Editors' Introduction
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Part I

Phenomenology, idealism, and intersubjectivity
A Festschrift in celebration of Dermot Moran’s sixty-fifth birthday
There’s an adage usually reserved for hosts of late night talk shows. It has even become the title of David Letterman’s most recent Netflix program, My Next Guest Needs No Introduction. Chances are, if you’re reading this journal, Dermot Moran needs no introduction. Nevertheless, and because this is a Festschrift after all, an introduction and some recognition of his many accomplishments are in order.

Dermot Moran was born in Stillorgan, County Dublin, Ireland in 1953. (We’re afraid that if someone publishes a Festschrift in celebration of your sixty-fifth birthday, there’s no keeping your age out of the matter.) He was educated at Oatlands College where he studied applied mathematics, physics, and chemistry in preparation for university. He was awarded the Higgins Gold Medal for Chemistry in 1968 and the Institute of Chemists of Ireland Gold Medal for Chemistry in 1970. He enrolled at University College Dublin (UCD) on an Entrance Scholarship to study languages and literature, and in 1973 he graduated with a Double First Class Honours Degree in English and Philosophy. Upon graduating from UCD he entered Yale University as the recipient of the Wilmarth Lewis Scholarship for graduate study. He accumulated a mere three degrees from Yale, graduating with an MA (1974), MPhil (1976), and PhD (1986) in philosophy.

Moran returned to Ireland to teach philosophy. He held positions at Queen’s University Belfast and St. Patrick’s College Maynooth before he was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy (Metaphysics and Logic) at his alma mater in 1989. Presently, he is the inaugural holder of the Joseph Chair in Catholic Philosophy at Boston College, where he is also the Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy. He has held more visiting and distinguished professorships than it would be polite to name because we would inevitably leave one off the list.

Moran is no slouch when it comes to service to the profession either. He is the founding editor of International Journal of Philosophical Studies, published by Routledge and still managed out of the philosophy department at UCD. He has been a member of the Governing Authority of University College Dublin since 2009. He served as Chairperson of the Programme Committee, Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie (FISP), from 2009 to 2013, and was elected President of the Executive Committee of the same in 2013. In 2018 he will preside over the XXIV World Congress of Philosophy in Beijing. He has, over the years, been on the steering committee or boards of dozens of philosophical societies from the Mind Association to the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. From 1982 to 2018 he convened eighteen major conferences worldwide. In 2012, in honor of his scholarship and outstanding academic career, the Royal Irish Academy (RIA), of which he has
been a member since 2003, granted him the highest honor it can bestow, the Gold Medal. He was the first philosopher to be granted this distinguished award, which “aim[s] to identify and recognise inspirational figures – the stars of the knowledge economy – to celebrate the achievements of higher education in Ireland and to inspire future generations.”

There are more awards and distinctions that we could list, and there are numbers we could point out that might make a sane person’s head swim. He has been awarded more than fifteen major grants and fellowships for his research, which are cumulatively valued at over 1,000,000 euros. He has been the supervisor, member of dissertation committee, or external examiner for approximately fifty doctoral dissertations, including one member of this guest editorial team. He has mentored thirteen postdoctoral fellows, including the other two members of this guest editorial team. And in 2003 The Encyclopedia of Ireland included an entry on Dermot Moran.

Moran’s Yale dissertation was entitled *Nature and Mind in the Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena: A Study in Medieval Idealism*. It is also in this regard that Moran’s career and record of scholarship stand out from the crowd. He is one of a few philosophers working today to have developed not just competencies but true specializations in at least two distinct eras in the history of philosophy and on both sides of the analytic–continental divide. He can count among his areas of expertise the philosophy of mind, phenomenology, existentialism, and medieval philosophy – especially the Christian Neoplatonism of Eriugena, Eckhart, and Cusanus. Thus, in choosing the theme for this *Festschrift*, we had our work cut out for us. We settled on three motifs that have permeated Dermot’s work from its inception and continue to motivate it today: *phenomenology, idealism*, and *intersubjectivity*. Accordingly, the contributors of this volume – all of whom have crossed academic paths with Moran at various stages of their careers and have intensively collaborated with him on multiple occasions, engage with one or more of these core motifs, while some explicitly reflect on Moran’s take on them in his publications. In their methodological and thematic orientation, they aptly reflect, we believe, both the breadth and depth of Moran’s philosophical outlook.

Andrea Staiti’s (University of Parma) contribution to this volume engages with Moran’s 2014 article, “Defending the Transcendental Attitude: Husserl’s Concept of the Person and the Challenges of Naturalism.” In so doing, Staiti seeks to clarify in what sense Husserl’s account of action is correctly described as anti-naturalistic. His article presents and assesses Husserl’s account of action as found in the forthcoming and much anticipated *Husserliana* publication of *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*. He argues that Husserl’s description of action charts a course between an anti-naturalistic construal of action as non-reducible to natural causality, and a broadly naturalistic refusal to assign to actions a non-natural cause. After presenting what he describes as the “anatomy of action” for Husserl, Staiti offers a description of the subtle interplay of passivity and activity for the constitution of deliberate, goal-oriented actions. In closing, he argues that contemporary debates over free will can learn an important lesson from a Husserlian account of action. Husserl redirects our attention from the question of the position of actions *within nature* to the question of the position of actions *within consciousness*. Hence, as Staiti puts it, “The pressing

philosophical issue is . . . no longer the ontological status of actions in a uniformly
deterministic nature, but rather the ontological status of the body as the locus of free-
dom within the nexus of nature.”

Mette Lebech’s (National University of Ireland, Maynooth) contribution to the present Festschrift draws from another Festschrift published some eighty-nine years previously, the 1929 edition of Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische For-
schung (notably the historical forerunner of the present journal), which was issued in
celebration of Husserl’s seventieth birthday (albeit belatedly because of difficulty in
procuring funding). Lebech’s article works at the intersection of our themes of phe-
nomenology and intersubjectivity in her analyses of Edith Stein’s understanding of
essence and eidos and offers an eidetic analysis of the intersubjective occurrence of
dialogue.

Steven Crowell’s (Rice University) article, “ Twenty-First-Century Phenomenology?
Pursuing Philosophy with and after Husserl,” is another of our contributions that
directly engages Moran’s work. Crowell turns to Moran’s Introduction to Phenome-
nology, which paints the philosophical movement as inextricably tied to the twentieth
century and as both a brilliant breakthrough and as a fractured movement with an
uncertain future. Crowell attempts to “extricate” phenomenology from the twentieth
century in order to see what a twenty-first-century phenomenology might look like.
He suggests the return of transcendental phenomenology, and in so doing he rejects the
“story” of twentieth-century phenomenology that Moran’s Introduction offers, espe-
cially its reading of Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Crowell
offers, alternatively, a transcendental reading of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein that
he argues can resolve a paradox that arises at the very heart of Husserlian phenome-
nology. Ultimately, Crowell suggests that twenty-first-century phenomenology ought
to return to transcendental phenomenology and embrace as our own the “ultimate
philosophical self-responsibility” that phenomenology proffers when it is understood
as seeking the clarification of meaning, carried out on the basis of evidence that each
of us can produce for him or herself.

In his contribution, Tim Mooney (University College Dublin) considers Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and habitual movement in relation to
Hubert Dreyfus’s account of skilled coping. At issue is the question of whether reflec-
tion and conceptual contents completely drop out of the picture when one is fully
engaged in episodes of skilled coping. According to Mooney, Merleau-Ponty affirms
that everyday reflection, with its objectifications and analyses and syntheses, is integral
to a developed perceptual life. Acquired skills help open up the space for the reflective
activities in which we take a distance, as subjects, from the things in our environment
taken as standing against us. Together with language, our habitualized bodies allow
for the explicit recognition of objects and the thematic investigation of their properties;
the cognitive stage of awareness is both the outcome and the ultimate destination of
an integrated process of human perceptual development. Merleau-Ponty’s critique of
objective thought nonetheless ensues in a dissociation of reflection from the skillfully
acting body. Having characterized all reflections on the body as variants of objective
thought which involve a departure from the world of practical engagements, he passes
over the contribution some of them make to coping in the flow. Merleau-Ponty’s posi-
tion thus appears closer to Dreyfus’s account than other commentators are ready to
admit. This problem is surmountable though, since elsewhere he points toward a more
balanced view of engaged perception that could accommodate what Mooney describes
as “little reflections” – small episodes of reflective thought that arise in response to situations of resistance which do not threaten to send skillful acting completely off the rails.

In “Grief and Phantom Limbs: A Phenomenological Comparison,” Matthew Ratcliffe (University of Vienna) makes the case that grieving over the loss of a loved one and the experience of losing a limb of one’s own body are structurally similar in a number of important ways. Another person, he argues, can come to shape how we experience and engage with our surroundings in a way that resembles the contribution of our own bodily capacities and dispositions. Ratcliffe maintains that the boundary between the experience-shaping contribution of bodily capacities and the contribution made by potential, anticipated, and actual relations with another person is blurred. In other words, the boundaries between bodily and interpersonal experience are indistinct. Though there are important physiological, neurobiological, and indeed phenomenological differences between the two experiences, they are importantly similar. When I lose a loved one, something that was previously integral to my ability to experience and engage with the world, to perceive things in structured ways that reflect a coherent system of projects, cares, concerns, and abilities, is now absent. Comparisons between bereavement and losing part of one’s body are not mere analogies that convey the closeness of a relationship. The two phenomena are structurally isomorphic in a number of important respects. These serve to illustrate how the habitually taken for granted world is shaped by one’s bodily capacities, one’s projects, and one’s relations with other people in a unified way.

Lilian Alweiss (Trinity College Dublin), like Mooney and Ratcliffe, discusses the phenomenology of embodiment in her article, “Back to Space.” The targets of her argument, however, are interpreters of Husserl’s account of embodiment – in particular Edward Casey – that read it in such a way as to reduce our understanding of space to place. While the tradition of modern philosophy and science holds that place merely “takes up space,” insofar as any representation of spatial relations or positions can only be determined within one absolute and infinite space, the claim now is that phenomenology reveals the opposite: space is not an infinite given magnitude in which bodies can be located and through which bodies can move, but space is a system of relations holding between things. Places taken together make up space. Alweiss argues that this is a misunderstanding of Husserl’s phenomenology of embodiment in light of a proper account of the relationship between place and space. Rather, she argues, first, that an appeal to embodiment does not question the priority of space. Second, she argues that Husserl’s aim is not to question our scientific conception of space but to show that there is a conceptual continuity between intuitive and geometrical conceptions of space that has been severed by the modern outlook.

Anthony J. Steinbock (Southern Illinois University Carbondale) turns our attention to two intersubjective acts within the affective sphere in his article, “Hating as Contrary to Loving.” Steinbock’s concern can be expressed in a few short questions: What is the relation of hating to loving? Are the two acts coeval? Do they stand in a dialectical relation? Or instead, is hating founded in loving, and if so, in what way or ways? Steinbock begins with a consideration of how and where the phenomenological problem of hating emerges. Loving and hating, like some other emotions discussed in his book Moral Emotions, belong to the sphere of revelation or revelatory givenness. In this regard, the descriptions of loving and hating are primarily in service of articulating the phenomena of vocations and exemplarity as modes of personal revelation.
It is within this framework that he investigates the relation between loving and hating and will ultimately suggest how hating is founded in loving. After establishing the context in which hating emerges and after describing some of its essential characteristics, he focuses on the question of whether there is a symmetry between loving and hating, as for example between liking and disliking. Or is there a dialectical relation, or even a relation of co-primordiality at work between these two emotions? Against all of these options, Steinbock argues that loving and hating are not coeval or parallel movements, and further, that hating is founded in loving as a movement that is contrary to loving. The movement of hating gets its bearer-of-value-feed, as it were, from loving. In hating, one closes down or is destructive of what can appear as value, negating or diminishing “from” the movement of loving, which is a revealing-revealed movement. This means, then, that when one hates one has to do so already within the ongoing movement of loving.

Thomas Nenon’s (University of Memphis) article, “Do Arguments about Subjective Origins Diminish the Reality of the Real?” reviews criticisms that Tom Sparrow and Quentin Meillassoux, from the so-called “speculative realism” camp, level against transcendental philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular. Of specific concern is the allegation of “correlationism,” a philosophical approach that insists on “the irreducibility of subject and object, thinking and being.” Against this, Nenon argues that correlationism, as a criticism of phenomenology, falls flat for want of understanding the transcendental tradition. Furthermore, he asserts that it does not accurately describe the phenomenological project, or any philosopher since before Kant.

“God Making: An Essay in Theopoetic Imagination” by Richard Kearney (Boston College) revisits the concept of theopoetics as a divine becoming human and human becoming divine. It develops an “anatheist” reading of poetic re-creation (God after God) in terms of theopoetic imagination in Western philosophy, literature, and culture. It then applies this hermeneutic reading to the contemporary art work of Irish artist Sheila Gallagher.

Nicolas de Warren’s essay, “Husserl’s Awakening to Speech: Phenomenology as ‘Minor Philosophy,’” outlines a novel way of approaching, reading, and writing about Husserl’s texts. de Warren argues that, although Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy is seldom considered from either the point of its materiality in language or as a form of discourse, Husserl did conceive of his thinking as requiring an original form of writing and of fashioning philosophical discourse. When one approaches Husserl’s oeuvre from this perspective, his phenomenology can be seen as a type of “Minor Philosophy,” by which the author means, a type of doing philosophy that struggles to create novel philosophical concepts within established – inherited and institutionalized – dominant languages of philosophy.

All these contributions, directly or indirectly, touch on the work of Dermot Moran, thereby once again showing how rich and insightful his philosophical production has been. We dedicate this special issue to him as a sign of our gratitude and admiration. We wish him many more years of health and passionate engagement with the philosophical community.