, in particular, is “generically identified” in a dynamic discrete choice model with hyperbolic discounting. Abbring and Daljord (2019) point to a number of formal problems with Fang and Wang’s proof and show that the sense in which these authors use the term identified is non-standard. It seems that a model may be generically identified, in the sense of Fang and Wang, independently of whether or not any dataset that can be generated by the model corresponds to a unique parameter vector. We refer readers to Abbring and Daljord (2019) for further discussion to which we have nothing to add or subtract.
\( \Omega_{s+h}/\Omega_s \) and \( \Omega_{t+j}/\Omega_t \). There is a difference though: since the term \( \Omega_t \) in the naive model does not have an economic interpretation, thinking of types of instantaneous utility function for the naive model where requiring \( (\Omega_{t+j}/\Omega_t)^{1/j} > (\Omega_{s+h}/\Omega_s)^{1/h} \) leads to a restriction on observed behaviour is somewhat harder than for sophisticated hyperbolic discounting. However, a necessary condition is given in Proposition 4.

**Proposition 4.** If the naive model rationalises the data \( \{\rho_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau} \) for an agent with an instantaneous utility function exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion, \( v''v'/(v')^2 < 1 \), where \( v''v'/(v')^2 \) is independent of prices \( \rho \) then the data \( \{\rho_t, c_t\}_{t \in \tau} \) satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1 and the following conditions. For all \( \forall \{\{t+i\}_{i=0,...,j},\{s+g\}_{g=0,...,h}\} \in \tau, t < s, t + j \leq s \) and \( h \geq 1, \rho_t^i c_t > \rho_s^i c_t, \rho_t^i c_s < \rho_s^i c_{s+h} \) and

\[
\left( \frac{\rho_t^i (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t^i (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} < \left( \frac{\rho_{s+h}^i (c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho_s^i (c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h}
\]

(RN)

implies \( \max \{\rho_t^i c_{t+i}\}_{i=1,...,j} > \min \{\rho_{s+h}^i c_{s+i}\}_{i=1,...,h} \) and

\[
\not(\rho_{s+g}^i c_{s+1+g} > \rho_{s+g}^i c_s + g \text{ and } \rho_t^i c_{t+i} < \rho_{s+g}^i (c_{s+g} - c_{s-1+g}))
\]

for any \( i = 1, ..., j, g = 1, ..., h \).

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

The first part of the condition for the restricted naive model (RN) is identical to that of the corresponding sophisticated model (RS) and the second (additional) restriction seems a priori very weak, in that violating it and thus rejecting the model would appear to be unlikely. For example \( \rho_t^i c_{t+i} < \rho_{s+g}^i (c_{s+g} - c_{s-1+g}) \) means spending has increased so much between \( t + i \) and \( s + g \) that \( \rho_t^i c_{t+i} \) is even smaller than \( \rho_{s+g}^i (c_{s+g} - c_{s-1+g}) \).

For data that pass Proposition 1, the further restrictions needed to reject the naive model are slightly different from those for our restricted version of the sophisticated hyperbolic...
discounting. The empirical restrictions for both models are almost identical: the observed behaviour needed to reject involves the agent increasing spending in response to a (discounted) price decrease but then decreasing spending in response to a bigger (relative) price decrease – something that is completely ruled out for the exponential discounter. For both models the spending decrease must come earlier in time than the increase. The theoretical, functional restrictions, though, differ across the two models. For the naive case, the extra restriction on the (indirect) utility function is that the ratio of the coefficient of prudence to the coefficient of risk aversion is less than one, which is equivalent to

\[ \frac{v''v' - v'''}{(v'\gamma)^2} < 0 \]

i.e. decreasing absolute risk aversion. For sophisticated hyperbolic discounting the restriction is that this quantity is constant, so, although there are overlaps, neither is a subset of the other. Proposition 4 also adds the extra restriction that the ratio of the coefficient of prudence to the coefficient of risk aversion is independent of prices. This allows a weak kind of distinction between naive and sophisticated behaviour. For example, suppose we insist that the instantaneous utility function be iso-elastic, as in the case in most macro or lifecycle models of consumption. Then if the data do not satisfy Proposition 2, they could not have been generated by a sophisticated discounter, but they could have been generated by a naive discounter.

### 3 Empirical Application: Hyperbolic Behaviour in Household Panel Data

Much of the empirical evidence for hyperbolic behaviour comes from laboratory studies. It is sometimes argued (and indeed has been argued to us) that the key insight that has emerged over the past decade of research into time-inconsistent behaviour is that to identify \( \beta, \delta \) discounting one must have access to observations made in the kind of rich decision-making environments which only labs or perhaps artefactual field experiments can produce. Such environments allow us to observe subjects making a mixture of decisions, some governed by short-term consideration influenced by \( \beta \), others governed by longer-term impatience influenced by \( \delta \), and in which they may be able to make partial commitments and so on. Echenique, Imai and Saito (2019), for example, use the Convex Time Budget experimental design from Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), in which subjects are asked to allocate monetary amounts between a “sooner” and a “later” time whilst facing an interest rate with each subject asked to make several choices as the timings and rate of return are varied. Even better would be data in which we could observe consumption plans made by subjects at different dates and then, subsequently, observe whether and how those plans are revised.

Experimental data are not without problems. Excellent discussions of various elicitation techniques, and methods used to analyse data, are presented in, amongst others, Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015), Andersen et al (2013, 2014), Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and
Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2010). For example, many of the experimental studies referenced in Federick et al (2002) (see, for example, their Table 1) are hypothetical, i.e. questions of the type “What amount of money, $x$, if paid to you today would make you indifferent to $y$ paid to you in $t$ days” are asked of the subjects purely hypothetically. Many studies also do not consider curvature of the utility function. The Convex Time Budget data mentioned above comes from Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), and, though meticulously designed, with real payoffs made to the participating students with the possibility of real time delays (by selecting one of their experimental choices at random), necessarily involved small monetary amounts – each participant was asked to allocate 100 tokens with values varying from $0.10 to $0.20.

Setting aside arguments over the external validity of lab work or small-stakes field experiments, and accepting that data of this kind provide the ideal conditions for studying time inconsistency, if that is the only data in which time inconsistency might be empirically relevant then this seems tantamount to saying that $(\beta, \delta)$ discounting as an empirical phenomenon is confined to the lab and has little to say about the kinds of real world data with which economists interested in empirically modelling large scale consumption dynamics normally deal. Therefore, we are interested in the empirical consequences of hyperbolic behaviour in standard, widely-available household survey data on consumption behaviour across multiple goods which contain none of these “rich” features (for example, by limiting ourselves to non-durable consumption, we are not able to exploit durable purchases as commitment devices – a classic indicator of sophisticated hyperbolic behaviour). Our theoretical results above indicate that hyperbolic behaviours do have falsifiable consequences even in such environments.

We focus on the consumption model and consumption survey data for a number of reasons. The first is that consumption matters in both macro and microeconomics. Consumption by households accounts for around 60% of GDP among OECD countries and it is therefore important that we understand these decisions in the real-world.

The second is that we would like to develop simple nonparametric methods which can be applied to readily-available expenditure survey data. The strongest evidence in favour of hyperbolic discounting behaviour often comes from the laboratory or artefactual field experiments that allow researchers to offer participants the ability to make identifiable committed payments and to observe both the subjects’ hypothetical plans as well as their realised choices. The data recorded in expenditure surveys, by contrast, are far less rich – we only ever see what the surveyed households actually do, never what they plan to do. Our approach is therefore different from, but hopefully complementary to, that of Echenique, Imai and Saito (2019) whose characterisations of time-inconsistent behaviour are based on the idea that, for each consumer, researchers can observe and compare several different planned and pre-committed consumption profiles for a single consumption good resulting from different temporal price paths and budgets.

Thirdly, consumption behaviour is a good focus of study for our purposes because the

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survey data are often abundant. Time-inconsistency may be an important feature of house-
holds’ decisions to invest in a house or an individual’s decision to invest in education, but such
decisions are made infrequently. Consumption decisions, on the other hand, are made all the
time by households and so, as argued by Angeletos et al (2001, p.65), provide an excellent
context in which to study inter-temporal models. In particular the frequency of these types
of choices by households mean that we can be vastly more flexible about allowing for prefer-
ence heterogeneity between households as we can effectively model households using their
own idiosyncratic time-series rather than having to pool across different households.

Our empirical application uses the theoretical results to consider a number of substantive
issues. Firstly, how well does the hyperbolic model represent behaviour in these sorts of data?
Secondly how does hyperbolic behaviour relate to the observable characteristics of different
households? Thirdly how can we properly evaluate the hyperbolic model against the standard
exponential model when the hyperbolic model necessarily fits the data better due to the
presence of a free parameter? And finally, using the implications of the theory we show that
we are able to recover an estimate of the joint distribution of time preference parameters.

3.1 Data

The data used here to investigate the empirical implementation of the ideas outlined above is
a large, nationally representative consumption panel: the Spanish Continuous Family Expen-
diture Survey (the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares - ECPF). The ECPF is a
quarterly budget survey of Spanish households. The survey interviews about 3,200 households
every quarter. It is a rotating panel in which participating households are followed for up to
eight consecutive quarters. One eighth of the panel is replenished quarterly. This dataset is a
much studied survey which has often been used for the analysis of intertemporal models and
particularly, latterly, the analysis of habits models (for example, Browning and Collado (2001,
2007)).

The dataset we construct consists of 21866 observations on 3134 households. The data
record household non-durable expenditures and these are disaggregated into the following com-
modity groups: food and non-alcoholic drinks consumed at home, alcohol, tobacco, domestic
energy, services, domestic non-durables, over-the-counter medicines, medical services, trans-
portation (fares), petrol, leisure services, personal services, personal non-durables, restaurants
and bars.

Our theoretical results apply to an environment in which both discounted prices and
income are assumed known to the agent. We therefore make a number of sample-selection
choices designed to make this empirically appropriate. We focus on the sub-sample of couples
in which the husband is in full-time employment in a non-agricultural activity and the wife
is out of the labour force for the entire period during which they are observed. This group
are therefore stable with respect to both employment and household composition. As well
as helping to control for income uncertainty this selection also minimise the effects of any
non-separabilities between consumption and leisure which the empirical application does not
otherwise allow for. Our period of study spans the period from the first quarter of 1985 to
the first quarter of 1997. As we show in the Appendix, both spot prices and discounted prices were highly predictable over this period – log discounted prices for our commodity groups are almost perfectly captured by commodity-specific linear time trends over the period study (see Appendix).

The discounted price data are calculated from published price indices which correspond to the expenditure categories, and the average interest rate on consumer loans. The price data are published quarterly indices from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (the Spanish National Statistics Institute). They are national prices indices rather than actual transactions prices. In this we are no worse, although, clearly no better either, than many studies which merge national survey data on spending with price indices. In the case of consumer interest rates, the period studied predates use of sophisticated credit scoring. Furthermore the selection of the household types we use is such that they are reasonably homogenous (to recap, they are couples in which the husband is in stable non-agricultural employment, the spouse is out of the labour market and in which there are no changes in family composition). For these reasons we do not think that there were significant differences in the interest rates charged to different consumers and so the use of the average is appropriate although we cannot be sure. These caveats should nonetheless be borne in mind.\textsuperscript{18}

3.2 Hyperbolic behaviour

3.2.1 Consistency Results

We examined the consistency of the data with each of the following models: atemporal (i.e. within period) utility maximisation (this is a useful benchmark but also a necessary condition for any inter-temporal model in which preferences are weakly separable over time); hyperbolic discounting as characterised in Propositions 1 and 3; the restricted versions of the sophisticated and naive hyperbolic discounting models as characterised in Propositions 2 and 4 respectively; and finally the exponential discounting consumption model\textsuperscript{19}.

We examine the behaviour of each individual household for consistency with each of these models separately. This is a one-at-a-time approach to the data; the data are never pooled across households so we therefore allow for unrestricted heterogeneity within the classes of models studied: households may differ arbitrarily with respect to whether they are rationalisable by a given model, their time preferences and their preferences for different goods and services.

\textsuperscript{18}It should also be noted that these results treat the household as a unitary entity and abstracts from issues to do with collective household behaviour. For a discussion of the issues raised by collective models of households in a revealed-preference framework see Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) and especially Mazzocco (2007) Adams et al (2014) and Jackson and Yariv (2015), who all suggest that the coexistence of exponential discounters with differing discount rates within a household as another potential source of time-inconsistency in aggregate (household) behaviour.

\textsuperscript{19}We use a previously unexploited (we believe) method of testing for exponential discounting which uses the conditions for $\delta$ implied from inequality (12) with $\Psi_t = 1 \forall t$. This enjoys a great computational advantage over linear programming combined with a grid search over $\delta$. See https://sites.google.com/site/laurablow/working-papers/exponential.pdf for details.
Table 1: Rationalisability results: pass rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>GARP (General)</th>
<th>Hyperbolic (Restricted Sophisticated)</th>
<th>Hyperbolic (Restricted Naive)</th>
<th>Exponential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass Rate (Std. Error)</td>
<td>0.9371 (0.0044)</td>
<td>0.4445 (0.0091)</td>
<td>0.1946 (0.0072)</td>
<td>0.1946 (0.0072)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “General” refers to both the sophisticated and naive version of the models (Propositions 1 and 3). “Restricted Sophisticated” refers to Proposition 2; “Restricted Naive” refers to Proposition 4. Standard errors are reported in brackets.

Table 1 reports the pass rates for each model considered. We see that nearly 94% of the households in these data pass GARP and therefore their behaviour is consistent with within-period utility maximisation. When we add condition (H) and thus test hyperbolic discounting (sophisticated or naive), as specified in Propositions 1 and 3, we find a pass rate of 44% - a little more than two out of five of the households in our data behave precisely consistently with the predictions of the $\beta, \delta$ model. The models of Proposition 2 and 4, which impose restrictions on preferences as described in these Propositions, reduce the consistency to about one fifth of households. The sophisticated and naive versions of this model perform identically because the restrictions the models impose on observable behaviour are almost the same: the first restriction in (RN) is identical to that of (RS), and the second restriction of (RN) is such that, in this data, nobody fails it.\(^{20}\) Thus it does appear that these functional form assumptions, so common in applied work, have a material impact on the fit of the model.

The standard exponential model reported in the fifth column rationalises very few households (about 2 percent). Given that within-period consistency with utility maximisation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the exponential model, and that most households do pass GARP, this poor performance must therefore be due, in the main, to the inter-temporal behaviour displayed by the households in the sample. The standard errors for each of these pass rates is given in brackets in Table 1. In each case the effects of sampling variation appear to be quite modest and we would therefore expect the proportions of households consistent with each model in another random sample of a similar size from this population to be close to those in Table 1.\(^{21}\)

Our revealed-preference results reported in Table 1 (like all revealed preference exercises we are aware of) only utilise the choice behaviour of agents. It does not employ other variables to explain those choices. By contrast, regression-based approaches typically condition on “taste-shifters” like demographic variables to help to explain departures from the baseline model. It is thus interesting to then see how closely (or otherwise) the revealed preference results are associated with other standard observables. To this end, Table 2 reports the results from a probit model of the conditional probability of a household displaying hyperbolic behaviour.

\(^{20}\)Note that for the restricted models (Propositions 2 and 4) these are upper bounds on the pass rates for the proposed restrictions on utility functions since the restrictions on observed behaviour are necessary but not sufficient.

\(^{21}\)The standard errors are computed treating the pass/fail indicator as a binomial random variable.
Table 2: The probability of Hyperbolic behaviour - probit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Marginal Effect (Std Err)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbolic=1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Marginal Effect (Std Err)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (Head of Household)</td>
<td>$-0.004^* (0.002)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Spouse)</td>
<td>$0.005^{**} (0.002)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 0-2</td>
<td>$0.002 (0.018)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 3-6</td>
<td>$0.020 (0.015)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 7-13</td>
<td>$-0.017^* (0.009)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 14-15</td>
<td>$-0.004 (0.016)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children aged 16-17</td>
<td>$0.015 (0.017)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Occupier</td>
<td>$0.030^* (0.018)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Owner</td>
<td>$-0.042^{**} (0.021)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University level Education</td>
<td>$-0.016 (0.028)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Education</td>
<td>$0.015 (0.017)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low spending on health</td>
<td>$0.053^{**} (0.022)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Smoker</td>
<td>$0.048^{**} (0.024)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Drinker</td>
<td>$-0.003 (0.025)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Total Expenditure</td>
<td>$-0.966^* (0.576)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Total Expenditure-squared</td>
<td>$0.033^* (0.019)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs</td>
<td>$-0.041^{***} (0.007)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 3,134
Log Likelihood: -1,464.158
Akaike Inf. Crit.: 2,964.316

Notes: Marginal effects calculated at the average  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The most significant variables seem to relate the hyperbolic behaviour we detect to variables which reflect long-term behaviour. An evidently important correlate is low out-of-pocket expenditure on health (durable and non-durable expenditure on medical products and spending on medical services). The explanatory variable here is coded as a dummy variable indicating that the household is in the bottom 10% of the sample distribution of these expenditures: these households are relatively low health-spenders and are either presumably relatively healthy or treat medical investments in their health differently from the way in which they treat a durable like car-ownership and so under-invest. Along the same lines, being a heavy smoker (expenditure on tobacco at or above the 90’th percentile in the sample) is positively associated with time inconsistency. Drinking (defined in the same way) seems to have little explanatory power. Interestingly, we also note a strong, positive association with total household expenditure which we use as a rough approximation to the overall resources in the
household. As these grow, the rate of hyperbolic behaviour increases. The variable recording
the number of observations we have on the household is included as a control because the
ability of revealed preference tests to detect off-model behaviour is necessarily increasing in
the number of observations and it is therefore important to allow for this effect.

3.3 Model comparison

As Angeletos et al (2001) conclude, on the basis of their own empirical work and their sense
of the literature, “All in all, a model of consumption based on a hyperbolic discount function
consistently better approximates the data than does a model based on an exponential discount
function.” On the basis of our results in Table 1 it would be hard to disagree. Nonetheless,
is important to remember when looking at measures of fit that these models are not equally
flexible. The atemporal model of utility maximisation does not consider inter-temporal plan-
ing at all and takes the budget allocated to each period as exogenously given. It thus places
no restrictions whatsoever on how spending is allocated across time and therefore, as long
as within-period preferences are time-separable and satisfy GARP, any inter-temporal allo-
cation is, in that sense, rationalisable with the atemporal model. The exponential model,
in contrast, is much more demanding. It constrains both within-period and inter-temporal
choices: within-period choices must be rational and stable, and inter-temporal choices must
be time-consistent. The hyperbolic model is, in a sense, intermediate. It too requires within-
period rationality and stability, but whilst it does not require time-consistency, inter-temporal
behaviour is constrained by the form of the hyperbolic Euler equation. Thus, whilst much is
sometimes made of the ability of the hyperbolic model to explain observed behaviour which
the exponential model cannot\textsuperscript{22}, the fact that our (or anyone else’s) results show that the
hyperbolic model fits better should come as little surprise. How, then, should we make sense
of the results in Table 1? We consider two approaches. The first is based on Selten’s Index of
predictive success, the second on the Kullback-Leibler information criterion.

3.3.1 Predictive Success

In their revealed preference guise, stripped of special functional form assumptions, all three
models generate restrictions in the form of sets of choices which are consistent with the model
of interest (for example, given any collection of budget constraints there will be a set of
demands which satisfy GARP). To investigate the performance of models which predict sets,
it is useful to think about two objects. The first is the feasible outcome space (for example, the
set of choices which satisfy the inter-temporal budget constraint) which we will denote $F$. The
second is the subset of model-consistent choices (the subset of feasible choices which satisfy the
restrictions of the model), denoted $P$, with $P \subseteq F$. When one conducts a particular empirical
revealed preference test one is, in essence, checking to see whether the observed choices lie
within $P$.

With this in mind it becomes clear that it is necessary to allow for the size of the

\textsuperscript{22}See Frederick et al (2001) for example.
theoretically-consistent subset relative to the set of possible outcomes. The essential idea – which is due to Selten and Krischker (1983) and Selten (1991) – is that if the subset of observations consistent with the model \((P)\) is a large proportion of the set of behaviours which the consumer could possibly display \((F)\) then we should be little surprised if we find that many of the observed choices lie in \(P\) – they could hardly have done otherwise. For example, if we are testing the atemporal model and the collection of budget constraints never cross then all feasible choices, necessarily, satisfy GARP; it would be impossible to make a choice that was not in \(P\) because \(P = F\). This means that empirical fit alone (the proportion of the sample which passes the relevant test) is not a sufficient basis for ranking the performance of alternative theories: if it were, then no theory could out-perform a meaningless theory like “anything goes”. A better approach would be to consider the trade-off between the pass rate and some sort of measure of how demanding the theory is. Following Selten (1991) let \(a\) denote the size of the theory-consistent subset \(P\) relative to the outcome space \(F\) for the model of interest. The relative area of the empty set is zero and the relative area of all outcomes is one so \(a \in [0, 1]\). Now suppose that we have some choice/outcome data. Let \(r\) denote the pass rate; this is simply the proportion of the data that lies in \(P\) and hence satisfies the restrictions of the model of interest (i.e. the numbers in Table 1). Selten (1991) argues that both the pass rate and the area should be taken into account when comparing models into an overall measure of predictive success \(m(r, a)\). He further suggests that demanding theories are characterised by small values for \(a\); and empirically successful theories combine small values of \(a\) with a high degree of agreement between the data and theory (large \(r\)). He also argues that the trade-off between the ability to fit the data and the restrictiveness of the theory should be the difference measure\(^{23}\):

\[
m(r, a) = r - a
\]

The Selten index for the models is shown in Table 3 where the area has been computed by numerical (Monte Carlo) integration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>GARP (General)</th>
<th>Hyperbolic (Restricted Sophisticated)</th>
<th>Hyperbolic (Restricted Naive)</th>
<th>Exponential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selten Index</td>
<td>0.0092</td>
<td>0.0742</td>
<td>0.0365</td>
<td>0.0365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td>(0.0091)</td>
<td>(0.0072)</td>
<td>(0.0072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “General” refers to both the sophisticated and naive version of the models (Propositions 1 and 3). “Restricted Sophisticated” refers to Proposition 2; “Restricted Naive” refers to Proposition 4. Standard errors are reported in brackets.

These results indicate that even allowing for the stronger restrictions in the exponential model the hyperbolic models (particularly the restricted versions) out-perform it. In other

\(^{23}\)In brief, Selten’s main requirements are monotonicity \(m(1, 0) > m(0, 1)\), equivalence of meaningless theories \(m(0, 0) = m(1, 1)\), and the requirement that the performance of the mean (across subjects) is equal to the mean performance (across subjects) \(m(\bar{r}, \bar{a}) = \bar{m}\). This last assumption is strong and responsible for the linearity of the resulting index.
words, whilst the hyperbolic model must fit better than the exponential alternative it does so without becoming vastly more permissive and the improved fit outweighs the effects of having an extra free parameter. The exponential model on the other hand appears to have a predictive success which is not statistically significantly different from zero. In this case the model is more demanding than the hyperbolic models yet the pass rate is far lower than you would expect even allowing for this.

3.3.2 Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC)

An alternative approach to assessing the fit of the model is to use the fact that since both the relative size of the theory-consistent set and the empirical pass rate satisfy all of the necessary properties of probabilities we are justified in thinking about the problem of comparing them as the problem of comparing probability distributions. Here $a$ is the probability that a random uniform choice over the feasible set will satisfy the restrictions of the model. Similarly $r$ is the probability that a randomly drawn subject will exhibit behaviour consistent with the model. A simple way in which to make a comparison between these two distributions in units which are meaningful is to use the Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler (1951))

$$KL(r, a) = r \log_2 \left( \frac{r}{a} \right) + (1 - r) \log_2 \left( \frac{1 - r}{1 - a} \right)$$

One interpretation of the Kullback-Leibler divergence of one distribution from another is the information gained by revising beliefs from a prior to a posterior. Hence in this example, the Kullback-Leibler divergence measures the information (in bits) conveyed by the empirical distribution of outcomes, $\{r, 1-r\}$, relative to a prior model of uniform random choice over the set of feasible outcomes, $\{a, 1-a\}$. For example, suppose that the pass rate was 0.7 and this matched the size of theory-consistent set predicted by the model precisely (i.e. the proportion of all possible observed choices which satisfy the theory was also 0.7) then the observed pass rate would convey no surprise at all and the data would generate zero bits of information about the empirical performance of the model. If, on the other hand, the set of outcomes which are rationalisable represent very little of the outcome space ($a \to 0$) (i.e. the model makes very precise predictions) and most of the data generally satisfy the theoretical restrictions ($r \to 1$) then the outcome of the empirical test is extremely informative and $KL(r, a)$ is large.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>GARP (General)</th>
<th>Hyperbolic (Restricted Sophisticated)</th>
<th>Exponential (Restricted Naive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KLIC (Std. Error)</td>
<td>0.9437 (0.9088)</td>
<td>16.6604 (3.6197)</td>
<td>6.8018 (2.3867)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.8018 (2.3867)</td>
<td>0.0462 (0.1965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “General” refers to both the sophisticated and naive version of the models (Propositions 1 and 3). “Restricted Sophisticated” refers to Proposition 2; “Restricted Naive” refers to Proposition 4. Standard errors are reported in brackets.

24 They are non-negative real numbers, the relative area of the outcome space $F$ is one, the area of two non-overlapping subsets within $F$ is the sum of their individual areas.
Table 4 presents the Kullback-Leibler information criteria\textsuperscript{25} for the five models. It concurs with the Selten index results. The very high pass rate of the atemporal model is revealed to be quite uninformative about the success or otherwise of that model – and indeed the standard error indicates that the observed non-zero value in the sample is very likely to be due to sampling variation rather than a feature of the population: another sample could easily produce zero information about the model\textsuperscript{26}. The KLIC being essentially zero indicates that the predictive success of the model is due, almost entirely, to its permissiveness. Turning to the comparison of interest between the exponential and the hyperbolic models, we see that, even allowing for the less-demanding nature of the hyperbolic models, their performance is better than the exponential model. The exponential model does badly because, even though it is very restrictive, few people pass the test. The unrestricted hyperbolic model seems to be the most informative about household behaviour.

### 3.4 The distribution of time preferences

Our conclusion from the analysis of model consistency is that, even making proper allowance for the relative parsimony of the alternative models, hyperbolic behaviour provides the best explanation of the consumption behaviour we observe in these data. Given this, for those households that behave consistently with the hyperbolic model, we can apply the inequalities in corollary 3 to recover their time preferences.

![Figure 2: The \{\(\beta, \delta\)\} set](image)

Figure 2 shows a unit-square illustrating a generic example of what the set of discounting parameters will look like for a household whose behaviour is model-consistent. Recall that the exponential term is always bounded from above by one, and the hyperbolic term from below by zero. Also recall that the lower bound on the exponential discount factor (shown by the dashed vertical line) is independent of the value of \(\beta\). Finally, note that, as per corollary 3, the upper bound on \(\beta\) varies inversely with \(\delta\). To display the variation in the behaviour of a

\textsuperscript{25}Measured in bits \(\times 10^3\).

\textsuperscript{26}The standard errors are calculated using the delta-method.
complicated object like the set shown in Figure 2 we first look at the exponential margin, and then the hyperbolic discount factor at fixed values of the exponential parameter. We finally look at the distribution of discounting functions at different temporal distances.\textsuperscript{27}

Table 5: The distribution of time preferences: the exponential parameter \( \delta \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>10th p'tile</th>
<th>1st quartile</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>3rd quartile</th>
<th>90th p'tile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \delta )</td>
<td>0.9570</td>
<td>0.91675</td>
<td>0.94175</td>
<td>0.96850</td>
<td>0.98775</td>
<td>0.99625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We begin with the exponential discounting parameter. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for \( \delta \). It is based on an estimate of the nonparametric (kernel) density of the exponential parameter which uses kernel functions with bandwidths corresponding to the interval \([\delta, 1]\) for each household. The mean value for the exponential parameter is 0.957 and the median 0.9685 (the skew is caused by the fact that the rationalising interval for the exponential discount factor always includes one at the upper end). Frederick \textit{et al} (2002) review a large number of studies which have attempted to measure \( \delta \) and whilst, they argue, that there appears to be remarkably little consensus in the literature, a value of around 0.96 is probably reasonable.

To describe the hyperbolic parameter we look at how the upper bound varies across the range of possible values for \( \delta \). We focus on the upper bound as it is an intuitive measure of the distance from exponential discounting (recall that the closer \( \beta \) is to 1, the closer the hyperbolic model is to the exponential model; at \( \beta = 1 \) they are identical).\textsuperscript{28} Figure 3 places the exponential parameter at its lower bound for each household (point A in Figure 2); Figure 4 sets \( \delta = 1 \) for each household (point B in Figure 2); finally Figure 5 represents the concentrated-out upper bound on \( \beta \) across the whole range \([\delta, 1]\) (the line from A to B in Figure 2).

As expected the support of the hyperbolic parameter is wider when \( \delta \) is set to its lower bound (Figure 3) than it is when \( \delta = 1 \) (Figure 4). This is because the lower bound is heterogeneous and varies across the sample whereas the upper bound does not. Nonetheless, comparing Figures 3 and 4 we can see that when the exponential parameters is higher (Figure 3) the hyperbolic parameter is correspondingly lower: when households are maximally impatient the mass of the hyperbolic parameter distribution is shifted upwards, and when households are more patient the trade-off is that a greater degree of hyperbolism is needed to rationalise behaviour. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the concentrated-out upper bound on \( \beta \) across the whole range \([\delta, 1]\) (the line from A to B in Figure 2). It is derived using a household-specific kernel function over the identified range for \( \beta \) for each household.

\textsuperscript{27}We are grateful to two anonymous referees who suggested both Figure 2 and the following way of organising the description.

\textsuperscript{28}We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested this interpretation and approach.
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics based on numerically integrating the density in Figure 5. The mean value of the hyperbolic parameter is around 0.84 and the median is 0.86. Compared to the exponential rate there is a less dispersion/heterogeneity: the interquartile range is from about 0.8 to 0.9. Ten percent of the distribution shows quite pronounced hyperbolism with $\beta < 0.73$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>10th p’ctile</th>
<th>1st quartile</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>3rd quartile</th>
<th>90th p’tile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.8362</td>
<td>0.72900</td>
<td>0.79700</td>
<td>0.85675</td>
<td>0.89975</td>
<td>0.93350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ultimately, the important aspect of the $\beta, \delta$ time preference parameters is how they combine to form the individual’s discount function. Figure 6 provides a contour plot of the estimated distribution of discount functions at various time horizons among the hyperbolic households. Each household’s discount function is calculated using a parameterisation which
applies a central value for $\beta, \delta$ given that household’s identified set. In terms of Figure 2 we use the value of $\delta$ at the centre of the $[\bar{\delta}, 1]$ interval and the corresponding value for the hyperbolic parameter on the line from A to B directly above this value. The averages of the $\beta, \delta$ values chosen in this way correspond closely to the averages reported in Tables 5 and 6. We then estimated the cross-sectional density of the quasi-hyperbolic sequence $[1, \beta \delta, \beta^2 \delta^2, \beta^3 \delta^3, ...]$ at each time horizon. For comparison Figure 6 also plots (dotted line) the quasi-hyperbolic sequence using $\beta = 0.8362$ and $\delta = 0.9570$ which are the mean values from Table 5, the exponential function $\delta^t$ for $\delta = 0.9570$ and the true hyperbolic function $(1 + \alpha t)^{-\gamma/\alpha}$ with $\alpha = 4$ and $\gamma = 1$. There is evident heterogeneity but on average postponing an immediate reward by a quarter reduces the value of that reward by approximately one-tenth to one-fifth. By contrast, delaying a distant reward by an additional quarter reduces the value of that reward by a much smaller proportion.

4 Conclusion

We provide a choice-revealed preference characterisation of quasi-hyperbolic consumption behaviour in the kind of decision-making and measurement environment of the kind routinely provided by household expenditure surveys. We describe conditions which break down neatly into a within- and between-period component which allows for useful diagnostics regarding the source of any violations. We also explore whether preference restrictions of the type commonly used in lifecycle consumption modelling, such as an iso-elastic instantaneous utility function, have further revealed preference implications. We have also applied this characterisation to a large, nationally representative consumption panel to explore a number of substantive issues including the joint distribution of time preferences, the distribution of discount functions at various horizons and the relationship between the prevalence of hyperbolic preferences in the household population and household characteristics.

In this paper we have focussed on the perfect foresight version of the model and selected
the study sample and period to make this tenable. This is nonetheless a limitation and we leave to future research the extension of the conditions to deal with uncertainty. To see some of the challenges which may arise consider the exponential model. Ignoring the discount factor, with perfect certainty the marginal utility of income is constant. Allowing for uncertainty results in the martingale property: $E_{t-1}(\lambda_t) = \lambda_{t-1}$. This can be written $\lambda_t = \lambda_{t-1}\varepsilon_t$ where $\varepsilon_t$ is a positive random variable with $E_{t-1}(\varepsilon_t) = 1$. Given a sequence for $\lambda_t$ we can define the series $\varepsilon_t := \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t-1}}$. Then one way to proceed may be to choose the $\lambda_t$’s to minimise the deviation from unity of the $\varepsilon_t$’s. For example, we could take the first order autocorrelation and:

$$\min \sum_{t \in T} \left( \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2$$

subject to the Afriat conditions. The first order autocorrelation being zero is only necessary for the unit conditional mean requirement and not sufficient. Furthermore, the resulting program is (highly) nonlinear in the $\lambda_t$’s and allowing for the discount factor (ignored here) would make it more complex still. Nonetheless, if these problems could be overcome then the hyperbolic model under uncertainty may, analogously, be reformulated as the sequence $\{\Psi_t\}_{t \in T}$ following a sub-martingale. We note, however, that, qualitatively speaking, uncertainty introduces a precautionary motive for saving which will have precisely the opposite implications for consumption paths to those of hyperbolic behaviour – which tend to elevate rather than depress current consumption compared to future consumption.

Another limitation is that we treat the household as a unitary decision-making entity and ignore the issues raised by collective household behaviour. The revealed preference implications of atemporal collective models are discussed in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007), and intertemporal models in Mazzoco (2007) and Adams et al (2014). Both Mazzoco (2007)
and Adams et al (2014) speculate that households composed of two exponential individuals with heterogeneous discount rates may give rise to aggregate (household) behaviour which is time-inconsistent. Since our empirical work looks at couples this may, if true, account for the apparent prevalence of hyperbolic household behaviours. It may be important therefore to extend the ideas presented here to collective models of households, but at present we have not done so.

We have focussed on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, but hypothesise that a similar approach could be used to see if nonparametric tests of other models of temporal discounting can be formulated. Of course, phenomena such as the magnitude effect might be difficult to test on survey data as we may not see the same agent making repeated choices over different principals. There is no reason, though, that the methods we use could not be used on experimental data. For example, in experimental data eliciting choices over time-dated monetary flows we see the agent make committed choices; the test for hyperbolic discounting would therefore be exponential discounting between future payments, with an extra discount factor between immediate and future payments, and where we observe an agent making multiple choices they must have consistent discount factors across those choices.

The empirical conditions we find are quite easy to apply since they require nothing more complicated than checking inequalities. In an empirical application we consider in some detail how to interpret the revealed preference performance of alternative models which differ in their restrictiveness. We suggest Selten’s index of predictive success and the Kullback-Leibler divergence as sensible means of doing this. This seems to be quite a fruitful way of describing the performance of the models in question – and possibly economic models in general. We compare tests of atemporal behaviour (a GARP test), hyperbolic discounting and exponential discounting. We find that, although most households pass GARP, when we consider the trade-off between the pass rate and measures of how demanding the theory is, GARP does not do very well because of its permissiveness. Exponential discounting also does not do well predictively because, although it is very restrictive, few people pass the test. However, we find that the hyperbolic discounting models perform well.

We show that the hyperbolic behaviour detected by our restrictions is sensibly correlated with household characteristics related to long-term decision making and other behaviours in which inter-temporal considerations are important like smoking and health investments. Using our characterisation of the model we are able to provide estimates of the joint distribution of time preference and the distribution of discount functions. We find average exponential quarterly discount factors around 0.96 and hyperbolic factors around 0.84.
References


Econometrica, 70(2), 737-753.


Appendix - Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Denote savings as $S_t$ (with the assumption that $S_T = 0$). In period $t$, person $t$’s program is:

$$V(A_t) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{T-t} \delta^i u(c_{t+i})$$

$$s.t. \quad p_t'c_t + S_t = A_t$$

$$A_{t+1} = (1 + r_{t+1})S_t$$

Expressing everything in discounted terms gives

$$V(\Delta_t) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{T-t} \delta^i u(c_{t+i})$$

$$s.t. \quad \Delta_{t+1} = \Delta_t - \rho_t'c_t$$

where $\Delta_t = A_t / \prod_{i=1}^{t} (1 + r_i)$ and $\rho_t^k = p_t^k / \prod_{i=1}^{t} (1 + r_i)$.

Person $t$ knows that each person $\varsigma = t + 1 \ldots T$ (his future selves) will have program:

$$V(\Delta_{\varsigma}) = \max_{c_{\varsigma}} u(c_{\varsigma}) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{T-\varsigma} \delta^i u(c_{\varsigma+i})$$

$$s.t. \quad \Delta_{\varsigma+1} = \Delta_{\varsigma} - \rho_{\varsigma}'c_{\varsigma}$$

Thus we can re-write the value function in equation (16) as

$$V(\Delta_t) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{i=2}^{T-t} \delta^i u(c_{t+i}) + \beta\delta u(c_{t+1}) - \delta u(c_{t+1})$$

$$= \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \delta [V(\Delta_{t+1}) - (1 - \beta) u(c_{t+1})]$$

$$s.t. \quad \Delta_{t+1} = \Delta_t - \rho_t'c_t$$

The first order condition from equation (18) is

$$\frac{\partial u_t}{\partial c_t^k} - \delta \rho_t^k \left[ V_{\Delta_{t+1}} - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{t+1}^k} \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right] = 0 \quad \forall k$$

(19)

where $V_{\Delta_{t+1}}$ denotes $\frac{\partial V(\Delta_{t+1})}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}}$, and the envelope theorem gives

$$V_{\Delta_t} = \delta \left[ V_{\Delta_{t+1}} - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{t+1}^k} \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right] \quad \forall k$$

(20)
Equations (19) and (20) give
\[ V_{\Delta t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial c} \frac{1}{\rho_t^k} = \forall k \] (21)

Updating (21) and substituting into (19) gives
\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t^k} = \delta \rho_t^k \left[ V_{\Delta t+1} - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} V_{\Delta t+1} \rho_{t+1}^k \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta t+1} \right] \forall k \]
\[ = \delta V_{\Delta t+1} \rho_t^k \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{t+1}^k \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta t+1} \right] \forall k \]
and using (21) once more gives
\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t^k} = \delta \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{t+1}^k} \frac{1}{\rho_{t+1}^k} \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{t+1}^k \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta t+1} \right] \forall k \]
which is the Euler equation in Lemma 1.

Define
\[ \mu_{t+1} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_{t+1}^k \frac{\partial c_{t+1}^k}{\partial \Delta t+1} \] (22)

Note that this is the period \( t + 1 \) marginal propensity to spend out of wealth. Given consumption in each period is normal then it follows that
\[ \mu_t \in (0, 1) \quad \forall t \neq T \]
with \( \mu_T = 1 \) by exhaustion of the lifetime budget. Solving for \( \partial u / \partial c_{t+1}^k \) gives
\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{t+1}^k} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t^k} \frac{1}{\rho_t^k} \frac{\rho_{t+1}^k}{\delta} \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1} \right]^{-1} \forall k \]
and solving recursively gives
\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t^k} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} \frac{1}{\rho_0^k} \frac{1}{\delta} \prod_{i=1}^{t} \frac{1}{\left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i \right]} \forall k \] (23)

Using (21) dated in \( t = 0 \) and denoting \( V_{\Delta 0} = \lambda \) gives
\[ \lambda = \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} \frac{1}{\rho_0^k} \forall k \]

On substitution into (23) this gives the condition
\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t^k} = \lambda \frac{1}{\delta} \rho_t^k \prod_{i=1}^{t} \frac{1}{\left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_i \right]} \forall k \] (24)
which is Definition 1. Reinserting the definition of \( \mu_i \) (as given in equation (22)) into equation
(24) gives the first equation of Lemma 1

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial c^k} = \frac{1}{\delta^r} \rho^k \prod_{i=1}^{t} \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho^k \frac{\partial c^k}{\partial \Delta^t} \right]^{-1} \forall k$$

Proof of Corollary 1

Using equation (2) for two periods \(s\) and \(s + h\) gives

\[
\begin{align*}
 u_1 &\leq u_2 + \delta \Psi_2 \rho_2' (c_1 - c_2) \\
u_2 &\leq u_1 + \Psi_1 \rho_1' (c_2 - c_1)
\end{align*}
\]

which imply

\[0 \leq \delta \Psi_2 \rho_2' (c_1 - c_2) - \Psi_1 \rho_1' (c_2 - c_1) \tag{25}\]

If \(\rho_1' (c_1 - c_2) < 0\) then (25) gives

\[\delta \geq \frac{\Psi_2 \rho_2' (c_1 - c_2)}{\Psi_1 \rho_1' (c_1 - c_2)} \]

Since we know \(\Psi_2/\Psi_1 > 1\), then if

\[\frac{\rho_2' (c_1 - c_2)}{\rho_1' (c_1 - c_2)} \geq 1\]

this implies \(\delta > 1\) thus rejecting the model. \(\blacksquare\)

Proof of Corollary 2

(1) ⇒ (2)

Using equation (4) for two periods \(s\) and \(s + h\) gives

\[
\begin{align*}
 u_s &\leq u_{s+h} + \tilde{\Psi}_{s+h} \rho_{s+h}' (c_s - c_{s+h}) \\
u_{s+h} &\leq u_s + \tilde{\Psi}_s \rho_s' (c_{s+h} - c_s)
\end{align*}
\]

which imply

\[0 \leq \tilde{\Psi}_{s+h} \rho_{s+h}' (c_s - c_{s+h}) - \tilde{\Psi}_s \rho_s' (c_s - c_{s+h}) \tag{26}\]

In a one-good case (4) this reduces to

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{If } (c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 &\text{ then } \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} \leq \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} \tag{27} \\
\text{If } (c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 &\text{ then } \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} \geq \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} \tag{28}
\end{align*}
\]
which is simply a consequence of condition (4) being equivalent to the existence of a concave utility function with $\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t} = \tilde{\Psi}_t \rho_t$.

Condition (H) gives $\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < 1$ and therefore (28) implies

$$\text{If } (c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \text{ then } \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < 1 \Rightarrow (\rho_s - \rho_{s+h}) < 0$$

which is the first part of Corollary 2 (2).

Now consider time periods $s < t < t + j < s + h \in \tau$. If $(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0$ and $(c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0$ then (28) and (27) give

$$\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} \geq \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \leq \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}$$

and condition (H) implies $\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}}$, so the combined implication is

$$\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \leq \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}$$

i.e.

$$\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}$$

which is the second part of Corollary 2 (2)

(2) $\Rightarrow$ (1)

Consider some time periods $s < t < t + j < s + h \in \tau$. Suppose we want to define some $\tilde{\Psi}_s$, $\tilde{\Psi}_t$, $\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}$ and $\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}$ such that

$$\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} = \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}}{\Psi_{s+h}}$$

Suppose that $(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \Rightarrow (\rho_s - \rho_{s+h}) > 0$ for all $s, s+h \in \tau$, $h \geq 1$ and $(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}$ for all $s < t < t + j < s + h \in \tau$.

Let us consider four exhaustive cases:

(i) If $(c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0$ then we can choose

$$\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \right\}$$

$$\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \right\}$$
(ii) If \((c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0\) then we can choose
\[
\frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < 1
\]
\[
\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} \right\}
\]

(iii) If \((c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0\) then we can choose
\[
\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, 1 \right\}
\]

(iv) If \((c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0\) then we can choose
\[
\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, 1 \right\}
\]
\[
\max \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} \right\} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < 1
\]

Thus, in all cases we have chosen
\[
\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}}
\]

and therefore can always choose
\[
\tilde{\Psi}_s < \tilde{\Psi}_t < \tilde{\Psi}_{t+j} < \tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}
\]

Now suppose we have chosen \(\tilde{\Psi}_s, \tilde{\Psi}_t, \tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}\) and \(\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}\) as above, and we now consider time periods \(u, u+i\) where \(u < s < s+h < u+i \in \tau\), with \((c_u - c_{u+i}) < 0 \Rightarrow (\rho_u - \rho_{u+i}) > 0\) for all \(u, u+i \in \tau\), and \((c_u - c_{u+i}) < 0 \land (c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_{u+i}}{\rho_u} < \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}\). Building on the four cases above, it is easy to show that we can again always choose
\[
\tilde{\Psi}_u < \tilde{\Psi}_s < \tilde{\Psi}_{s+h} < \tilde{\Psi}_{u+i}
\]

For example:

If \((c_u - c_{u+i}) < 0 \land (c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0\) then we choose
\[
\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, 1 \right\}
\]
\[
\frac{\rho_{u+i}}{\rho_u} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_u}{\tilde{\Psi}_{u+i}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} \right\}
\]

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If \((c_a - c_{u+i}) < 0 \land (c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0\) then we choose

\[
\frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < 1
\]

\[
\frac{\rho_{u+i}}{\rho_u} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_u}{\tilde{\Psi}_{u+i}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \min\left\{\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}}\right\}
\]

, or:

If \((c_a - c_{u+i}) > 0 \land (c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0\) then we choose

\[
\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < \min\left\{\frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, 1\right\}
\]

\[
\frac{\tilde{\Psi}_u}{\tilde{\Psi}_{u+i}} < \min\left\{\frac{\rho_{u+i}}{\rho_u}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}}\right\}
\]

If \((c_a - c_{u+i}) > 0 \land (c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \land (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0\) then we choose

\[
\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+j}} < \min\left\{\frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, 1\right\}
\]

\[
\max\left\{\frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}}\right\} < \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_u}{\tilde{\Psi}_{u+i}} < \min\left\{\frac{\rho_{u+i}}{\rho_u}, \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_s}{\tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}}\right\}
\]

and similarly for the other four combinations.

So, since this argument can be extended to all partitions of the data then we can always choose \(\left\{\tilde{\Psi}_t\right\}\) to satisfy condition (H).

Note that if there are only three periods, which we can think of as a limiting case where, say, \(t + j = s + h\) then the requirement that \((c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < 1\) for any \(s, s+h\) automatically gives us \(\tilde{\Psi}_s < \tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}\) if \((c_t - c_{s+h}) > 0\). This is because with three periods if \((c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0\) and \((c_t - c_{s+h}) > 0\) then it must be the case that \((c_s - c_t) < 0\) and hence \(\tilde{\Psi}_s < \tilde{\Psi}_{s+h}\) if \((c_t - c_{s+h}) > 0\). Obviously with only two periods, the requirement for being able to choose \(\tilde{\Psi}_s < \tilde{\Psi}_{s+1}\) is simply \((c_s - c_{s+1}) < 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_{s+1}}{\rho_s} < 1\).

In all cases we have also chosen \(\left\{\tilde{\Psi}_t\right\}\) so that \(\tilde{\Psi}_t \rho_t < \tilde{\Psi}_{t+i} \rho_{t+i}\) if \(c_t > c_{t+i}\) and \(\tilde{\Psi}_t \rho_t > \tilde{\Psi}_{t+i} \rho_{t+i}\) if \(c_t < c_{t+i}\) therefore condition (4) is satisfied since, by Afriat’s Theorem, it is equivalent to the existence of a concave utility function with \(\frac{\partial u}{\partial c} = \tilde{\Psi}_t \rho_t\). Indeed, without the addition of condition (H), condition (4) (or GARP) is trivially satisfied when there is only one good. For example, all we require is \(c_t < c_s \Rightarrow \tilde{\Psi}_t \rho_t > \tilde{\Psi}_s \rho_s\). So if we arrange consumption in order of size (where now the superscript denotes magnitude, not time)

\[
c^1 < c^2 < \ldots < c^M
\]
and then define
\[ \tilde{\Psi}^1 = \frac{\varepsilon^1}{\rho^1}, \tilde{\Psi}^2 = \frac{\varepsilon^2}{\rho^2}, \ldots, \tilde{\Psi}^M = \frac{\varepsilon^M}{\rho^M} \]
\[ \varepsilon^1 > \varepsilon^2 > \ldots > \varepsilon^M \]
then we have
\[ \tilde{\Psi}^1 \rho^1 > \tilde{\Psi}^2 \rho^2 > \ldots > \tilde{\Psi}^M \rho^M \]
as required. The proof shows that as long as \((c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \Rightarrow (\rho_s - \rho_{s+h}) > 0\) for all \(s, s + h \in \tau\) and \((c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \& (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}\) for all \(s < t < t + j < s + h \in \tau\). then these \(\{\tilde{\Psi}\}\) can also be chosen to satisfy condition (H).

Note that if we wanted to use the conditions in Corollary 2 (2) to check for violations, the procedure is even easier than the conditions suggest. We are checking that there are no cases where \((c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \& (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0 \& \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} > \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}\). So clearly we can restrict attention to \(\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < 1\) since in the first step we will have checked that \(\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} < 1\). Now note that \(\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_s} > \frac{\rho_{t+j}}{\rho_t}\) \(\Rightarrow \frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s+h}} \frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_{t+j}} > 1\) which means either \(\frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s+h}} > 1\) or \(\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_{t+j}} > 1\) or both. But since \((c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \& (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0 \& (c_{t+j} - c_{s+h}) < 0\) and therefore we have either \((c_s - c_t) < 0, (c_{t+j} - c_{s+h}) > 0, \frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s+h}} < 1\) and \(\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_{t+j}} > 1\) or \((c_s - c_t) > 0, (c_{t+j} - c_{s+h}) < 0, \frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s+h}} > 1\) and \(\frac{\rho_{s+h}}{\rho_{t+j}} < 1\). Therefore we can restrict attention to intervals where consumption increases and then decreases twice, with the price ratio for the first decrease being \(< 1\) and that for the second decrease being \(> 1\), or to intervals where consumption decreases twice and then increases, with the price ratio for the first decrease being \(> 1\) and that for the second decrease being \(< 1\).

**Proof of Corollary 3**

In the proof of Proposition 1 we showed that if the data satisfy the Afriat inequalities then we can satisfy the sophisticated hyperbolic discounting model by setting
\[ \delta > \max \left\{ \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}} \right\} \quad \forall t, t + 1 \in \tau \]
and then setting
\[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1} = \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1} \delta} < 1 \]
Conditional on our choice of \(\delta\), this gives us \(\tau_2 - \tau_1\) equations:
\[ \beta = 1 - \frac{\left(1 - \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_t}{\tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\mu_{t+1}} \right)}{\delta} \]
\[ (30) \]
Since \( \mu_{t+1} \in (0, 1) \) for \( t + 1 \neq T \) and \( \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\delta} < 1 \), then \( \left(1 - \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\delta}\right) / \mu_{t+1} > \left(1 - \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\delta}\right) \), so equation (30) (plus \( \beta > 0 \) by assumption) gives us:

\[
0 < \beta < \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\delta} \Rightarrow \quad 0 < \beta < \frac{1}{\delta} \\min \left\{ \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \right\} \quad \forall t, t + 1 \in \tau, t + 1 \neq T \tag{31}
\]

Writing equation (4) for any pair of periods \( t, t + j \in \tau, j > 0 \) gives:

\[
\begin{align*}

u_t &\leq u_{t+j} + \bar{\Psi}_{t+j} \rho_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j}) \\
u_{t+j} &\leq u_t + \bar{\Psi}_t \rho_t (c_{t+j} - c_t)
\end{align*}
\Rightarrow \quad \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \rho_t (c_t - c_{t+j}) \leq \rho_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j}) \tag{32}
\]

Equation (32) gives:

\[
\begin{align*}

\rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0 &\Rightarrow \quad \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \geq \frac{\rho_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t (c_t - c_{t+j})} \\
\rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0 &\Rightarrow \quad \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \leq \frac{\rho_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t (c_t - c_{t+j})}
\end{align*}
\tag{33}
\tag{34}
\]

Since

\[
\frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} = \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \frac{\bar{\Psi}_{t+1}}{\Psi_{t+2}} \cdots \frac{\bar{\Psi}_{t+j-1}}{\Psi_{t+j}}
\tag{35}
\]
then

\[
\max \left\{ \frac{\bar{\Psi}_{t+i}}{\Psi_{t+i+1}} \right\}_{i=0, \ldots, j-1} \geq \left( \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \right)^{1/j} \tag{36}
\]

Taking equation (36) over all observations implies

\[
\left( \max \left\{ \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \right\} \forall t, t + 1 \in \tau \right) \geq \left( \max \left\{ \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \right\}^{1/j} \right) \quad \forall t, t + j \in \tau \tag{37}
\]

Substituting (37) into (29) and using (33) gives

\[
\delta > \max \left\{ \left( \frac{\rho_{t+j} (c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} \right\} \forall t, t + j \in \tau, \rho'_t (c_t - c_{t+j}) < 0
\]

Equation (35) also implies

\[
\min \left\{ \frac{\bar{\Psi}_{t+i}}{\Psi_{t+i+1}} \right\}_{i=0, \ldots, j-1} \leq \left( \frac{\bar{\Psi}_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \right)^{1/j} \tag{38}
\]
Therefore equations (33) and (38) imply that
\[
\left( \min \left\{ \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+1}} \right\} \right) \forall t, t+1 \in \tau \leq \left( \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}'(c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t'(c_t - c_{t+j})} \right\} \right)^{1/j} \forall t, t+j \in \tau, \rho_t'(c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0
\]
and substituting this into equation (31) gives
\[
0 < \beta < \frac{1}{\delta} \min \left\{ \frac{\rho_{t+j}'(c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t'(c_t - c_{t+j})} \right\}^{1/j} \forall t, t+j \in \tau, \rho_t'(c_t - c_{t+j}) > 0
\]
\[\blacksquare\]

**Proof of Proposition 2**

Write equation (2) for any pair of chronologically ordered periods \(s, s+h \in \tau\) to give:
\[
u_s \leq u_{s+h} + \delta \Psi_{s+h} \rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h}) \tag{39}
\]
\[
u_{s+h} \leq u_s + \delta \Psi_s \rho_s'(c_{s+h} - c_s) \tag{40}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \delta^h \Psi_s \rho_s'(c_s - c_{s+h}) \leq \Psi_{s+h} \rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h}) \tag{41}
\]

Equation (41) gives us the following restrictions on \(\delta\) (beyond \(\delta \in (0,1]\))
\[
\rho_{s}'(c_s - c_{s+h}) > 0 \Rightarrow \delta \in \left( \frac{\Psi_{s+h} \rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho_{s}'(c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h} \tag{42}
\]
\[
\rho_{s}'(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \vee \rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h}) < 0 \Rightarrow \delta \in \left[ \frac{\Psi_{s+h} \rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho_{s}'(c_s - c_{s+h})} \right]^{1/h}, 1 \tag{43}
\]

Therefore, if in the data we observe
\[
\rho_t c_t > \rho_{t+j} c_{t+j}, \rho_s c_s < \rho_{s+h} c_{s+h} \text{ and } \left( \frac{\rho_{t+j}'(c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t'(c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} < \left( \frac{\rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho_s'(c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h}
\]
then using equations (42) and (43) gives
\[
\delta \left( \frac{\Psi_t}{\Psi_{t+j}} \right)^{1/j} \leq \left( \frac{\rho_{t+j}'(c_t - c_{t+j})}{\rho_t'(c_t - c_{t+j})} \right)^{1/j} \leq \left( \frac{\rho_{s+h}'(c_s - c_{s+h})}{\rho_s'(c_s - c_{s+h})} \right)^{1/h} \leq \delta \left( \frac{\Psi_s}{\Psi_{s+h}} \right)^{1/h}
\]
\[
\Rightarrow \delta \left( \prod_{i=1}^{j} \left( 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+i} \right) \right)^{1/j} < \delta \left( \prod_{i=1}^{h} \left( 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{s+i} \right) \right)^{1/h}
\]
\[
\Rightarrow \max \{\mu_{t+i}\}_{i=1,...,j} > \min \{\mu_{s+i}\}_{i=1,...,h} \tag{44}
\]

Denote the instantaneous indirect utility function by \(v(\rho,y) = \max u(c) \text{ s.t. } \rho^c = y\). Here,

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and in subsequent proofs in the Appendix, we will make use of the fact that
\[ \lambda_t = \frac{\partial v_t(y_t)}{\partial y_t} = \frac{1}{\rho_t} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t} \]
which we denote by \( v'_t \), and thus the first order conditions for the sophisticated hyperbolic discounting can be written as
\[ v'_t = \delta v'_{t+1} (1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_t + 1) \]
For the final decision making period, totally differentiating the first order conditions \( v'_{T-1} = \beta \delta v'_{T} \) with respect to \( \Delta_{T-1} \) (remembering that \( \Delta_T = \Delta_{T-1} - y_{T-1} \)) gives
\[ \frac{\partial y_{T-1}}{\partial \Delta_{T-1}} = \frac{\sigma_T}{(\sigma_{T-1} + \sigma_T)} \]
where \( \sigma_t \) denotes \( v''_t / v'_t \). Totally differentiating again gives
\[ \frac{\partial^2 y_{T-1}}{\partial \Delta_{T-1}^2} = \left( \frac{1}{(\sigma_{T-1} + \sigma_T)} \right)^3 \left( \frac{v'''_T}{v'_T} (\sigma_{T-1})^2 - \frac{v'''_{T-1}}{v'_{T-1}} (\sigma_T)^2 \right) \]
and thus
\[ \frac{\partial^2 y_{T-1}}{\partial \Delta_{T-1}^2} = 0 \Rightarrow \]
\[ \frac{v'''_T}{v'_T} (\sigma_{T-1})^2 = \frac{v'''_{T-1}}{v'_{T-1}} (\sigma_T)^2 \Rightarrow \]
\[ \frac{v'''_T}{v'_T} \frac{v'_T}{(v''_T)^2} = \frac{v'''_{T-1}}{v'_{T-1}} \frac{v'_{T-1}}{(v''_{T-1})^2} \]
Therefore if \( v'''_T / (v'')^2 \) is constant, the period \( T - 1 \) expenditure function, \( y_{T-1} (\Delta_{T-1}) \), is linear. It is intuitively obvious that if in the final period
\[ v'_{T-1} = \beta \delta v'_{T} = \kappa_T v'_{T} \]
where \( \kappa_T \) is (obviously) a constant, gives a linear consumption rule (i.e. a constant \( \mu_{T-1} \)) then
\[ v'_{T-2} = \delta v'_{T-1} (1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{T-1}) = \kappa_{T-1} v'_{T-1} \]
where \( \kappa_{T-1} \) is a constant (since \( \mu_{T-1} \) is constant) will also give a linear expenditure rule, and
so on backwards through time. We prove this by induction. Differentiating
\[
v'_{t} = \delta y'_{t+1} \left( 1 - (1 - \beta) \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right)
\]
(remembering that \(\mu_t \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{K} \rho_t^k \frac{\partial x^k_t}{\partial x_t} = \frac{\partial y_t}{\partial x_t}\)) twice with respect to \(\Delta_t\) gives
\[
\frac{\partial^2 y_t}{\partial \Delta_t^2} = \frac{\left( \frac{v''_{t+1}}{v''_{t+1}} \left( \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right)^2 + \sigma_{t+1} \frac{\partial^2 y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_t^2} - \frac{(1-\beta) \frac{\partial^3 y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_t^2}}{\psi_{t+1}} \right) (\sigma_t)^2 - \frac{v''}{v'_t} \left( \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} - \frac{(1-\beta) \frac{\partial^2 y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_t^2}}{\psi_{t+1}} \right)^2}{\left( \frac{\sigma_t + \sigma_{t+1} \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} - \frac{(1-\beta) \frac{\partial^2 y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_t^2}}{\psi_{t+1}} \right)^2 (\sigma_t)^2 - \frac{v''}{v'_t} \left( \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} - \frac{(1-\beta) \frac{\partial^2 y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_t^2}}{\psi_{t+1}} \right)^2}
\]
where \(\psi_{t+1} = \left( 1 - (1 - \beta) \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right)\), and so if \(y_{t+1} (\Delta_{t+1})\) is linear so that \(\frac{\partial y_{t+1}^3}{\partial \Delta_t^2} = 0\) then the top of the right hand side becomes
\[
\left( \frac{\partial y_{t+1}}{\partial \Delta_{t+1}} \right)^2 \left( \frac{v''_{t+1}}{v''_{t+1}} (\sigma_t)^2 - \frac{v''}{v'_t} (\sigma_{t+1})^2 \right)
\]
which = 0 if \(v''/ (v'')^2\) is constant. Thus if \(y_{t+1} (\Delta_{t+1})\) is linear and \(v''/ (v'')^2\) is constant then \(y_t (\Delta_t)\) is linear. But we have shown that when \(v''/ (v'')^2\) is constant then \(y_{T-1} (\Delta_{T-1})\) is linear. Therefore, by induction, \(y_t (\Delta_t)\) is linear \(\forall t\).

With a linear expenditure rule (so \(\mu_t\) is also the average propensity to spend) then for any \(t_1 < t_2\) we can write
\[
\rho'_{t_1} c_{t_1} = \mu_{t_1} \Delta_{t_1}
\]
\[
\rho'_{t_2} c_{t_2} = \mu_{t_2} \Delta_{t_2} = \mu_{t_2} \Delta_{t_1} \prod_{i=t_1}^{t_2-1} (1 - \mu_i)
\]
so that
\[
\rho'_{t_1} c_{t_1} > \rho'_{t_2} c_{t_2} \iff \mu_{t_1} > \mu_{t_2} \prod_{i=t_1}^{t_2-1} (1 - \mu_i)
\]
\[
\rho'_{t_1} c_{t_1} < \rho'_{t_2} c_{t_2} \iff \mu_{t_1} < \mu_{t_2} \prod_{i=t_1}^{t_2-1} (1 - \mu_i)
\]
and, since \(\mu_t \in (0,1) \ \forall t:\)
\[
\mu_{t_1} > \mu_{t_2} \Rightarrow \mu_{t_1} > \mu_{t_2} \prod_{i=t_1}^{t_2-1} (1 - \mu_i)
\]
\[
\Rightarrow \rho'_{t_1} c_{t_1} > \rho'_{t_2} c_{t_2}
\]
Therefore for a linear consumption function, if \( t < s \) and \( t + j \leq s \) then

\[
\max_{i=1,...,j} \{ \mu_{t+i} \} > \min_{i=1,...,h} \{ \mu_{s+i} \} \Rightarrow \max_{i=1,...,j} \{ \rho'_{t+i} c_{t+i} \} > \min_{i=1,...,h} \{ \rho'_{s+i} c_{s+i} \}.
\]

\[\blacksquare\]

**Proof of Lemma 2**

We proceed by working backwards from the agent’s last decision making period. In the exposition we will use a superscript to denote whose beliefs/plans we are using, i.e. \( c_{T-1}^T \) denotes the consumption in period \( T - 1 \) that person \( T - 1 \) chooses, whereas \( c_{T-1}^{T-2} \) will denote the consumption in period \( T - 1 \) that person \( T - 2 \) believes person \( T - 1 \) will choose. Note that this implies that actual consumption in a period \( t \) is the same as \( c_t \) but different from all \( c_{t-i} \) for \( i > 1 \) (i.e. different from what previous selves thought the current self would do).

**Period \( T - 1 \)**

In the last decision making period, person \( T - 1 \)’s program is:

\[
\max_{c_{T-1}^{T-1}} u \left( c_{T-1}^{T-1} \right) + \beta \delta u \left( c_T^{T-1} \right)
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad \rho_{T-1}^{T-1} c_{T-1}^{T-1} + \rho_T c_{T-1}^{T-1} = \Delta_{T-1}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \lambda_{T-1} = \frac{1}{ \rho_{T-1}^{k} } \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1,k}} = \beta \delta \frac{1}{ \rho_T } \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_T } \quad \forall k \quad (46)
\]

**Period \( T - 2 \)**

Now moving back, person \( T - 2 \)’s program is:

\[
\max_{c_{T-2}^{T-2}} u \left( c_{T-2}^{T-2} \right) + \beta \delta u \left( c_{T-1}^{T-2} \right) + \beta \delta^2 u \left( c_T^{T-2} \right)
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad \rho_{T-2} c_{T-2}^{T-2} + \rho_{T-1} c_{T-1}^{T-2} + \rho_T c_T^{T-2} = \Delta_{T-2}
\]

while believing person \( T - 1 \) will do:

\[
\max_{c_{T-1}^{T-2}} u \left( c_{T-1}^{T-2} \right) + \delta u \left( c_T^{T-2} \right)
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad \rho_{T-1} c_{T-1}^{T-2} + \rho_T c_T^{T-2} = \Delta_{T-1} = \Delta_{T-2} - \rho_{T-2} c_{T-2}^{T-2}
\]

Looking at the last two components of \( T - 2 \)’s objective function, \( \beta \delta u \left( c_{T-1}^{T-2} \right) + \beta \delta^2 u \left( c_T^{T-2} \right) \), we see that it is consistent with his beliefs about what person \( T - 1 \) will do (equation (47)), and so the first order conditions are simply the ones they would be if \( T - 2 \) was choosing the whole consumption path:
\begin{align}
\lambda_{T-2}^k &= \frac{1}{\rho_{T-2}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^k} = \beta \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} = \beta \delta^2 \frac{1}{\rho_T^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_T^k} \quad \forall k \tag{48}
\end{align}

So \(T-2\) plans for the path implied by (48), but when it comes to \(T-1\)’s turn, he does:

\begin{align}
\frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} &= \beta \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} \quad \forall k
\end{align}

as given by (46), instead of what is given by (48), namely:

\begin{align}
\frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} &= \beta \delta^2 \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} \quad \forall k \tag{49}
\end{align}

Since \(0 < \beta < 1\), this means that

\begin{align}
\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} < \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^k} \quad \forall k \tag{50}
\end{align}

and so

\begin{align}
\lambda_{T-2}^k &= \frac{1}{\rho_{T-2}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^k} = \beta \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} > \beta \delta^2 \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^k} = \beta \delta \lambda_{T-1}^k \quad \forall k
\end{align}

Assuming concave utility (50) also implies

\begin{align}
c_{T-1}^k > c_{T-2}^k \quad \forall k
\end{align}

i.e. person \(T - 1\) consumes a bigger share of the assets left to him by \(T - 2\) than \(T - 2\) planned that he would.

**Period \(T - 3\)**

We now look at what person \(T - 3\) does. His program is to

\[
\max_{c_{T-3}^k} u \left( c_{T-3}^{T-3} \right) + \beta \delta u \left( c_{T-2}^{T-3} \right) + \beta \delta^2 u \left( c_{T-1}^{T-3} \right) + \beta \delta^3 u \left( c_{T}^{T-3} \right)
\]

s.t. \( \rho_T c_{T}^{T-3} + \rho_{T-1} c_{T-1}^{T-3} + \rho_{T-2} c_{T-2}^{T-3} + \rho_{T-3} c_{T-3}^{T-3} = \Delta_{T-3} \)

believing that \(T - 2\) and \(T - 1\) will behave as simple exponential discounters, i.e. that person \(T - 2\) will do:

\[
\max_{c_{T-2}^k} u \left( c_{T-2}^{T-3} \right) + \delta u \left( c_{T-1}^{T-3} \right) + \delta^2 u \left( c_{T}^{T-3} \right)
\]

s.t. \( \rho_{T-2} c_{T-2}^{T-3} + \rho_{T-1} c_{T-1}^{T-3} + \rho_{T} c_{T}^{T-3} = \Delta_{T-2} = \Delta_{T-3} - \rho_{T-3} c_{T-3}^{T-3} \)

and that person \(T - 1\) will also follow this plan.

Again, his objective function is consistent with his beliefs about \(T - 2\) and \(T - 1\), so \(T - 3\)
plans for

\[ \lambda_{T-3}^{T-3} = \frac{1}{\rho_{T-3}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-3}^{T-3,k}} = \beta \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-2}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^{T-3,k}} \]

\[ = \beta \delta^2 \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^{T-3,k}} = \beta \delta^3 \frac{1}{\rho_{T}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T}^{T-3,k}} \quad \forall k \]

since he does believe that \( T - 2 \) will do

\[ \frac{1}{\rho_{T-2}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^{T-3,k}} = \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^{T-3,k}} = \delta^2 \frac{1}{\rho_{T}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T}^{T-3,k}} \] (51)

But when it comes to \( T - 2 \)'s period of control it turns out instead, as shown by (48), that \( T - 2 \) plans for

\[ \frac{1}{\rho_{T-2}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^{T-2,k}} = \beta \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-1}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-1}^{T-2,k}} = \beta \delta^2 \frac{1}{\rho_{T}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T}^{T-2,k}} \] (52)

Again this implies that

\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^{T-2,k}} < \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-3,k}} \]

\[ \lambda_{T-3}^{T-3} = \frac{1}{\rho_{T-3}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-3}^{T-3,k}} > \beta \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{T-2}} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{T-2}^{T-2,k}} = \beta \delta \lambda_{T-2}^{T-2} \]

and so with diminishing marginal utility, \( c_{T-2}^{T-2,k} > c_{T-2}^{T-3,k} \).
Periods 0 to T

Thus, continuing working backwards through time we get (removing the superscripts for ease, so that \( c_k^t \) denotes the consumption at \( t \) chosen by person \( t \) - i.e. observed consumption):

\[
\lambda \equiv 1 \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} > \beta \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_1^k} > ... > \frac{\beta^{T-1} \delta^T \partial u}{\rho_T^k} > \frac{\beta \delta \partial u}{\rho_1^k} > \frac{\partial u}{\rho_0^k} \quad \forall k
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \exists \phi_t > 1, \ i = 1, .., T - 1 \ s.t. : \\
\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} = \beta \delta \phi_1 \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_1^k} = ... = \beta^T \delta^T \left( \prod_{i=1}^{T-1} \phi_i \right) \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_T^k} = ...
\]

since

\[
1 \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} > \beta \delta \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_1^k} \Rightarrow \exists \phi_1 > 1 \ s.t. \ 1 \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} = \phi_1 \frac{\beta \delta \partial u}{\rho_1^k}
\]

and

\[
\frac{\beta \delta \partial u}{\rho_1^k} > \frac{\beta^2 \delta^2 \partial u}{\rho_2^k} \Rightarrow \\
\phi_1 \frac{\beta \delta \partial u}{\rho_1^k} > \phi_1 \frac{\beta^2 \delta^2 \partial u}{\rho_2^k} \Rightarrow \exists \phi_2 > 1 \ s.t. \ \phi_1 \frac{\beta \delta \partial u}{\rho_1^k} = \phi_2 \phi_1 \frac{\beta^2 \delta^2 \partial u}{\rho_2^k}
\]

and so on

(the equality between the final two periods in (53) holds since person \( T - 1 \) is the final decision maker, although we assume in general that we do not see the final period).

Note that the \( \{\phi_t\} \) are the same for all \( k \) goods within a period since

\[
1 \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0^k} = \lambda_t^k \quad \forall k, t
\]

Hence, denoting

\[
\Omega_t = \frac{1}{\beta_1} \prod_{i=1}^{t} \frac{1}{\phi_i} \\
\lambda = \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_0} \frac{1}{p_0^k}
\]

we can write the conditions for the naive hyperbolic discounting model as

\[
\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_t^k} = \lambda_t^k \delta_t^k \Omega_t \quad \forall k
\]

which is the first line of Lemma 2

The second line of Lemma 2 (the restrictions on \( \Omega_t \)) is derived as follows. Comparing the plans made by person \( t \) and person \( t + 1 \) (now we need to reintroduce the decision maker super-
scripts), and expressing in terms of the marginal utility of wealth \( \lambda_{t+i} = \partial v (\rho, y_{t+i}) / \partial y_{t+i} = (1/\rho_t^k) (\partial u / \partial c_{i+t+k}^t) \) we have

\[
\begin{align*}
  t \text{ plans:} & \\
  \lambda_t^t = \beta \delta \lambda_{t+1}^t = \beta \delta^2 \lambda_{t+2}^t = \beta \delta^3 \lambda_{t+3}^t = ... \tag{54}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
  t + 1 \text{ plans:} & \\
  \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} = \beta \delta \lambda_{t+2}^{t+1} = \beta \delta^2 \lambda_{t+3}^{t+1} = \beta \delta^3 \lambda_{t+4}^{t+1} = ... \tag{55}
\end{align*}
\]

This means that we can rule out

\[
\lambda_t^t \geq \delta \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} \tag{56}
\]

since if (56) was to hold, then equations (54) and (55) would imply

\[
\begin{align*}
  \beta \delta^2 \lambda_{t+2}^t & \geq \beta \delta^2 \lambda_{t+2}^{t+1} \\
  \beta \delta^3 \lambda_{t+3}^t & \geq \beta \delta^3 \lambda_{t+3}^{t+1} \\
  ... & \\
  \beta \delta^{T-t} \lambda_T^t & \geq \beta \delta^{T-t} \lambda_T^{t+1}
\end{align*}
\]

which by concavity of \( v (\rho, y) \) in \( y \) given \( \rho \Rightarrow \)

\[
\begin{align*}
  y_{t+2}^t & \leq y_{t+2}^{t+1} \\
  y_{t+3}^t & \leq y_{t+3}^{t+1} \\
  ... & \\
  y_T^t & \leq y_T^{t+1}
\end{align*}
\]

and we already know that \( y_{t+1}^t < y_{t+1}^{t+1} \). Hence for periods \( t + 1 \) to \( T \), person \( t + 1 \) would be planning to consume the same or more each period (and strictly more in period \( t + 1 \)) of good \( k \) than person \( t \) planned and so would violate the lifetime budget constraint.

Therefore we must have

\[
\lambda_t^t < \delta \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} \tag{57}
\]

or equivalently

\[
\frac{1}{\rho_t^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{i+t+k}^t} < \delta \frac{1}{\rho_{t+1}^k} \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_{i+1+t+k}^{t+1}} \tag{58}
\]

The intuition of this is that it tells us that an exponential discounter planning to spend \( y_{t+1}^{t+1} \) tomorrow would be spending less today than an naive hyperbolic discounter with otherwise equivalent preference parameters, or, equivalently, a naive hyperbolic discounter spending \( y_t^t \) today will spend less tomorrow than an (otherwise equivalent) exponential discounter spending \( y_t^t \) today.
Equation (57) gives us the final line of Lemma 2 since

\[ \lambda_t = \delta \frac{\Omega_t}{\Omega_{t+1}} \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \frac{\Omega_t}{\Omega_{t+1}} < 1 \]

\[ \Rightarrow \Omega_t > \Omega_{t+1} \] (59)

Proof of Proposition 3

We need to show the empirical conditions for the naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting model rationalising the data are identical to those of the sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. This can be done by following the proof of Proposition 1, remembering that by definition

\[ 1 - \beta (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1} = \Psi_t / \Psi_{t+1}, \]

replacing \( \Psi_t \) with \( \Omega_t \), and noting that, of course (since \( \Omega_0 = 1 \))

\[ \prod_{i=1}^{t} \frac{\Omega_i}{\Omega_{t-1}} = \Omega_t \] (60)

Note that \( \phi_t \) does not have an interpretation like \( \mu_t \) in \[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_t \] does as being the marginal propensity to spend. We simply defined \( \phi_t \) by

\[ \lambda_t = \beta \delta \phi_t \lambda_{t+1} = \beta \delta \phi_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} \]

\[ \Rightarrow \lambda_{t+1} = \phi_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} \]

where \( \phi_{t+1} > 1 \) since person \( t + 1 \) spends more in period \( t + 1 \) than person \( t \) planned he would. Thus finding the empirical implications of \[ \max \{ \phi_{s+i} \}_{i=1, \ldots, h} > \min \{ \phi_{t+i} \}_{i=1, \ldots, j} \] requires a different strategy from the one we used for the sophisticated discounter. We need to look at
adjacent period pairs \( \{(t + i, t + 1 + i)\}_{i=1,...,j} \) and \( \{(s + i, s + 1 + i)\}_{i=1,...,h} \). In what follows we will use \( t, t + 1 \) and \( s, s + 1 \) as examples or else the notation becomes very long. We have

\[
\lambda_{t+1}^t = \phi_{t+1}\lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} \Rightarrow \lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} > \lambda_{t+1}^t
\]

and

\[
\lambda_{s+1}^s = \phi_{s+1}\lambda_{s+1}^{s+1} \Rightarrow \lambda_{s+1}^{s+1} > \lambda_{s+1}^s
\]

and also if \( \phi_{s+1} > \phi_{t+1} \) then equations (63) and (64) imply

\[
\frac{\lambda_{s+1}^s}{\lambda_{s+1}^s} > \frac{\lambda_{t+1}^{t+1}}{\lambda_{t+1}^{t+1}}
\]

we will come back to equation (65) shortly.

Comparing the plans of \( t \) and \( t + 1 \) (as in equations (54) and (55) implies

\[
\lambda_{t+1}^t = \delta^m \lambda_{t+1+m}^t \quad \forall \ m = 1,...,T-t-1
\]

\[
\lambda_{t+1}^{t+1} = \beta \delta^m \lambda_{t+1+m}^{t+1} \quad \forall \ m = 1,...,T-t-1
\]

and these and equation (63) give

\[
\lambda_{t+1+m}^t = \beta \phi_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1+m}^{t+1} \quad \forall \ m = 1,...,T-t-1
\]

and similarly for \( s \) we have

\[
\lambda_{s+1+n}^s = \beta \phi_{s+1} \lambda_{s+1+n}^{s+1} \quad \forall \ n = 1,...,T-s-1
\]

Remembering that by definition \( \beta \phi_{t+1} = \Omega_t / \Omega_{t+1} \) and thus equation (59) implies \( \beta \phi_{t+1} < 1 \), then equation (66) and concavity of \( v(\rho_t, y_t) \) with respect to expenditure give

\[
y_{t+1+m}^t > y_{t+1+m}^{t+1} \quad \forall \ m = 1,...,T-t-1
\]

Thus whatever person \( t + 1 \) overspends in period \( t + 1 \) compared to person \( t \)'s plans, he must save by underspending in periods \( t + 2, ..., T \) compared to \( t \)'s plans in order to preserve the budget constraint. And the same argument applies to person \( s + 1 \) compared to person \( s \). Thus we have (remembering that \( t < s \)):

\[
(y_{t+1}^t - y_{t+1}^t) = \sum_{m=1}^{T-t-1} (y_{t+1+m}^t - y_{t+1+m}^{t+1}) > \sum_{n=1}^{T-s-1} (y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1})
\]

\[
(y_{s+1}^s - y_{s+1}^s) = \sum_{n=1}^{T-s-1} (y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1})
\]

So now we would like to be able to say something about the size of \( y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1} \) versus
\( (y_{s+1+n} - y_{s+1+n}^{+1}) \), \( n = 1, \ldots, T - s - 1 \).

Repeating equation (68) over time (for \( m = s - t + n \)) gives

\[
y_{s+1+n}^t > y_{s+1+n}^{t+1} > y_{s+1+n}^{t+2} > \ldots > y_{s+1+n}^{t+1+n} \Rightarrow
\]

\[
y_{s+1+n}^t > y_{s+1+n}^{t+1+n} \quad \forall \ n = 1, \ldots, T - s - 1
\]  \( (71) \)

Equations (66) and (67) with \( \phi_{s+1} > \phi_{t+1} \) imply

\[
\frac{v_{s+1+n}^{t+1}}{v_{s+1+n}^t} = \frac{1}{\beta \phi_{t+1}} > \frac{1}{\beta \phi_{s+1}} = \frac{v_{s+1+n}^{s+1}}{v_{s+1+n}^t} \Rightarrow
\]

\[
\ln v_{s+1+n}^{t+1} - \ln v_{s+1+n}^t < \ln v_{s+1+n}^{s+1} - \ln v_{s+1+n}^t \quad \forall \ n = 1, \ldots, T - s
\]  \( (72) \)

Equation (72) involves differences in \( \ln v' \), and we know from the properties of \( v(v', y) \) that \( \partial (\ln v')/\partial y = v''/v' < 0 \). We also know from equation (71) that \( y_{s+1+n}^{s+1} < y_{s+1+n}^s < y_{s+1+n}^{t+1} < y_{s+1+n}^{t+1+n} \). Therefore if \( \ln v' \) is convex, so that

\[
\frac{\partial^2 (\ln v')}{\partial y^2} = \frac{\partial (v''/v')}{\partial y} \geq 0
\]

(i.e. decreasing absolute risk aversion) then equation (72) \( \Rightarrow \)

\[
y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1} < y_{s+1+n}^t - y_{s+1+n}^{t+1} \quad \forall \ n = 1, \ldots, T - s
\]  \( (73) \)

(under increasing relative risk aversion we could have \( y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1} \gtrless y_{s+1+n}^t - y_{s+1+n}^{t+1} \)).

Equation (73) implies

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{T-s-1} (y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1}) > \sum_{n=1}^{T-s-1} (y_{s+1+n}^s - y_{s+1+n}^{s+1})
\]

which implies by equations (69) and (70) that we must have

\[
(y_{t+1}^{t+1} - y_{t+1}^t) > (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - y_{s+1}^s)
\]  \( (74) \)

Now we want to ask what conditions will generate a violation of (74). Equation (65) gives

\[
\ln v_{t+1}^t - \ln v_{t+1}^{t+1} < \ln v_{s+1}^s - \ln v_{s+1}^{s+1}
\]  \( (75) \)

As with equation (72), equation (75) involves differences in \( \ln v' \). Again, we know that \( y_{t+1}^t < y_{t+1}^{t+1} \) and \( y_{s+1}^s < y_{s+1}^{s+1} \) and so if \( \partial (v''/v')/\partial y \geq 0 \) we would like to be able to say that having \( y_{t+1}^t < y_{s+1}^s \) implies \( y_{t+1}^{t+1} - y_{t+1}^t < (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - y_{s+1}^s) \), and therefore equation (74) is violated. However, unlike equation (72), the comparison in equation (75) is across different time periods \( s + 1 \) and \( t + 1 \) and thus we are not holding prices constant. Therefore we cannot say that equation (75) with \( \partial (v''/v')/\partial y \geq 0 \) and \( y_{s+1}^{s+1} > y_{t+1}^{t+1} \) implies \( y_{s+1}^{s+1} - y_{s+1}^s > (y_{t+1}^{t+1} - y_{t+1}^t) \) without also assuming that \( \partial (v''/v')/\partial y \) is independent of \( \rho \).
The other circumstance under which equation (74) is contradicted is as follows: if in the
data we have $\rho'_s c_s > \rho'_{s+1} c_{s+1}$, then, since $y_{s+1}^{s+1} > y_{s+1}^s$, it must be the case that
$\rho'_{s+1} c_s > y_{s+1}^s$. Hence equation (74) becomes

$$(y_{t+1}^{t+1} - y_{t+1}^t) > (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - y_{s+1}^s) > (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - \rho'_{s+1} c_s)$$

and, of course $y_{t+1}^{t+1} > (y_{t+1}^{t+1} - y_{t+1}^t)$, so we can write

$$y_{t+1}^{t+1} > (y_{t+1}^{t+1} - y_{t+1}^t) > (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - y_{s+1}^s) > (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - \rho'_{s+1} c_s)$$

Therefore if we see

$$\rho'_{s+1} c_s > y_{s+1}^{s+1}$$

and $y_{t+1}^{t+1} < (y_{s+1}^{s+1} - \rho'_{s+1} c_s)$

i.e.

$$\rho'_{s+1} c_s > \rho'_{s+1} c_{s+1}$$

and $\rho'_{t+1} c_{t+1} < (\rho'_{s+1} c_{s+1} - \rho'_{s+1} c_s)$

then equation (74) cannot hold.

Recall that we used $(t, t + 1)$ and $(s, s + 1)$ as an example, and that to investigate whether
max $\{\phi_{s+1}\}_{i=1,...,h} > \min \{\phi_{t+1}\}_{i=1,...,j}$ we actually need to look at all adjacent period pairs
$\{(t - 1 + i, t + i)\}_{i=1,...,j}$ and $\{(s - 1 + i, s + i)\}_{i=1,...,h}$. Thus to apply the above analysis to
the generalised version of equation (72) comparing periods $(t - 1 + i, t + i)$ and $(s - 1 + g, s + g)$
we need to be able to replace $y_{s+1}^{s+1} < y_{s+1}^{s+1}$ (which comes from equation (71)) with
$y_{s+1}^{s+1} < y_{t+1}^{t+1}$, and hence (again referring to equation (71)) we need all $t + i \leq s + j$.

Proof of Corollaries 1-3 for the naive discounter

These follow the proofs of Corollaries 1-3 replacing $\Psi_t$ with $\Omega_t$. For Corollary 3 we again
remember that by definition $1 - (1 - \beta) \mu_{t+1} = \Psi_t / \Psi_{t+1}$ and $\Omega_t / \Omega_{t+1} = \beta \phi_{t+1}$, thus

$$\beta = \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\lambda t+1} \phi_{t+1}$$

and therefore, as before, $\beta < \frac{1}{\lambda_{t+1}} \frac{1}{\phi_{t+1}}$ since $\phi_{t+1} > 1$. Again, since $\Omega_{T-1} / \Omega_T = 1$, then if we
observe the final period

$$\beta = \frac{\lambda_{T-1}}{\lambda_T} \frac{1}{\delta}$$

\[\square\]
Appendix - Discounted prices

Figure 7 plots the price indices for our 14 commodity groups and Figure 8 plots the interest rate. The base period for the prices is in the first quarter of 1992. Figure 7 shows that the growth of spot prices varies across goods, but in each case growth is steady (approximately constant) over the period studied.

Figure 7: The time-series of spot prices (14 commodity groups)

![Figure 7](image)

Figure 8: The interest rate

![Figure 8](image)

Figure 9 shows the time series of log discounted prices for the 14 commodity groups. The effect of the discounting creates a concave, declining path for the commodity groups: the annual interest rate (Figure 8) is around 15% whereas annual growth rates in the spot prices are much lower (varying between 2.1% and 8.6%). In log-discounted prices the concavity is removed and series become close-to-linear.

We are interested in predictability of discounted prices at the level of the household. Given the rotating panel with a 12.5% refresh rate, no household is in the data over the entire period, so for each individual household we regressed the log discounted price series of each commodity group for the period of observation of that household on a linear time trend and recorded the $R^2$-squared value as a simple measure of predictability. On average (across both commodities and households) the time trend accounted for 99.7% of the variation in the log discounted prices. The histogram Figure 10 shows the distribution of $R^2$-squared values across households.
We conclude that over our study period the discounted prices were highly predictable because spot prices were growing at very steady rates and the effect of discounting (which compounds the interest rate series) resulted in essentially linear log discounted price series.