Soviet Cultural Diplomacy towards Denmark during the Cold War, 1945-1991

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Foreword

The Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy consisted of numerous organizations. They all had longish names that wreak havoc on a dissertation with a 100,000 word limit. Luckily, the Soviet organizations excelled in the use of abbreviations. For pragmatic reasons I have expanded this use of abbreviations to include both international and Danish organizations and a full list of the many abbreviations utilized in the dissertation is found in appendix 1. Also due to the word limit the footnotes are full of abbreviations. They are listed in appendix 2. Finally, it should be noted that with the same pragmatic reason in mind the various parts of archival references in the footnotes are separated by “/”, as this approach saves me a lot of words. The bibliography includes a note on sources.

Transliterations of names and place follow the Library of Congress style except in a few cases where another form is more commonly used (e.g. Moscow for Moskva or Trotsky for Trotskii). All place names correspond with the names in use at the time (eg. Leningrad and not Saint Petersburg).

All quotes originally not in English have been translated into English by the author.

This dissertation is primarily based on unpublished as well as published sources. I would therefore like to thank the archivists and librarians at TORS library, Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Rigsarkivet, Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, Lamont Library, Wiedener Library, and Harvard Law School Library. Especially Jesper Jørgesen at ABA.

I am very grateful to the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies for housing me for one semester as a visiting scholar. My stay was made possible thanks to a EliteForsk rejsestipendium (‘EliteResearch Travel Grant’) awarded by Uddannelses- og Forskningsministeriet (‘The Ministry of Higher Education’).

I would like to thank all those I have met along the way who had to suffer the long talks concerning Soviet cultural diplomacy. The dissertation has benefited from all your discussions and input. You all know who you are.

I would like to thank associated professor Rosa Magnusdottir for her constructive criticism at my pre-defense without a doubt it made this finished version of the dissertation much better.

Naturally, I am solely responsible for the way all the utilized materials are presented in this dissertation, and the conclusion drawn on that basis.

I am very grateful to Tine Roesen, who stepped in as my new supervisor at a very difficult point in time, for your patience, comments, and technical know-how.
Finally thanks to Marianne and Sophia for patiently surviving my years as a PhD candidate and for traveling with me to Boston, arriving during the coldest winter ever recorded, so I could spend half a year in a library basement reading microfilms.

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my mother, paternal grandmother, mother-in-law, and my first supervisor, Professor Jens Nørgård-Sørensen, who all held a living interest in my dissertation, but did not live to see it finished.
Introduction

“More than four centuries ago, Nicola Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it is more important to be feared than to be loved. But in today’s world, it is best to be both. Winning the hearts and minds has always been important”.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.¹

On April 3rd 1954 at a concert in The Smaller Hall at Odd Fellow Palæet (‘the Odd Fellow Palace’) in Copenhagen the Soviet violinist Mikhail Vaiman and the pianist Maria Karandasiova played a selection of – among others – Bach and Beethoven. A few days earlier the baritone Pavel Listsian had guest performed in the opera Bajadser at The Royal Danish Theater.²

Although ordinary spectators most likely did not consider the reason, the performances of the Soviet artists did not take place by chance. They were in Denmark as part of a Soviet cultural delegation to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Danish-Soviet Friendship Association.³

Such delegations visited Denmark and other countries annually. Each year the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved a drawn up plan for the cultural activities to take place.⁴

SOVIET CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN DENMARK AS THE CASE STUDY

Cold War studies have traditionally placed emphasis on the study of grand politics or diplomatic history – that is, super power politics, security politics, bloc politics and the balance of terror – whereas the struggle over hearts and minds has been largely neglected, and earlier research has almost exclusively focused on the Anglo-American actors. It is very peculiar that the high level of activity by practitioners of Soviet cultural diplomacy during the Cold War is almost inversely proportional with the research interest after the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, research on the American apparatus for state cultural diplomacy has turned into something of a research industry,⁵ although this apparatus did not function as widely or for as long as the Soviet equivalent. This led to a problematic tendency of turning the cultural Cold War into an almost one-sided affair of shadow

² Politiken 3.29.1954; 4.4.1954.
³ KB/II/24 /General report draft DKSU congress 1954.
⁴ E.g. RA/Danica/105/О мероприятия по культурным связям со скандинавскими странами 4.18.1956.
⁵ Klaus Petersen and Nils Arne Sørensen: ”Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten. En indledning”, in Klaus Petersen og Nils Arne Sørensen (ed.): Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten (Odense, 2004), 23.
boxing of the USA vs. the USA where the Soviet Union with affiliations seemed to have mysteriously disappeared.6

By turning the searchlight towards the cultural diplomatic activities of the USSR and including new archival sources with Denmark as the case study it is the aim of this dissertation to analyze a neglected field within Cold War studies concerning Soviet cultural diplomacy.

The utilized archival documentation as well as other studies gives the impression that the attempted Soviet cultural diplomatic activities did not differ much whether from one side of the Iron Curtain to the other or from one continent to the next. It could be argued that the greatest difference from one country to the next is the quantity of activities.

The level of activity in Denmark, the number of organizations and actors involved, and full access to numerous archival sources give us the perfect opportunity to present this first full analysis of the many corners of the Soviet apparatus for foreign cultural diplomacy 1945-1991, its products, and their possible impact. Regarding the title of this dissertation the emphasis will therefore be placed on the words “in Denmark”.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

When investigating the research interests within the cultural diplomatic activities of the USSR with affiliations in Denmark during the Cold War three key groups of research questions can be organized. We consider them equally important.

1: How was the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy with international affiliations organized, planned and financed?
2: What kind of activities took place?
3: How were the activities perceived and received, and can they be said to have had any effect?

With Denmark as our case study we can base our answers to these questions on examples and themes that may also be considered representative on a wider scale insofar as it is possible to find similar organizations and manifestations in most other countries.

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Examples of the journal *Fakta om Sovjetunionen* [“Facts on the Soviet Union”] published in Danish, the Danish Language broadcasts by *Radio Moscow*, and other publications in Danish as well as activities within different forms of bilateral cultural agreements were concluded between the two countries.

Alongside the state-sponsored Soviet activities, attempts were made to carry out activities with a postulated Danish point of origin in the form of front organizations such as *Fredens Tilhængere* (“Partisans of Peace”, the Danish affiliate of the World Peace Council). These organizations claimed to work independently of the interests of any political party, but in reality had an objective of furthering foreign policy aims of the USSR. This dissertation includes an analysis of these organizations.

The most important Danish practitioner of Soviet cultural diplomacy was *Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen* (“The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and The Soviet Union”), the oldest organization of its kind in Denmark during the period 1945-1991.

We label these forms of activities mass activities or mass propaganda, understood as activities aimed at as broad an audience as possible that is, a quantitative criterion of measuring success.

It is also possible to identify forms of individual propaganda understood both as activities aimed at individuals (such as trips by delegations or tourists and the participation of individuals in the activities of peace movements) or the publication of materials favorable to Soviet state’s points of view.

We will attempt to measure whether the mass or individual activities affected the Danish publics’ view of the Soviet Union.

**THE CULTURAL COLD WAR**

This dissertation falls within a relative new research trend in international Cold War studies of the last 15-20 years, *the cultural Cold War*.

This tradition perceives the Cold War as driven by an ideological contradiction between the liberal-democratic NATO countries and the Marxist-Leninist Warsaw Pact bloc.7

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Following this approach, the Cold War becomes a conflict between two Weltanschauungen both of which attempted to organize cultural life, especially high culture, as a political and ideological weapon utilized in the competition between two narratives of modernization. Therefore, cultural issues not only add a third pillar to traditional security or economic studies of international relations, they also influence and broaden our definition and understanding of power, security, and economic relations in an international system. This does not mean that a cultural approach aims at establishing a new general paradigm for international history – rather it aims to add a new dimension of international relations within the more traditional studies of diplomatic history.

The international cultural competitions have not received the same level of interest in mainstream historiography on the Cold War as the above mentioned themes as they have been perceived not as decisive “high politics” but as “low politics”. Nigel Gould-Davies warns against this mistake showing how at the end of World War II three factors influenced the fast creation of a new pattern of global conflict:

Firstly, the victors held a strong mutual distrust against the model of society chosen by the other side.

Secondly, the invention of nuclear weapons created an incentive to avoid a direct military confrontation.

Thirdly, since neither of the first two factors can explain the proportions or intensity of the confrontation between the super powers, a third and more important factor has to be included, namely the ideological clash of interests. The super powers had crucially disparate conceptions of how politics, economics and societies should develop. Hence, on its own, military strength did not play the decisive role in defining the Cold War. This is seen most clearly by studying the end of the Cold War. A possible victory in the Cold War could only be defined as a complete reorientation of the ideological system of the other side. When the ideological conflict ended, so did the Cold War. It is important to note that the USSR folded with its nuclear arsenals intact. This goes to show that military strength does not always determine the course of power struggles. The economic, ideological, cultural, and moral elements of the erosion of capabilities have to factor in as well.

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This makes way for a new analytical approach to the study of the Cold War, with a focus on the ideological and cultural aspects instead of solely on the traditional view of a political and military conflict between super powers. Culture was utilized as an instrument to make the European populations support the policies of one super power or the other. Making a good impression in the cultural sphere was meant to cement political sympathies and anti-sympathies. The cultural Cold War is an example of the utilization of comprehensive state strategies in peace time incorporating culture into a campaign directly aimed at defeating the adversary.

In this regard it is important to bear in mind how people obtained the knowledge that formed their sympathies or antipathies. Traditional research on the Cold War places emphasis on the minutes of parliamentary proceedings, what one civil servant said to the other, what was stated in defense analyses, or in the international framework such as the arms race or ideological divisions. However, it is not necessarily politicians and their decisions that form the opinions of ordinary citizens. Instead, emphasis should be placed on the knowledge obtained from printed or other cultural sources, both high and popular.

It would be fair to argue that the Cold War, as it was fought in Europe, was not marred by wars by proxy unlike most other parts of the world between 1945 and 1991 and cannot be understood simply as a political and military confrontation between the leading powers, but as a confrontation between Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica (understood not only as peace, but peace on the terms of either one of the super powers). It is not only the rapid growth of the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals that must be taken into account, since they would make a direct military confrontation suicidal, but also the ideological and cultural competition that was without historical precedent. The parties placed emphasis on demonstrating a cultural supremacy understood as broadly as possible, including everything from sports and ballet to comics and space travel, in order to win the hearts and minds of the targeted foreign publics. The cultural Cold War was a constant struggle to win this battle, utilizing the printed word, radio, movies, TV, and concert halls. Propaganda became the main weapon used by both sides in what was primarily a clash between cultures and ideologies.

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**Soviet cultural diplomacy.** To wage cultural Cold War it was necessary to have access to both the domestic front and the front of the opponent. The USSR had an advantage; At least until the emergence of new communication technologies that could penetrate deeply behind the Iron Curtain, it was possible to maintain a just about hermetically sealed information environment where the Soviet world-view could prevail and through state controlled media outlets have a high level of capacity to provide the information and shape the opinions of its citizens on the intentions of the outside world.¹⁶ Furthermore, the USSR had free and complete access to the territories and the populations of the other bloc countries both through official channels such as embassies, consulates, and press agencies, and through loyal affiliations such as communist parties, friendship societies and other similar organizations in a free market for cultural manifestations – even if the aim was to struggle against the governments and democratic societies.¹⁷ At the end of World War II the USSR immediately launched a propaganda offensive through every available channel to seize the initiative in formulating the terms of the struggle or debate over the international discourse on international affairs. As my previous research has shown, America in this respect became the reactive part. Firstly, they had to answer to an already functioning and well-oiled Soviet machine. Secondly, in April 1967 the Californian journal *Ramparts* exposed the American financing through the CIA of an international network of organizations for cultural diplomacy leaving the field undisputedly in the hands of the Soviet run and financed counterparts.¹⁸

The Soviets pursued a strategy of presenting themselves as the bearers, protectors, and promoters of European *Bildung* and *Kultur* against (according to the Soviet stance) the threat of American degenerating low (popular) cultural and political influence.¹⁹

As exemplified by the Danish case, the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy functioned in a number of forms, manifestations and products. Firstly, there were the official news agencies with their newsletters, journals, and book publications. Secondly, the USSR displayed high or folkloristic culture primarily through the friendship societies with the Soviet Union in foreign countries and promoted causes such as “peace” or the interests of particular groups whether it was “women”, “youth”, “students”, “workers” or some other party. This system contained a network of international organizations with national branches.

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Thirdly, the KGB used active measures or agents of influence through disinformation campaigns. KGB functioned not only as an internal security policy and external intelligence service, but also as an active actor in the Soviet disinformation onslaught on the West.\textsuperscript{20}

According to Clive Rose, we can identify a number of main objectives of Soviet cultural diplomacy. The key element was to project an image of the Soviet Union as the guiding force in the struggle for peace in the entire world and to present all of its plans and actions within the framework of this struggle. Following this, they attempted to project an image of the USA as the opponent of world peace and in this manner undercut the international influence of the other super power. Similarly, the USSR worked to further criticism of the USA and NATO in public discourse in Western countries and at the same time to present itself as the foremost supporter of movements struggling against imperialism and capitalism in third world countries. As part of the peace struggle, the USSR attempted to negotiate and enter into practical contracts with western countries in areas such as weapons control, promoting actions to further the establishment of relationships based on trust. In Soviet “newspeak” this meant the downscaling of western defense capabilities without noteworthy limitations on the Soviet Union’s possibilities to uphold its own capabilities. Such negotiations were entered into especially if they were to the economical or technological advantages of the USSR or to avoid the tensions that would limit the Soviet Union’s opportunities to pursue its own ideological goals or threaten their conquests in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{21}

To pursue these aims, the USSR operated a foreign policy apparatus consisting of three dimensions: \textit{Regular diplomacy} executed through the Peoples’ Commissariat/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. \textit{Revolutionary diplomacy} executed through the Comintern/The International Department (ID) of the Secretariat of the CPSU CC. \textit{Cultural diplomacy} executed through a network of organizations run by VOKS/SSOD.\textsuperscript{22}

Although we acknowledge that several conceptual models for the cooperation or competition over the allocation of resources or influence on the decision making process between various actors or organizations in the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy could be presented\textsuperscript{23} it would lead us too far astray from the theme of the dissertation. To some degree these questions concerning the


\textsuperscript{22} Jean-Francois Fayet: "VOKS: The Third Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy", in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (ed.): \textit{Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy} (New York, 2010), 34.

\textsuperscript{23} Graham T. Allison: “Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Paul R. Vitotti and Mark V. Kauppi (ed.): \textit{International Relations Theory} (New York, 1993), 342-374.
various actors’ attempts at influencing the decision making process within the various layers of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus will be discussed in further chapters. Therefore it is sufficient to state here that although competition\textsuperscript{24} as well as cooperation\textsuperscript{25} between interest groups of the Soviet apparatus can be identified, one should not forget that despite these possible competitions the archival evidence indicates that, due to the ideological consensus, the end goals as identified above were commonly accepted by all possible groups.

**CULTURE, A DEFINITION**

A central term has been mentioned repeatedly: Culture.

For the purpose of this dissertation we will proceed from the definition of culture in a theme issue of the *Journal for Cold War Studies* on the cultural Cold War. Here, culture is very broadly defined as a system of meanings that enables humans to translate their instincts, urges, needs, and other propensities into representative and communicative structures including language, visual symbols, gestures, codes, art, and texts that a social group creates and uses to carry out its daily life and routines.\textsuperscript{26}

By such a definition culture could be seen as a controversial or disputed object that could mean different things to different people at different times and thereby lead to a situation where the concept of culture becomes so broad and all-encompassing that it is no longer analytically meaningful. A concept that includes more or less every human phenomenon runs the risk of losing its value as an analytical tool.\textsuperscript{27}

To avoid these dangers of non-definition we shall identify the central manifestations of Soviet cultural diplomacy (that is culture utilized for an ideological purpose) that we are going to analyze in the following chapters.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{26} Muysa Glants and Pamela Kachurin: “Special Issue: Culture, The Soviet Union and the Cold War: General Introduction”, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2002(4):1, 3.

\textsuperscript{27} Conze: 199; Volker Depkat: “Cultural approaches to International Relations”, in Gienow-Hecht/ Schumacher, 178, 181.

\textsuperscript{28} The following is developed and expanded based on Caute (2003b), 15; Gould-Davis, 196-212.
• Performing arts (theatre, cinema, ballet).
• Musical arts (classical, jazz, popular)
• Visual arts (painting, sculpture, poster art)
• Tourism and exchanges (travel, delegations, tourism, congress/conference/festival participation, and education).
• Print media (brochures, journals, magazines)
• Mass media (Radio and TV broadcasts)
• The spoken word (lectures, conferences, seminars, speeches)
• Sport (bilateral friendship matches, international championships, the Olympic Games)

The above categories are not chosen by chance. The chairman of the Council of Ministers’ State Committee on Cultural Contacts Abroad (GKKS), Sergei Romanovskii, in his 1966 book on Soviet international cultural and scientific contacts highlighted exactly these elements as the key elements of Soviet cultural connections.29 Similarly, as early as 1917 Lenin pointed to the possibility of utilizing scientists, artists, writers, painters, musicians and the new forms of mass communication for propaganda on an ideological front.30 Throughout his book Romanovskii gives numerous examples of how the Soviets followed the Leninist line of thought considering the utilization of the various manifestations for the popular promotion of the USSR abroad.31

In addition to the aforementioned concert, we shall use ballet as an example. High arts such as ballet and ballet troupes such as the Bolshoi or Kirov ballets in czarist Russia, were awarded a special highbrow imperial status and protection. Interestingly, following the Bolshevik takeover they became part of a Soviet cultural project aimed at a complete cultural transformation of society and the utilization of high culture to create political and ideological allegiance. As a form of high culture ballet was transformed from elite culture to popular culture and an art form of national pride that also showcased the level of kulturnost (general cultural education) of the Soviet population. Ballet was one of the fine arts forms utilized internationally to provide the USSR with a sheen of cultural legitimacy, and the dancers functioned as cultural ambassadors abroad by showcasing that

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30 Shaw, 60.
31 Романовский. 12-114.
the performance and forms of Soviet culture and thereby the society that promoted them were superior to those of the West.32

Romanovskii states that for the Soviets, tourism was considered to be one of the most important ways to promote mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and foreign countries. Tourism was actively used to promote the building of socialism and present the richness and diversity of the cultural level and heritage in the USSR. As such, it was a field in constant development with new routes, cities and resorts opening for foreign tourists every year. International tourism was considered an instrument in the struggle for mutual understanding, peace (in the special Soviet definition of that term), and friendship.33 As such, The Soviet government viewed tourism and travel not merely as vacation travel, but as a means in the international ideological struggle. Incoming tourists were treated according to the framework of “polittourism”. Visitors should forget their false images of USSR created by western press by meeting Soviet citizens, touring model factories and collective farms, and spread the word of their impressions upon arriving home. In accordance with the techniques of hospitality,34 specific plans for working with each tourist group were developed. The Soviets acknowledged that it might not immediately change a person’s political views, but it could limit the leeway for anti-communist propaganda, and give a foundation to build on. Guides were instructed in how to propagandize economic and social developments under socialism, how to answer critical questions, and how to identify foreign agents in an international tourist group. In the case of delegations the Soviets wished for a high a profile of its members as possible especially key figures such as politicians, popular public figures, opinion makers, unionists, scientists, teachers, and journalists, or members of peace, youth or women’s organizations. It was hoped that they would have something positive to say about their trip both upon arriving home and in the Soviet press, as both could be used to legitimize the Soviet government abroad and at home.35

Another example is sports. Sport played an important role in the Soviet project of projecting a form of society superior to the capitalist both in the form of exchanges and friendly matches, and eventually in participation in the Olympic Games. The games and other international championships came to be viewed as venues for playing out the conflict of the cultural Cold War as competitions to prove the superiority of one political system over the other. As with other Soviet

33 Романовский, 127-134.
34 See Chapter 1.
35 DIIS II, 366-370.
citizens travelling abroad Soviet athletes were expected not only to perform well but also to promote the Soviet ideology.\(^{36}\)

Our research interest is not the cultural objects in themselves, nor their possible aesthetic value, but the value of their political utilization by Soviet and Soviet aligned government and non-government organizations.

**ARCHIVAL SOURCES**

The historian David Caute warns against the charms of archival reading rooms where one might too easily be seduced by the idea that the more or less hidden hand of promotion always explains the product.\(^{37}\) However, Caute’s warning leaves would-be historians of Soviet cultural diplomacy in dire straits as to what then to utilize as source materials. Naturally, paintings, posters, sculptures, and so on can continue to exist beyond their time and context of creation, although not necessarily in the same condition as at the time of origin. This problem becomes even greater in regards to oral disseminations. Even if speech manuscripts have survived or have been summarized in the print media, there is no guarantee that the speaker has stuck to the script or that the summary is correct. Similarly, it is usually possible to locate a recording of a specific musician, orchestra, singer, or choir. But this will only seldom reproduce the specific event in question. Therefore, unprinted and printed source materials still remain the best means to document the organization, implementation and evaluation of the activities.

The bibliography contains a full discussion on the utilized archival sources. Here I will only note that the key sources for the dissertation are primarily Danish and to a certain extent former Soviet archival materials stored outside Russia, especially at Lamont Library.\(^{38}\)

Generally speaking, it should be noted that archival sources seem to be better preserved for earlier periods of the Cold War, whereas they seem to dry out somewhat for the later years. In addition there is a flood stream of printed materials published by the involved organizations, and finally a few interviews were made.

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David Caute laments that: “In the cultural field Soviet Studies and Cold War Studies do not inhabit the same planet”.\(^{39}\) This dissertation aims at contributing to bringing these fields closer together by following Volker Depkat’s suggestion\(^{40}\) of expanding the field of Cold War Studies to recognize the importance of the role of culture in the conflict.

**METHOD AND OUTLINE**

This dissertation follows a classic source critical approach in answering the research questions. Due to the sheer magnitude of both the availability of source materials and manifestations of the cultural production of the Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark during the Cold War, it will often be necessary to give some kind of a quantitative presentation of the research results and then choose representative examples to present as case studies.

The dissertation consists of nine chapters.

The first chapter presents the theoretical and methodical framework of the dissertation, reviews the historiography, the main theories within the field, and the key schools within Soviet and Cold War studies, defines some key terms, and ends with the formulation of theoretical synthesis defining the methodical framework of the empirical research.

The second chapter discusses how the structures of the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy were organized and financed, and how decisions were taken.

The following seven chapters analyze the organizations (especially the Danish) involved in Soviet cultural diplomacy, their activities, and discuss their possible impact. The chapters generally follow a chronological structure; 1945-1949 (in the spirit of the Grand Alliance), 1949-1956 (the first peace offensive), 1956-1974 (the humdrum years, 1974-1985 (the second peace offensive), and 1985-1991 (the Glasnost years), although the start and end years should be regarded as indicative and not as set in stone. Two chapters will discuss long lasting Soviet activities that defy the chronology of the remaining chapters. Finally, the conclusions are drawn.

In Danish historiography the Cold War, and especially the question of Soviet cultural diplomacy activities and participants, is a very sensitive topic. Therefore, it is very important to note that this is a dissertation within the field of history, not law. When describing and documenting the forms and practitioners of this involvement, we do not in any way imply that any Danish citizen named could

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\(^{39}\) Caute (2003b), 614.

\(^{40}\) Depkat, 177.
or should have been accused, tried, or convicted for committing any sort of criminal act in accordance with chapters 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code. This Danish “fifth column law” did not forbid in peacetime (including the time of a Cold War) the promotion of views of foreign states against the political development or foreign policy of Denmark nor the acceptance of hidden economic support. In other words, the concepts of “cultural diplomatic practitioner” or “agent of influence” as used in this dissertation should in no way whatsoever be understood to imply the concept “spy”.

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Chapter 1: Approaches

“Revisionism is a healthy historiographical process, and no one, not even revisionists, should be exempt from it”.
John Lewis Gaddis

Invoking Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay, Richard Ned Lebow compares political scientists to hedgehogs and historians to foxes. Political scientists, like hedgehogs, know one big thing very well and try to invoke it repeatedly, believing that one complex explanation for seemingly complex situations can be applicable for a wide range of situations. Historians, like foxes, know many things and tailor their strategies to the circumstances, believing every historical situation to be unique, and propose varied and layered explanations based on the assumption that complex events have complex causes. However, as Lebow criticizes, both political scientists and historians lack a connection between their fields and he points to the need for cooperation between theories of social science and the empirical studies of history.

With this in mind the aim of the current chapter is to discuss the historiography of the study of the Cultural Cold War, the periodization, theories on methodical approaches, and various schools on Soviet, Cold War, IR theory, peace movements, and communism history with the purpose of establishing a balanced theoretical basis for the empirical study of Soviet cultural diplomacy in the following chapters.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Although the field of Cultural Cold War studies is growing, research still tends to show a strong numerical majority of studies of the Anglo-American side over the Soviet side. Comparative studies of cultural diplomacy of both super powers are an even rarer find. Considering studies of Soviet cultural diplomacy it is notable that studies usually do not attempt to present the full picture, but instead discuss a special national framework, a particular theme, and/or movement or organization.

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42 Gaddis, 294.
Danish studies have so far been dedicated to partial studies of the early period, examples of activities, finding aids to the archival records, a festschrift published by the major Danish organization involved in the activities, a description of the perception of the Danish public of the activities, a study of the Soviet cultural center in Copenhagen, two preliminary studies to this dissertation, and the knowledge of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) of said activities. Only some of the studies such as those by Bent Jensen, this author, and DIIS have accessed relevant Danish and Soviet archival sources whereas the PET white paper is based on the incomplete files of the PET. However, as its task was to study the PET’s knowledge of the activities this was to be expected (and still rewarding, since prior to its publication this area constituted a blind spot in our knowledge), the problem being that no attempts to validate the perceptions of the PET were undertaken, and that the PET archival materials considering the history of other organizations were used uncritically. The same angle of interest is to be found in a Norwegian white paper on the Norwegian police intelligence and security services monitoring of politically engaged Norwegian citizens.

Likewise, international research repeats the tendency of national frameworks and singular themes, for example on the respective friendship societies with the USSR in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Great Britain, or Czechoslovakia.

46 DIIS I-V.
51 Kim Frederichsen, Gennem venskab til kendskab: Sovjetisk propaganda i Danmark under Den Kolde Krig (Copenhagen 2010); Ibid.: "Soviet Cultural Diplomacy in Denmark during the Cold War: The Case of the Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union" in Olaf Mertelsmann and Kaarel Piirimäe (ed.): The Baltic Sea Region and the Cold War (Frankfurt am Main, 2012), 181-203.
53 PK I, 16-17.
54 Dokument nr. 15 (1995–96) – Rapport til Stortinget fra kommisjonen som ble nedsatt av Stortinget for å granske påstander om ulovlig overvåking av norske borgere (http://www.opo1.no/Lundkommisjonen/Lundkommisjonen%20komplett.pdf)
55 Ingunn Rothaug: “For fred og venskap mellom folkene: Sambandet Norge-Sovjetunionen 1945-70”:
Forsvarstudier 2000:1, 1-164.
Existing studies focus on different themes such as the financial support of foreign communist parties, tourism and travelling, sports, organizations such as The World Federation of Science Workers (WFSW) or The Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), various international manifestations, a particular part of the Soviet apparatus such as VOKS or activities within a certain time frame. Examples of Soviet practices prior to World War II give a clear impression of a form of continuity in the Soviet practices from the interwar years to the Cold War. These studies make good use of the possibilities to access former Soviet archives. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about Danish research on for example the Soviet use of inviting

67 Gould-Davies; Metta Spencer: The Russian Quest for Peace and Democracy (Lanham, 2010).
68 Fayet.
travelers or students. These studies do not utilize Soviet source materials, and this omission causes them either to forget to consider a possible Soviet agenda behind the activities, or to simply and uncritically group together (sometimes impressive) listings of activities, practitioners or organizations in this or that cultural field. Despite the fact that several Danish studies show that it is possible to include considerations of the Soviet agenda even without possessing archival access or the necessary linguistic skills.

During the Cold War Western studies tended not only to present research results but also to warn against falling for the siren songs of Soviet propagandists. Authors of directories on the Soviet cultural diplomatic apparatus such as the annual reviews in Problems of Communism or Yearbook on International Communist Affairs made use of the publications of the organizations themselves. The same can be said for studies of departments in the Soviet party apparatus, news agencies, reviews of Soviet cultural diplomacy, or critical assessments of their western supporters.

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74 Jacob Andersen with Oleg Gordievsky: De røde spioner: KGB’s operationer i Danmark – fra Stalin til Jeltsin, fra Stauning til Nyrop (Copenhagen, 2002); Hasselbalch; Morten Møller: Hvem er Nielsen? En fortælling om kommunister och modstadslederen Børge Houmann (Copenhagen, 2012), Ibid., Mogens Fog: En biografi (Copenhagen, 2009).
76 Rose.
Although current Russian studies on Soviet foreign policy often neglect the element of cultural diplomacy, even in studies of bilateral relations, a new tendency of research interests in Soviet cultural diplomacy can be noticed especially regarding the interwar years or in specialized studies on news agencies, tourism, sport or key figures. A general trend is to publish collections of transcripts of sources either in the form of general collections of central Soviet organizations or on specific subjects such as education or sports. Since the end of the Cold War several Soviet key players published their memoirs. Likewise, DKP members have published memoirs, which occasionally contain valuable information for this dissertation.

As noted the above mentioned works generally give the impression of focusing on specific themes often within a given national context. Although due to space restrictions this dissertation must adhere to the latter principle, we shall attempt to draw a much fuller picture of the Soviet activities in Denmark.

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84 АПН: От Совинформбюро до РИА “Новости”: 60 лет в поле информационного напряжения (Москва, 2001).
86 Прозумеников.
89 Т.Ю. Красовицкая (отв. сост.): “Возвращать домой друзьям СССР...”: Обучение иностранцев в Советском Союзе (Москва, 2013).
90 Н. Томилина (ред.): Путь к олимпийским звездам: документальная хроника Олимпиады-80 в Москве (Москва, 2011).
PERIODIZATION

In this dissertation the Cold War will be defined as the period from the end of the overall military hostilities in Europe in 1945 to the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the ideological reason for the conflict disappeared along with one of the two main antagonists. As this is a fairly long period of time it is useful to discuss whether it should or could be broken in to shorter periods.

Traditional timeline. Usually, three time periods are identified on the basis of the level of intensity of the systemic conflict and level of tension: 1945-1962 (the first Cold War), 1963-1978 (détente), and 1979-1991 (the second Cold War). It has been argued that the final years, 1985-1991, could be seen as a separate period due to the changes in the relationship between the super powers after Gorbachev’s ascension to power and the internal reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries.

As the focus of dissertation is the cultural Cold War we should also consider the timeline for Soviet cultural diplomacy suggested by Nigel Gould-Davies who identifies seven distinct periods:

1: The 1920s and early 1930s. From 1925 onwards, the Soviets regulated the contacts through VOKS.
2: During the height of Stalinist terror in the second half of the 1930s the USSR followed a line of isolationism and contacts abroad were cut off.
3: During the Grand Alliance of World War II the contacts flourished once more with the active support of both governments.
4: After the victory, late Stalinist USSR returned to the pre-war isolationistic position of segregation from the surrounding world and the confrontational period was reinforced by American McCarthyism and restrictions on travel to the USA for Soviet citizens, including cultural workers.
5: After Stalin’s death the new leadership made way for cultural connections as a result of renewed ideological optimism and the conviction that the world correlation of forces was turning to the advantage of the socialist camp which entailed a wish to open up to the surrounding world and showcase the Soviet capacities both in the economic and cultural fields by conducting a more proactive and outgoing foreign policy, including the cultural field.

93 DIIS IV, 23.
94 Nikolaj Petersen: "Den kolde krigs historie" [second part], in Lauridsen et.al. (ed.), 48-51.
95 Gould-Davies, 196-212.
6: With the ousting of Khrushchev the voices worried about the influence of Western culture on Soviet citizens due to the reciprocal openness came into power, which led to great restrictions on cultural connections abroad.

7: The Gorbachev years where the doors were completely swung open to cultural connections abroad.

It is worth noting that Gould-Davies moves the temporal point of origin of Soviet cultural diplomacy back to the inter-war years. Elsewhere, it has been argued that the starting point of the Cold War could be moved back to November 1917. However, although the apparatus of Soviet cultural diplomacy also operated in the interwar years, it would be an over-interpretation to talk of a Cold War prior to World War II, since neither the USSR nor the USA could be considered superpowers in the inter-war years even if the USSR did direct a network of front organizations against Nazi-Germany (until the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact).

A new timeline. In this dissertation we argue that a reading of the archival sources in both a Danish and a transnational comparative perspective calls into question whether it is, in fact, possible to identify such distinct periods during the cultural Cold War as Gould-Davis does. On the one hand, we acknowledge the increase in the quantity of activities fairly quickly after Stalin’s death and that this, more than anything, had to do with the new strongman Khrushchev’s wish to showcase to the world that the Soviet socialist system was superior to the competing system. A study of foreign scientific contacts of the Turkmen SSR (considered part of the cultural diplomacy by the Soviets) concludes that until 1956, international contacts were sporadic, but afterwards they became very frequent. It became possible for Turkmen scientists to participate in delegations going abroad for conferences and guest lectures. Most exchanges took place within the field of natural science. Within humanities most exchanges took place in the field of archeology. Programs for book exchanges also flourished. By the mid-1960s, the USSR was represented in 270 international organizations within the fields of science and culture.

96 Jonathan Haslam; Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven/London 2011), ix, 1-5.
97 RA/Danica/105/Minистр культуры СССР Н. Михайлов ЦК КПСС 3.2.1956.
98 RA/Danica/105/Постановление комиции ЦК КПСС по вопросам идеологии, культуры и международных партнёрских связей протокол № 23 от 14 февраля 1959 г. О сводном плане по культурным связям СССР с капиталистическими странами на 1959 год; Д. Шелягин, Л. Толкунов, Н. Удалов, А. Панюшкин, Ф. Крестянков, Н. Ястребов к заседанию Секретариатов центрального комитета КПСС 11.29.1963.
99 Gilburd, 362-401.
101 Романовский, 135.
On the other hand, based on the available sources it is not possible to identify the supposed neo-isolationist position in the field of cultural diplomacy in the Brezhnev years. As my previous research on the Danish context has shown it is even possible to note an increase in and a further institutionalizing of the cultural work in Denmark. If anything, the archival documentation strongly suggests that the Soviet cultural diplomatic policies followed a certain set of themes and methods of conduct with occasional deviations for special commemorations such as the centennial anniversary of the birth of Lenin.

The Gorbachev years with their numerous reconstructions leave the impression that they more than anything brought frustration and bewilderment over loosing long time institutional partners and long established and well-functioning models of cooperation between Danish and Soviet participants. The archival materials utilized for this dissertation allow us to argue for a new approach to the periodization of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Clear distinctions cannot be identified according to the methods, planning, or overall themes, but utilizing quantity as a marker we can identify three shifts: A late-Stalinist isolationistic trend, a post-Stalin increase in the activity level, and finally a period of difficulties due to the numerous reconstructions of the Gorbachev years. However, both for practical reasons and to take into consideration the importance of emphasizing the equal importance of both the recipient and the sender perspective it is possible to argue a periodization that corresponds to the chapter divisions in this dissertation.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Any state’s diplomatic endeavors contain an element of attempting to approach foreign publics. Within academia this approach is known by various terms such as public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, arts diplomacy, soft power, nation branding, framing, or (negatively)

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104 ABA/DKSU/1/DKSU/SSOD/SUDK 1970 cooperation plan.
105 Frederichsen (2011b), 80.
107 Gienow-Hecht (2010), 9-11
109 Nye Jr.
propaganda. The term depends on the academic discipline in question, but this differentiation is rather theoretical as they can all be considered grand theories for analyzing activities of seeking contact with foreign public spheres. Although it should be acknowledged that the term propaganda is usually defined negatively as political manipulation and subordination, Nye Jr. notes that skeptics who define public diplomacy as just another way of saying propaganda misunderstand the term because propaganda often lacks credibility and therefore is counterproductive as public diplomacy. As such this could be seen as a continuation by Cold War historians of the practice of evaluating the activities as either welcome or unwelcome from the point of view of the authorities in the recipient countries. In Danish historiography dealing with the Cold War period we can identify a tendency to describe American initiatives as public diplomacy and Soviet as propaganda. Furthermore, it is important to note that in an internal Soviet context the terms agitation and propaganda where not considered to be negatively valued words. The editor-in-chief of Pravda stated this in 1978 when he explicitly pointed out that the aim of the newspaper was the propaganda of the party and the state and that he saw no reason to hide this.

We will in this dissertation disregard the above mentioned boundaries and follow the broad definition of cultural diplomacy forwarded by the Russian historians Golubev and Nevezhin: The utilization of general, cultural, public, or scientific relations as a means to fulfill political, diplomatic, or propagandistic aims as part of a clearly defined and well-coordinated somewhat centralized policy with a number of clearly defined political aims that continues to be carried out over a number of years even if the aims or methods change over time.

**Identifying key markers.** This broad definition of cultural diplomacy enables us to utilize the main insights of the various disciplinary approaches to establish the key elements to be identified in a given study of cultural diplomacy. We need to establish a methodical approach to answer the key research questions of identifying the actors, their activities, main strategies for communicating the messages, and their possible impact.
As Simon Addams highlights the campaigns are a part of complex long-term strategies and we should strive to identify ten key markers:

- The ideology behind the propaganda campaign (e.g. communism).
- The context of the campaign.
- The identity of the propagandists.
- The context of the campaign.
- The structure of the propaganda organization.
- The relationship between members of parties or movements, and fellow-travelers.
- The utilized media techniques.
- The use of special techniques (for example music or a central figure).
- Possible counterpropaganda.
- The possible effect or impact.

At the same time we also have to take into consideration what has been called the color of the messages:

*White* propaganda has a clear sender and the information is mostly truthful.

*Black* propaganda has a hidden sender and the information is mostly false (disinformation).

*Grey* propaganda lies somewhere between white and black. It might be possible to identify the sender and the information may or may not be truthful.\(^\text{118}\)

At the same time we need to consider the target audience of the activities and messages. That is, whether they were directed towards as broad an audience as possible with some form of quantitative criteria for measurement of success, or whether they were directed individually. The latter holds a double meaning. Firstly, as cultural diplomacy directed at individuals, secondly as the actions of individuals. In the context of the study of the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy this should not be taken to mean that Soviet cultural diplomacy was carried out as individual initiatives outside of the system, but that the Soviet apparatus could be directed at individuals such as members of delegations. However, on a national Danish level individuals in fact acted on their own accord or gave public lectures upon returning from trips to the USSR.

The specific choices of strategy within the markers discussed above should provide important information on the overall communication strategy of the sender.

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\(^\text{118}\) Adams, 6-8, 14-17.
Communication strategies. Following Joseph Nye, cultural diplomacy consists of three elements of equal importance and each demands a combination of direct information and long term cultural elements. The three elements are:
The daily communication aims to constantly explain the contents of the domestic and foreign policy.
Strategic communication consists of a number of arguments developed as part of a political or commercial campaign in order to communicate various themes or accentuate certain elements of governmental policies for example to highlight policy initiatives.
Development of long term relationships with key individuals through scholarships, education, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.

However, any communications strategy may be undercut by actual political events or actions. Deeds speak louder than words. In this manner public diplomacy is different from PR: both forms of communication pass on information and try to sell a positive image, but a key task of public diplomacy is also to build long-term relations within a positive environment for the policies of the given state. A country’s soft power therefore depends on its attractiveness by means of culture, political ideals and policies and on its success in bringing foreigners to admire its values and to aspire to follow its example. When a country’s policies are perceived as legitimate by the surrounding world the soft power of said country rises – and vice versa. When a country’s soft power is strong, fewer military or economic means are needed to achieve a desired outcome. But on the other hand, international actions that are perceived negatively by world opinion can undermine the actual message and its deeper values. Soft power is the ability to reach desired outcomes by influencing others to change their behavior. Naturally, this demands a high level of insight into the expected behavioral patterns of the target audience. In other words, the states we perceive as the most powerful do not always achieve the desired outcome if their actual deeds contradict their projected images or their influence on the target audience is misjudged.

This has also been pointed out by George Lakoff in a discussion of how messages are framed. The key argument of his framing theory is that a person depends on frames – deeply rooted neural structures – that define the common sense or basic understanding of how the world works. These frames facilitate our basic interactions with the surrounding world. They structure our ideas and conceptions, form our way of reasoning and influence how we perceive or act. These sets of

119 Nye, Jr., 107-110.
120 Ibid., ix-xi, 1-16.
121 Lakoff, xii, 8-15, 25-38, 119.
frames, *deep frames*, are our most basic frames that contain our view of the world. Executers of cultural diplomacy seek to influence these deep frames by utilizing various forms of frames. *Surface frames* introduce a concept (e.g. associations with the term “war on terror”). Then *issue-defining frames* are utilized to explain the concept, place blame for the existence of problems caused by the concept, and present a possible solution, at the same time they seek to identify possible objections to the solutions and present arguments in favor of the suggested solution. Finally, the issue-defining frames are presented to the public through *message frames* consisting of some variation of messengers, messages, audiences, media, and images, for example in the form of speeches, debates, advertising, news stories, editorials or commentaries. Well-planed long or short term campaigns are carried out with the purpose of establishing new deep frames on the side of the recipient. The key to success is effective communication as it is impossible to communicate without activating frames and give them a positive or negative value. In a context of public or cultural diplomacy a political argument is successful if it has a moral premise; (telling us what is right), utilizes versions of contested values taken from a moral worldview, contains an implicit or explicit narrative structure (telling a story of heroes, villains, victims, common themes etc.), also functions as counterarguments to the arguments of the opposition, includes both a problem and its solution, utilizes frames so widely recognized they immediately resonate among a broad audience whether they are true or not and utilizes a communication strategy that enables surface frames to influence deep frames.

**Reception/impact.** In a review essay of several monographs dealing with public diplomacy Professor Emeritus D.C. Watt called for the inclusion of discussions of reception or impact in any study of cultural diplomacy and criticized it as the failing point of most studies at time.122 In this dissertation we shall attempt to meet his call.

Naturally, there is no easy answer to the question of how this can be done. One approach is to assume that participation in a transnational context in itself facilitated influence and consequently seek to validate this hypothesis through memoir literature.123 Another approach is to comb through newspapers and magazines for articles about the activities without taking into consideration the

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123 Matthew Evangelista: "Transnational organizations and the Cold War", in Westad/ Leffler III, 400–421.
agenda or aims of the sender.\textsuperscript{124} Yet another approach is to comb through the Soviet archives for reports.\textsuperscript{125} However, none of these approaches provides us with a full picture.

To get a fuller perspective of the possible impact of cultural diplomacy it is necessary to develop a method that incorporates the perspectives of both the senders and the receivers. To accomplish this we will include and compare materials belonging to a number of different categories. Firstly, we have internal Soviet documents of evaluations, reports, and proposals. Secondly, we have the materials of Danish participating organizations in the form of both internal evaluations and in some cases reports forwarded to the Soviet side. Thirdly, depending on the time period under consideration, it could be possible to include interviews with participants on how they perceive their involvement and whether they consider themselves to have executed influence or been influenced. Memoir literature should also be included in this category. Fourthly, we have media clippings primarily from the press in the country of reception, in our case: Denmark. Media products should be subdivided into two categories: pro-Soviet/fellow-travelling/communist press and non-communist press respectively. It is particularly important to distinguish between these two sub-categories when discussing the question of impact. We have to discuss whether pieces were framed differently depending on the intended target group, whether media outlets framed their perception of the activities depending on their view of the USSR, and whether pieces in the pro-Soviet press reached beyond that relatively narrow circle. As an example of the possible paths of influence we shall look at the dissemination of reports on the experience of participating in delegations travelling to the USSR.

\textsuperscript{124} Rostgaard (2012), 253-254.
If we take the sum of Soviet cultural diplomacy and place it in a model of dissemination (figure 1.1) we see how public diplomacy could be disseminated in either written or oral form. For both forms it is possible to identify various possible target groups. But to reach any of them Soviet cultural diplomacy had to overcome the key problem of the language barrier. Russian was not ordinarily a second or third language among Danes. Therefore, dissemination had to take place primarily through translations into Danish, less frequently to English, German, Swedish, or rarely to French. The first target group was the members of the communist party (C). They must be considered the core group of Soviet supporters in any country, and as such it was also possible for them to function not only as a target group but also as a means of dissemination towards the general public (GP). It is highly likely that some members of the general public never came into contact with disseminated
Soviet cultural diplomacy, or that some of those who did reacted indifferently or even with hostility towards the Soviet messages. The sub-group of interest is therefore those members of the general public whose deep-frames became influenced by the Soviet issue-defining and message frames and in return acted in support of the Soviet messages. We name the members of the sub-group fellow-travelers. The overall goal of the attempted influence through dissemination of cultural diplomacy was to especially influence the fellow-travelers, in the hope that they would be perceived as members of GP, so they in turn could attempt to influence political decision makers. For example, Fredens Tilhængere through the collection of signatures on the Stockholm peace appeal in 1951 clearly intended to organize a campaign that would create the impression of a strong public opinion against nuclear weapons and thus influence politicians. Similarly, The Danish Communist Party, DKP envisioned the creation of strong popular movement against the NATO double track decision of 1979 to affect political decision makers.

A reading of Soviet archival materials gives the impression of a strong institutional focus on the number of participants as the most important measure of success, for example in the over fulfillment of the Intourist plan for incoming tourism 1961-1962.

Another example of how the aim of the dissemination was to influence the public at large is individual propaganda, here exemplified by delegations travels. A model for this form of dissemination consists of two steps (figure 1.2). The first step includes the selection of participants and the actual travel. The second considers the dissemination of the experience upon returning home. As we shall discuss in chapter 8, individuals were selected on the basis of an assumption that they would have something positive to state about their experiences and impressions upon returning home. Therefore, delegations included not only known communists and fellow-travelers, as it would also be difficult for them to reach a non-communist audience. Their opinions were disseminated in two forms; written and oral. The written dissemination could take the form of articles, feature articles, books, travelogues, op-eds, interviews, and so on, whereas oral dissemination most often took the form of public lectures. Again, both written and oral dissemination was targeted at two different audiences. One was the communist and, to a certain extent, fellow-traveling circles, the second – that should have been considered the primary – was the wider public. The latter public dissemination was more important because it did not solely

126 КВ/ИИ/30/Инструкции к подписчикам апреля 1951.
128 РГАНИ/5/55/55/1-12/Председатель Правления Интуриста В. Бойченко в Отдел пропаганды и агитации по союзным республикам 10.12.1962.
Figure 1.2: Model of dissemination through participants in delegation travels

preach to the choir. In the case of written dissemination the communist and fellow-travelling press consisted of newspapers and journals published by the communist party, the friendship society, or front organizations, whereas the non-communist circles constituted the remaining press. Considering book publishing it should be noted that communist and fellow-travellers were not solely published at communist publishing houses, nor that other participants solely published travel accounts outside the communist press. The audiences of dissemination follow the same dividing line. The communist and fellow-travelling circle included local branches of the communist party, various front organizations and the friendship society. As a rule of thumb, non-DKP meetings were open to the general public. However, most lectures attended by the general public took place in the numerous non-political public lecture associations that constitute a defining feature of Danish society. These organizations included open lecture societies, evening schools, and various professional organizations among others. Lectures given in these organizations were occasionally referenced in various local newspapers.
In conclusion, as Ieva Zeka shows, the USSR employed a very strict utilization of culture and mass media activities in connection with uneven cultural exchange programs as instruments playing a central role in the self-promotion of the USSR vis-a-vis foreign countries with the purpose of changing the image of the USSR among foreign publics.  

TRADITIONALISM AND REVISIONISM

Soviet studies primarily fall within two schools, traditionalism and revisionism, originating in the USA. Since this pattern is repeated within Cold War, communism, and peace movement studies we shall discuss them and position this dissertation within the field.

Originally, the fault line dividing the schools related to the question of studying and understanding Stalinism. The American field of Soviet studies grew out of World War II with several military programs and general institution building. First generation scholars used the term totalitarian as a synonym for dictatorship when defining Soviet society. Totalitarianism was originally a term coined in Italy in the 1920s as a synonym for anti-liberal dictatorship and then proudly adopted by Mussolini as a description for the regime he wanted to establish. In a scholarly sense the term came into prominence through the works of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski who in 1956 inspired by the Frankfurt School (especially Hannah Arendt’s *The Origin of Totalitarianism*) and influenced by the ideological tightening of late Stalinist USSR conceived the model of totalitarianism to describe the dictatorships of Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini as permanent and unchangeable by nature. They argued that it was possible to identify six features common to all totalitarian societies:

- An elaborate ideology with a number of doctrines covering all aspects of existence that the members of the society are supposed to adhere to. The ideology usually projects an end goal of some form of ideal society and rejects the existing.
- A single mass party led by one person (a dictator) and consisting of a relative small number of members of the society (up to 10 percent) of which the hardcore are completely dedicated to the cause.

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132 Engerman, 206-209; Ю.И. Игринский: "Снова о тоталитаризме", *Отечественная история* 1993:1, 3-17.
• A system of physical and psychological terror run by the party and the secret police and directed primarily against certain classes of the society.
• Complete control over all forms of mass communication.
• Complete monopoly over the use of force.
• Central control and direction of the economy through bureaucratic coordination.133

A second school began to emerge when a new generation of scholars, who had had partly access to Soviet archives during study trips to the USSR, entered the field in the late 1960s. This school, called revisionism, challenged the model of totalitarianism over the question of whether the Soviet society was static and emphasized social history and mobility and reforms from below instead of from above. The critics of the model of totalitarianism can be divided into two groupings. The first considers the model to be anti-socialist and/or anti-marxist and created with the purpose of discrediting the socialist countries wherefore it should be dismissed as an unscientific and politically undesirable product of the Cold War. The second group considers the model to be too vague and imprecise to take all factors of Soviet society into consideration, especially in regard to the study of post-Stalin developments.134

The break-up of the USSR saw unprecedented short-time liberal access to the former Soviet archives, and they have yielded the impression that although Soviet society did not run smoothly according to planning and utopia did not come about, a clear ideologically defined end goal had been established and there was a continuous striving towards accomplishing this goal by totalitarian means. Totalitarian societies claimed to equate a scientific ideology with the interest of the citizens and demanded the popular support of the same citizens whether they sympathized with the regime or not. Dogmatism and doctrinaire fanaticism dictated the policy more than realist approaches, even when the ideology was tweaked for tactical purposes. These societies still suffered from structural flaws such as placing the virtue of loyalty above that of competences, which lead to corruption, arrogance, and an inaccurate knowledge of the governed society, however this did not, in turn, result in the ideology and the intention being relented.135 The Soviet totalitarian regime used its part in the victory over fascism as a means to give anti-fascism such a negative ring and communism such a certificate of democracy that any analysis of the nature of communist regimes became next

135 Pauley, 1-10, 256-268.
to impossible and made studies of the similarities academically awkward or undesirable.\textsuperscript{136} However, the argument is not, that the two ideologies are identical, but that there are so many striking similarities that the terms "left" or "right" lacks any meaning as a theoretical approach to distinguish between them.\textsuperscript{137}

The strongest critique of revisionism was voiced in the 1990s by Russian historians with access to the formerly closed Soviet archives.\textsuperscript{138} Irina Pavlova bluntly states that revisionists set the research back several decades. By taking the words of NKVD documents literally and not understanding the meaning behind the various terms, they wrongly dismissed the leading role of the CPSU in all aspects of Soviet life due to a basic lack of understanding of Soviet reality.\textsuperscript{139}

The second feature of critique of the totalitarian model regards the question of its inability to incorporate the changes that took place in Soviet society after the death of Stalin.\textsuperscript{140} For example, reforms were implemented that changed the relationship between state and society after Stalin’s death during “the thaw”.\textsuperscript{141}

But again we have to consider the question of ideologically based intention. The post-Stalinist leaders could not keep control over society whilst allowing freedom of speech, for example.\textsuperscript{142} A reading of the archives\textsuperscript{143} of Central Committee departments involved in cultural diplomacy both during and after Stalin gives the impression of a strong continuity in the intention of the regime to stay in total control, based on an ideological understanding of the activities, likewise, a continuation of the attempted total control over society can also be identified.\textsuperscript{144}

In conclusion, we acknowledge that although developments unforeseen in the model of totalitarianism did take place, the USSR continued to be a dictatorship based on a certain Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout its existence, with the clear intention of the CPSU of keeping total control over society. This intention of control and conformity should not be ignored in the study of the history of the USSR, including its foreign policy.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Francois Furet and Ernst Nolte: \textit{Fascism and Communism} (Lincoln, 2001).
\item \textsuperscript{137} Bent Jensen: "Totalitарismetoeorier", \textit{Historisk Tidsskrift} 1982:2, 322-328.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Т.И. Хорхордина: “Архивы и тоталитаризм (Опыт сравнительно-исторического анализа), Отечественная история 1994:6, 145-159.
\item \textsuperscript{139} И.В. Павлова: “Современные западные историки о сталинской России 30-х годов (Критика "ревизионистского" подхода)”: Отечественная история 1998:5, 113-118.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Jensen (1981), 20.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Milanie Ilic: “Introduction”, in Ilic/Smith, 3-5.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Robert Gellately: \textit{Stalin’s Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War} (Oxford, 2013), 387-388; Игрицкий,16.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Located in RGANI fond 5.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Ег. РГАНН/89/6/22/1/КГБ СССР ЦК КПСС 7.25.1962.
\end{itemize}
Schools of Cold War studies. Similarly, Cold War studies have traditionally been divided between traditionalists and revisionists.\textsuperscript{145} The traditionalistic school considers the USSR to be a totalitarian state based on an all-embracing ideology, Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet desire for expansion and the forcing of its regime upon Eastern Europe are considered to be the main reasons for the Cold War, whereas the USA is considered to have played a much more passive role as a defender of democracy against communism. The Cold War is described as a struggle over values.

Revisionism is to a large degree a mirror image of traditionalism. US economic interests and need for expansion to find new markets is considered to be the main reason for the outbreak of the Cold War, whereas the USSR merely reacted to the American expansionism and arms race. Soviet leaders were not controlled by ideology, but were careful and flexible with limited security interests. The Cold War could have been avoided if the American side had been more accommodating.

Post-revisionism is a much more vague school, often connected with the name of John Lewis Gaddis and especially differs from the above by its use of archival sources. The Cold War is considered a more interactive affair and although points are made about a gradual Soviet expansion (lacking a master plan, but not an ideologically motivated discourse) into Eastern Europe due to security interests, this school does not shy away from pointing out the forceful manner of the expansion. On the other hand, the USA is not considered to have played only a passive, defensive role, but US economic interests are considered to have been utilized for an active containment policy. At the same time post-revisionists call for the inclusion of consideration of other states’ interests and an expansion of the map to include other scenes than the European in the analysis more actively and point to the difference between the USA as an “empire by invitation” in Western Europe compared to the USSR as an “empire by imposition” in Eastern Europe.

When the Cold War ended, numerous archives, especially Eastern ones, opened more for researchers.\textsuperscript{146} The new findings led to developments especially in the research on the origins of the Cold War, where a clear emphasis could now be placed on the active role of the USSR and the influence of ideology on the decision-making process, thus confirming many of the original traditionalistic positions.\textsuperscript{147} The new archival documentation indicates that the USSR made all of

\textsuperscript{145} The following is based on \textit{DIIS I}, 20-27; Geir Lundestad: “How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War”, in Westad, 64-65.


\textsuperscript{147} Lundestad, 66-69.
the first moves and that the West was too complacent at least until 1947 or 1948 when the die was already cast.\footnote{Gellately, 9.} A second important point to be learned from the archives was that interests in material terms – what people possessed or wanted to possess – was not as important as ideas – what people believed or wanted to believe.\footnote{Marc Frey: “Gender, Tropes, and Images”, in Gienow-Hecht/Schumacher, 215-230.} This latter point is especially important when studying the Cultural Cold War with its intent on winning over public opinion of certain ideas and points of view.

**Avoiding triumphalism.** After the end of the Cold War, a new political discourse on the Cold War declared American liberalism, capitalism, and presidents like Ronald Reagan winners of the conflict, thereby creating a narrative to support the so-called New World Order. In recent years this approach has been challenged as a school of triumphalism.\footnote{Ellen Schrecker: “Introduction: Cold War Triumphalism and the Real Cold War”, in Ellen Schrecker (ed.): *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism* (New York, 2004), 1-24.}

Within the field of cultural diplomacy the triumphalist approach has been promoted by Yale Richmond who argues that the USSR collapsed due to an active American use of the US-USSR exchange programs.\footnote{Yale Richmond: “Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: How the West Won”, *American Communist History* 20(8): 1, 61-75.}

Naturally, one should be especially careful not to fall back on a triumphalist approach when studying the “losing” side\footnote{When we understand the Cold War as an ideological borne systemic conflict the losing party is the system that vanishes and thereby erases the grounds for the existence of the systemic conflict.} since this approach does not in any way add to our understanding of the reasons why events turned out the way they did. However, it is not “triumphalism” to state that the USSR lost the systemic conflict, if for no other reason than because the USSR ceased to exist.\footnote{Jensen (2014) I, 31.}

**Avoiding neo-triumphalism.** At the same time it is possible to identify a new trend, especially within Danish, Cold War studies. We shall name it neo-triumphalism. At the very end of a recent article on the Danish US oriented journal *Perspektiv*, Regin Schmidt, without any knowledge of Russian and never having utilized Soviet archival sources, argued that because the Soviet system
collapsed while the US survived and continued to be a super power the study of Eastern attempts at accomplishing influence via cultural diplomacy was irrelevant.\textsuperscript{154}

However, as Odd Arne Westad has rightly pointed out, interpretations similar to Smith’s can be considered to be reductionist since they attempt to reduce Cold War history to a history of US foreign policy after World War II instead of embracing the inclusion of new research trends and archival evidence in broadening the horizons of Cold War studies.\textsuperscript{155} Following this line of thought, it should be considered just as relevant or important to study why something did not work out as intended as why it did.

**IR theory.** The prominent schools within the contemporary field of international relations theory (IR) were the realist and neo-realist paradigms closely associated with Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. They argue that policy decisions by politicians are not made under the influence of personal, philosophic, moral, or ideological motives, but are influenced by a comprehension of the current political needs and the ability to translate this understanding into political action as they best serve the interests of the given state, and that states pursue their national interests in terms of power.\textsuperscript{156}

**The role of ideology.** IR theory on the Cold War has been heavily criticized on two accounts – a systemic and an ideological.

In a systemic perspective IR is criticized – along with American Soviet studies in general – for not having foreseen the breakdown of the USSR because IR theory was formed during a bipolar world order with the purpose of explaining it without incorporating the possibility of change.\textsuperscript{157} However, this is a judgment made with the benefit of hindsight. Nobody else foresaw the breakdown of the USSR and thus the end of the systemic conflict.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{154} Regin Schmidt: “”Situationen er og bliver absurd”: Perspektiv, “det tredje standpunkt” og forsøget på at rejse en socialdemokratisk debat om velfærdsstaten under den kolde krig”, in Niels Gunder Hansen and Rasmus Mariager (ed.): *Der truer os i tiden: Velfærds- og koldkrigstænkning i 1950’ernes danske kulturdebatt* (Odense, 2013), 114.
\textsuperscript{158} Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski: “Culture, International Relations Theory, and Cold War History”, in Westad, 149.
The second point of critique, the lack of emphasis on the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, is very important.

Disregarding ideology, IR theory defines the Cold War as a conflict between two superpowers that were enemies by position, as heads of competing blocs competing solely for power and spheres of influence while locked in a traditional strategic rivalry; by this definition ideology is seen as completely separated from state (or national) interests whereas power maximization becomes the primary theme in the zero-sum approach by the involved superpowers.159

In this dissertation, we argue that Marxist-Leninist ideology was deterministic, rejected political rights as charades of the bourgeoisie, and contained an element of messianism. It was built upon the centrality of class conflict and transformations of societies. Ideology was a key part of the framework of Soviet foreign policy, despite any policy shifts. As political actors, Soviet leaders proactively used their ideology for building and maintaining institutions, defining situations planning action. Ideology was not a smokescreen. Marxist-Leninism was the deep frame about discussion and for making decisions about foreign policy. Soviet leaders were prepared to help history along by supporting the working class in capitalist countries as well as national independence movements in the third world, and generally worked on persuasion campaigns targeting foreign audiences by advancing a utopian vision.160 As David Brandenberger argues, the USSR should be considered a propaganda state where ideology, propaganda, and mass indoctrination through transmissions belts such as mass media and culture were key elements in the state’s means of communication with the surrounding world.161 Stalin is an excellent example of the role played by ideology. During his wartime dealings with the allies of the USSR he did not formulate Marxist-Leninist sounding demands but instead framed them in terms of guarding his country’s security interests. However, his ideological perceptions informed everything from military strategy to personal values. In a 1936 internal party form he formulated his job description

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as professional revolutionary and party organizer. Stalin and his contemporaries, including foreign minister Molotov, viewed foreign policy through a prism of revolutionary Bolshevik ideology combined with the geopolitical inheritance from czarist Russia, and this revolutionary-imperial paradigm was formulated as a mixture of geopolitical ambitions and ideological promises. Stalin’s influence continued after his death. The system he built was sufficiently strong to survive the half-hearted attempts at destalinization of his successors, since they knew no other method of governing. It was not until Gorbachev came into power that they were willing to dismantle Stalin’s structural legacy. A typical example of ideology being the controlling factor is found in the minutes of the June 1963 CPSU CC plenum. Foreign policy was framed through the prism of a struggle between the peaceful and progressive forces of socialism versus the reactionary and aggressive forces of imperialism, with socialism safely on the winning side due to the deterministic discourse embedded in the ideology. A MID policy brief divided the world into “democratic” (socialist) countries and capitalistic countries operating in aggressive blocks. Denmark was placed in the latter block due to its NATO membership. A MID note about Denmark preparing for the state visit of premier and foreign minister H.C Hansen contains wild overestimates of popular support for the peace movement and the opposition to NATO membership. It is strangely out of tune with the sober tone of the rest of the document and seems to be a concession to the dictates of ideology. Simply put, Marxist-Leninist theory predicts a relatively simplistic story of a sequence of social formations following a specific line of development, from primitive communalism to an end point of voluntary association by free individuals (communism). The intermediate period is a series of upheavals brought forward by class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. The fifth stage is a transitory society, socialism, between capitalism and communism. Socialism as a society would then be superior to the capitalistic society, both because of its socially optimal use of resources based on collective ownership and central planning and because it would come after the capitalistic stage. This master narrative played the deciding role in determining the discourses formulated by generations of Soviet leaders brought up and educated within the belief system of

162 Gellately, 9.
164 Gaddis., 293.
165 РФАИ/2/1/658/3-об-6-об/Пленум ЦК КПСС Июнь 1963 Стенографический отчет.
Marxism-Leninism. It gave the system historical legitimacy and justified the privileged position of the communist elite. The identity of the members of the elite was anchored in this narrative and it filled them with a historical mission and calling. The master narrative of Soviet socialism created a historical project and over a long historical period provided a powerful mental mechanism for constructing a systemic identity for socialism.\textsuperscript{168}

Thus, we have a very strong argument that ideology did play a central role in Soviet policy planning during the Cold War, as Soviet leaders followed a strictly deterministic discourse. The definition of Marxism-Leninism may have been changed by CPSU leaders over time,\textsuperscript{169} but they continued to consider themselves Marxist-Leninist, and the ideology was utilized as a means of communication, a way of legitimizing CPSU rule, the expression of the worldviews of Soviet leaderships, and the rationalization for policies.\textsuperscript{170}

Without going too far in the direction of the school of traditionalism and the theory of a completely static society for the entire period, we wish to emphasize the fact that for its entire existence the Soviet Union was a one-party dictatorship and police state where the party leaders may have been able to tweak definitions according to their needs but where they did not cease to see the Cold War and foreign policy in accordance with a master narrative of a deterministic development of history. Furthermore, the archives do not indicate any changes over time in the way the cultural diplomacy apparatus functioned or the kinds of the activities that were conducted in foreign countries.

**Fellow-travelers.** Neither American nor Soviet cultural diplomacy was primarily aimed at preaching to the choir. In the case of the USSR with regards to Denmark this means that it was not primarily aimed at the members of DKP but rather at those who Soviet terminology called “progressive and liberal persons” and the Americans called “the non-communist left”. In the Danish context this included members of the social-democratic party, the social-liberal intelligentsia, and various left leaning personalities and cultural workers. These possible sympathizers who were not members of DKP, but somehow involved in the circles of DKP related organizations were called “fellow-travelers”.

The term fellow-travelers or poputchiki was originally coined by Aleksandr Herzen to describe what he believed would be a close relationship between the USA and Russia in the future. In 1923

\textsuperscript{168} György Peteri: “Introduction: The Oblique Coordinate Systems of Modern Identity”, in, György Peteri (ed.): Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Pittsburg, 2010), 5-6.
Leon Trotsky redefined the term as a label for the hesitant or doubtful supporters of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky originally applied the term to Russian cultural workers and intellectuals, but from the 1930s onwards it was (in a Soviet context) used as a common political notion of Western intellectuals who supported the socialist experiments in the USSR. The communists were more than happy to welcome them as showpieces for showcasing the existence of independent and unprejudiced support for the Soviet experiment. They could be utilized for writing politicized journalism and lending their prestige to legitimatizing front organizations or supporting other Soviet foreign policy initiatives. 171

In a Danish context, two schools exist in the debate over the role of intellectual fellow travelers’ support of the Soviet Union.

In his book on fascination with Stalinism, the historian Bent Jensen asks why so many intellectuals became fascinated or supportive fellow-travelers of communism. He dismisses both of the classic arguments: That they either were attracted to it due to the economic crisis of the time and the Soviet resolute struggle against fascism, or that it was impossible to know the reality of the horrible conditions in the totalitarian USSR. Instead, he advocates the psychological explanation of “double thinking”. They accepted Marxism-Leninism as a special form of science based on the principle of dialectics that enabled them to deny all accusations against the Soviet regime and based their arguments on the utopian promises of the future society. Stalinism fulfilled a need for a substitute religion and resulted in voluntary self-deception in support of a system that seemed to promise the ability to overcome all conflicts and offered intellectuals an important role. Additional psychological explanations include a fascination with power, and a faith in the eventual victory of reason (in the form of the Marxist-Leninist science) combined with a belief in the illusion of the possibility to establish such a society. 172

In direct opposition to Bent Jensen, the historian Morten Thing dismisses that entire argument. He does not refute that left-wing, communist or fellow-travelling intellectuals actually praised Stalinist USSR in uncritical tones, but he considers reducing the overall evaluation of them to only cover this aspect too one-sided. Thing argues that in reality the intellectuals were not fascinated by the mass deportations of kulaks and communists (he does not mention the millions of other innocent victims of the communist regime throughout the history of the USSR), but that they were fascinated by freedoms, planning, and human happiness and therefore believed the USSR to be a utopia, and that they themselves were the bearers of humanism and modernity in the inter-war years. Thing declares

171 Caute (1988), 1-60.
172 Jensen (2002), 188-212.
Bent Jensen a non-marxist historian and thereby seems to infer that Bent Jensen is unfit to study the subject.\textsuperscript{173}

The final part of Things argument is deeply problematic. Following the line of argument that only socialist historians should study the history of socialism would mean that only fascist historians should study Nazi-Germany or other brown totalitarian dictatorships. The latter argument is just as unthinkable as the former should be. Secondly, it is deeply problematic that Thing dismisses the fellow-travelers’ praise of a fairy-tale version of the USSR, because it was this version they decided to convene to a broader public audience despite the actual conditions they had experienced first-hand in the USSR.

**Travelling to the Soviet Union.** During the Cold War the CPSU placed great emphasis on the possibility to influence travelers with a positive impression of the USSR and the Soviet form of society.\textsuperscript{174}

The traditionalist model for the study of this phenomenon was developed by Paul Hollander. Hollander considers the travelers as political pilgrims that the USSR sought to utilize for propaganda purposes through a set of so-called “techniques of hospitality” consisting of six elements that are identifiable in all communist regimes:

1. Thoroughly organized and well-planned tours with choices of possible excursions presented in advance as to give the traveler a fake impression of influence on the contents of the travel.
2. Fully packed program that causes physical and psychological exhaustion and hinders critical reflection.
3. Model institutions for showcasing to foreigners.
4. Attempts to bribe the travelers through VIP treatments of comfortable means of transportation, luxury hotels, and fashionable restaurants.
5. Travelers offered non-material privileges such as meetings with high-ranking politicians.
6. Participants selected on the assumption of them being of a positive mind and reporting positively upon returning home.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{173} Thing (1993), 57-60.
\textsuperscript{175} Hollander, 347-399.
This approach has recently been challenged. Revisionism-like critics recognize that the travels took place in a political context by participants of ideological motivated circles, but argue that they should not be considered political pilgrims, but rather travelers who attributed to the journey a special meaning as a practice that gave the landscape a special symbolic importance and filled them with utopian ideas, ideologies, and practices to which they attached a special authenticity and potential.\footnote{Karen Stellar Bjerregaard: “Cuba og Vietnam som symbolske og konkrete utopier: Danske solidaritetsrejser i 1960’erne og 1970’erne”, Arbejderhistorie 2011:1/Arbejderhistoria 2011(137):1, 29-37.}

There are several difficulties with both approaches to analyzing traveling to communist dictatorships. Firstly, it is unlikely that all travelers should be considered political pilgrims, at least if we differentiate between delegation participants on the one hand and, on the other, tourists who may have just have wanted to go on a cheap summer holiday, or high school and university students who might not have had influence over the destination. Secondly, it is reductionist, to consider the frame of traveling, as the revisionist approach does, as merely a study of more or less naïve travellers and as such dismiss the way the Soviet authorities were closely monitoring, guiding, and reporting on all travel groups that came to the USSR\footnote{РГАНИ/5/28/271/122-125/Справка О предполагаемом приезде иностранных делегаций в Москве, по приглашению советских организаций в июне, июле месяцах с.г. [1954].} down to detailed reports on the doings and comments of each individual group.\footnote{РГАНИ/5/28/371/152-155/Интурист ЦК КПСС 10.24.1955.} We have to place emphasis on the importance of the Soviet intention to utilize each and every traveler to the USSR as a possible propagandist upon his or her return to their own country.

**The debate on possible Soviet involvement in the peace movements.** Within the field of peace movement studies there is a strong disagreement between various schools as to whether or not the USSR can be said to have played a role in the revival of the peace movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s or if these movements should be considered social movements.

A typical representative of the latter point of view is Steve Breyman who argues that social movements were the most important force for progressive social change and that the peace movements in the 1980s were essential in dismantling the threats of the arms race.\footnote{Steve Breyman: Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy (New York, 2001).} Breyman was an active participant in the West German movement. According to the bibliography in his book he does not speak Russian, nor does he make use of former Soviet archival materials, but he still denies that the World Peace Council had any leading role in the development. He considers this
discourse a “fever fantasy” of the then president Ronald Reagan and he blames the arms race solely on the American side. In Denmark a similar analysis has been presented by Søren Hein Rasmussen.\textsuperscript{180} Although he acknowledges that some peace movements could be considered to have been influenced by the Soviets, he still places the main emphasis on an understanding of the movements as popular mobilizations on a grass roots level against the official state position on foreign policy questions. That means that, overall, the role of Soviet influence and the activity level of the DKP is dismissed as a primary engine of the Cold War peace movements. Hein Rasmussen claims that the communists should be acknowledged as very active worker bees, but that they were unable to promote any of their political agendas through the various peace movements. We see several examples of historians who were embedded in the movements in their youth and made it the subject of their professional studies, and while for linguistic reasons they are unable to include any Soviet sources and instead base their research solely on the written materials of said movements, they nevertheless still feel confident to dismiss influence by communists or Soviet organizations, as we have also seen, this pattern is not an exclusive feature of peace movement studies.

Søren Hein Rasmussen in particular has been challenged by the former DKP member Jørgen Grimstrup, who calls him a poor historian and points out Rasmussen’s membership of DKU, DKP, and the communist peace movement SAK, and criticizes the fact that he on the one hand acknowledges the numerous communist representations, but on the other does not acknowledge their communist character. For his part, Grimstrup remembers the selective anti-militarism of the DKP that did not include national resistance movements in the third world nor the Soviet deployment of SS-20 rockets. He remembers how DKP mobilized both communists and non-communists in a one-sided campaign against the NATO reaction to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, the double track decision.\textsuperscript{181}

A similar denial of possible Soviet influence to that of Hein Rasmussen can also be found in works written by participants in the third generation non-communist Danish peace movement Nej til Atomvåben (‘No to nuclear arms’). A leading participant Judith Winter describes the movements as a popular reaction from below to the general political development of the time, concentrated in a protest against the double track decision even in cases of evident Soviet front organizations such as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Søren Hein Rasmussen: \textit{Sære Alliancer: Politiske bevægelser i efterkrigstidens Danmark} (Odense, 1997), 7, 247-287.
\item Grimstrup, 139-181.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A similar absence of possible Soviet influence or involvement can be identified both in general studies[^1] and in studies of the British peace movements[^2] – and even in cases where monographs[^3] do include a chapter on the Marxist peace movement the perception remains domestic and the USSR disappears out of the picture.

The hardest debate over the possible involvement in or control over the peace movement seems to have taken place among German scholars. On one side, the Russian speaking historian Gerhard Wettig has argued based on studies of Soviet source materials that the Soviet activating of the more or less inactive peace movements, especially in Western Europe, should be considered part of a well-thought-out and formulated strategy. His analysis shows that the intention was to utilize the mass mobilization through various networks, such as national communist parties and front organizations of public opinion, to counter government decisions in reaction to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles – thereby leaving the USSR with the military advantage gained by initiating a new arms race. Based on Soviet sources he traces this plan back to the 1969 international meeting of communist parties in Moscow. Upon being hatched, it lay dormant until the time was deemed right to implement it.[^4] Wettig’s position has been challenged by the historians Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann who dismissed this allegedly outdated understanding of the peace movements as remote controlled by the USSR, and instead presented the movements as a popular mobilization of social activism.[^5] Again, critics who are unable to include Soviet archival sources dismiss concrete sources and base their arguments solely on contemporary writings by German peace activists and secondary non-Russian literature, while overemphasizing the role of the non-communist Christians and other parts of the movements.

As such the latter position must be found lacking due to its disregard for the well-documented fact that the USSR was very active in initiating parts of the late Cold War peace movements, and that this was possible due to a shift in the public sentiment towards the US in a post-Vietnam War environment. Unlike the situation in the 1950s, this made larger portions of the public attentive to the Soviet position and willing to engage in a campaign against the Western reaction to the Soviet initiated new arms race.\textsuperscript{188}

Memoirs of leading Western participants such as Bernard Lown\textsuperscript{189} illustrate the aspects people were prepared to overlook in their active campaigning against the NATO defense initiatives. Lown apparently believes that it was mere chance that he just happened to run into the personal physician of the Soviet general secretary after it had become publicly known that he was searching for a Soviet representative to cooperate with. More than anything, such memoirs showcase the naïveté and anti-American position and feelings of some participants.

It would be more fruitful to follow in the footsteps of the American scholar of peace movement studies Lawrence Wittner. He approaches the question of the peace movements and Soviet involvement by acknowledging that the peace movements were multifaceted and to a lesser or greater extent populated by persons feeling a genuine sense of fear (defined as uncertainty of the future and what it could bring in pain and losses to themselves and their loved ones\textsuperscript{190}) faced with possibility of a renewed nuclear arms race. These participants were to be found both in the communist and the non-communist parts of the movements.\textsuperscript{191}

That the USSR attempted to utilize part of the movement to further its own aims, by having communists place themselves in central positions of various national movements, means that this part of the movement should be included in a study of a greater Soviet network of front organizations.


\textsuperscript{189} Bernard Lown: Prescription for Survival: A Doctor’s Journey to End Nuclear Madness (San Francisco, 2008).


Regarding this connection it should be taken into consideration that as early as the third Cominform congress in 1949 the emerging CPSU chief ideologist Mihail Suslov had placed special emphasis on the newly founded World Peace Council and stated that the national communist parties should play a leading role in the peace struggle by attracting all kinds of movements (peace, female, youth, cooperative, sports, culture, religious, other associations, trade unions, scientists, writers, journalists, parliamentarians, and other public figures), into a singular movement.\(^{192}\) Another important fact is that at the very beginning of the campaigns against the NATO double track decision the Secretariat of the CPSU CC ordered its various news agencies, international front organizations, and the communist parties abroad to activate their contacts in Western Europe and create an international public movement against the deployment of new NATO missiles.\(^{193}\) The Secretariat also issued an order to various Soviet public organizations to coordinate their efforts among themselves and those of the Socialist countries, for the struggle for peace prior to the sessions of the Second World Parliament.\(^{194}\) In December 1980 the Secretariat ordered a meeting in Moscow for peace movements of the Socialist countries to decide WPC activities in 1981.\(^{195}\) Furthermore, at a 1983 Politburo meeting it was decided to actively utilize the upcoming WPC congress in Prague in the campaign against the deployment of NATO missiles.\(^{196}\) The former British NATO ambassador Clive Rose has convincingly argued that the Soviet leadership mistakenly analyzed the decision by President Jimmy Carter in April 1978 to suspend the construction of a neutron bomb to be a result of giving in to public pressure, when in fact the decision was made due to internal disagreement within NATO.\(^{197}\) However, the USSR considered it the result of a communist led campaign, concluded that it was possible to influence Western political leaders through public opinion, and building on this mistaken conclusion over-estimated the influence of public opinion when activating the campaign against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.\(^{198}\)

\(^{193}\) РГАНИ/89/31/46/1-2/О дополнительных мероприятиях по активизации выступлений общественно сти против решения НАТО о производстве и размещении новых американских ракет в Западной Европе 4.15.1980.
\(^{194}\) РГАНИ/89/46/65/1/Постановление Секретариата ЦК Коммунистической Партии Советского Союза от 237/101 О мерах по активизации выступлений миролюбной общественности в свете итогов Всемирного парламента народов за мир 11.18.1980.
\(^{195}\) РГАНИ/89/46/71/1-4/Постановление Секретариата ЦК Коммунистической Партии Советского Союза от 240/70 О проведении в г. Москве консультативного совещания представителей движений за мир социалистических стран 12.8.1980 [с приложением].
\(^{196}\) РГАНИ/89/42/53/1-14/Заседание Политбюро ЦК КПСС 5.31.1983.
\(^{197}\) Rose, 13-15.
The Soviet documents are not necessarily “smoking guns”, but they are very strong and telling evidence of the clear intent of the CPSU to control the international peace movement, and as such prove that this Soviet intention of control should not be dismissed from any discussion of the roles and functions of 20th century peace movements.

**Soviet understanding of “struggle for peace”**. The struggle for peace was a dominant theme in Soviet foreign propaganda. Departing from Lenin’s theory on imperialism, overall communist ideology, Soviet foreign policy history, and various statements by Soviet leaders, the communist movement formulated a theory that only socialism and communism could bring about world peace. Capitalist states were considered expansive by nature in their thirst for new markets, whereas socialist societies were peaceful by nature because they had rooted out the reason for war; private ownership, and thereby created the only possible road to world peace. Hence, capitalist and socialist states became each other’s mirror images of socialist “peace” and capitalistic “war-mongering”. Despite the theory’s hostility towards capitalist society, so-called progressive forces of all political observations were to be considered possible allies in the struggle for peace – as long as it took place under communist leadership. The Norwegian historian Lars Rowe calls it “the communist peace mythology”.  

The peace mythology also formed the basis of the “two-camp theory” formulated by Andrei Zhdanov at the 1947 founding meeting of Cominform. According to Zhdanov, two opposite camps existed in the postwar world. On one side, the imperialistic camp under the leadership of the USA sought to strengthen imperialism, prepare for a new war, struggle against socialism and democracy, and support anti-democratic or pro-fascist governments. To carry out these tasks the imperialistic camp was willing to utilize any reactionary or anti-democratic force in any country, even former enemies, in the struggle against a former ally. On the other side were the anti-imperialistic and anti-fascist forces under the leadership of the USSR and the new governments in Eastern Europe founded on workers’ and democratic movements, the communist parties, independent movements in the third world, and progressive and democratic forces anywhere. The aim of this camp was to struggle against the threat of new wars or imperialistic expansion. The end of World War II had tasked all peace-loving humans with securing a lasting democratic peace that would secure the victory over fascism. The basis for success was the USSR and its foreign policy line, because the Soviet socialist state was fundamentally estranged to aggressive or exploitative motives and only

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199 Rowe, 299-300.
worked to ensure the best possible conditions for building the communist society. One of these conditions was external peace. As the bearer of a new, more highly developed social system the USSR in its foreign policy mirrored a wish of the entire developed human race for a lasting peace, as the USSR did not have any interest in a new war, because wars were products of capitalism. The USSR was the defender of the freedom and independence of all people, and the enemy of nationalism, racism, and suppression.  

The same year, in a private conversation, Zhdanov explained the official Soviet view of the reasons for a future ideological confrontation between the blocks:

“The situation is quite serious and complicated. The plans of the imperialists to defeat us on the battlefield have failed. From now on, they will be engaged in an increasingly determined ideological offensive against us. We must keep our powder dry. And it is completely out of place for us to indulge in hypocritical complacency: ‘we won, so now we can do anything. Things are difficult, and most difficulties lie ahead. Serious difficulties. Our people showed self-sacrifice and heroism that defies description. Now they want to live well. Millions of them tasted life abroad, in many countries. They saw not only the bad but some things that made them wonder. And much of what they saw they interpreted incorrectly, one-sidedly. Anyhow, people want to reap the fruit of their victory, live well – have good apartments like the ones they saw in the West, eat well, dress well. And we are duty-bound to give them all that /…/ These moods are all the more dangerous when they are accompanied by kowtowing before the West. ‘Ah, the West!’ ah, democracy!’ There is literature for you!’ look at those polling stations!’ What a disgrace, how demeaning to our national dignity! There’s just one thing these gentlemen sighing for the ‘Western way of life’ cannot explain: Why was it we who defeated Hitler, and not those others with their pretty ballot boxes in the streets?’”

At the third and final Cominform congress Mihail Suslov had picked up the mantle of the peace struggle in his report on the defense of peace and the struggle against war mongers. He claimed that the fault line in international politics between the two camps had become clearer, that NATO was preparing a new war, and that the anti-imperialistic Soviet-led camp was carrying on an ongoing struggle against imperialistic reaction, for peace among the peoples, and democracy.  

A second objective of the Stalinist peace struggle was to create a link between a popular movement for peace and popular support for American withdrawal from Europe, thereby leaving the USSR in control of Germany. Since the days of Lenin, a socialist Germany had been considered the necessary cornerstone for a socialist Europe. The founding of NATO thwarted the continued expectation by Soviet leaders throughout the Cold War that the USA would at some point withdraw from Europe as had been the case following the end of World War I, and that since socialism was

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200 Procacci, 224-227.  
202 Procacci, 676-707.
historically determined to be superior to capitalism, half a century of peace in Europe was expected to provide the necessary time for the correlation of forces to come out in favor of socialism as the USSR expected to attract popular support in smaller and medium sized European countries.\footnote{Gerhard Wettig: \textit{Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conflict} (Lanham, 2008), 2, 53-54, 72,197-199.}

At the 20\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress in 1956 Stalin’s successor Khrushchev not only gave his famous “secret speech”, but he also presented the new foreign policy doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The doctrine had two important points. On the one hand, Stalin’s thesis of a coming inevitable war with the West was denied, but on the other, it held on to the idea of a world divided between capitalism and socialism with a continued rivalry expected to change from direct to indirect.\footnote{Robert English: "Old Thinking and New: Khrushchev and Gorbachev", in Abbott Gleason (ed.): \textit{A Companion to Russian History} (Malden, 2009), 434.}

That peaceful coexistence should not be understood as a campaign for world peace, but merely as the new Soviet leadership’s attempt to avoid a direct confrontation between the two camps until the correlation of forces would be in favor of the USSR, was made clear at the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Party Congress in 1961 when Nikita Khrushchev explained the Soviet understanding of peaceful coexistence. According to Khrushchev, two systems existed in international politics. One was the socialist system of social progress and peace; the other was the reactionary capitalist system of oppression and war. The socialist camp would eventually show itself to be superior to the capitalist, and the USSR was prepared to defend – also by military means – any gains made by socialism.\footnote{RGANII/1/4/89/31-36/Отчетный доклад ЦК КПСС 10.17.1961.}

Whereas peaceful coexistence outside of the USSR seems to have been understood as an agreement on moderation, the Soviet leaders understood it as a continued rivalry, ideological mistrust, and a continued attempt to weaken the opponent through a combination of political, economic, cultural, and ideologically motivated activities that would make it possible for the USSR to keep, improve, and strengthen the security of the territorial gains of World War II, drive wedges among alliances aimed at the USSR, keep the leading position of USSR in the communist world, continue the proletarian internationalist support of national independence movements (if it was in the interest of the USSR), and minimize any risk of being attacked on several fronts at once.\footnote{Schultz/Godson, 10.}

A similar line of thought was presented by GKKS chairman Sergei Romanovskii concerning the cultural exchange program. In his book on the subject he repeatedly highlights that peaceful coexistence does not mean peaceful coexistence between the ideologies. He states culture plays an important role in the continued confrontation because it gives foreigners the opportunity to
experience Marxist-Leninist ideology, the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist, the successes of the Soviet and fellow socialist countries in building socialism and communism, the socialist countries’ results within the fields of science and technology, and the high quality of Soviet cultural life. Referencing CPSU resolutions, he states that in the cultural relations with the capitalist countries neither the ongoing ideological battle nor the sharpening of the confrontation should be forgotten. A compromise between the ideologies – despite all talks of peaceful coexistence – could never be found. 207

At the 24th CPSU congress in 1971 Brezhnev presented a new peace program. It had two general set of aims:

- Pragmatically impossible aims of disarmament in Western Europe.
- Pragmatically achievable aims of a security conference that would secure the Soviet gains in World War II and open for possible mutual disarmament and arms-control negotiations.

In the periodization of the Cold War, the Brezhnev years almost correspond with those of détente. Soviet foreign policy had stalled and the USSR was no closer to achieving its revolutionary goals, but by promoting itself as the defender of détente it would have a positive influence on changes in the correlation of forces favorable to the USSR in the long run. 208

Mikhail Gorbachev also presented his own initiative on the peace front. It has been argued that Gorbachev can be seen as a reformer who attempted to seek a way out of the East-West confrontation and make concessions to secure the stability of the relationship by the casting out of ideological positions that hemmed this development. 209

However, it would be too far to claim that Gorbachev’s project was one of removing ideology and zero-sum thinking.

It should be remembered that Gorbachev did not come into power intending to dismantle the USSR. He genuinely believed that the USSR would become the world’s most dynamic society and economy and thereby eventually overtake capitalist societies if the USSR was just given a breathing space in international politics whereby it would be able to reorganize itself and eventually reach the deterministic endpoint of history, the communist society. 210 Alongside the overtones of peace, the Soviet propaganda continued to demean USA as an imperialistic power that sought to rule the world and wished for a nuclear war while the Soviet Union was presented as leading the progressive

207 Романовский, 10-11, 168, 181.
forces in the struggle for world peace – in May 1985 Gorbachev personally stated: “American imperialism is at the forward edge of the war menace for mankind” due to “the aggressive strivings of the elite of that country” that wanted to “[step] up the arms race” and held: “dangerous plans for the militarization of space”, whereas the USSR stood for “a world without wars, for a world without weapons”.\(^{211}\) At the time the USSR was engaged in its own Vietnam War in Afghanistan.

As one contemporary commentator noted, Soviet leaders continued to talk of the class nature of international relations, the eventual victory of socialism over capitalism in the economic, political, and ideological competition, and as such Gorbachev’s plan should be seen as no more than an update of the classic peace offensive without alteration of Soviet long-term strategic aims.\(^{212}\)

In conclusion, peace policies from Stalin’s peace campaigns to Gorbachev’s promotion of the common European home in connection with the campaign against the NATO double track decision should, as several historians have argued, be seen in the light of the Soviet attempt to drive a wedge between the European and North American NATO allies. There was continuity from one Soviet leadership to the next, including dissatisfaction with the international status quo. Any discontinuity was in the cadres, not in the foreign policy goals, even when strategies seemed to change. The keyword for the Soviet leadership was “eventually”. There was a continued strong belief in the dogma that eventually history would follow its deterministic route.\(^{213}\)

Finally, we have to take in the non-equality of the various Soviet peace and disarmament proposals. At the end of the Russian civil war the Red Army had 5 million men at arms. It was not economically possible to sustain such a large army during peacetime and the army was reduced to 800,000 men. Lenin had the idea that if the Soviets were to reduce their number of soldiers then so should everybody else. In November 1922 representatives of the neighboring countries were invited to a conference in Moscow and met with a proposal to lower their armed forces with 75 pct. This would leave the USSR with more than one million men under arms, but countries like Poland and Finland with only 2-3 divisions, and Estonia or Latvia practically without an army.\(^{214}\)

Throughout its existence the USSR continually tried to weaken the opposition and strengthen the country’s own military position through campaigns for peace and/or disarmament. For example, Yury Andropov’s proposal to establish a 600 km nuclear weapons free zone on each side of the point of contact

\(^{211}\) Ebon, 3.

\(^{212}\) Rose, xvi, 4-8.

\(^{213}\) Pleshakov, 233; Marie-Pierre Rey: ”'Europe is our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept, Cold War History 2003(3):3, 33-65, Rose 7, Wettig (2008), 53

\(^{214}\) Гранин, 57-59.
between the military blocs in Central Europe would have made the Soviets move their missiles back a few hundred kilometers, but effectively empty the European mainland of NATO missiles.\footnote{McNeill: 3-4.}

During The Cold War the Soviet and Warszawa pact conventional forces continued to outweigh NATO forces,\footnote{Jensen (2014) I, 171-173.} despite all talks of peace and disarmament.

**Three generations of peace movements.** It is possible to identify three generations of peace movements in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century both internationally\footnote{For the similarities see Wittner (1993, 1997, 2003).} and in Denmark. The first generation was the liberal peace movements. They were pacifist by nature. The first Danish pacifist peace movement was Dansk Fredsforening (‘Danish Peace Society’) founded in 1882. This was later followed by Kvindernes Internationale Liga for Fred og Frihed (the Danish affiliation of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) founded in 1916 and Aldrig mere Krig (‘No More War’) founded in 1926 as the Danish affiliation of War Resisters’ International.\footnote{Sune Pedersen: *Kampen for fred: Den liberale fredsbefægelse i Danmark 1919-1960* (MA thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2000), 1-73.}

The second generation was the Stalinist peace movement. It was born out of the Zhdanov two camp theory presented at the founding meeting of Cominform.\footnote{Jensen (2014) I, 344.} The second generation had a very different understanding of the term peace struggle. Instead of pacifism, understood as the evolution towards a just world peace, they promoted an image of the USSR and the socialist form of state as the powerful moral protector of suppressed peoples and the global defender of the Peace. For example, in 1951 the Chinese peace movement bought 2000 war planes and 200 tanks. Critics of the USSR were frozen out of the movement. Pravda repeatedly reminded its readers that the primary task of the peace struggle was to strengthen the power of the USSR as the fortress of peace for the entire world.\footnote{Timothy Johnston: “Peace or Pacifism? The Soviet ‘Struggle for Peace in All the World’, 1948-54”, *Slavonic & East European Review* 2008(86):2, 260-264, 270, 273.}

Some contemporary commentators considered the peace movement a Soviet means to attempt to split the Western powers and that the slogans of class struggle of the interwar years were exchanged for the peace struggle as part of the Soviet psychological warfare.\footnote{Greenlaw, 99-100, 105-106, 114; Possony, 353-357.}

Therefore, it is possible to speak of a special kind of Soviet peace ideology or philosophy aimed at securing international relations that furthered the building of communism in the USSR, and protected its national interests. However at the same time the Soviet leaders argued that they were obliged to support armed revolutionary struggled against non-socialist governments. This meant
that the Soviet leadership followed the argument that the USSR needed peace, but that the anti-imperialistic forces needed the support of the USSR, and ergo the anti-imperialistic forces were also struggling for peace. By this definition, defensive and liberation wars were just and therefore progressive while the wars of the imperialists were aggressive.\textsuperscript{222}

In the late 1970s the third generation of peace movements came into existence, when movements were activated in connection with the struggle against the double track decision. These movements disappeared simultaneously with the demise of the USSR and DKP.\textsuperscript{223}

\textbf{Nylon or Iron Curtain.} Yet another example of a problematic approach proposed by non-Russian speaking scholars is the multilevel-multipolar interaction paradigm which is especially advocated for by several Finnish historians. They argue that relations between East and West were not solely based on confrontation of ceaseless mutual distrust, but also on collaboration, since as the ideological dividing line did not penetrate the whole of society it was possible for lower-level actors to engage in mutual beneficial cooperation. Applying this paradigm should lead to new modes of explanation and re-evaluation of the boundaries and a conclusion that the interactions rather weakened than strengthened the internal structures of the two blocs. These scholars argue that the Iron Curtain was not an insurmountable mental boundary, that the role of small states and organizations on a national and transnational level so far have been overlooked, and that the argument of the realist school – that non-state or sub-state actors in reality are practically irrelevant – should be dismissed, because even when the state systems controlled cultural exchanges the participating orchestras, theater groups, sport clubs, research institutions and individuals interacted despite the Cold War divide.\textsuperscript{224}

This argument is very similar to that of György Peteri’s so-called Nylon Curtain theory. Peteri argues that historians should not fall so heavily in line with Churchill’s Fulton speech on the existence of an Iron Curtain, but instead place emphasis on the existence of a Nylon Curtain due to the many economic, cultural and political penetrations of the boundary carried out by both eastern

\textsuperscript{223} Jensen (2014) I, 615-686.
On the third generation see also \textit{PK VI}, 282-299; \textit{DIPS III}, 321-337, 360-361.
and western cultural actors who supposedly acted on a level of equal strength and therefore with a distinctive element of free competition for the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{225}

However, proponents of both the paradigm and the theory fail to take into consideration not only the intentions, demands, and expectations of the state leaders but also the difference between living in a western liberal-democratic state and an eastern dictatorship.

**Traditional and comparative studies of communism.** The final central debate between traditional and revisionist schools concerns the question of the relationships between CPSU and the national communist parties.

The traditional school sees the communist movement as monolithic, totalitarian, and directed from Moscow without internal conflicts of interests or other noteworthy disagreements, and the national communists’ loyalty to their homeland is doubtful. This tradition harkens back to the days of the Comintern when all national communist parties were member sections of the communist international. As argued in the next chapter, Comintern was only dissolved on paper in 1943 and the organization’s framework continued to exist. The national communist parties constantly received a stream of instructions via the Soviet embassies.\textsuperscript{226}

The critics belonging to the neo-revisionist, so-called comparative school argue for the existence of a so-called double frame of the national communist parties as acting not only in relation to a politically dominating USSR, but also individually according to the national, cultural, political, and personal differences across Europe, with strong emphasis on national differences rather than on attempts at transnational unity.\textsuperscript{227} It has been argued that communists were equipped with a special set of double patriotism that included loyalty both to their home country and to the world.


\textsuperscript{226} Jensen (2014) I, 179-182; Rose 243; Wettig (2008), 5-67, 137-149.

This is also the view of the annual reviews of the world communist movement published in *Yearbook on International Communist affairs and Problems of Communism*.\textsuperscript{227}

communist movement, and since they themselves did not see a problem in this, it should be considered unproblematic.  

However, as the Danish architect and multi-artist Poul Henningsen once pointed out, at the end of the day a communist would have to choose between feelings of nationality and political outlook, and a communist would eventually choose the latter. 

The main difference between the two schools is whether they emphasize the primacy of the intentions of the center or the possible comparability of the periphery. Two questions should be answered when analyzing the validity of these approaches. Firstly, we need to consider the question of the view of the world communist movement in Moscow. Secondly, we have to question whether there were more similarities or dissimilarities in the organization of the communist parties with affiliates in various countries. 

Again, our point of departure for answering these questions is the founding meeting of Cominform where Andrei Zhdanov clearly stated the continued Soviet insistence on a closely knitted world communist movement. Even if the movement developed within national frames, the national parties had the same assignments and interests and there was the same need for consultations and voluntarily coordination (as it was called in Soviet wording). Alternatives were considered wrongful, damaging, and unnatural. Afterwards, Zhdanov could report home to Stalin (code named “Filippov”) that the participating communist parties had fallen into line with the Soviet demands for a new political course. Furthermore, when inviting foreign communist parties to send delegations to CPSU congresses, the International Department evaluated them on their support of the general line stipulated from Moscow; Khrushchev expected foreign communist parties to recognize the leading role of CPSU on the basis of ideological affinity and at CPSU CC plenums the unity of the world communist movement was a recurring theme. Great emphasis was placed on the question of unity based on central ideological principals outlined from Moscow, and various parties such as the Chinese were condemned if they did not adhere to this general line.

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230 Procacci, 248-249. 
232 РГАНИ/1/2/11/Б. Пономарев ЦК КПСС 11.15.1955. 
234 E.g. РГАНИ/2/1/696/118/Пленум ЦК КПСС Декабрь 1963 года Стенографический отчет; 2/1/743/103-об-121/Пленум ЦК КПСС Февраль 1964 года Стенографический отчет; 2/3/100/4-16/Пленум ЦК КПСС Апрель 1968 года Стенографический отчет.
DKP was one of the most loyal national parties. In a 1950 speech at a CC meeting the party ideologist Ib Nørlund stated that it was the strong bond with the USSR that would eventually bring the party to victory in Denmark.\(^{235}\) An important Italian study of the PCI clearly shows that communists did have a form of double identity, but contrary to the revisionists’ argument it stemmed from a belief that the USSR was their true home country and that their task in their country of residence, therefore, was to represent and promote Soviet interests.\(^{236}\) CPSU closely monitored the communist parties’ positions to see if they kept in line with the signals from Moscow.\(^{237}\) The similarities between Danish and Italian communists’ perceptions and agendas are striking. Therefore, we must conclude that there are several central aspects that the comparative school does not take into consideration. Those are the continued existence of Comintern (under another name), the intention of the CPSU to preserve a power monopoly over a coherent international movement, the dependency on financing from Moscow, the newly available Soviet sources (as most supporters do not speak Russian), and the unwillingness to call things by their right name. Instead of acknowledging the widespread schooling of foreign communist in Moscow\(^{238}\) and considering its implications for the center-periphery relationship it is vaguely referred to as “a form of international cooperation.”\(^{239}\) Furthermore, it is highly problematic when historians uncritically take over communnistic terms such as double patriotism, simply because the communists themselves saw it as unproblematic.

Even when we acknowledge the differences in membership figures, activity levels, and possibilities of operating, there are more similarities than differences between the communist parties within various countries with regards to the pattern of operations of the communist parties, front organizations, book shops, and programs from Radio Moscow. This pattern of similarities needs to be taken into account.

\(^{235}\) ABA/DKP/74/ Ib Nørlund speech DKP CC meeting 6.3-5.1950.  
\(^{236}\) Agarossi/Zaslavsky, 302-303.  
\(^{237}\) РГАНИ/2/3/261/19об/Коммунистические, национально-демократические и левы социалистические партии о международной политике КПСС Спорник документов и материалов для участников Пленума ЦК КПСС Ноябрь 1971 года.  
\(^{239}\) Saarela/Rentala, 10.
In this chapter we have discussed a number of key theories and schools on various themes central to this dissertation. On the basis of these debates we will seek to establish a coherent theoretical framework for the empirical studies in the following chapters.

The empirical analysis will focus on both the organization, the framing of the messages, and the reception. The level of organization is important in order to identify the various participants in and senders of the Soviet messages. When analyzing the activities themselves it is important to consider both the context of the messages and the strategy used to present them to the public, and finally whether the senders wanted to disclose their identity or not. Finally, when analyzing the reception of the messages/activities we have to take into consideration the evaluation on a Soviet level, on an internal Danish participation level, and – to the degree to which it is possible to identify this – the reception in wider public circles.

Although we recognize that Soviet society was not completely static and that everything did not necessarily worked out as planned we still base our empirical study on a mostly traditional approach that emphasizes the importance of the ideology, and the importance of the intention of the center and the similarities of the periphery compared to the differences.
Chapter 2: Structures

“We must create a whole solar system of organizations and smaller committees around the Communist Party, small organizations, so to speak, actually working under the influence of the party but not under its mechanical control”
Otto Kuusinen

Several historians have highlighted the importance of including considerations of the significance of the key role played by the Soviet apparatus in studies of USSR cultural diplomacy. As Jennifer Anderson states:

“What is clear is that Canadian historians have for too long overlooked the importance of VOKS in negotiating both high and grass-roots cultural exchanges, and as actors in international relations”.

Ludmilla Stern support this point:

“Attempts to explain Western intellectuals’ attraction to the Soviet Union are incomplete as long as they exclude the Soviet Union’s contribution to these relations. The commonly accepted view, that this attraction was spontaneous and that the support of intellectuals was inspired from within, overlooks the fact that, to a large extent, these relations were instigated and manipulated by the USSR. It has been recognised that the Soviet Union had a vested interest in attracting and influencing its foreign friends; however, it has not been adequately understood how the Soviets manufactured this support”.

In this chapter we discuss four elements: Apparatus, financing, cultural agreements, and the decision-making process. Regarding the apparatus, this chapter places focus on the Soviet level of the apparatus. The international as well as the national, Danish levels will primarily be discussed in the following chapters.

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241241 Anderson, 179.
242 Stern, 35.
STRUCTURES

**Culture and causes.** The Soviets aimed at presenting themselves, in self-comparison with their American rivals, as the saviors and keepers of European high culture (*Kultur*) through the presentation of music, paintings, history and performing arts such as internationally staged productions of orchestral concerts and ballets.\(^{243}\) Additionally the USSR also sought to promote a number of causes such as peace or the interests of workers, youth, women, professional, and other groups. Both culture and causes were seen as part of the same structure for promoting Soviet interests abroad and therefore were directed by the same administrative system.

**Mono-organizational socialism.** In the analysis of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus we utilize the theory of mono-organizational socialism developed by T.H. Rigby,\(^{244}\) who bases his theory explicitly on the ideological nature of the world view of the Soviet rulers. All groups in power have an ideal they seek to implement. For the Bolsheviks the ideal was to create the communist society foretold by Karl Marx and in the process they were willing to violate their ideal in the interest of its fulfillment. The violations were seen as unfortunate but temporarily necessary to ensure the full and genuine realization of the ideal. They developed a hierarchical administration for the whole country and intended to secure party supervision of all spheres of social activities, from retail sales and internal security to farming and the arts. Soviet society became a command society defined, as a relationship with one active and one passive side in the decision-making process. One actor alone formulated and transmitted goals, assignments, tasks, and prescribed methods. Although various changes in the hierarchy of the structure of the administrative system took place after Stalin's death, the USSR was run by a combination of official hierarchies with a monopoly in a given field of activity and bound together and integrated by the hierarchy of the Communist Party apparatus. This bound them into a single centralized organizational structure and coordinated their activities as if the entire country was run by a single giant firm. The USSR became an enterprise both in the way society was developed and how it operated. All spheres of social activity were not only managed but directed by formal hierarchical organizations set up by the political authorities, with the purpose of integrating all organizations under the leadership of the Communist Party so it could determine their goals, structures and management and thereby protect

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\(^{243}\) Gienow-Hecht (2010), 402-404.

\(^{244}\) The following is based on T.H. Rigby: *The Changing Soviet System: Mono-Organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev’s Restructuring* (Aldershot 1990).
the end goal of building the communist society from any possible competition. This was clearly stated in the preamble to the 1977 constitution, were it said that the supreme goal of the Soviet state was to build a classless communist society, and in article 6 it was stated that the Communist Party was the leading and directing force in Soviet society and the nucleus of among other all state and public organizations.²⁴⁵

Soviet society should be perceived as being run by an ideologically driven political party that played the pivotal role and directed the operation of various sub-trees;²⁴⁶ these could be anything from regional administration to an international network of front organizations pursuing goals that benefitted Soviet foreign policy aims.

**Three level sub-tree.** When we develop a model for the apparatus for Soviet cultural diplomacy we should divide it into three levels.

1: The Soviet level: The CPSU, ministries, state committees, public organizations, and state enterprises.

2: The international level: International front organizations.

3: The national level: DKP, the friendship society, Danish affiliations of international front organizations, and travel agencies.

Due to the large numbers of organizations involved it is necessary to strike a balance between giving an accurate picture of the sub-tree and emphasizing the elements related to our Danish case study. Although fronts without threads to Denmark did receive attention in the Danish press,²⁴⁷ we shall limit our analysis to fronts with Danish affiliations or otherwise Danish involvement, even in cases where the attempt to create a national Danish affiliation was not met with success, that we can identify from the available archival materials. Table 2.A lists an overview of the International front organizations, the Soviet public organizations assigned to them, and Danish organizations affiliated with them.

²⁴⁷ E.g. Socialdemokraten 1.2.1958.
Figure 2.1.: The Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{248} Developed from Frederichsen (2010a).
Due to last minute last minute technical issues this figure appears in a hand drawn version only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International front</th>
<th>Soviet matrix</th>
<th>Danish national affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WPC</td>
<td>Soviet Peace Committee</td>
<td>Fredens Tilhøngere  Dansk Fredskonference  Dansk Fredskomite  Samarbejdskomiteen for fred og sikkerhed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFDY</td>
<td>Committee of Youth Organizations in the USSR</td>
<td>[Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd]*  Den danske DUV Komite  DKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Soviet Committee of War Veterans</td>
<td>Sammenslutningen af Erhvervshæmmede fra Modstandskampen i Danmark Udvalget for tidligere fanger og modstandsfolk FIR-Danmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Movement against German Rearmament</td>
<td>Soviet Peace Committee</td>
<td>Modstandsbevægelsens Initiativkomité mod Tysk Genoptrusting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUS</td>
<td>USSR Student’s Council</td>
<td>[Danske Studerendes Fællesråd]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMEA</td>
<td>Committee of Youth Organizations in the USSR</td>
<td>DKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIDF</td>
<td>Women’s Antifascist Committee</td>
<td>Danmarks Demokratiske Kvindeforbund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFTU</td>
<td>All-Union Central Council of Trade Union</td>
<td>Communist dominated unions LLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOJ</td>
<td>USSR Union of Journalists</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIRT</td>
<td>[Not identifiable]</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFSW</td>
<td>[Not identifiable]</td>
<td>[Foreningen til bevarelse af videnskabeligt arbejde]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFDL</td>
<td>Affiliation af Soviet Lawyers VOKS/SSOD</td>
<td>Demokratiske juristers danske afdeling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPNW</td>
<td>Committee of Soviet Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War</td>
<td>Danske læger mod Kernevåben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament</td>
<td>All-Union Central Council of Trade Union</td>
<td>Fagbevægelsen for fred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generals for Peace and Disarmament</td>
<td>Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament</td>
<td>Generaler for fred og nedrustning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers for Peace</td>
<td>Soviet Union of Teachers</td>
<td>Lærere for fred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates that a Danish organization either disaffiliated itself or that it did not fully act as a national affiliation.

For an explanation of the abbreviations, see appendix 1.

The various Danish organizations are discussed in Chapters 3 and 7.
Three generations of Soviet apparatus. Although the outlook and tasks of the Soviet apparatus for foreign propaganda did not change, it is possible to identify three apparatus generations separated by structural changes.

The first generation consisted of structures and organizations either in existence at the outbreak of the Cold War (such as VOKS) or founded during the time of Stalin.

The second was the result of a post-Stalin attempt at sweeping changes. In the time leading up to the 20th party congress, several reports criticized the lack of impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy abroad, argued it was too non-centralized and uncoordinated and recommended either a complete reorganization of the existing apparatus or the creation of new organizations. However, the overhaul only resulted in the renaming and restructuring of some organizations and the founding of numerous bilateral Soviet friendship societies. Therefore the changes should be seen more as belonging to the destalinization process than an actual attempt at structural revision.

During perestroika several reorganizations also reached parts of the foreign apparatus. They could be seen as an attempt by Gorbachev to move power from the party apparatus to his new power base that eventually became The Presidential Council with Soviet president, Gorbachev, as chairman. Traditional departments of the party apparatus were structurally placed under the control of sub-committees of the council, although this apparently did not diminish either the assignments or the influence of the party apparatus departments.

CPSU CC’ apparatus. The single most important entity in the Soviet Union was the Communist Party (CPSU). The country was ruled by various small groups within Politburo/Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

The day-to-day affairs were run by the central administrative organ, the secretariat. It consisted of approximately 22 departments (the number varied throughout the years) directed by 10-12 secretaries, some in charge of several departments. In 1970 the secretariat had approximately 3300 employees, 900 were party functionaries (called “responsible employees”), the rest worked as office

251 The relationship between party and government structures will be discussed further below in this chapter.
or technical personal. Several of the departments came into contact with the organization of cultural diplomacy abroad, but here we will focus on the two directly intended for this work.

**The Department for International Information.** The Department was in charge of the Soviet news and press agencies, both controlling their dissemination and filtering back the information gathered by the agencies abroad - especially from the various news agencies. The first Russian news agency was the state-owned Russian Telegraph Agency founded in 1870. Due to an international cartel agreement it was completely dependent on the Prussian Bernard Wolff’s Continental Telegraph. In 1904, as an attempt to escape the dependence on the German agency, the new Saint Petersburg Telegraph Agency was established (later to be renamed Petrograd Telegraph Agency). As part of the coup d’état the Bolsheviks took over the news agency and kept it as a window to the world, formally answering to Sovnarkom. At the same time The Press Bureau of the all-Russian executive committee of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ soviets was founded. In 1918 Lenin merged them into the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA). In 1925 ROSTA was renamed TASS (The Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union). TASS sent a large number of journalists abroad, and following the end of the Cold War it has been discussed whether (and to what degree) they operated under the auspices of the KGB. The first two TASS correspondents reached Denmark from Sweden on May 5th 1945, immediately following the German capitulation, and reported home in long secret reports (rather than news articles) on the political situation in Denmark. One of them, Mikhail Kosov, obstinately denied having any KGB contacts for many years. Only shortly prior to his death did he admit his KGB status. The KGB defector Ilya Dzhirkvelov gives a very detailed description of the KGB’s leading role and strong influence on Soviet journalism, both in the Union of Journalists and TASS, including on his own tenure as TASS correspondent (as a cover identity) abroad. However, this role is hardly surprising considering that one of the daily tasks of TASS was to compile digests of the most important international news items for distribution among the upper echelon of the Soviet

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254 DIIS I, 69-370.
255 Kruglak, 2-8.
256 Jensen (1999), 127-133.
257 Mikhail Kosov: ”Mit liv med TASS”, *Udenrigs* 1993:2, 57-65.
258 Weekendavisen 2.13.2015.
259 Dzhirkvelov, 263-353.
leadership. The “operative information” was gathered from Western telegram agencies and translated into Russian.

Following, the Nazi-German attack on USSR the Soviets opened a second news agency, Sovinformburo, led by the TASS chairman, by a resolution of June 24th 1941 “On the strengthening of the leadership the overall work of explaining to international developments, the country’s inner life and military development by founding a Soviet information bureau.” It was tasked with three assignments:

1: To take control of the information on domestic and foreign developments.
2: To organize countermeasures against hostile foreign propaganda.
3: To publish information on the developments at the war fronts.

Sovinformburo consisted of several departments: The military department (reporting on the war effort), the department on international affairs (political articles), the department of counterpropaganda, the department of literature (fiction), and various other departments. Following the end of World War II, seven main editorial offices with the responsibility for specific geographical areas were introduced. In February 1961 it was renamed APN, which could be seen as one of the final features of the post-Stalin reform. Officially the founding of APN was the result of a congress initiated by various public organizations.

According to its constitution, APN should function as the information agency of Soviet public organizations and disseminate information in the form of articles, commentaries, interviews, discussions, photo journalism and other forms of information materials on the life, economy, culture, and society of the Soviet peoples, Soviet foreign and domestic politics, and national and international developments – preferably in cooperation with foreign publishers and news media.

On the management level APN was run by a board. The board oversaw the running of the main secretariat, which in turn ran a number of departments, groups, boards, and the main editorial offices. They can be divided into three groups.

The first group, consisting of departments and boards, were in charge of the material aid and secretarial functions of the day to day operation of APN.

The second group, consisting of the main editorial office of operative information, the main editorial office of centralization of information, the main editorial office on information programs,

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260 Ebon, 175-176.
262 АПН, 5-19; Roth (1979), 204-208.
263 Ebon, 205.
Figure 2.2: APN
the group of political commentators (the internationally well-known Spartak Beglov belonged to this group), the main editorial office for political publications, the main editorial office for teleinformation, the main editorial office for photo information, the main editorial office for information programs (including exhibitions), the publishing arm, and the main editorial office for translations, provided the materials to be distributed by the third group. The main editorial office on the methods and effectiveness of propaganda moreover studied and measured APN activities and campaigns abroad and issued recommendations as to how they could be improved.

The third group consisted of eight main editorial boards each in charge of dissemination of APN products to specific geographical areas. Denmark belonged to the area covered by the main editorial board for Western Europe. As part of its program, points of correspondents (offices) operated abroad. Additionally, in 1976 the publication of periodicals abroad was withdrawn from the main editorial boards and turned over to seven united editorial offices under the auspices of the main editorial office for periodical publication.264

By a CC decree of February 12th 1957, a Sovinformburo office was opened in Denmark,265 staffed by a director, two employees and a radio operator.266 The task of the office was to strengthen the publication of the Danish language Soviet publication *Fakta om Sojvetunionen (FOS)* and begin the publication of a daily news bulletin aimed at Danish newspapers to better the image of USSR in the Danish press.267 Upon arriving in Denmark the first director L. Malov stated at a press conference that he had come to find out what news items (news, culture, politics, sports) Danish newspapers would be interested in. As his office was in direct contact with the main office in Moscow he would be able to fairly quickly obtain materials for the Danish press.268 The office had several Danish employees with the primary assignment of translating Soviet texts received in Russian (using the Latin alphabet) via teleprinter from Moscow for the various Danish language publications.269

APN had a special publishing branch, Progress, for the publication of books and pamphlets – primarily abroad.270 This publishing house had a department for Scandinavian literature.271 In 1982 Raduga was established for publishing children’s literature.272 During the 1980s Progress employed

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264 АПН, 28-165.
266 RA/Danica/105/Заместитель министра культуры СССР Н. Данилов ЦК КПСС undated.
267 RA/Danica/105/ Зам. Зав. Отделом пропаганды и агитации ЦК КПСС по союзном республикам А. Романов, зав. сектором Отдела пропаганды и агитации ЦК КПСС по союзном республикам ЦК КПСС 1.31.1957.
268 Hejmdal 2.7.1958.
269 E. Nielsen, 165.
270 АПН, 105-112.
271 Politiken 10.24.1978
two Danish translators and Raduga one. At Progress they were part of the Northern European section. Based on overall production plans and negotiations with the Danish recipient publishing houses, Tiden and Sputnik, who received the books free of charge the translators were tasked with translating specific books such as the speeches of Yury Andropov or the history of Comintern. Other titles, for example written by members of the front organization Generals for Peace also saw publication. Each book was proofread first for linguistic errors, and then the proofs were read three times. Many errors had to be corrected at this stage, as the Soviet typographers could not read the print, and therefore there were often several errors in each line. Due to financial concerns Progress closed its doors in 1992.273

During perestroika APN was renamed The International News Agency (IAN) without this affecting either its activities or its organization. By decree of then president of the Russia Soviet Republic Boris Yeltsin, in September 1991, IAN was renamed RIA Novosti.274 Following the collapse of the USSR merging TASS and APN under the acronym ITAR (Information and Telegram Agency of Russia) was considered. The merger never happened, but as a result TASS was renamed ITAR-TASS.275

The International Department (ID) The most important departments for international relations was the so-called “party foreign ministry“, The International Department – the direct continuation of Comintern. Comintern was founded in January 1919 as a world party. National communist parties were considered sections of Comintern and had to follow the general line issued from the Executive Committee. In 1943, officially as a goodwill gesture to the USSR’s allies in The Grand Alliance, it was decided that Comintern should be dissolved. However, the dissolution was an illusion. The Comintern apparatus moved inside the party apparatus and in the following years took on various names such as Institute 99,100, and 205, OMI, or the Commission on Foreign Policy.276 In 1953 it was reorganized as The Department for Contacts with Foreign Communist Parties with cadres and

274 АПН,166-168.
275 Ibid.,170.
Based on Kittrinos, 68-74.
In a few cases it is not possible to identify the deputy in charge of a certain sector.
assignments intact. In 1957 it permanently became The International Department. At that point the control of the ruling socialist parties in Eastern Europe and elsewhere was transferred to a separate department. Throughout the name changes, the cadre continuity from Comintern was evident. Both management and staff stayed unaltered.

Throughout its existence the ID had three different chairmen. The first was the orthodox communist Boris Ponomarev, who made sure that the general party line was followed both at home and abroad. He was replaced by the unwilling former long-time Soviet ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin, who was quickly followed by Valentin Falin.

The chairman had a number of deputies each in charge of one or more sectors overseeing either a geographical area or a cause. Each geographical sector had a number of national desks, each run by a rapporteur (referent). For many years the deputy in charge of the Scandinavian sector was Vitalii Shaposhnikov and the rapporteur Vladimir Savko. Each spoke Danish or another Scandinavian language. The department had approximately 200 employees. Unlike other party departments they were not recruited from within party ranks, but from amongst teachers at institutions of higher education, journalists, and diplomats. They had to speak at least two foreign languages and possess knowledge of the country they were to work with.

The ID was tasked with five assignments:

- Ensure the implementation of the general line of Soviet foreign policy.
- Maintain contacts with foreign communist parties.
- Maintain contacts with foreign liberal and left-wing parties, revolutionary groups, and national liberation movements.
- Maintain contacts with front organizations.
- Recommend which parties and movements should receive economic support from the so-called “Trade Union Foundation”.

The contact with foreign communist parties was maintained either through consultations in Moscow or through conversations and transfer of written instructions at the local Soviet embassies.

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279 DIIS I, 369; Terkelsen, 127; Rose, 27.
280 Dobrynin, 601, 619, 628.
281 Falin, 479
282 Kitrinos, 47-75.
283 Dobrynin, 619.
284 Чернаев, 240.
archives are full of examples of the ID receiving copies of the records conversations of the embassy staff with local communist representatives.287 After Aksel Larsen’s fall from grace, the party leadership was invited to a meeting in Moscow both to be evaluated and to strengthen their domestic position.288

Cominform as non-continuity. In the literature on this topic the role of The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) as the new Comintern has been overemphasized.289 Although we should not completely dismiss the role of Cominform in tightening Soviet control and coherence in Eastern Europe,290 the misunderstanding has more to do with the way the new bureau was presented to the world.291 It would be much more accurate to understand Cominform as a relay station for shifts in Soviet policies.

The first meeting took place in 1947, in the deepest secrecy in the Polish village of Szklarska Poreba.292 The overall theme of the congress was Andrei Zhdanov’s introduction of the two camp theory of two opposing camps in world politics,293 thereby signaling the return to an ultra-left line following the popular front strategy of World War II and the earliest post-war years. The second congress in 1948 marked the political break between the Tito and Stalin294 and signaled the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the ranks of communism and communist controlled fronts (as we shall see below). The third and final congress in 1949 signaled the initiation of the peace struggle,295 which was to become a corner stone of Soviet cultural diplomacy.

After the third congress Cominform lost any importance and the fourth meeting was continuously postponed.296 In 1956, Khrushchev finally decided to dissolve it.297 Only Cominform’s heavily subsidized journal, For Lasting Peace, For People’s Democracy,298 survived in its headquarters in

287 E.g. РГАНИ/5/28/225/3-4/Запись беседы А.С. Каплина с председателем Компартии Дании Аксель Ларсен 5.5.1954.
288 RA/Danica/105/3ав. Международным отделом ЦК КПСС Б. Пономарев в центральный комитет 6.11.1959.
293 Procacci, 224-263.
295 Procacci, 676-707.
296 Egerova., 203-205.
297 Фурсенко Т. И., 116.
298 AKA World Marxist Review.
Prague as a platform for theoretical communist debate.\textsuperscript{299} The journal finally closed in 1990 when the USSR could no longer afford the subvention.\textsuperscript{300} DKP also loyally followed the signals from CPSU, even when they came through Cominform, and the shifts in the international communist movement coming from Moscow can be seen in identical shifts in DKP’s positions.\textsuperscript{301}

Public organizations. Within the society of mono-organizational socialism the organizations of public life controlled by the party called themselves public organizations (‘obshchestvennye organizatsii’). They served a twofold purpose: To monopolize public life or interests within a sphere such as “sport”, “trade unionism” or “the struggle for peace” and to be the sole official Soviet representatives for contacts with Western organizations and to dominate the international front organizations by having members in key office positions and by controlling financing.\textsuperscript{302} The role of public organizations to actively support Soviet foreign policy aims through engagement with foreign organizations was even written into the 1977 Soviet constitution.\textsuperscript{303} The Soviet Peace Committee was one of the key organizations in Soviet Cultural diplomacy. SPC was founded at the initiation of the massive Soviet peace campaign run throughout the Cold War at an August 1949 congress in Moscow.\textsuperscript{304} SPC was divided into two departments and several committees. SPC played a leading role in an international front organization (in this case WPC) through the employment of Soviet citizens in the WPC bureau.\textsuperscript{305} CPSU placed high value on the control of SPC through WPC to such a degree that SPC chairman Yury Zhukov (formerly of GKKS) was removed as WPC vice-chairman when he proved to be unable to cooperate with non-communists.\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{300} РГАНИ/89/9/104/1-4/Выписка из протокола № 184 заседания Политбюро ЦК КПСС 4.5.1990
\textsuperscript{301} Jensen (2014) II, 184-186.
\textsuperscript{302} Clive Rose: \textit{The Soviet Propaganda Network}, 257-258; К.А. Залесский: \textit{Кто есть кто в истории СССР} (Москва, 2011), 553.
\textsuperscript{303} Г.Я. Тарле: “Международная деятельность советской общественности на современном этапе”//\textit{Вопросы истории} 1980:2, 3-16; З.М. Круглова: “Союз Советских обществ дружбы и культурной связи с зарубежными странами. Новый этап развития”//\textit{Вопросы истории} 1981:12, 34-55.
\textsuperscript{304} Egerova in Gori/Pons, 200.
\textsuperscript{305} Rose, s. 258-261.
\textsuperscript{306} Ebon, 91-98.
Figure 2.4: SPC

Based on ГАРФ/Р-9539/Предисловие, 1-7.
I have only been able to gain access to the finding aid.
Other public organizations such as the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Association of Soviet Lawyers, The Committee of Soviet War Veterans, The Committee of Soviet Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, The Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, The Soviet Women’s Committee, Retired Soviet Generals for Peace and Disarmament, The Soviet Students’ Council, and The Association of Soviet Journalists all played similar roles as Soviet controllers in international front organizations (see table 2.A.). As part of the new openness under Khrushchew, between 1956 and 1958 The Academy of Sciences entered 38 international organizations and 69 forums.

CPSU closely monitored the development within the various organizations and controlled the election to key positions. When E.P. Pukhova was elected chairman of the Women’s Committee in 1987, her appointment, salary, and benefits were pre-approved by the CPSU CC Secretariat.

After 1917, the Bolsheviks were interested in inviting foreigners to Soviet Russia to experience the new regime with their own eyes and, hopefully, present it in a positive manner upon returning home. During the 1921 Volga famine the Bolsheviks established the All-Russian Committee for Helping the Hunger Victims. Under the leadership of Olga Kameneva the committee eventually took over the contacts with foreign intellectuals. In 1925 the work was continued through VOKS. VOKS was tasked with penetrating the circles and institutions outside of the working areas of Comintern and NKID. Being Trotsky’s sister and Kamenev’s wife was not a healthy position in the 1930s. Kameneva was fired, jailed, and eventually executed (1941). However, the organization she founded continued to exist, although several successors and employees suffered similar fates during The Great Terror. In the end, VOKS was almost closed, but survived thanks to the outbreak of World War II on the eastern front that made it necessary for the USSR to invest in improving its image abroad and gain allies in its struggle for survival. VOKS was considered important enough to be one of the organizations transferred to Kubyshev.

VOKS was organized as seven bureaus. Six of them were in charge of a general area such as book exchanges, PR, promotion through photographs, exhibitions, delegation exchanges, and the city level local branches of VOKS. The seventh bureau consisted of a number of departments for

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308 Rose, 262-276.
309 Борисова, 152.
Figure 2.5: VOKS\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{312} Based on Roithaug 13-16.
contacts with certain geographical areas. Each country within a given geographical department was given its own office operated by a secretary with knowledge of the language and culture of the specific country. In its capacity of cultural exchange organization VOKS (and later SSOD) was able to establish contacts with countries without diplomatic relations with USSR. In 1957 it was decided that VOKS would be discontinued. It was argued that VOKS could no longer fulfill its task of broadly engaging foreign publics and Soviet party leaders wanted an organization that involved more public organizations. In 1958 a new decree ordered that the republic level OKS reorganized along the same lines. The Russian historian Borisova argues that VOKS was closed because it was perceived as being too closely connected to the MID and not an independent NGO, it had to be restructured to appear softer. Interestingly, neither historians nor Soviet archival sources consider the influence of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 on the increasingly difficult working environment of VOKS.

In connection with the dissolution of VOKS, CPSU CC decided to establish SSOD by organizing a conference with 700 participants in Moscow and pre-approving the list of participating organizations in the conference. Soviet leaders placed great emphasis on the role of SSOD. Both Yury Andropov and Andrei Gromyko were personal members of SSOD. The Soviet leadership chose Nina Popova chairman, a party veteran of cultural diplomacy and member of the Supreme Soviet who was simultaneously chairman of the Soviet Womens’ Committee, active in WIDF, and had a strong international name. She continued as SSOD chairman until her retirement in 1975. Popova was succeeded by Zinaida Kruglova and, later by the first female cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova. SSOD was a larger organization with more assignments than VOKS, although this was not reflected in the number of employees. SSOD initially had 235 compared to VOKS’ 228. The Scandinavian department had 7 employees; a chairman, a vice-chairman, four rapporteurs (the Danish and Icelandic desks shared one), and a typist. According to SSOD vice-chairman Mikhail Palshak,
Based on ГАРФ/Р-9576/20, Предисловие.
Unfortunately I have only had access to the finding aid.
SSOD included 134 Soviet friendship societies with 50 million members overall. The SSOD constitution stated that SSOD had been established in accordance with § 126 of the Soviet constitution to strengthen the friendship and mutual understanding between the Soviet and foreign peoples, promote Soviet culture and science, and coordinate the work of public organizations for contacts abroad. SSOD Established several departments, operated a friendship house and organized lectures, exhibitions, parties, and meetings. SSOD could also operate similar houses abroad. By the mid-1980s SSOD was in contact with 9000 organizations, including international fronts, in 141 countries and in charge of the twinning city program. Another new feature of SSOD was the direct contact between republic level SODs and organizations in foreign countries assigned according to a CPSU CC Secretariat decree. DKSU was contacted first by the Latvian SOD and a few years later by the Belarusian SOD concerning the establishment of direct contacts.

In a report concerning the establishment of SSOD it was noted that since SSOD could not count on any income, but would have a significant expenditure, the state should bear the operating costs. At the same time, the report recommended the creation of special bilateral societies in other countries. The Soviets established 72 bilateral, Soviet friendship associations. One of them was the Society USSR-Denmark which was established in 1958. The list of participants in the founding conference, coverage of their travel expenses, the members of the board, and the presidency of MGU Vice-Rector, Professor G. Vovchenko, had all been pre-approved by the CPSU CC on the recommendation of SSOD chairman Nina Popova. Although the friendship society also included individual members, the larger part of the membership was made up of collective members. They included a wide variety of Soviet research institutions, factories, editorial boards, football clubs, collective farms, collective fisheries, shops and public schools from numerous Soviet republics. Most collective members did not have a business related reason for joining. This supports the impression that we are dealing with GONGOs (Government Organized NGO’s presenting

324 Statut des Verbandes Sowjetischer Gesellschaften für Freundschaft und kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Aussland (Moscow, 1963).
325 Rose, 273-274.
327 KB/JJ/26/Latvian SOD to DKSU 1.8.1955.
328 ABA/DKSU/I/Belarussian SOD to DKSU 10.17.1962.
330 ГАРФ/P-9576/20/Listings in the finding aide.
332 ABA/DKSU/I/List of collective members of SUDK undated [1960s].
themselves as independent) where the CPSU decided both collective and prominent individuals’ membership.

Nevertheless, the Soviets tried to convince foreigners that organizations such as SSOD and SUDK were formed on the basis of spontaneous public initiative of ordinary citizens and organizations with the benevolent purpose of strengthening international peace and mutual understanding. Such claims were made to the main Danish partner, DKSU. Following the founding of SSOD Nina Popova framed her case in this manner when writing DKSU with a proposal for future cooperation, and repeated it in her speech as a guest at the 1965 DKSU congress. In their first written contact with DKSU, SUDK framed their founding in a similar way. Apparently, individuals from all parts of the USSR had decided simultaneously and spontaneously to gather for a conference in Moscow. The communists and fellow-travellers from the DKSU executive responded overwhelmingly positively to the explanation and suggestion of cooperation. Only blind loyalty towards the USSR explains such a reaction. Following its inception, SUDK took over as the main Soviet point of contact between the USSR and DKSU.

The Danish foreign ministry had a very different attitude to SUDK. The Danish ambassador in Moscow reported that the congress had been tightly controlled, everything well prepared in advance, and the coming chairman, Vovchenko, had not even been present, so he highly doubted the spontaneous nature of the founding of SUDK. After long deliberations the ambassador had been allowed to attend the founding meeting and gave a non-committing speech, but especially due to SUDK cooperation with DKSU the official Danish representation kept its distance. Following Prime Minister Krag’s speech at the SSOD house during his 1964 state visit to Moscow the embassy had to change its policy.

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335 ABA/DKSU/1/Congress minutes 1.31.1965.
336 ABA/DKSU/6/SUDK to DKSU undated [late 1958].
337 KB/JJ/27/Telegram DKSU to SUDK 1.29.1959.
338 KB/JJ/27/SUDK to DKSU 2.25.1959; SUDK to DKSU 4.2.1959; SUDK to DKSU 6.17.1959.
341 RA/UM.17.I.126/Summary 11.3.1958
342 A DKSU delegation was also present (ABA/Fridericia/1/Пригласительный билет 1958).
343 RA/UM.17.I.126/Speech manuscript undated
345 Jensen (1999), 152.
Organizing sport. During the interwar years the USSR did not participate in relations within international sports. But in 1945 the soccer club *Dinamo* toured England, and finally, in 1952, Stalin allowed Soviet athletes to participate in the summer Olympics.\(^{345}\) The All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport oversaw all sporting activities in the USSR. The committee consisted of separate departments for each sport as well as a department for international sports’ relations. A mirror organization existed in each republic.\(^{346}\) It was later renamed The Central Council of Sport Unions and Organizations and The Committee for Physical Culture and Sport. Despite the name changes, it was generally referred to as The Sports Committee.\(^{347}\) Local sports clubs were formed in each republic down to city level as work and trade-union based sport societies such as *Spartak* for producer cooperatives, *Lokomotiv* for railway workers, *Torpedo* for auto workers, and so forth. National sport leagues came into existence in the 1930s.\(^{348}\)

From the late 1940s the USSR actively sought IOC membership, but critics highlighted the state-run sports system, that did not correspond with the mantra of athlete amateurism of the time. In the end, however, IOC was won over, and the USSR was allowed to compete. Stalin gave his approval, when he had been assured, that the Soviets would win the overall medal count (an unofficial Olympic competition). The Soviet National Olympic Committee (NOC) was organized in 1951. Despite giving the impression of living up to the IOC demand of national independence of NOCs, the Soviet NOC was tightly controlled by CPSU.\(^{349}\) Simultaneously, the USSR joined numerous international sporting federations, hoping to influence them through a coordination of efforts with East European representatives. The practical work was carried out by the international department of the Sports Committee.\(^{350}\)

Ministries and State Committees. The second aspect of the Soviet state executed cultural diplomacy was the government apparatus. In the following we shall identify key institutions in the cultural diplomacy apparatus.

On March 15\(^{th}\) 1946 the government, earlier The Council of Peoples Commissariats (Sovnarkom), was renamed Council of Ministers (Sovmin). In 1990 it was renamed The Cabinet of

\(^{345}\) Прозуменщикова, 3.


\(^{347}\) Прозуменщикова, 11.

\(^{348}\) Parks, 24-25.

\(^{349}\) Ibid., 29-81.

\(^{350}\) Ibid., 45, 91-112.
Ministers of the USSR.\textsuperscript{351} Formally, Sovmin was the Soviet government. However, as we shall discuss further below, the government was answerable to the top party echelon. Sovmin was comprised of both ministries and state committees. The ministries were led by a minister who held a seat in Sovmin, whereas the state committees were led by a chairman who did not hold a seat in Sovmin.

For a fairly long period of its existence the USSR did not have a regular Ministry of cultural affairs. In 1936 a Committee on Cultural Affairs was formed. Later an actual ministry was founded by merging several ministries and state committees. The most notable of the ministers of culture throughout the years was the first ever female Soviet minister EA. Furtseva.\textsuperscript{352}

In 1954 the state security organizations were reorganized as the state committee for state security (KGB). Although the committee was formally placed as a State Committee under Sovmin it was understood that it should answer directly to the top echelon of the party. When founded, KGB had 15,956 employees and an annual budget of 346 million rubles.\textsuperscript{353}

By a CC decree of March 4\textsuperscript{th} 1957 The State Committee on Cultural Connections abroad (GKKS) was founded.\textsuperscript{354} It had 80 responsible employees and 36 technical. It existed from 1957-1967 to coordinate the annual plans for international cultural and scientific connections of various ministries, public organizations, and the Academy of Sciences into one package for CC approval\textsuperscript{355} to coordinate the work and avoid parallel or uncontrolled activities.\textsuperscript{356} Additionally, GKKS participated in the process of entering into state cultural assignments with foreign countries.\textsuperscript{357}

Perhaps the most interesting feature of GKKS is the fact that it was created as part of the post-Stalinist overhaul and that it was an untraditional attempt to move responsibility and a lower-level decision-making process from the party apparatus to the government apparatus.

For the same reason, GKKS never came to function as originally intended. The first chairman, Yu. Zhukov, emphasized this problem in a report where he complained that because GKKS had been established not as a ministry but as a state committee under Sovmin its capacity to fully control the activities of the ministries was undercut because they tried to avoid it and instead directly contacted

\textsuperscript{351} В.И. Ивкин: Государственная власть СССР: Высшие органы власти и управления и их руководители 1923-1991 гг. Историко-биографический справочник (Москва, 1999), 20-29.
\textsuperscript{354} РГАНИ/5/30/235/62-64/Жуков ЦК КПСС 5.20.1957.
\textsuperscript{355} RA/Danica/105/ Д. Шевлягин [и др.] к заседанию Секретариатов ЦК КПСС 11.29.1963.
\textsuperscript{356} РГАНИ/5/30/235/62-64/Жуков ЦК КПСС 5.20.1957.
\textsuperscript{357} Barghoorn, 31, 159.
Following its dissolution its assignments were transferred to the Ministry of Higher Education.

The State Committee for radio and television broadcasting (Gosteleradio) was founded in 1962 and was responsible for Radio Moscow among other things. Radio Moscow’s broadcasting for foreign audiences officially began on October 29th, 1929. The first Danish broadcast took place in 1943 with Georg Motlke (Laursen) as the first speaker, under the pseudonym “Peter Hansen”. The Danish desk evolved and eventually consisted of seven Soviet and three Danish citizens. The best known Danish radio speaker was Erik Carlsen. The Danish desk was part of an overall Scandinavian editorial department with the (in Denmark) well-known translator Nina Krymova in a leading role. 95% of all radio broadcasts were prerecorded and to be censored editorial groups and the Soviet censorship institution Glavlit. Technical issues such as communications infrastructure were controlled by the Ministry of Communications, investing and financing by Gosplan and the Ministry of finance, and jamming of foreign broadcasts by the border police.

The State Committee for Cinematography (Goskino), first established in March 1938 and reestablished in 1963, was responsible for all aspects of movie production from financing to ideological control and had departments at republic level. It answered to Sovmin on economic matters and CPSU CC on ideological issues. Goskino controlled film export (Sovexportfilm), co-productions (Sovinfilm), and film festivals (Sovinfest). In the final years of Gorbachev’s rule, Goskino was reorganized. All movie studios gained the opportunity to decide their own annual productions both in regards to screenplays, production plans, and financing. Goskino was to play a coordinating role in distribution at home and abroad. In reality Goskino lost its influence and in 1989 had to close Sovinfilm.

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358 РГАНИ/5/30/304/54-57/Жуков ЦК КПСС 5.29.1959.
359 RA/UM.41.Sovjet.50/Embassy to UM 12.29.67
360 Ивкин, 165-167.
363 *FOS* 1973(23):22, 6, 29.
364 Jentoft, 177.
366 Ивкин, 165-166
367 Anna Lawton: *Before the Fall: Soviet Cinema during the Gorbachev Years* (Washington DC, 2004), 57-58; Tony Shaw and Denise Youngblood: *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Lawrence, 2010), 40-59.
**State enterprises.** Sovexportfilm (founded in 1924 as Sovkino) was the production and renting company of the Soviet movie industry and from 1945 also in charge of all movie imports and exports. The 1987 “Law on state enterprises” ended Sovexportfilm’s monopoly on selling Soviet movies in the international market, but Sovexportfilm quickly adapted to the new situation thanks to its large organization and many resources. In the summer of 1989 alone, Sovexportfilm sold 500 different titles to foreign movie theaters, TV stations, and the video rental market in 110 countries and bought 150 titles (half of them from socialist countries) for Soviet movie theaters. The purchase of foreign movies from non-socialist countries had to be approved by the Ministry of Culture’s Committee on the Selection of Movies from Capitalist Countries. Usually both an ideological and economic reason for the recommendation of the purchase of a film was given. In the case of the Danish movie *Altid Ballade* it was stated that:

“The movie illustrates the strong social problems and shows the viewers the hard, unhappy life in a capitalist country for an ordinary working class family, and the constant fear of unemployment. The movie also illustrates the bourgeoisie society’s destructive influence on the youth”.

A purchase was recommended because it would help Sovexportfilm establish contacts with Danish movie rental companies and further the renting out of Soviet movies in Denmark. The movie cost 28,955 rubles (50,000 kroner) and the payment was established within Sovexportfilm’s import plan. Sovexportfilm had a representative in Denmark. Its main business partner in Denmark was Dan-Ina Film although the cooperation between the two companies did not always run smoothly. It was not until 1958 that a formal agreement was signed that gave Dan-Ina Film first choice with a 3 month right of first choice on any Soviet film intended for the Danish market. The other half of Dan-Ina, Folkefilmen, received various documentaries free of charge. In 1921 Lenin signed a decree on “Acquiring and Distributing Foreign Literature” which led to the formation of the Russian-German joint company Kniga as an import-export company operating out of Berlin with the Soviet trade representative as director and operated under the directives of The

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369 Lawton,, 86.
372 ABA/DKP/699/Note on the dissemination of Soviet films in Denmark undated.
373 ABA/DKP/699/ Protocol 12.15.1958.
374 ABA/DKP/699/16 mm narrow-gauge movies recieved from Sovexportfilm 1.1.1957-1.13.1959.
Council of Books under The National Committee on Foreign Trade. In 1922 the joint venture opened a branch in Moscow, which from 1923 known as Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. By a 1923 decree issued by the Council on Labor and Defense it was reorganized as a joint stock company owned entirely by the Soviet state.\(^{375}\) This state company became the leading soviet trade organization for selling books, newspapers, magazines, journals, various forms of prints and reproductions of art works, musical recordings, stamps, maps, atlases, movie recordings, and slides in the various languages of the USSR as well as in numerous foreign languages, and it had contacts to book shops, publishing houses, companies and galleries in more than 140 countries.\(^{376}\) At the same time Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was responsible for the import of foreign reading materials to the USSR as well as related payment transactions.\(^{377}\) Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga continually had a business representative in Denmark.\(^{378}\) No later than 1978 it opened a special Danish department that primarily worked with translations.\(^{379}\)

**Delegations and tourism.** Travelers usually entered the USSR either as part of a delegation invited and usually paid for by the Soviet side (delegations were formally invited through national organizations such as the friendship society)\(^{380}\) or as members of tourist groups (paying their own expenses, even if organized as a study group).\(^{381}\) Although examples of individual travel for businessmen do exist,\(^{382}\) traveling was usually limited to group travel.

By a decree of the Council for Labor and Defense, Intourist was founded April 12th 1929 as a state joint stock company with a founding capital of 5 million rubles and 80 % of the shares maintained by Intourist (the rest were distributed among government organizations). Intourist had a near monopoly on foreign tourist services in the USSR (the exceptions being VOKS’ guests, for example).\(^{383}\) Another reason for the near monopoly was a chronic lack of hotels and tourist facilities.\(^{384}\)

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376 KB/AJRA/1/Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to Alfred Jensen 7.7.1983.
383 Salmon, 31-37.
384 Е.И. Корнеева: "Организация иностранного туризма в СССР в 1920-1930-х годах", *Российская история* 2010:3, 134-141.
Following World War II it took several years to rebuild the tourism infrastructure, such as the construction of new hotels. Having solved this problem along with the problems of lack of interpreters, means of transportation and high travel costs, the Soviets opened for foreign tourism in higher numbers.

Intourist’s monopoly on mass tourism was finally broken in 1957 when the Central Trade Union was allowed to begin operation on a mass basis of foreign tourism as part of a plan to improve the work of Soviet trade unions and promote the results of Soviet power, and increase the influence on non-communist western trade unions. Centrotourist owned hotels, restaurants, cruise ships, trains, charter plains, and buses. Beside tourist travels they organized study trips and language studies.

The following year Sovmin approved the operation of Komsomol’s own youth travel agency, Sputnik, to improve the political, cultural, and fraternal relations with foreign youth and provide truthful information on the development of the USSR. As with other agencies, ministries, public organizations, state companies and party departments partaking in Soviet cultural diplomacy, archive material indicates an organizational structure of geographical sectors with Denmark belonging to a Scandinavian sector.

**Soviet travel abroad.** A study of Soviet travelling shows that the number of Soviet tourists traveling abroad was constantly lower than incoming tourism. The explanation concerns the difficulties of obtaining permission to travel abroad. Applicants had to pass a severe screening process. Adults had to apply to the local chapter of their trade union at their place of employment, younger employees to the Komsomol department. After the first sorting, candidates were send to the oblast party office (obkom) where a commission consisting of a representative of the obkom, the trade union, and KGB seperated them into groups and gathered information on them, including character assessments, and had them fill out questionnaires, health sheets, and a deposit for the travel to the Intourist account in the State Bank. Filling in the three page questionnaires included giving information on your personal history, your history of employment, nationality, party

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385 РГАНИ/5/30/70/110-112/Об иностранном туризме в СССР март 1954.
386 РГАНИ/5/30/70/118-119/Перечень [1954].
388 РГАНИ/2/1/274/277/О улучшении работы профессиональных союзов СССР 10.4.1957.
389 РГАНИ/2/1/284/60/Пленум ЦК КПСС декабрь 1957 года стенографический отчет.
390 АВА/DBS/1/DKSU pamphlet undated [ca. 1974].
391 Иванов, 221.
393 Иванов, 249.
membership, previous travels abroad, and appendixes had to include personal character assessments (kharakteristika) from the place of employment or the local party office. This usually summed up information about the applicant’s education, nationality, job title, party or Komsomol membership, and achievements and personal qualities. Any mistake, even a typo, meant rejection. Any successful applicant then had to be able to pay for the trip that could cost up to one sixth of an average Soviet salary.\footnote{Gorsuch, 83-84.}

**DKP.** A special role in the cultural diplomacy apparatus was allocated to the national Communist Parties, in our case The Danish Communist Party (DKP). DKP and its youth organization (DKU) was not a typical Danish political party. During its existence it loyally followed every policy change directed from Moscow and it was deeply dependent on CPSU for its political and economic survival.\footnote{Ibid., 184.}

Following World War II, DKP, like other Western communist parties, held a strong parliamentarian position thanks to its role in the resistance movements and believed influence could be achieved through the ballot box.\footnote{Jensen (1999), 264} However, when this policy proved unsuccessful and the Soviets had used the first Cominform congress to criticize the foreign communist parties for following the policy line expected of them by the Soviets, DKP was also heavily criticized.\footnote{Jensen (2014), I, 186-187.} As always, DKP fell in line with the directives from Moscow and swung back to an ultra-left line.\footnote{ABA/EK/2/The Information Bureau and the Yugoslav Party. Manusript for Ib Nørlund’s speech at activists’ meeting in the Copenhagen Districts 7.12.1948.} When the Yugoslavs were expelled DKP once again loyally followed the Soviet directives and completely denounced the Titoists.\footnote{ABA/DKP/103/Paper on the problems of the peace struggle presented at CC meeting 1.22.-23.1983.} When the third Comintern congress announced the peace struggle as the main assignment, the DKP congress promptly adopted this directive,\footnote{Hans Hertel: "Kulturens kolde krig 1946-1960", Kritik 2002:158.} and during the Cold War played a deciding role in numerous local and national peace movements\footnote{Jensen (2014) I, 186-187.} as we shall discuss in further chapters.

At the same time, DKP attempted to portray itself as the party of kulturnost. The party newspaper was generally considered by the public to be the primary paper of news on culture in the early post-war years.\footnote{Hans Hertel: "Kulturens kolde krig 1946-1960", Kritik 2002:158.} DKP operated Oplysningkontoret (Enlightenment Office) run by actors Valsø Holm
and Bjørn Ploug, who organized special evenings commemorating specific poets and writers. Other cultural activities included concerts, a folklore music school, and art exhibitions.\textsuperscript{403} An early highlight was a December 1953 international exhibition of progressive art in Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{404} Khrushchev personally approved the Soviet participation, and coverage of the expenses.\textsuperscript{405}

In the early post-war years DKP tried to organize the various groups of intellectuals who had become members since 1945 into professional groups. On April 10\textsuperscript{th} 1946 DKP held a meeting in Copenhagen to promote the image of DKP as the party of progressives and intellectuals. A 1950s overview lists groups of architects, kindergarten teachers, writers, youth recreation center pedagogues, historians, engineers, lawyers, teachers, musicians, doctors, actors, students, and economists. A representative of each group took part in a special cultural committee with the purpose of creating a coherent cultural policy for DKP. However, the groups never functioned as intended. They worked erratically, as many cultural workers were unable to uncritically follow the dogmas of the struggle with titoism, the Hungarian events of 1956, or the primacy of socialist realism.\textsuperscript{406}

**CULTURAL AGREEMENTS**

Usually cultural agreements are understood as bilateral agreements between states. However, this understanding is too narrow. Most Soviet cultural diplomacy operated through frames of signed agreements. As such it is possible to identify four different kinds of bilateral cultural agreements.

**State-level.** During the Cold War Denmark entered into cultural agreements with 13 countries. The one with the USSR was the most active.\textsuperscript{407} The first Danish-Soviet cultural agreement was agreed in 1962 and made public in 1963. It spoke of furthering the knowledge of culture, science, and university and school teaching through the exchange of scientists, teachers, researchers, specialists within the fields of industry, construction, transport, business, nuclear energy and sport, and

\textsuperscript{403} Thing (1993), 821-822.  
\textsuperscript{404} ABA/DKUS/48/Exhebition catalogue.  
\textsuperscript{405} RA/Danica/105/Копия приглашении к участию на выставке художников и графиков в Копенгагене [без дата]; Министр культуры СССР П. Пономаренко Секретарю ЦК товаришу Хрущеву Н.С. [без дата]; Секретарю ЦК КПСС тов. Хрущеву Н.С. 12.4.1953; О правлении в г. Копенгагена приозведений советской графика и плаката для экспонировании на Международной выставке изобразительного искусства 12.4.1953.  
\textsuperscript{407} Folkebladet 7.9.1973
through exchanges of educational films, audiovisual materials, radio and television programs. It also included an agreement to encourage tourism, and the unhindered relations between Danish and Soviet non-government organizations and institutions. The contents were similar to those agreements the USSR entered into with other states. On the Soviet side, it was primarily used for the training of young natural scientists, whereas the Danes primarily sent students in the field of humanities to the USSR.

Following the Soviet insistence on natural sciences and the need for secrecy, it was particularly emphasized in the overall plan for cultural and scientific exchanges with foreign countries for 1964-1965 that GKKS as well as all ministries, departments, and organizations must exercise strict control over the preparation and instruction of all Soviet delegations, artist collectives, and other representatives of science and culture going abroad. It was also stressed that they should keep in mind that every Soviet citizen should be an active propagandist for the Soviet ideology in the foreign community and that representatives of science and culture absolutely had to keep state secrets. This also applied to receiving delegations from abroad. The State Committee for Keeping State Secrets in the Press was to make sure that no Soviet printed materials distributed abroad contained any state secrets and as such discouraged the exchange of any technical literature. All travels abroad had to be party approved. Soviet scientists were screened on several parameters. Only CPSU members could travel for training in the US or UK. Others could be selected for exchanges to smaller countries such as Denmark. Applicants were screened by the local trade union and party committee (including non-party members), linguistic skills were tested, only married scientists could travel (the family would stay back as a guarantee of return), and finally all applicants had to pass an interview (including a test on the knowledge of the country in question) at The International Department, where they also received instructions on how they should act during their stay abroad.

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408 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1.a/Cultural agreement.
410 Land og Folk 10.4.1972.
414 Lena Smirnova: INDvandrerhistorier (Copenhagen, 2011), 8-11.
The Danish state purposefully entered the cultural agreements as a means to outmaneuver the friendship society.\(^{415}\) and DKSU was deeply frustrated by their lack of influence on the contents of the agreements and the lack of subvention for activities covered by them.\(^{416}\)

**Party.** DKP and CPSU entered into their own agreements on exchanges of delegations, primarily delegations of Danish communists going to the USSR to study Soviet society and the role of the Soviet party in national and municipal politics, whereas Soviet representatives primarily came to Denmark to participate in various celebrations.\(^{417}\)

**Friendship.** In 1960 a DKSU delegation traveled to Moscow. During negotiations it was agreed that the communication and cooperation between the two sides should be improved.\(^{418}\) In 1962 further negotiations resulted in the signing of a general agreement of cooperation between DKSU, SSOD, and SUDK.\(^{419}\) Each year a specific agreement of cooperation was signed on activities to take place within the framework of the general agreement. Originally the agreements consisted of four parts: Exchange delegations and tourism, exchange of literature, exhibitions, and other materials, the dissemination of information on culture and society of the other party, and the commemoration of red-letter days, both national and the jubilees of the birth or death of famous persons, especially cultural workers. Each part contained detailed descriptions on how the parties were to fulfill the agreement. The number of exchanges and kind of materials were specified along with the number of delegations and the participants’ professional fields. Concerning tourist groups, it was stipulated that the parties were to organize meetings and excursions according to their professional interests.\(^{420}\) In 1972 the agreements were extended with an additional four paragraphs on the invitation of trade union delegations; extending help in the establishment of contacts between public, educational, trade union, youth, and women’s organizations; working for the establishment of friendship city contacts; and keeping each other informed of the implementation of the plans.\(^{421}\) The 1973 plan serves as a representative example of the contents of the cooperation plans. Paragraph one dealt with the knowledge of the Danish and Soviet peoples of each other’s life and


\(^{416}\) ABA/DKSU/3/EC minutes 12.2.1972.

\(^{417}\) RA/Danica/106/ План связей и сотрудничества с Коммунистической партией Дании на 1978 год.

\(^{418}\) ABA/DKSU/1/Draft report 1960 congress.

\(^{419}\) ABA/DKSU/1/Report on activities 1961-1962.

\(^{420}\) ABA/DKSU/1-2/Copies of various agreements 1960s-1970s.

\(^{421}\) ABA/DKSU/2/1972 agreement.
culture through lectures, travels, exchanges, exhibitions, movies, and other information materials. This meant that DSKU was obliged to celebrate the 30\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the battle of Stalingrad, the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of birth of Sergei Rachmaninov, Lenin’s birth, the 80\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the birth of Maiakovskii, the 15\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of SUDK, the 56\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of The Great Socialist October Revolution, as well as other red-letter days. Additionally, DKSU was obliged to organize friendship evenings, exhibitions and lectures on the USSR, showcase Soviet movies, promote translations and publication of Soviet books, further the study of Russian in Denmark, and publish information materials regarding the USSR. DKSU was obliged to further the involvement of businesses, educational institutions and others in their activities and promote the establishment of contacts between interested collective members of the respective friendship societies.

Paragraph two concerned the number of delegations each side was to invite. The Soviet side was obliged to invite 11 persons overall, including two Russian teachers for the 13\textsuperscript{th} seminar for teachers of Russian as a foreign language. The travel agency Sputnik would arrange the trip of the two winners of the annual essay competition for pupils and students to the USSR. DKSU would invite two delegations and two lecturers. Both sides should strive to assist citizens of the opposite party who traveled to Denmark through other channels and Soviet cruise ships visiting Denmark.

Paragraph three on the work with tourists further defined the tasks listed above. For example, both parties should strive to establish contacts corresponding with the professional or other interests of tourists.

Paragraph four further defined the organizing of exhibitions, movie screening, and exchanges of literature (including detailed listings of the specific interest in folklore).

The final paragraphs indicated intentions to promote the idea of twinning cities, generally expand the work to include new fields, and keep each other informed of activities through other channels.\textsuperscript{422} At a later point the cooperation plans became bi-annual without this influencing the contents.\textsuperscript{423} Each plan was formally signed at a ceremony in either Copenhagen or Moscow by high-ranking representatives of each organization.\textsuperscript{424}

**Workplace/special interests.** It is possible to identify one example of workplace agreements between the United Union Club at the shipyard B&W and the Soviet Shipbuilders’ Union on

\textsuperscript{422} ABA/DKSU/4/1973 Cooperation plan.
\textsuperscript{423} OF/1982-1983 Cooperation plan.
\textsuperscript{424} Frederichsen (2011b), 70-71.
exchanges of delegations.\textsuperscript{425} Similarly, The Danish Sports Federation (DIF) signed a bilateral agreement on the exchange of athletes, coaches, scientists, and experiences in projecting and building new facilities.\textsuperscript{426}

**FINANCING**

Danish communists continuously denied the existence of “red gold”. In 1959 then editor-in-chief of the communist daily Martin Nielsen claimed that the only capital that kept the newspaper running was the communist capital of confidence, generosity and faith.\textsuperscript{427} A few years later the author Hans Scherfig claimed that the newspaper’s monthly deficit of 30,000 kroner was covered by volunteer payments to its Guarantee Fund.\textsuperscript{428} Then former chairman Aksel Larsen stated in several interviews with CIA in 1959 that various front organizations and DKP received secret funding from the USSR but denied that the party had received any Soviet funding during his tenure as chairman.\textsuperscript{429}

**DKP as a (poor) business.** A full study of the economic history of DKP and the front organizations would be a dissertation in itself. Instead we will briefly discuss the business side of DKP and its economic results, documenting why DKP needed foreign subvention, the size of the Soviet subvention, and how subventions were laundered. To understand DKP’s business affairs we have to understand it as a cooperation with various subsidiaries that all seemed independent of DKP but were interlocked in a complex system of ownerships of stocks and shares,\textsuperscript{430} and, as we shall see, more often than not showed minus figures.

**Ejendomsselskabet af 25/9-1945.** DKP owned two holding companies that made up the center of its economic activities. Both of them are overlooked in the existing research.\textsuperscript{431} One of them was a real estate company that owned the party headquarters and overall center of activities on Dronningens Tværgade. Part of the building housed all party activities; the remaining office space was rented out to various companies.\textsuperscript{432} At first the stocks were shared between the party

\textsuperscript{425} Andres Laubjeg: *Det største håb: Erindringer fra rejser bag Jerntæppet* (Tisvildeleje, 2009), 105, 227-266.
\textsuperscript{426} Politiken 10.15.1978.
\textsuperscript{428} Hans Scherfig: *Presse- og ytringsfrihed* (Copenhagen, 1983), 52.
\textsuperscript{429} DIIS IV, 159-173.
\textsuperscript{430} Information 8.20-21.1977
\textsuperscript{431} Thing (2001).
\textsuperscript{432} ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/5/List of tenants 6.1.1959.
newspaper, the party, and the party publishing house. Later the company changed into a private limited company with DKP as sole shareholder.

**Figure 2.7: Annual results for Ejendomsselskabet 1946-1988**

On the surface figure 2.7 might give the impression of a small but relatively stable company, at least until the final years. However, unmentioned in the accounts are a long list of...

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433 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/6/Book of stock owners.
434 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2/1981 Statutes.
No accounts for 1972 have survived.
re prioritizations, requests for deferment, payment of default interest, overdrafts on the bank credit, and a building mortgaged to the hilt. On top of this, the company seems to have been considered some kind of money bin for the other DKP companies. Occasionally, strange looking debts to other parts of the DKP cooperation that should not have had show up, and the company guaranteed loans and credit lines for everybody from the party’s travel agency to DKU.

Foreningen Folkepresen. Folkepressen was the main holding company of DKP. The private limited company operated the various party press activities. In 1949 the company had 254 shareholders distributed between party branches, trade unions, workplaces, fractions, and individuals. Although it was intended to appear independent, its statutes clearly state that the task of the board was to secure the necessary funds to continue operations and executive power belonged to the DKP CC. The activities were divided into 4 departments: Editorial, printing, distribution, and administration. Originally, Folkepressen consisted of the communist daily newspaper Land og Folk, several local newspapers, the printer Terpo-Tryk, the provincial printer Rota-Tryk, and several publishing houses. Later a book shop was added to the activities. The overall impression of the activities is the huge deficit as seen in figure 2.8. Unfortunately the figures for the entire period are not available. The negotiation protocol merely states that the accounts had been presented at the annual general meeting. However, the 1987 accounts with a deficit of over 3 million kroner confirm the picture. Between 1945 and 1955 the newspaper lost three out of four readers. The newspaper’s circulation, aside from a small period of progress in the 1970s, continued to decline. Several times the page count was cut, and the newspaper ceased to be published daily, for example in the weekend. The number of staff was also cut on several occasions. The local newspapers folded fairly quickly, and an attempt to establish a special provincial weekly also folded within a few years. In 1950

438 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2/Accounts 1977.
439 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2/Letter 2.23.1979
441 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2/Audit protocol 1979.
442 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2/Deed of Pledge undated.
444 ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2/Deed of Pledge undated.
445 ABA/FF/1/Negotiation protocol.
447 ABA/DKP/558/Memorandum 1978.
448 ABA/OS/2/FF’ Accounts 1987.
449 ABA/FF/1/Negotiation protocol; Thing (1993), 806-824, 1014-1015; Møller (2012), 220-269.
the economy was so poor that the then editor-in-chief Børge Houmann ordered that all stamps on incoming letters should be collected and sold for the benefit of the newspaper. The newspaper had been the party's problem child since its earliest incarnations and always showed deficits. One of the main problems was the question of distribution. Subscriptions and kiosks aside, the newspaper was primarily sold on the streets, by going door to door, and at various major factories by party activists. At times of international crisis such as the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 not even kiosks wanted to sell the paper. Special emphasis was placed on the Friday edition as activists were able to sell more copies on that day. In 1989 the then editor-in-

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450 ABA/Folkepressen/1/Negotiation protocol
452 ABA/ÅJ/2(Accounts for Arbejderbladet August 1921.
453 ABA/DKP/77/CC minutes 1.14.-15.1950.
chief Frank Aaen wrote that the newspaper needed a capital injection of 5 million kroner immediately to survive. Attempts at reconstructing the newspaper failed and it folded in December 1990. Terpo-Tryk was the main economic provider for Folkepressen thanks to commercial contracts, both Soviet, such as the printing the journal *Fakta om Sovjetunionen*, as well as various prospects, brochures, calendars and so on for Soviet companies and for Danish, such as local commercial newspapers. For example, in the year 1982 Terpo-Tryk had a turnover of 13 million kroner and a surplus of 850,000. However, a few years later, despite large Soviet orders, Terpo also began to go into deficit. An external consultancy report described Terpo as a printer with a daunting economy, lack of financial management, poor internal communication, poor division of tasks, and general mismanagement.

DKP ran a number of publishing companies. The main one was Forlaget Tiden. The PET white paper incorrectly states that the publisher folded in 1957. This mistake has continuously been repeated in the literature, despite the fact that a bibliography and later catalogs clearly demonstrate the continued existence. When the publisher was threatened by bankruptcy in 1958, the DKP economic holding company Folkepressen acquired the company and at the same time changed its statute to allow for the operation of a publishing business. The party secretariat continued to control the production plans for all publications.

In 1955, after negotiations between DKP chairman Aksel Larsen, Tiden director Gelius Lund, and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, a second publishing company for publishing Soviet fiction in Danish was

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457 KB/BH/53/Collection of newspaper articles on the closure of *Land og Folk*.
459 ABA/FF/1/ draft report 04.28.1965.
460 ABA/FF/1/Negotiation protocol.
461 ABA/FF/1/Memorandum 10.7.1988.
463 "Forlaget Tiden", in John T. Lauridsen et.al. (ed.): *Den Kolde Krig Danmark* (Copenhagen, 2011), 263-264.
464 PK V. 175.
468 ABA/FF/1/Negotiation protocol; Draft agreement undated.
established: Mega. According to the agreement Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga selected the books for translation and covered the production costs and Mega was allowed to keep a commission for sold books of 4000 kroner pr. month. The surplus, excluding the commission, was to be transferred to Mezhkniga. Initially, each book had a print run of 4000 copies. The office was placed outside the DKP building. The director was Gottlieb Japsen, who had worked for the Comintern publishing house The Foreign Worker. The publishing seems to have been discontinued after the publication of the initial program.

In addition, in 1957 Børge Houmann started his own publishing company, Sirius, mostly publishing fiction, his own extensive research on the writer Martin Andersen Nexø, and translations of ancient Greek and Roman literature. Until he was ousted from all party positions and moved to Aarhus, the party leadership insisted on checking all publications as they were very skeptical about the lack of ideological profile of the company. The outside world also continued to be very skeptical, but this had to do with Houmann’s continued party membership.

Aside from these companies various departments and local branches published primarily schooling materials, the communist daily occasionally published political pamphlets, and several high-ranking communists published at Athenæum and Melbyhus. The primary reason for the 1957 near bankruptcy was the problem of distribution. In 1982 only 20% of Tiden’s books were sold through book stores. Instead, most books were supposed to be sold through so-called literature leaders appointed in each party cell. Sales were poor and the archives are full of a combination of pleas and threats to either return payments or unsold books, but they seem not to have been met. The publishing house had the same problem with the sale of the booklets and schooling materials published by various DKP committees. Eventually, the publishing house, in contradiction with the party's ideological principles, hired travelling salesmen and this proved to be very effective in comparison with the weak sales in the party cells.

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471 RGANI/5/28/332/46-48/Agreement undated.
473 ABA/Komintern/Japsen/Анкетный лист 2.3.1937.
474 Moller (2012), 276-278, 396.
475 John and Sanne Hansen.
476 Thing (1993), 851.
480 ABA/OS/5/Memorandum on sale figures 1987.
481 ABA/FF/19/Accounts [1961].

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The theoretical party journal also had the title *Tiden* (with the insert *Verden Rundt* – the Danish language version of *World Marxist Review*). As figure 2.9 (which is based on sales figures of the first and final issue of each volume between 1984 and 1989 as well as scattered information on the following three years) indicates the journal suffered from the same problems of not attracting readers.

**Figure 2.9: Subscription figures for *Tiden* 1984-1991:**

![Subscription figures for Tiden 1984-1991](image)

 Earlier reporting indicates that each issue showed a deficit of 6306 kroner. Party ideologue Ib Nørlund played a key role in editing and personally transported the subvention from *World Marxist Review*.

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482 For a discussion of the contents see Thing (1993), 825-830.  
484 ABA/FF/19/Accounts for volume 21 (1960) 5.2.1961.  
Marxist Review to print the insert Verden Rundt in cash to Denmark from Prague.\textsuperscript{486} The subvention enabled a continued high circulation of 3-4000 copies per issue despite the poor sales figures.\textsuperscript{487}

**Land og Folks Boghandel A/S.** Several satellite businesses existed outside of the DKP holding companies. The first of these, a book shop, was opened as an independent stock company in the basement of the party building by Helga Kastoft (the then wife (later divorced) of DKP chairman Aksel Larsen). The stock company had 70 stocks, all of them owned by party companies Foreningen Folkepressen, *Land & Folk*, and Ejendomsselskabet.\textsuperscript{488} Archival materials show the board consisted entirely of communists representing the DKP-owned business.\textsuperscript{489} A reading of the sparsely worded minutes of general meetings gives the impression of a stable bookshop (figure 2.10), but if we scrutinize the economics of the shop a different picture similar to that of the real estate company appears.

**Figure 2.10: Annual results for Land og Folks Boghandel A/S 1946, 1951-1954, 1962-1969:**\textsuperscript{490}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Annual results for Land og Folks Boghandel A/S 1946, 1951-1954, 1962-1969.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{486} Thing (2001), 184.  
\textsuperscript{487} ABA/DKP/106/Draft of CC report to the 28th congress presented at CC meeting 11.8.-9.1986.  
\textsuperscript{488} ABA/FF/33/ Memorandum of association 2.11.1946; Book of shareholders.  
\textsuperscript{489} ABA/FF/32/Extracts of minutes of general meetings, 1947-1956.  
\textsuperscript{490} ABA/FF/32-33/Various extracts of negotiation protocol, general meeting minutes, and accounts.
There were five reasons for the bookstore’s 1972 bankruptcy.

Firstly, the company continually struggled with debts\(^{491}\) and survived on a combination of credit lines,\(^{492}\) loans from employees\(^ {493}\) and various unknown sources.\(^{494}\)

Secondly, external events such as the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary severely hurt the turnover.\(^{495}\)

Thirdly, the introduction of paperbacks on the Danish book market in the early 1960s lowered the profit on the individual titles and led to a decline in the sale of non-paperbacks. This happened almost simultaneously with the introduction of the new Danish sales tax (“OMS”) on the wholesale level, imposed on the store due to the import of Soviet books.\(^{496}\)

Fourthly, the accounts show that the bookstore maintained a disproportionately large stock of goods in relation to the store size, to such an extent that the company’s auditor complained about it and warned against it.\(^{497}\)

Fifthly, the auditor’s reports, for example the 1971 report, showed serious deficits, large debts, and large outstanding credit.\(^{498}\)

In 1967, when the economy of the bookshop started to falter an addition was made to the statutes of Foreningen Folkepressen so that it could operate a bookstore. A new bookstore, *Tidens Bogsalg*, owned by Folkepressen and operated in connection with the publishing company Tiden opened a year after the bankruptcy of the former bookstore. The annual turnover was around 2.8 million kroner. The annual accounts of one year showed a profit of 41,000 kroner the next a deficit of 28,000 kroner\(^ {499}\) and this tendency continues throughout the years. When the party building had to be sold, Tidens Bogsalg was sold off, the name was changed to Tidens Bog og Papir Handel ApS and the shop moved to another address in Copenhagen.\(^ {500}\)

**Travel agencies.** The second large collection of satellite companies was travel agencies, the first, Folketurist A/S, was run by DKP members Helge Kierulff and his son Søren Kierulff. The former

\(^{491}\)ABA/DKP/74/Minutes of CC meeting 9.23.-24.1950.

\(^{492}\)ABA/FF/33/letter 11.6.1946 with continuations.

\(^{493}\)ABA/FF/33/Loan statement 6.28.1947.

\(^{494}\)ABA/FF/33/Loan statements 12.16. 1955; 6.10.1956; 1.22.1957.

\(^{495}\)ABA/FF/33/Extract of negotiation protocol 5.13.1957.

\(^{496}\)ABA/FF/32/Report1962.

\(^{497}\)ABA/FF/33/Comments on management accounts for the year 1967 11.1.1968.

\(^{498}\)ABA/FF/33/Profit and loss account for the year 1968, Status 1.1.1969; Profit and loss account for the year 1969, Status 1.1.1970.

\(^{499}\)ABA/FF/1/Negotiation protocol

had been a business manager for the communist daily *Land og Folk*. In 1960 he began to arrange cruises for various trade unions and in 1962 he founded Folketurist as a stock company, with the main purpose of arranging holiday trips and stays at health spas in the Eastern European and later on, Egypt. It is unclear who owned the stocks, but the usual collection of centrally placed communists party members made up the board. However, not all employees were communists. The travel agency had a large turnover, it did not result in a large surplus, only in the creation of large debt to Danish and foreign creditors.

**Figure 2.11: Annual results for Folketurist A/S 1962-1977**

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501 DKP/FF/1/Negotiation protocol.
502 Henning Andersen: *Et liv på vulkaner: Vi må tilbage i fortiden for at kunne se ind i fremtiden...* (Them, 2013), 52-72.
504 ABA/DKP/558/Internal accounts 1971.
505 ABA/DKP/558/Accounts 1962-1977
Following the 1977 bankruptcy of Folketurist, the DKP EC discussed the reasons for the collapse. It was stated that the travel agency opened for two reasons, partly from the standpoint of a possible political function of tourism, partly in the hope of creating profits for the party. During the discussion two main reasons for the bankruptcy were highlighted. The first had again to do with the actual actions of the USSR. The crushing of the Prague Spring had resulted in a large number of cancellations, requests for refunds, and troublesome work to restore confidence in the socialist countries as travel destinations. The second major problem was the lack of earnings and high debt to foreign firms. Folketurist had a long credit line at Intourist and other eastern travel companies and signed a standstill agreement with the four main socialist partners, but this was not enough to make a profit. When it finally became clear that it was necessary to secure a large capital injection and that this could not be obtained, the DKP EC ordered the travel company to enter into receivership.\footnote{ABA/DKP/558/Memorandum on Folketurist A/S based on DKP EC discussion 1.24.1978.}

**HANSA Folketurist A/S.** Shortly after the bankruptcy of Folketurist a new travel agency, HANSA Folketurist, quickly opened. Like the old company it provided travel to socialist countries in Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean. Half of its business was supposed to come from school and study trips. The agency intended to cooperate with various friendship societies. As a starting capital it had an exclusive deal on sending Danish participants to the youth festival organized by WFDY and IUS in Cuba in the summer of 1978.\footnote{Land og Folk 4.29.1978.} Based on information on the composition of the board and the company name, it is likely that the company was created by funding from the East German travel company Hansa.\footnote{Der Spiegel 2001:50, 40-56.}

When the company advertised for guides to destinations in GDR, Poland and Bulgaria the advertisement stated: “Prerequisites: Knowledge of German/English and a positive attitude to the socialist countries.”\footnote{Land og Folk 5.19.1978.}

At the beginning of the 1980s the company seemed sound. It expanded and opened new satellite offices.\footnote{Land og Folk 10.21.1982.} The company had an annual turnover of approximately 50 million kroner. However, it started to develop debts at all destinations totaling roughly 10 million. In the end all business partners accepted a 9 year repayment plan except the Yugoslavian company Kompas. HANSA went
bankrupt in 1987. At that time the director, Jeppe Strange, had been fired by the main shareholder, the chairman of the seamens’ union, Preben Møller Hansen, who prior to being ousted from DKP, by DKP secretary Ingmar Wagner had been talked into investing in the travel company through one of the many foundations owned by the union.511

**Fremadrejser** The final travel company to be discussed here belonged to DKU. DKU had for some years organized travels to Eastern Europe such as the 1984 “friendship train” to Poland.512 Eventually this developed into a full-fledged travel company that began operation in 1986. The daily management consisted of enthusiasts working around the clock, but despite an annual turnover of 7-8 million Kroner this was still not enough to provide black figures.513

Despite the continued massive deficits, Fremadrejser continues to exist.514

**Figure 2.12: Annual results for Fremadrejser 1986-first half of 1988:**515

514 As of writing a company with the same name and logo (http://www.fremadrejser.dk/) (retrieved 2.2.2017).
“Red figures”. As we see from the above, DKP was a party of very poor financial management. This is also confirmed by the memoirs of Freddy Madsen who remembers how DKP Aarhus was a mess of financial mismanagement.\textsuperscript{516} CC minutes show that the local branches quickly accumulated a large debt to the party of non-payment for contingent stickers, newspapers, and books.\textsuperscript{517} In addition other entities in the DKP circle such as the friendship society and the movie importer Danina Film also owed DKP money.\textsuperscript{518} In 1951, the newspaper's managing editor noted that debt from party branches to the paper corresponded to more than two months' revenue.\textsuperscript{519} This trend continued and in 1989 it was noted that for the party accounts to balance the branches had to reduce their debt so that it corresponded to a maximum of three months' revenue, and preferably only two.\textsuperscript{520}

Following the end of the German occupation DKP received 750.000 kroner in reparations from the Danish Social-democratic led government, in the hope that it would put an end to the attempt by the communists to overplay their role as political martyrs in the upcoming general elections.\textsuperscript{521} By 1947 the money had been spent.\textsuperscript{522} As we have seen above, they had many expenses and not enough income to cover them. By 1950 the DKP leadership seriously considered selling the party house and tried to find a buyer who would let DKP rent some of it afterwards.\textsuperscript{523} However, due to the Soviet subvention this did not become necessary.

\textbf{Paying overprice.} The Soviet subvention of DKP took on two forms. One was paying overprice for the printing of various materials at Terpo-Tryk. As we have seen, Terpo-Tryk took on “foreign work” as its main source of income. However, it is not clear from the sources when this term began to include Soviet orders. The earliest identifiable order from 1965 amounted to 1 million kroner. For a number of years they averaged 3-4 million kroner, whilst the final identifiable contract in 1988 amounted to 10.2 million kroners. Folkepressen’s business manager negotiated the annual contracts with the Soviet company Vhezhtorgizdat, and their importance can be gleaned from documents based on the shock waves that went through the party one year when it seemed that the expected orders would not be placed.\textsuperscript{524}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[516] F. Madsen, 33.
\item[517] ABA/DKP/74/CC minutes 1.14.-15.1950.
\item[519] ABA/DKP/74/Extract of speech by Børge Houmann at the CC meeting 9.22.-23..1951.
\item[520] ABA/OS/3/Comments to DKP accounts January-September 1989.
\item[521] ABA/LO/303/SD to CTU 7.5.1945.
\item[522] ABA/EK/2/Memorandum [early 1948]
\item[523] ABA/HH/REA report April 1950.
\item[524] ABA/FF/1/Negotiation protocol; general meeting reports 1948-1988; ABA/Jensen/1/Memorandum 1977.
\end{footnotes}
Table 2.B.: The Trade Union Foundation and DKP, 1950-1990:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foundation size</th>
<th>Received by DKP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1 500 000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
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<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1981</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>18 350 000</td>
<td>400 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
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<td>3 694 683</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>18 350 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
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<td>3 001 007</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>20 350 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 183 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>20 300 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>13 500 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(currency rubles)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>13 500 000</td>
<td>3 679 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(currency rubles)</td>
<td>350 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22 000 000</td>
<td>150 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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525 РГАНИ/89/38/1-56; Thing (2001), 291-292.
All amounts are in US dollars, except *italics* for Kroner.
Years marked "-" does not necessarily mean that DKP was not subvented, but that no archival evidence was identified.
The Trade Union Foundation. The second form of Soviet subvention was cash. No organized Soviet funding similar to that of the interwar years existed from 1945-1950. However, a CC decree of January 17th 1950 founded The Foundation for Support to Left-Wing Workers’ Association (called The Trade Union Foundation). Formally the Foundation was controlled by the Soviet Central Trade Union, but executive power lay within the ID. To hide its origin it was formally placed in Bucharest as part of the Rumanian Central Trade Union. Each year the Foundation received new means from the Eastern Bloc countries, which were then distributed among the applying communist parties outside the communist bloc. For many years, Boris Ponomarev’s handwritten recommendations were agreed on in advance with Brezhnev and Suslov, who both signed the voting slip before it was sent around to the other Politburo members. The transfers were kept very secret, and KGB was responsible for them. ID transferred the funds to the KGB department for foreign intelligence against proper receipt. KGB then transferred the funds abroad and the local KGB resident told the representative of the local Communist Party that the union funding had arrived. Then the representative came to the Soviet Embassy and was handed the amount against proper receipt, along with a report on the transaction this receipt was sent to the Central Committee; where it was filed (see figure 2.13).

As seen in figure 2.B., DKP was among the recipients. Former KGB resident in Denmark Mikhail Liubimov gives this account of the procedure:

“The Danish party leader came, had a glass of whiskey, and receipted for the money. Then we proposed a toast for proletarian internationalism. Afterwards we had one of the embassy’s drivers bring the envelope containing the money to the Danish party office”

And he stated that the amounts were paid in Danish kroner.

527 For a comparative study of subvention of European communist parties, see Foitzik, 140-147.
528 Holstmark, 24-26.
529 The Foundations means were held in an account of the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank (Лисов, 6.)
530 Frederichsen (2010a), 12.
Figure 2.13: The whirlpool of money."^{532}\\n
The diagram illustrates the complex network of money flows between various entities. The text note "Based on Frederichsen (2010a)." indicates the source of the information.
Guarantee Foundation and party collections. However, as we have seen, DKP representatives continuously denied Soviet subvention – according to their narrative, the economic means for continuing operations originated from private donors. Such subvention did, in fact, exist in the form of a monthly collection for the Guarantee Foundation and an annual collection conducted by the party for the benefit of the party press.

Between September 1949 and August 1950 the monthly fund-raising goal was 30,000 kroner. This aim was not reached once.\textsuperscript{533} Similarly, in 1956, the overall monthly target for the provincial branches was 10,147 kroner. Not once was the target met, and by the end of the year the monthly collection yielded only half of that amount.\textsuperscript{534} If we approach the question from the point of view of a local party branch we reach a similar conclusion. DKP-Gladsaxe, for example, was able to meet the monthly target of 1000 kroner, but after the target had been raised to 1200 Kroner in May 1956, it was not met once.\textsuperscript{535}

However, it is highly plausible that collections served another purpose – the laundering of the red gold. Naturally, Danish communist archives do not contain smoking guns stating how Soviet subvention was received and laundered, but a few examples are known. For example, a 1986 comment thanks the USSR for a contribution to a collection.\textsuperscript{536} Former editor-in-chief of \textit{Land og Folk} Frede Jakobsen remembered how Ingmar Wagner in 1990 gave him a substantial cash sum for the newspaper and that he afterwards followed procedures and added the sum (that he without doubt considered to be of Soviet origin) to the collection lists under “anonymous contributions”.\textsuperscript{537} These examples strongly indicate that the collected means were handed by the party to Foreningen Folkepressen in exchange for shares. At one point Folkepressen introduced a new series of shares with a nominal value of 100,000 kroner so the board did not have to sign as many shares purchased by the party.\textsuperscript{538} These cash injections made it possible for Folkepressen to write off the annual deficits.\textsuperscript{539}

Ole Sohn’s knowledge. In Denmark both historians and journalists of major national media outlets have been very interested in the possible knowledge of the last DKP chairman (and former minister)
Ole Sohn about the Soviet cash subvention, resulting in several rounds of heated public debates in Denmark. As such, it is a major and central question within Danish communist studies that is still unsolved, but if answered would shed new light on the questions of the role and position of DKP both as a political party in Danish society and its relations to the world Soviet communist movement. Ole Sohn has repeatedly stated that although he was party chairman he did not have full knowledge of DKP’s economic situation prior to surviving an attempted coup by high-ranking DKP members in November 1989 and that he never received or knew about amounts of subvention in cash, but he has acknowledged the procedure of subvention through overpricing.\(^{540}\)

However, Ole Sohn’s papers are full of various minutes, speech manuscripts, and notes written in his own hand that clearly indicate that he, contrary to what he remembers about the question, did have a solid knowledge about the economic situation in DKP prior to November 1989.\(^{541}\) In addition, the journalist Vladimir Pimonov, who in the early 1990s wrote the first articles concerning the question of Soviet subvention in the Danish newspaper *Ekstra Bladet*, in 1992 interviewed Vitalii Shaposhnikov who confirmed that he, in approximately 1987, in his office in Moscow held a meeting with DKP chairman Ole Sohn and explained to him the possibilities and procedures of Soviet subvention through the channel of the Trade Union Foundation (read: cash subvention), how it had taken place for many years, and how it should continue. Shaposhnikov states that Ole Sohn was not a naïve young man and that he fully understood and accepted the information he was given.\(^{542}\)

In conclusion, we have to note the clear differences between what Ole Sohn remembers and the picture drawn by contemporary sources, including his personal files. This documentation indicates a continuation of established procedures during his tenure as DKP chairman.

**DKSU.** DKSU was also among the recipients of Soviet subvention. This form of subvention was not a special Danish case. In 1956, for example, the French-Soviet Society received 1.14 million rubles in foreign currency.\(^{543}\)

It is not clear when DKSU began to receive Soviet subvention in cash. A tapping of DKSU and DKP vice-chairman Alfred Jensen’s apartment in the 1950s revealed that following visits to the Soviet Embassy he counted large amounts of cash, but it is not known whether the money was...


\(^{543}\) РГАНИ/89/46/2772/Об оказанное финансовой помощи обществу Франция-СССР 10.16.1956.
intended for the party or the friendship association.\textsuperscript{544} DKSU accounts contain vague information on income through subsidy from unnamed institutions and organizations,\textsuperscript{545} but it is not known if this included Soviet sources. On the other hand, it is well known that DKSU from an early point received numerous handicrafts to sell for the benefit of the association on a national and local level.\textsuperscript{546} The earliest identified example of cash subvention is a 1962 decision to provide 4000 currency rubles (40,000 kroner) pr. year.\textsuperscript{547} By 1969 the subvention amounted to 14,500 currency rubles (145,000 kroner) pr. year,\textsuperscript{548} and in 1977 it was decided to more than double the annual amount from 84,000 to 171,000 kroner pr. year for each of the Scandinavian-Soviet friendship societies.\textsuperscript{549} As we shall discuss in a further chapter this increase took place simultaneously with the Soviet purchase of a building in Copenhagen for DKSU. Following this, DKSU constructed a special annual budget that vice-chairman Ingmar Wagner personally presented to the Soviet embassy where he also collected the cash subvention and brought it to the DKSU building where it was placed in a safe. The subvention never figured in official accounts, but special accounts were provided to the Soviets.\textsuperscript{550} This system must have been established after 1978, when the Soviets had wrongly accused Ingmar Wagner of embezzlement due to the unexpected high cost of running the new building.\textsuperscript{551} This system continued until the break-up of the USSR.\textsuperscript{552}

**Front organizations.** A third party to receive Soviet funding was the international front organizations. As shown in table 2.C, based on estimation presented in a report to a subcommission in the House of Representatives. By 1979 this was by no means a new accusation and it was furiously denied by the various fronts who claimed to receive their funding, primarily through, membership fees from national affiliated organizations.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Peer Henrik Hansen: *Firmaets største bedrift: Den hemmelige krig mod de danske kommunister* (Copenhagen, 2005), 150.
\item ABA/DKSU/34/Ifrim Jensen to Aase Secher 5.17.1950
\item РГАНИ/4/18/144/1/О дополнительных мероприятиях по развитию культурных связей между СССР и Данией 6.11.1962.
\item РГАНИ/4/19/153/155/Об оказании помощи Обществу “Дания-СССР” 5.13.1969.
\item РГАНИ/4/24/57/40/О увеличении финансовой помощи обществам дружбы с Советским Союзом в Скандинавских странах 5.31.1976.
\item Interview with Asger Pedersen.
\item ABA/Jensen/I/Ingmar Wagner to Jørgen Jensen 12.24.1978.
\item ABA/DKSU/5/EC minutes 9.22.1991.
\end{itemize}
Table 2.C: Estimation of economic support of international Front organizations in 1979.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Front</th>
<th>Amount in $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The African and Asian People’s Solidarity Organization</td>
<td>1 260 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Peace Conference</td>
<td>210 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADL</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>125 000</td>
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<td>IOJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIDF</td>
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<td>WFTU</td>
<td>8 575 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPC</td>
<td>49 380 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>63 445 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this claim is easily dismissed if we for example look at the ability of Danish national affiliations to pay fees. Although DDK, the Danish affiliation of WIDF, paid fees for some years they repeatedly had to write and tell WIDF that it did not possess the necessary means to pay membership fees. Similarly, based on the accounts, it seems that Fredens Tilhængere paid a membership fee to WPC as a lump sum in 1950, and none of the accounts for the following years contain this expense.

Overall, the Danish front organizations seem to have been very poor. Archival evidence indicates that, for example, Fredens Tilhængere constantly had to be creative to come up with income whether it was by selling specially produced stamps or scarves, or organizing flea markets and Sunday matinées. Niels Barfoed argues that one of the associations’ journals *Tænk i Tide* folded primarily due to political disagreements. However, a reading of steering committee minutes shows that all of the various journals published at one time or the other folded due to chronic financial woes.

A more creative claim on sources of income was made by IUS. IUS claimed that one third of its income came from bazars organized in Eastern Europe to sell goods that recipients of IUS travel

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553 Rose, 282.
555 ABA/DDK/4/DDK board minutes 9.25.1962; 5.27.1964.
557 ABA/FT/1/Accounts 6.1-.11.23.1950.
558 KB/JJ/30/SC minutes 2.23.1951.
559 ABA/FT/2/Poster 1954.
560 KB/JJ/31/SC minutes 8.27.1953.
grants had brought back with them.\textsuperscript{563} Apparently, IUS had not considered the fact that this claim undermined Soviet propaganda of no shortages in socialist countries.

However, in 1991 IUS admitted to both its propagandistic purpose and source of funding and promised to adopt a new democratic constitution and find new sources of income.\textsuperscript{564} IUS was not the only organizations to have to look for a new source of income. In 1978, CPSU decided to give additional funding to WPC and increase the number of free Aeroflot tickets,\textsuperscript{565} in 1980, they chose to help WIDF send Asian and African representatives to a women’s conference in Copenhagen,\textsuperscript{566} and in the same year they covered several delegates’ travel expenses to an IOJ conference,\textsuperscript{567} or to a national affiliation of WPC.\textsuperscript{568}

To finance international front organizations and similar activities\textsuperscript{569} the Soviets officially established the Peace Foundation in 1961 as “a public fund to provide financial aid to Soviet public organizations in their work for strengthening peace, solidarity, and friendship among peoples”.\textsuperscript{570} It never made its accounts public or had a board of publicly elected members – nonetheless, thousands of Soviet citizens occasionally had to pay part of their salary to the foundation or “work a shift for peace”.\textsuperscript{571}

An expensive habit. The Soviet Union had extensive costs for the maintenance and operation of its extensive apparatus for foreign propaganda. In addition to costs to maintain the parts of the apparatus within Soviet borders there were a number of expenses: The Trade Union Foundation, The Peace Fund, subvention of friendship societies, expenses to directly state executed activities in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{572} Additionally communist parties, friendship societies, and front organizations received an unending stream of gifts.
Estimation of costs varies between $2 billion in 1960s\textsuperscript{573} and $4 billion in 1980s.\textsuperscript{574}

As an overall conclusion on the financial situation, Freddy Madsen, concludes:

“On the whole, I was sure that the poor economy was not due to dishonesty, but a poor overview, lack of accounting and realistic budgets”\textsuperscript{575}

For DKP these conditions suddenly became very immediate in the late 1980s. In 1989 Ole Sohn stated that DKP had to pay annual interest charge of over 5 million kroner and that it was impossible for such a small a party to survive this situation in the long run.\textsuperscript{576} Due to personal disagreements in the leadership for several years nothing had been done to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{577} Therefore, in 1989 it became necessary for them to sell half of the party building since they could not overcome the overall debt, which in 5 years had increased from about 11 million to 43 million kroners.\textsuperscript{578} The property’s value had been assessed at 70 million kroners\textsuperscript{579}, but despite warnings the party leadership initially decided to only sell half of the building. Subsequently, the property had to be divided into two cadastral numbers, and as this could take up to a year, and that payment would not be released for at least a year. Therefore, it became necessary to sell the rest of the property.\textsuperscript{580} The remainder of the property was sold for 43 million kroners, and in connection with the sale the party had to rent an expensive office property in Avedøre Holme.\textsuperscript{581} At the same time, the party leadership established a new economic structure to ensure the DKP concern. DKP was to establish the DKP-Foundation for business purposes. The Foundation would own the company DKP-Holding A/S. The holding company would own five companies, each dealing with a part of DKP’s business, Land og Folk A/S, Terpo Tryk A/S, Forlaget Tiden A/S, Rotatryk A/S, and Thor International A/S. This construction would ensure DKP against claims if one of the companies filed for bankruptcy, and expected losses could be written off in the overall tax payments by the holding company.\textsuperscript{582} However, the collapse of the USSR put an end to the subvention and therefore also to the DKP’s business activities.

\textsuperscript{573} Shaw, 60.
\textsuperscript{574} Rees, 4.
\textsuperscript{575} F. Madsen, 313.
\textsuperscript{576} ABA/OS/3/Ole Sohn’s personal copy of his speech at CC meeting 11.24.1989.
\textsuperscript{577} ABA/OS/2/Memorandums and Ole Sohn’s personal handwritten notes on CC meeting 11.25.-27.1988.
\textsuperscript{578} \textit{Land og Folk} 6.3.-4.1989.
\textsuperscript{579} ABA/Ejendomsselskabet/2Assessment report 2.15.1988.
\textsuperscript{582} ABA/OS/3/Memorandum 12.7.1989.
Therefore, overall Freddy Madsen’s comment only shows us half of the picture. The second half is that when discussing the possible impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy we have to take into consideration the difficulties they encountered of literally selling their message on market terms.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

As stated earlier in this chapter, when we discuss the decision-making process we have to differentiate between the de facto government (CPSU) and the de jure government (Sovmin). The party and executive branch upheld this divide at each level from local and regional to national. In 1947, Stalin once again reorganized the ruling circles of the USSR by placing the Politbureau/Presidium in charge of the political decision-making process and the government (renamed Sovmin) in charge of regulating economic politics and the execution of political decisions. As such it could be argued that the ministries and state committees played a coordinating role with the purpose of optimizing the technical-administrative level. In the Stalin years, political decisions were taken within various informal groups, known at various times as “the selects group”, “the close circle”, or “the ruling group”, depending on whomever Stalin decided to trust at any given time. During the Khrushchev years we see a tendency to place the decision-making process in the Politbureau/Presidium. As one Russian historian notes, on any given day in meetings of the Politburo/Presidium or the secretariat a very diverse number of questions had to be decided, from anti-missile defenses to preparing for spring sowing or the publication of new school text books to the sending of Soviet athletes abroad. As such it was considered a promotion to be named a party secretary, while an appointment to minister or president of parliament was effectively a demotion. This was most dramatically expressed through party secretary Yekaterina Furtseva’s failed suicide attempt following her demotion to become minister of culture. The Central Committee became a de-facto parliament or sounding-board. This had to do with the fact that the Supreme Soviet did not function as an actual parliament, but was an artificial institution of pre-

585 Фруненко, т. 1-3.
586 Прозуменников, 4.
588 Млечин (2009), 232-234.
approved reports, speeches, and unanimous votes.\textsuperscript{589} The CC minutes\textsuperscript{590} do appear polished and somewhat ritualistic in form, the meetings did grow in number – and length – during the Khrushchev years. Regarding the Brezhnev years we can identify a tendency to move the focal point of decision-making to the party secretariat, which as Gorbachev has described was primarily due to the failing health of Brezhnev. This resulted in 15-20 minutes long Politbureau meetings where the various party secretaries, as decided in advance said they would deal with the question, at each point of the agenda.\textsuperscript{591} This corresponds with the materials in the Danica collection of the Danish National Archives where we can identify a movement from decrees of the Politbureau to decrees of the Secretariat on questions of cultural diplomacy. Similarly, a reading of the various CC departments involved in Soviet cultural diplomacy\textsuperscript{592} paints a very uniform picture of the decision-making processes. Usually letters, questions, and reports arrived addressed to CPSU. The document was then forwarded to the relevant department of the Secretariat, where employees carried out the actual processing of the issue, after which they made a final recommendation addressed to a particular party secretary and attached a draft decree, which in principle only needed the signatures of the participants at the following meeting in the higher party body, where the decision was formally taken at a given time.

However, this should not be taken as an indication that party leaders did not control the decision-making process. Ideology played a leading role in the decision-making process, and the top party leaders (be it Stalin, his compatriots like Andrei Zhdanov or their party descendants) could and did alter, reject, or demand any proposal or decision at any point in the process.\textsuperscript{593} Due to the number of questions forwarded to the ruling circles, the responsible workers of the various party departments were instructed to keep recommendations and oral reports to a minimal length in words and time.\textsuperscript{594}

**Planning Soviet cultural diplomacy.** An overall plan for cultural and scientific relations with foreign countries was annually put forward for approval. The plan also included detailed country plans for each of the countries involved, regarding the quantity of incoming and outgoing exchanges, number of persons, and which Soviet institution or public organization had

\textsuperscript{589} Shepilov, 177-179.
\textsuperscript{590} Located in RGANI fond 2.
\textsuperscript{591} Mikhail Gorbatsjov: *Min egen historie* (Copenhagen, 2013), 248-250.
\textsuperscript{592} Located in RGANI fond 5
\textsuperscript{593} Meri Herrala: *The Struggle for Control of Soviet Music From 1932 to 1948: Socialist Realism vs. Western Formalism* (Lewiston, 2012), 8-12.
\textsuperscript{594} J. Arch Getty: *Practicing Stalinism: Bolsheviks, Boyars, and the Persistence of Tradition* (New Haven, 2013), 188.
responsibility for the activity. In the following we will discuss the development of country plans for Denmark for the years 1956 and 1958 and what they tell us about the Soviet cultural diplomatic system.

In early March 1956, the Soviet minister of culture Mikhailov put forward the proposal for cultural relations with Denmark for that year. Initially, Mikhailov praised the results of the 1955 plan. The Ministry of culture had implemented a number of measures to expand and strengthen cultural relations with the Scandinavian countries. In this context, Mikhailov particularly highlighted Soviet artists' participation in the so-called "friendship week" organized by friendship associations where artists performed at concerts, operas, and ballets. On the basis of the invitation of the Danish Prime Minister H.C. Hansen to visit the Soviet Union in 1956 Mikhailov saw good opportunities for the expansion of cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries. Against this background Mikhailov suggested that the Soviet Union should send a choir of 80 people, a group of dancers, a group of actors, and organize an exhibition of Soviet books including lectures by writers and literati in 1956. The draft was then submitted to the CC cultural department for comments. It supported the proposal, and called it "useful", a term that in the Soviet documents often recurs as a marker for approval of a project or request, and extended it to recommend negotiating with the Nordic public broadcasting companies on the exchange of radio programs of musical and literary content. Lists specifying the 7 artists (opera singers and ballet dancers), who were to participate in friendship month, and 10 ballet dancers, who would travel first to Iceland and then to Denmark, were attached to the document of approval. On April 18th 1956, the CC approved the plans for cultural exchange with Denmark and the other Nordic countries in 1956.

In 1958 the country plan for Denmark became the victim of Soviet bureaucratic infighting between various institutes and the newly established GKKS. A shortened version of the original plan was presented in April of that year and included performances by a choir, a ballet group, a circus group, and the violinist Igor Oistrakh. It was approved in principle, but by June a definitive plan had still not received final approval. Among other reasons, this was because the ministry of culture, ignoring GKKS, had forwarded its own more extensive plan that included both a full cultural

596 RA/Danica/105/Н. Михайлов ЦК КПСС проект 3.2.1956.
600 RA/Danica/105/Справка без дата.
ensemble and a puppet theater, and this had resulted in the CC cultural department presenting yet another reworked proposal that included several concerts of Soviet musicians and several travelling art exhibitions. To solve the problem, A.I. Mikoian was put in charge of a special commission. It was not until early August 1958 that the commission presented a recommendation for CC approval. However, the proposal did not appear to take into consideration that three quarters of the year when the plan was to be realized had already passed. Finally, in mid-August the CC approved a plan including a ballet group, an artist ensemble, a puppet theater, a quartet, 3-5 soloists with accompaniment, a Soviet actor to perform at DKP’ October celebrations, and the screening of 1-2 movie premiers.

As a result of the infighting no Soviet artists performed at DKSU or elsewhere until September of that year and DKSU had to postpone the annual congress from spring to autumn to secure Soviet participation at the congress and the following cultural friendship month. Late confirmation of the cultural exchange program was not the only problem with the Soviet model. Although decisions were taken far in advance, the Soviets did not always communicate them to their cooperation partners. In September 1955 the Soviets instructed DKSU very specifically as to which cultural workers they were to invite to perform in the USSR, for how long, and at what expense.

When the Danish Foreign Ministry was presented with a Soviet country plan for a given year they had to explain to the Soviets that plans had to be presented much earlier as they had to be incorporated into the Danish fiscal budget for the coming year. Danish authorities also wanted as many activities as possible to take place through private impresarios.

603 RA/Danica/105/Постановление ЦК КСС О планах мероприятий по развитию культурных связей с ФРГ, Австрией и Данией на 1958-1959 гг. проект 5.27.1958.
604 RA/Danica/105/Выписка из протокола № 161 заседания Президиума ЦК от 30 июня 1958 О планах мероприятий по развитию культурных связей с ФРГ, Австрией и Данией..
607 RA/Danica/105/О планах культурного и научного обмена с ФРГ и Данией на 1958-1959 гг. 8.15.1958 с приложением №№ 1, 2.
609 KB/JJ/27/Ifrim Jensen to Jørgen Jørgensen [September 1958].
610 KB/JJ/25/Head of Soviet ministry of culture’s department of foreign relations V. Stepanov, chairman of the international department of the Soviet Ministry of Culture to DKSU chairman Jørgen Jørgensen 9.17.1955.
611 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1.a/Verbal note 6.4.1964.
612 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1.a/Memorandum 7.17.1959.
The rigidity of the Soviet apparatus was also exposed when the organizers of the agricultural fair in Bellahøj asked for a Soviet exhibition on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and an accompanying troupe of Cossacks that had been a great success in Sweden. Despite the fact that both the organizers and DKSU strenuously tried to convince the Soviet side of the unique propaganda opportunity with 175,000 potential spectators neither the exhibition nor the show ever materialized since the Soviet system was not able to incorporate a new possibility that had not originally been included in the annual plan. The overall impression of the Soviet apparatus for planning and organizing the cultural diplomacy is that it was very rigid and inflexible and worked very slowly. Everything had to be planned and approved of in advance even if it meant that activities came to a standstill, and possibilities could not be incorporated since everything had to take place in accordance with the approved plan.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter is by far the longest chapter of the dissertation, but it is necessary to discuss all four central aspects of Soviet cultural diplomacy – Apparatus, bilateral agreements, financing, and the decision-making processes – in one comprehensive chapter if we are to understand the framework that the activities and organizations discussed in the following chapters takes place within. An overall conclusion stands clear. The Soviet apparatus was on the one hand extensive and had many methods for reaching as many potential audiences as possible, but on the other hand it was constrained by its large size. It was bureaucratically heavy, inflexible, hierarchical, and highly expensive. There was a strong emphasis that everything had to be planned and approved in advance and that more spontaneous possibilities could not be exercised. At times it seems as though the planning and approval was more important than the actual implementation of the plans. On the issue of the economy of the activities is worth noting that they could not take place under normal market conditions, but that a significant financial support was needed.

613 KB/JJ/26/DKSU to VOKS representative in Denmark V. Kobushko 4.18.1956; De samvirkende sjællandske landboforeninger to DKSU 5.11. 1956; DKSU to chairman of VOKS agricultural section A. Tulupnikov 5.28.1956; A. Tulupnikov to DKSU June 1956.
Chapter 3: In the spirit of the Grand Alliance, 1945-1949

“We now have the opportunity to pursue and defend our foreign policy interests under much more favourable conditions than before”. Andrei Zhdanov, 1946

Following World War II the USSR attempted to utilize the euphoria to set up a network of new international front organizations to replace those that had been compromised by the Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939. Over the current and following chapters we will discuss the origin of these new organizations on both an international and national level, their activities, coordinated campaigns, their reception, and results of actual Soviet policy actions.

In 1954 WFDY attempted and quickly failed to publish a Danish version of its journal World Youth. This is one of the few examples of activities organized by international front organizations taking place directly in Denmark. Therefore, our interest mostly concerns the Danish national affiliations of the international front organizations, Danish participation in the various major manifestations (congresses and festivals) of the fronts, and those manifestations and other meetings that took place in Denmark.

INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

The Soviets always denied that they had established a network of international front organizations and called them “international public organizations”. Similarly, the organizations in question presented themselves as international NGO’s. However, in reality they were GONGO’s – Government-organized Nongovernmental Organizations. A GONGO is an organization that presents itself as independent but is in reality run and funded by a government whereby it becomes an agent of the government’s foreign policy aims or is used to in domestic politics to silence oppositional voices within civil society.

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614 Pechatnov, 1.
615 Two issues of Verdens Ungdom published in 1954.
616 РГАНИ/5/28/101/7/В. Терешкин в секретариат Суслова М.А. 5.23.1953.
The Peace cause. As discussed in Chapter 1, the highest priority of Soviet cultural diplomacy was the peace struggle. This was also stated in internal Soviet documents. To emphasize the peaceful intentions of the Soviet peoples an international peace prize called The Stalin Peace Prize had been installed. An international committee was set up to give out the award. Among the members of the committee was the famous Danish author Martin Andersen Nexø who tried, and failed, to nominate the Danish MD, peace activist, and unofficial DKP member, Mogens Fog. One of the reasons of the committee’s indifference to the suggestion was that Stalin – as was the case with all prizes given out in his name – took a keen personal interest in who was presented with the prize. Following Stalin’s death the CC Presidium continued to decide the recipients of the prize despite the formal existence of an international committee. In 1956 the prize was renamed the Lenin peace prize. The first Danish recipient was the communist artist Herluf Bidstrup. A Danish embassy representative witnessed the ceremony and afterwards complained that it had been impossible to recognize Denmark based on the negative description given by Bidstrup and the communist author Hans Scherfig.

Due to the importance of the peace cause, the primary Soviet front organization was The World Peace Council founded at an August 1948 Soviet-organized World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace in Wroclaw. The congress established the International Connection Committee of Intellectuals, who convened the World Congress of Partisans for Peace (Les Partisans de la Paix) organization in Paris in April 1949. At the second congress in November 1950 the name was changed to the World Peace Council. The first three presidents were (in order of succession) the French scientist Professor Frederic Joilot-Currie, Professor J.D. Bernal, and the Belgian politician Isabelle Blume. The Soviets closely monitored the development, organization, and activities of WPC. The earliest Danish participants in WPC were Martin Andersen Nexø and Agnete Olsen.
First generation Soviet front organizations. The first new front organizations with participation covering a broad political spectrum came into existence as early as 1945. With the aim of healing the wound in international trade unionism between Comintern’s Red Labor Unions and the Second International’s labor unions, the British Trades Union Congress invited representatives of 71 trade unions from 31 countries to participate in a congress in Paris in October 1945. Although, the non-communist sir Walter Citrine was elected president in 1945, the communists won the more important post of general-secretary enabling them to fill the secretariat – which as in the USSR was the most powerful part of the organization – with their own supporters, and thereby succeeding in not creating a genuine trade union international, but a communist front. By 1949, the non-communist groups left and on the initiative of the British and American national trade unions formed the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in Brussels. Citrine was replaced by an Italian communist. WFTU operated a number a trade union internationals (TUI) as rivals to ICFTU’s International Trade Secretariats. To make them seem more independent they were given individual constitutions in 1966. Examples of TUI are the Energy Workers’ TUI or the Transport Workers’ TUI. The chairman of the Danish Seamen’s Union, Preben Møller Hansen, became vice-chairman of the latter in 1987.

The Women’s International Democratic Federation. WIDF was founded at a congress in Paris in November 1945 organized by the communist dominated Union des femmes Francaises. WIDF claimed to work for the unification of all women in a common struggle to win and implement their rights as mothers, workers, and citizens, and to struggle against racism and fascism and for world peace and disarmament. WIDF placed great emphasis on a claim of originating from the German KZ camps of World War II, but this must be seen primarily as an attempt to continue the wartime popular front strategy into the postwar period. For many years the president was Eugène Cotton, but the most active force was Nina Popova.

The World Federation of Democratic Youth was founded at a congress in November 1945, which took place in London. The founding conference had a very broad political composition. The honorary committee included among others eight British cabinet members, and Danish members included foreign minister John Christmas Møller (conservative MP) and the Danish Minister in London, count Reventlow, but communists were notably missing. The congress received a greeting

628 Rose, 160-175, 191-200.
630 Rose, 131-141.
632 Борисова, 103-144.
from king George wherein he expressed his conviction that a true cooperation among the youth would by the best warrant for continuous world peace. The Danish delegation also had a very broad non-partisan composition. Non-communist Svend Beyer-Pedersen and Jørgen Jessen were elected as Danish representatives in the WFDY leadership. However, the political honeymoon was short lived. A non-communist had been elected chairman, but communists and fellow-travelers occupied seven of the nine seats on the executive committee and the position of treasurer. Within a few years non-communists such as Svend Beyer-Pedersen and non-communist membership organizations were ousted. DKU chairman Aage la Cour took over as secretary for Scandinavia and member of the executive committee. In connection with the 1949 expulsion of Yugoslavian representatives the non-communists left and formed the counter-organizations World Assembly of Youth (WAY) and International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), which was at first headed by Danish Social Democratic Youth chairman Per Hækkerup. On several occasions the IUSY and WAY headquarters were situated in Copenhagen. WFDY claimed to work for the education of youth in the spirit of freedom, democracy and solidarity to end imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, fascist and neo-fascist regimes, and ensure world peace and security. One of the fronts of WFDY was The International Committee of Children’s and Adolescents’ Movements (CIMEA) founded at the 4th WFDY assembly in Kiev in 1957, which was situated in Budapest and aimed at 6 to 15 year olds (the age group younger than WFDY’s target group), but operated by WFDY. The second of the original front organizations aimed at world youth was the International Union of Students formed in 1946 at the World Students’ Congress in Prague with a broad political and religious participation. IUS was situated in Prague. IUS claimed to work for the promotion of universal right to education, the struggle against fascism, for peace, and genuine national independence. Figure 3.1. illustrates IUS organizational structures as a perfect example of how communists controlled the supposedly non-partisan organizations through indirect elections. Formally, the congress was the governing body made up of the delegates from national unions of students (NUS), but through a number of indirect elections of bodies that med seldom (but in accordance with the IUS constitution) leaving power in the hands of the secretariat that more or less consisted of communists.

635 Rose, 185-188.
636 Kotek, 86-106.
637 Mangelia, 63
Among the non-communist NUS there was strong dissatisfaction with the communist dominated executive organs’ promotion of Soviet foreign policy positions. This became especially clear during the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia when the IUS executives refused to protest arrest and exclusions of non-communist Czech students. The fractures grew even wider, with the expulsion of the Yugoslavian NUS following the Tito-Stalin break being the final straw. Western NUS withdrew and formed the counter-organization International Student Conference where the executive secretariat played a coordinating role but held no policy-making powers.\(^{639}\)

WPC was not the first front organization with Joilet-Curie and Bernal among the founders. The World Federation of Scientific Workers grew out of the interwar professional and political cooperation between British and French scientists united in a common struggle against Nazism. Following a February 1946 London conference a second conference took place in July and WSFW was founded with Joilet-Curie as chairman and Bernal as vice-chairman along with a Soviet representative. The first task stated for WFSW was to utilize science for the promotion of peace and welfare for mankind. Initially, the USSR had declined to participate, but eventually the Soviet

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\(^{638}\) Based on Mangelia, 63

\(^{639}\) RA/DSF/606/Report on DSF’ international activities august 1964.
aligned countries decided to join, and then non-communists, as it was the case with other fronts, quickly started to vote with their feet.\textsuperscript{640}

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers was also founded in 1946 at an international conference of lawyers in Paris. The Association attempted to create a bureau with participation of many internationally recognized lawyers, but controlled by communists. Most non-communists left the association in 1949 after the exclusion of Yugoslav members.\textsuperscript{641} Soviet archival materials disclose the intended leading role to be played by Soviet lawyers from the very beginning.\textsuperscript{642}

The international Federation of Resistance Fighters best known by its French abbreviation, FIR, was founded in Warszawa in 1946 as an association of former political prisoners of Nazi-Germany later situated in Vienna with an agenda of national independence of their country, liberty, and world peace. The expulsion of Yugoslavian members in 1949 led to the formation of the counter-organizations World Veterans’ Federation with a strong anti-communist profile and protests against political prisoners in the Soviet-controlled sphere.\textsuperscript{643} The Danish Landsforeningen Gestapofangeren, an anti-communist former World War II political prisoners’ organization, was the Danish member of WVF.\textsuperscript{644}

The International Organization of Journalists was a merger of the interwar International Federation of Journalists and the communist-influenced International Federation of Journalists of Allied and Free Countries established in London during World War II. IOJ was founded at a conference of international journalists in Copenhagen in June 1946. After the communists seized key positions, we see the repeated pattern. Non-communist journalists had left and reconstituted the interwar federation. Headquarters were first established in London, but in 1947 moved to Prague. The IOJ’ declared aim was through the flow of free and true information to help maintain international peace and friendship, but in reality the IOJ worked for the restriction of the free flow of words and ideas and government control over media.\textsuperscript{645}

The second professional media front was The International Radio and Television Organization known by the French abbreviation OIRT, was founded at a 1946 conference in Brussels. Again,
Western participants withdrew to found the European Broadcast Union (the organizers of the Eurovision song contest).  

**A repeated pattern.** When we discuss the origins of the first generation of Soviet Cold War front organizations a repeated pattern appears. The front organizations were established from 1945-1946 in the spirit of the grand anti-Nazi alliance of World War II (The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact apparently forgotten). Within a few years the Soviet insistence on controlling the organizations to promote their own international purposes and images began to drive off non-communist members. The big break-up happened in 1949 in connection with the expulsion of the Yugoslavian organizations as a result of the Stalin-Tito break. The Western organizations left the Soviet front organizations and founded new counter-organizations.

As the former British NUS president Frank Copplestone highlighted, the major problem with the establishment of the new organizations following World War II was the spirit of camaraderie of the Grand Alliance. This meant that key terms such as democratic, progressive, or anti-fascist were never defined, and that the pro-Soviet majority could manipulate their definitions and thereby the direction of the organizations and that non-communist participants overlooked the dangers for too long due to the idealistic belief that these new organizations had to succeed.  

**MEGA EVENTS**

When looking at the international front organizations two kinds of activities stand out. We see a flood of publications. Each front organization published various newspapers and journals in numerous languages.

The second major activity was mega events understood as major festivals of congresses organized by the international front organizations with large numbers of attendees. As seen in Table 3.A they were organized regularly throughout the Cold War.

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647 RA/DSF/609/A study of International Student Relations 1945-57 Survey by Frank Copplestone
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WPC</th>
<th>WIDF</th>
<th>WFTU</th>
<th>WFDY</th>
<th>JUS</th>
<th>Youth Festivals</th>
<th>WFSW</th>
<th>FIR</th>
<th>IADL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>East Berlin</td>
<td>Paris/Prague</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
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<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Sofia</td>
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648 Rose, 57-171.
International and national preparatory committees. Each time an international congress, conference, or festival took place, an international preparatory committee was set up to organize the event to give it a non-partisan appearance. The committees had a communist and fellow-traveler majority enabling them to control the process and the agenda of the event. Whether the event took place in the USSR or not, the CPSU was kept informed on developments. National preparatory committees were set up by a combination of communist parties and front organizations.

**DANISH FRONT ORGANIZATIONS**

As was the case in numerous other countries national Danish affiliations of the international front organizations came into being following the founding of the international organizations. In the following we shall identify Danish front organizations, discuss cases where Danish organizations disaffiliated with international front organizations, and look at case that completely stands out from either of these patterns.

**Danish affiliations.** The first Danish front organization, founded in November 1948, was Danmarks Demokratiske Kvindeforbund (DDK), which originally called itself WIDF Danish section until a 1953 name change. The first chairman was the Social-democrat Agnete Olsen, wife of DKSU chairman Albert Olsen. DDK claimed to have 10.000 members in its early years, but the archival evidence does not support this claim. By 1955 the society consisted of 51 branches with a total membership of 2191 people. Interestingly, the DDK journal *Vi Kvinder* sold 6470 issues in subscription and single copies. Although these figures may seem impressive by Danish standards of the time, several factors stand out. Firstly, most of the members lived in the greater Copenhagen area and Zealand, where that held 82% of the branches and 83 % of the members were, and 78 % of the copies of the journal were sold. Secondly, in Funen and Jutland branches existed only in the larger cities. Odense housed 3 branches, but the remaining members in Funen were not organized

650 Красовицкая, 30-32.
651 ABA/DKU/188/Minutes of meeting 11.4.1975.
653 ABA/DDK/6/1953 Constitution.
655 ABA/DDK/4 Women’s Danish Democratic Federation (WDDF) undated [late 1970s]
into branches. In Jutland, the Aalborg and Aarhus branches held more members than the other 3 juttish branches combined.\(^{656}\)

WFDY went through several national “affiliations” in Denmark. The first, in existence during the early Cold War, was Den danske DUV Komite\(^{657}\) of which next to nothing is known. The first chairman was the communist Hans Østergaard\(^{658}\) who was later replaced by another communist, Birger Christensen.\(^{659}\) The scarce source materials also indicate that DUV like other similar organizations, had several branches in the greater Copenhagen area,\(^{660}\) collective members\(^{661}\) as well as (skeleton) branches in some provincial cities.\(^{662}\) The party affiliation of the chairmen is not surprising. The committee seems to have died out, and eventually the role of national WFDY affiliate was taken over by DKU.\(^{663}\)

Very little is known about the Danish affiliate of IADL. It seems to have been very communist oriented and very small in size.\(^{664}\) At one point the chairman was the communist lawyer Christian Vilhelm Hagens,\(^{665}\) but the driving force was another communist lawyer Carl Madsen and later his son, the non-communist Søren Søltoft Madsen.\(^{666}\) Carl Madsen’s engagement continued after he was excluded from DKP, although Søren Søltoft gradually took over the work.\(^{667}\)

In Denmark there was a multitude of organizations of former resistance fighters against the Nazi occupation 1940-45 as well as former prisoners of German KZ camps and prisons. Some of them such as the Neungammenforeningen (‘The Neungamme Society’) had relationships with an international association. An umbrella organization Sammenslutningen af danske fanger fra besættelsesstiden (‘The Cooperation of Danish Prisoners of the Occupation’) was formed. At some unknown point FIR-Denmark was founded as a Danish national affiliation of the international front. FIR-Danmark was communist dominated and for a long time relatively small, but it did eventually seem to attract other associations as members not the least due to the natural death of many original members. Until then, the Danish point of contact with FIR seemed to be Sammenslutningen af

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656 ABA/DDK/4 Steering comittee to executive committee 12.31.1956  
657 ABA/LO/546/The Danish DUV Committee to Danish Central Trade Union 4.28.1948  
659 ABA/HH/50 REA report on communism in Denmark January-April 1950.  
661 Land og Folk 5.4.1950  
662 E. Nielsen, 30.  
Ehvervsæmmede fra Modstandskampen i Danmark (‘The Cooperation of Disabled Persons from the Resistance Fight in Denmark’), which became part of Udvalget for tidligere fanger og modstandsfolk (‘The Committee of Former Prisoners and Resistance Fighters.’). As Helge Kierulf was one of the active FIR members in Denmark it was housed at the communist travel agency Folketurist until the agency went bankrupt. Afterwards it moved to various addresses in the greater Copenhagen area.

The task of establishing a pro-Soviet peace movement in Denmark was placed in the hands of three communist; architect Edvard Heiberg, a veteran of similar anti-war and anti-fascist Soviet front organizations of the 1930s, Copenhagen mayor Johannes Hansen, and Erna Watson. They formed a provisional committee, but had to report to DKP that it suffered from too many communist members and too few well-known intellectuals and trade unionists. Finally, following a public invitation signed by well-known personalities Fredens Tilhængere was established as the Danish affiliate of WPC with 15 local committees in 1950. Afterwards, several persons declared that they had not signed even if their supposed signature appeared on the invitation. Within six months 75 local committees existed. In Copenhagen a committee would usually consist of a street, a residential area, or a smaller part of the city. Outside of the capital one committee covered an entire town. In some cases local committees split into several sub-committees. In 1950 the Mogens Fog became chairman. Mogens Fog placed great emphasis on Fredens Tilhængere and saw it as an opportunity for non-partisan mobilization similar to the resistance movement. At an earlier point he stated that communists had to “sprinkle sugar on the pretzels” to win over non-members to the cause of movements such as the later Fredens Tilhængere.

**The non-joiners.** In several cases Danish representatives or organizations originally joined international fronts but then opted to leave due to their openly pro-Soviet nature. This was the case of the Danish State Radio which left OIRT and later joined EBU. The Danish Central Trade Union, despite initially welcoming the idea of establishing one world trade union, left WFTU to

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672 KB/JJ/29/Fredens Tilhængere SC minutes 7.13.1950.
673 KB/JJ29/List of local committees 6.20.1950.
674 KB/JJ29/ Fredsnyt 2 7.15.1950.
participate in ICFTU. In some cases such as the latter, communist trade unionist continued on an individual basis to participate in the work of the international fronts.

The exception that proves the rule. When studying the Danish organizations that came into contact with Soviet front organizations one case stands out and completely breaks with any established patterns.

Foreningen til beskyttelses af Videnskabeligt Arbejde (FBVA) was founded in November 1943 with the purpose of improving the economic conditions of scientists in regards to salaries, patent rights, and payment for written works and translations. FBVA was divided into 25 sections along professional lines from archeology to zoology. The minimum requirement to become member was a degree from a Danish university or other institution of higher education. FBVA stands out for a very particular reason. On the one hand, throughout its existence it continued its membership of WFSW and paid membership fees despite harsh debates over the acknowledged pro-Soviet nature of WSFW, on the other hand, it did not promote any of the pro-Soviet positions of WSFW, but continuously worked to improve the aforementioned interests of its members, although it was not a formal trade union, but rather an interest group. By the early 1960s FBVA development stagnated and during the middle of the decade the organization dissolved. The agenda was carried on by another interest group without WFSW affiliation.

DKP and the front organizations. DKP followed the line of the “communist peace mythology”. To party members, the USSR was the guarantor of world peace whereas the US and NATO were the major threats. Leading communists repeatedly stated that the struggle for peace was an important part of the struggle for socialism, that NATO was an instrument for militarization and rearmament, and that the DKP should work to break Denmark away from NATO. The communists, for example party chairman Aksel Larsen, stated this aim publicly. To reach their aim, the communists had to find non-communist partners. Typical examples of partners were the first social-democratic Professor, DKSU chairman Albert Olsen and his wife Agnete Olsen, DDK

678 ABA/EK/2/Memorandum on Trade Unions for DKP CC meeting August 1957.
679 Where nothing else is mentioned the following is based on a reading of all volumes of Videnskabsmanden published 1947-1964.
680 ABA/DKP/74/Aksel Larsen speech DKP CC meeting 5.20.1951.
681 ABA/DKP/74/Svend Nielsen speech DKP CC meeting 9.22.-23.1951.
682 ABA/DKP/74/DKP CC minutes 1.14.-15.1950.
683 Land og Folk 3.4.1949.
chairman. In 1949 DDK published a pamphlet written by Albert Olsen. Olsen argued that the USA was not a real democracy, that the USA would not aid its European alias if they were attacked, he dismissed the slightest notion of aggressive Soviet actions (according to Olsen the liberation of Eastern Europe was followed by national social reforms to the benefit of the countries’ populations), and called Danish authorities’ perception of the USSR hysterical. Similarly, his successor as DKSU chairman Jørgen Jørgensen dismissed the mere possibility of any Soviet military threat to Denmark. DKP needed fellow-travelers to establish the non-parliamentarian movements that would influence the political decisions makers. Although they made a huge effort to present the non-partisanship of movements such as Fredens Tilhængere, leading communist members like Edvard Heiberg reported on developments in the association at DKP CC meetings (Heiberg held a seat), where DDK and DUV developments were also followed closely. Although not always successful, DKP’s strategy was to place a fellow-traveler as chairman and a communist as vice-chairman, secretary, or at least in several leading positions where they could stay in overall control of a given association. An example of this was the 1950 call to form a Fredens Tilhængere local committee in Frederiksberg Municpality, initiated by the well-known artisan Jørgen Kähler and the communist Gottfred Appel. If we consider the Cold War years overall, two leading communists spring to mind in these positions: Peace and solidarity secretary Ingmar Wagner and peace secretary Anker Schjerning. They both, so to say, received their salary from DKP to do “volunteer work” in numerous associations and could therefor take on time and work consuming positions. A reading of various DKSU executive organs’ minutes reveal how Wagner was often the only one with a full overview of ongoing activities. He is described as an articulated and pragmatic person with the ability to smooth things over so fellow-travelers also arrived at the pro-Soviet position. Whereas Wagner especially excelled in friendship and solidarity associations, Schjerning worked with the peace movements. Similar, DDK leaders denied DKP influence when serious criticism was leveled at various times. Despite this denial the chairman of the DKP

684 Albert Olsen: *Blokpolitik eller fredspolitik* (Copenhagen, 1949).
685 *Politiken* 5.11.1950.
687 ABA/DKP/74/DKP CC minutes 6.3.-5.1950.
691 ABA/DDK/11/Extraordinary membership meeting minutes 5.28.1956.
women’s committee, Alvilda Larsen, discussed DDK developments in detail at meetings with Soviet representatives. In further chapters this theme of DKP influence will reoccur.

**Well-established and non-established.** As with the international organizations it is possible to identify a specific pattern. In the Danish case the difference is very much found in the history of the organizations and institutions in question. On the one hand we see a number of newly established organizations founded as a direct result of the new international front organizations with the purpose of influencing Danish public opinion in favor of the pro-Soviet positions. These organizations continued to exist in one form or another throughout the Cold War with a strong DKP influence. On the other hand we have a number of well-established organizations that entered the new organizations out of a general wish for genuine international cooperation within their field. However, when they became aware of the true nature and position of the international front organizations they withdrew and contributed to the founding of new counter-organizations. Only FBVA stands out from this pattern.

**FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURE**

Above we discussed one of the two legs of the Soviet cultural diplomatic apparatus, “the causes leg”. That is the organizations involved in the promotion of Soviet position through peace, youth, women, or various professional causes. The second leg was Danish organizations involved in the dissemination of Soviet cultural productions to the Danish public, “the culture leg”.

**DKSU.** Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen (‘The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union’) was not only the largest Danish bilateral friendship society during the Cold War but also the most important Danish practitioner of Soviet cultural diplomacy.

The earliest incarnations were founded in 1921 in the struggle against the Volga famine. In April 1924 it found its definitive form through the founding of Dansk-Russisk Samvirke (‘Danish-Russian Cooperation’). It was a very small organization based in Copenhagen. From the early 1930s a second Danish-Soviet friendship organization came into existence in the form of Landsforbundet

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af Sovjetunionens Venner i Danmark (‘National Union of Friends of the USSR in Denmark’). It had numerous local branches, a fairly large membership base, a high level of activity, its own offices, and participation in a friendship international. Following the banning of these organizations during World War II, they merged into one organization.\textsuperscript{694} At first local branches were founded and operated more or less autonomously, but in 1950\textsuperscript{695} a national association was established, and in 1952\textsuperscript{696} the name changed to The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union. Throughout the years DKSU had several non-communist chairmen: Albert Olsen, Jørgen Jørgensen, Carl Thomsen, Allan Fridericia, and Hermod Lannung. However, the driving forces were the communist vice-chairmen, first Alfred Jensen and later Ingmar Wagner.\textsuperscript{697} According to its constitution DKSU worked on a non-partisan basis to disseminate information about all aspects of the USSR to the Danish public.\textsuperscript{698} The center-periphery relationship within DKSU was reflected in the constitutions that emphasized the supremacy of the center (the executive committee and the board of the EC (in 1970s called the steering committee)) over the local branches (their number varied throughout the years).\textsuperscript{699} In 1974 a presidium of figureheads was established. The constitution paragraphs guiding the work of the presidium were formulated in a way to ensure its inability to influence the executive power structure of DKSU.\textsuperscript{700}

**Movie-rental companies.** The other practitioner of cultural dissemination was the commercial movie-rental company Dan-Ina Film A/S, established in July 1945 as Victoria Film A/S by DKSU chairman Albert Olsen. He became chairman of a board consisting of communists such as Professor Stig Veibel, engineer Max Kaplan, Principal Inger Merete Nordentoft, architect Edvard Heiberg, and party employed Gelius Lund, and fellow-travelers such as the writer Kjeld Abell. The director was Svend Thorsen. The aim of the company was to distribute Soviet films with Danish subtitles.\textsuperscript{701} After a short time the company was renamed Sovjetfilm A/S\textsuperscript{702} until management settled on Dan-Ina Film no later than 1949.\textsuperscript{703} In 1949 Svend Thorsen stepped down as director\textsuperscript{704} and was

\textsuperscript{694} Frederichsen (2014), 44-62.  
\textsuperscript{695} ABA/DKSU/1/Two various sets of congress minutes 10.29.1950.  
\textsuperscript{696} KB/JJ/23/Congress minutes 4.11.1952.  
Marianne Rostgaard claims that the name changed in 1950 (Rostgaard (2012), 243), but unlike her use of a festschrift published 49 years later we identify the year based on the minutes of the congress.  
\textsuperscript{697} Frederichsen (2010a), 19-28.  
\textsuperscript{698} ABA/DKSU/104/1945 constitution.  
\textsuperscript{699} ABA/DKSU/104/1951 constitution; 1979 constitution.  
\textsuperscript{700} ABA/DKSU/2/Presidium constitution draft; 3/EC minutes 1.17.71; 5/Carl Madsen to Ingmar Wagner 2.13.1971.  
\textsuperscript{701} ABA/DKSU/105/Circular letter 8.17.1990; Jensen (1999), 145.  
\textsuperscript{702} ABA/DKP/699 Note on the dissemination of Soviet films in Denmark undated.  
\textsuperscript{703} KB/JJ/22/DKSU circular letter 9.7.1949.
succeeded by Max Kaplan (an old SUV and DKSU activist), and an advisory committee consisting of Ib Nørlund, Alfred Jensen and Ingmar Wagner — three of the most prominent members of DKP. Later Helge Schmidt became director. After Albert Olsen’s death in 1949 Kjeld Abell became chairman of the board. Soviet films and documentaries made up the bulk of Dan-Ina-Films catalog. Dan-Ina Film routinely complained that it received too few copies of popular movies, that they did not receive information on which new features to expect, and that the prices were too high in relation to possible profits. From the beginning of the early 1950s Dan-Ina also rented out non-Soviet movies. Despite a high activity level Dan-Ina Film suffered financial problems. In 1989 it was turned into a private foundation that continued operations until its 1995 bankruptcy.

Folkefilmen, the other half of Dan-Ina Film, was a department of Dan-Ina Film originally called Afdelingen for Foreningsfilm (‘The Department for Films for Organizations’) established to rent out primarily 16mm narrow-gauge Soviet documentary and feature films to various organizations, clubs, schools, and so on. Organizations renting the movies were not allowed to show them on commercial terms, but at closed screenings or in connection with lectures. Folkefilmen received narrow-gauge documentaries from Sovexportfilm, but as was the case with the features complaints were made about high prices for products that could only be rented out to organizations at low fees. At a later point an agreement was made with DKSU, stating that they could show new Soviet features licensed by Dan-Ina Film free of charge for their members if Folkefilmen received the documentaries given by the USSR to DKSU.

Frederichsen (2011), 76.
KB/II/23/Minutes of DKSU Copenhagen branch steering committee meeting 2.23.1952.
KB/II/23/Dan-Ina Film/Folkefilmen catalogue 1951-52.
ABA/DKP/699 The outstanding account between V/O Sovexportfilm and Dan-Ina Film undated note; note concerning the movie "Quiet Flows the Don", undated.
KB/II/23/DKSU Copenhagen SC minutes 2.23.1952.
ABA/DKP/699/16 mm narrow-gauge movies recieved from Sovexportfiom 1.1.1957-1.31.1959.
ABA/DKP/699/The outstanding account between V/O Sovexportfilm and Dan-Ina Film undated note.
Interview with Asger Pedersen.
RESISTANCE

A clear opposition to the communist dominated organizations existed from the very beginning. The chairwomen of the Danish affiliation of The Women’s International League dismissed Fredens Tilhængere due to its one-sided critique of the West and blind faith in the East. Similarly, criticism was raised in various op-eds in the newspaper Politiken. Erik Seidenfaden compared the propaganda to the Nazi propaganda of the previous decade and asked whether everybody had forgotten about it already. Similarly, The National Council of Women refused membership to DDK in the 1950s, because the DKP Women’s Committee was already a member. Despite the participation of some social-democrats this party led the strongest struggle against the communist front organizations in Denmark. At the time the Social-democrats was not only a political party but a way of life with a party, a youth party, control of trade unions, and a cooperative movement that could cater for all necessities from cradle to grave. The competitors to the large majority social-democratic movement were the communists. When we compare results in the general elections between 1945 and 1957 we see how the two parties struggled over the support of the same group of voters.

In the struggle over the youth movements DSU chairman Per Hækkerup as editor of Rød Ungdom (‘Red Youth’) promoted a strong anti-communist line. Following the coup in Czechoslovakia the journal title changed to Fri Ungdom (‘Free Youth’). Nina Andersen was in charge of the social-democratic work among women. In an op-ed she warned that DDK (and WIDF) were dominated by communists, only criticized the Western world, but, for example, not the uranium mines in Czechoslovakia (operated with POW forced labor), and that those women who joined KDV would pull a communist wagon wheel and morally support the ideology and methods in use east of the Iron Curtain. Local party branches were warned about the anti-democratic nature of KDV. Albert Olsen died in 1949, and later Agnete Olsen was excluded from the social-democratic party. The reason given was that the presidency of KDV was irreconcilable with party membership.

719 Information 5.12.1950.
721 Poul Shmidt: Viggo Kampmann: Modig modstandsmand, klog finansminister, ustyrlig statsminister (Copenhagen, 2016), 123.
723 Socialdemokraten 11.18.1948.
724 ABA/SD/1679/Circular letter [1949].
Nina Andersen was added in her campaign against KDV by a civil servant in the foreign ministry who sent her various background information and copies of reports from Danish diplomatic missions.\footnote{RA/UM.133.D.18/Foreign policy advisor Brun to Nina Andersen 3.4.1951.} This is hardly surprising considering that for the better part of the Cold War the social-democrats were in government.

Hans Hedtoft (PM twice between 1947 and 1955) was a staunch anti-communist. In various public speeches as party chairman he directly attacked Fredens Tilhængere for barking up the wrong tree when claiming that the threat to world peace came from the east and pointed to the ongoing war in Korea, Soviet vetoes in UN over Czechoslovakia, Berlin, control over the use of nuclear energy, disarmament control, the reelection of UN general secretary Trygve Lie, and the Korean situation as examples. He bluntly stated that Fredens Tilhægere operated as an instrument of a foreign government’s propaganda campaign.\footnote{ABA/HH/7/Manuscript for speech in Sønderborg 8.31.1950; Speech manuscript during general elections 1951; Manuscript speech 5.1.1951; Manuscript Constitution Day speech 6.5.1951.}

As we can see, at this point in time the social-democratic party and movement held a clear anti-communist position, even if some backbenchers cooperated with the new front organizations.

\textbf{CONCLUSIONS}

Following World War II the USSR, the communist world movement, and fellow-travelers used the euphoria over victory in the war to create a new network of front organizations not compromised by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. These new organizations promoted various causes such as women, youth, students, or various professional interests with an overall theme of peace.

On an international level we see an overall repeated pattern; establishment of a new front organization, a mass influx of enthusiastic members and organizations, a tight control of the executive of the organization by communists and fellow-travelers, the utilization of their position to claim support for Soviet foreign policy positions in the name of the organization, followed by departure of the democratic members, resulting in the organization of new counter-organizations.

On a national level various organizations were founded with a strong communist presence as national affiliations of the new international front organizations and in other instances already existing Danish associations or institutions entered the newly formed international organizations as Danish representatives. The main difference between these two generations of Danish associations being that the front organizations stayed on as Danish representatives in the international front
organizations, whereas the democratic institutions withdrew and participated in the organization of the new counter-organizations.

The second dimension to the Soviet cultural diplomacy was culture dissemination. In Denmark this took place primarily through DKSU. However, a commercial company was very active in the distribution of feature and documentary films.

The communist movement and the various front and friendship associations operated in a very harsh climate. Outside the communist and fellow-travelling circles they were met by a strong opposition that included an alliance between the central civil administration and the state-bearing social-democratic party and its entire movement in youth and women’s circles, trade unions, and so on. At the time leading social-democrats held a clear anti-communist and anti-Soviet position.
In this chapter we will discuss the activities of the various Danish front organizations including a number of coordinated campaigns, DKSU will be discussed separately, and the view of Danish authorities on the activities, and the damaging effects of the 1956 Hungarian event will be explored.

THE MANY ACTIVITIES OF DANISH FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

Based on the activity level the 1950s were the first golden days of Danish front organizations. Danish front organizations had no less than six members of the WPC council.

Although Danish organizations pursued various causes, whether it be peace causes, women’s causes, youth causes, trade unionism and so on, the forms of activities were very similar. Therefore we will below discuss the various forms of activities and exemplify them by cases taken from various organizations.

Public lectures. Many of the activities centered on dissemination of the written or spoken word. The dominant method was public lectures where one or several speakers discussed a theme. For example, Fredens Tilhængere (FT) local committees organized a meeting where Professor Stig Veibel spoke on international control over atomic energy, a local DKP branch organized a public meeting on KDV with chairman Agnete Olsen as speaker commenting not only on KDV but also positive impressions of a journey to the USSR, and FT organized a meeting with lectures by both Danish and international speakers under the heading “Against NATO and rearmament” clearly framing the topics as two sides of the same coin. Speakers could be politicians, artists,

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728 ABA/FT/1/Statement made by Fredens Tilhængere’s national committee 8.5.1951.
730 ABA/FT/1/Flyer undated.
731 ABA/SD/1679/Report on meeting in Søborg 4.5.1949.
732 KKB/JJ/29/Poster undated.
intellectuals or other well-known figures supporting WPC. An important aim of the public lectures was to attract listeners who did not belong to the usual communist or fellow-travellers’ circles. One such example is the fellow-traveling leading member of FT Elin Appel’s lecture at Gentofte Hotel, where she was invited by the social-liberal party. Appel spoke on her impressions of the latest WPC congress, the peace will of the Eastern bloc countries and Western misinterpretation of their intentions, defended Mao’s revolution in China, and accused President Truman of racism.

In other cases it was more difficult to attract outside listeners. At a March 1949 meeting organized by DDK only 16 people turned out for it, including five members of DDK EC. The organizers called for a new meeting two weeks later, but this time only 13 people attended. Even the organizers considered the meeting a failure.

**Living room meetings.** In cases where local branches or committees were too small to organize public lectures or conferences private meetings in living rooms at the homes of the members took place. One FT member, captain Andersen, recorded speeches at public lectures and offered to play them on his wire-recorder at the living room meetings.

**Open air meetings.** During the summer public meetings moved outdoors. For example, in July 1950 FT organized a meeting in Fælledparken (a large green common in Copenhagen) with speeches by FT stalwarts Preben Schlanbusch, Peter P. Rohde, and Mogens Fog. They lectured on the theme “Is the Korean war the beginning of World War III?” Open air meetings were a summer activity, and we do see cases from the fall when meetings had to be cancelled due to poor weather.

**Conferences.** Following the massive coordinated campaigns (see below) the early front organizations such as Fredens Tilhængere seem to have lost their drive and the ability to mobilize

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733 KB/JJ/29/Flyer undated
734 Villabyernes Blad 1.25.1951.
736 ABA/SD/1679/Report on meeting 3.31.1949
737 ABA/FT/1/Draft work program undated.
738 ABA/FT/1/Messages to the local committees # 2 7.12.1951
739 ABA/FT/1/Newsletter 7.1.1950.
their members for further campaigns leading many local committees to go into hibernation.\textsuperscript{741} In 1954, upon receiving a general worldwide approval from WPC,\textsuperscript{742} it was decided to turn FT into an actual association with membership fees and so on.\textsuperscript{743} Despite the reorganization, FT was losing momentum, and Mogens Fog seriously considered dissolving it. However, they decided to continue operations as a more coordination entity.\textsuperscript{744} Instead, Mogens Fog and other FT leaders got involved in the organization of Dansk Fredskonference (‘Danish Peace Conference’)\textsuperscript{745} depicting both the name and primary function of the new association.

Between 1952 and 1962 DFK organized 17 national and regional conferences.\textsuperscript{746} A typical conference was a 1954 conference in Odense with five major speeches covering the usual topics of the dangers of West German rearmament, increasing Danish military spending, statements against foreign military bases in Denmark, and for German reunification and the inclusion of communist China in the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{747} All were Soviet foreign policy positions. Despite the initial broad political composition of DFK,\textsuperscript{748} control over DFK quickly fell into the hands of the communists Einar Kruse and future DKP chairman Jørgen Jensen. In several letters, behind the back of the national chairman, the fellow-traveler Thomas Christensen, they discussed how best to conceal the communist control, so as to not scare off potential members.\textsuperscript{749}

\textbf{Participation in international events.} Throughout the years Danish front organizations participated in various meetings within the framework of the international front organizations. These could be executive meetings, conferences on specific themes, or mega events such as congresses and festivals.

Each time a supposedly independent preparatory committee was set up. In some cases, such as the 1953 WPC congress in Vienna the committee operated its own office, held meetings to create interest, started collections to fund Danish participation, and tried to give the impression of a fresh,
non-communist initiative. However, the committee still used paper with the FT letterhead, unsurprisingly, since the committee was initiated by FT.

In other cases, such as in 1952, DDK organized a conference to create interest and select participants for an international WIDF conference on children’s upbringing. Several lectures were followed by a heated discussion on the possible negative effects of rearmament on social and cultural progress, and disagreement over the previously drawn up list of participants in the international conference, as too many communists were included, promptly leading to the inclusion of a participant who had given a pro-communist statement. In the final selection only one of six elected representatives was not a communist or fellow-traveller.

Danish participation in the mega events (table 3.A.) varied. The 1950 WPC congress had 23 Danish participants, whereas almost 1000 Danes participated in the 1951 youth festival in East Berlin. Among other activities they staged a play in *Haus der Kultur* giving the impression of failed promises by the Danish government made to the country’s youth of better living conditions, education, and the right to vote, substituted for rearmament and militarization.

### Table 4.A.: International front organization events in Denmark, 1951-1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>WPC bureau meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The International Initiative Committee for the Organizing of an International Economic Conference in Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>International Initiative Committee against German Rearmament</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WFDY EC meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WPC conference</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DUV-Komite international youth festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>International WFDY Initiative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WIDF third congress</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Danish authorities made a clear distinction between communist and non-communist peace initiatives and meetings and in this area closely followed the policy of the NATO Special Committee where the British in particular played an active role, circulating numerous reports and

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50 ABA/FT/2/Newsletter undated; circular letter 7.29.1952; 8.25.1952; 11.3.1952; 11.18.1952; 1.18.1953
54 *Berlingske Aftenavis* 7.23.1951.
55 *Land og Folk* 8.11.1951.
57 To a degree that they were filed separately in the foreign ministry archives.
policy papers. Denmark followed the US and UK promoted policy towards international communist meetings. In a democratic country the organizations could not be denied the right to organize meetings, but participants could be denied visas. This position was taken in case of meeting where it was clear that they were camouflaged communist congresses operating as a tool for Soviet foreign policy. The reason given was that the holding of the meeting in no way served any Danish interests. Danish authorities did not wish to become known as the NATO country open to international front organizations thereby increasing the propaganda value of this for the USSR of staging the meeting in a NATO country. Four meetings were cancelled in Denmark due to the Danish visa policy. Danish authorities were also influenced by the statement of Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander who said that the Stockholm appeal had been harmful to Sweden’s international reputation and that the appeal should rightly had been called “the Moscow appeal” since it did not represent any Swedish interests.

Denmark was not alone in its negative attitude towards international front organizations. In 1951 WPC, WIDF, WFTU, WFDY, and IADL were expelled from Paris, accused by the French government of fifth column activities. WIDF moved to East Berlin, WFDY to Budapest (except for 1956 when it was temporarily relocated to Prague), and IADL to Brussels. WPC and WFTU moved to Vienna at first, but when the Soviet occupation forces left Austria they were expelled once more for conducting activities outside of the interests of the Austrian state. WPC moved to Helsinki, WFTU to Prague. WPC even tried for some years to recover lost ground by changing name to The International Institute for Peace (IIP) with headquarters in Helsinki. In 1968 it returned to its original name, although IIP continued operations (in Vienna in a building owned by a Soviet company based in Lichtenstein) as some people, who would not accept a WPC invitation, would accept one from IIP.

The Danish government also had a very negative attitude towards DKSU because the friendship society was under the influence of one particular ideology not shared by the majority of the Danish population. In a few cases the press bureau had helped DKSU with information materials on Denmark in the hope that this non-communist material would be send to the USSR and thereby present Soviet citizens with a different picture of Denmark.

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758 RA/UM.5.E.92/Dannato to UM 8.11.1958
761 Rose, 57-58, 92-93, 108-111, 135, 142,161-162
762 RA/UM.17.I.84/UM to Moscow Embassy 856 5.11.1958.
The June 1952 Odense Conference “For a peaceful solution to the German Problem”\textsuperscript{764} was originally supposed to take place in France, but the French authorities strongly opposed it.\textsuperscript{765} The venue was changed to Denmark despite Danish authorities’ visa denials to many foreign participants (traveling from visa free countries could not be denied) with the aforementioned reason given.\textsuperscript{766} The members of the Polish delegation (who were refused visas) had officially been elected five days after turning in their visa applications.\textsuperscript{767} The final statement of the conference called for a reunited, disarmed Germany.\textsuperscript{768}

The Danish organizers were also dissatisfied with the conference, but this had more to do with the chaotic and arrogant behavior of the French WPC representatives and their impolite treatment of the female students of the conference venue, an agricultural school. The description give the impression of a very chaotic event.\textsuperscript{769}

**Referendums.** Another method to claim popular support for the peace movements was to conduct private referendums, such as the 1951 privately organized referendum in the Copenhagen suburb Husum. Prior to the referendum several living room meetings had taken place, and all households received two explanatory letters in advance as a well as a door to door visit by activists distributing ballots. A few days later the activists collected the ballots. Of 404 households in the housing area Humlevænget 118 declined, did not answer, or did not return ballots that were filled out. This left 266 participating households, but 620 filled out ballots (although 162 of these were left completely or partially blank). No information exists on the number of edible voters. They were asked three questions:

1: “Do you support protest that could put an end to the rearmament and militarization politics that have such a negative influence on the economic situation of the household?” (425 voted yes, 18 no, and 3 blank ballots).

2: “Do you wish for the five great powers, the USA, USSR, UK, Chinese Peoples’ Republic, and France to initiate negotiations on a peace pact?” (428 voted yes, 16 no, and 2 blanks).

3: “In your opinion, should Danish military forces, in the current tense international climate, be deployed for combat engagement outside of Danish borders, for example in Korea?” (17 voted yes,

\textsuperscript{764} Congress of the Peoples for Peace Information Service 10.13.1952.
\textsuperscript{766} RA/UM.5.E.95/Legation Warsaw to UM 298 6.16.1952.
\textsuperscript{767} RA/UM.5.E.95/Instruction 6.10.1952.
\textsuperscript{768} KB/JJ/30/Final statement 1952.
\textsuperscript{769} ABA/EK/1/Report 6.19.1952.
A referendum with similar questions and results took place in Jægerborgsgade. There are several problems with this referendum (even without going into the legal questions of organizing it). Firstly, the figures do not in any way tally with the overall figure of ballots. Secondly, the questions were extremely biased in the manner they were framed. Thirdly, it is very likely that members of the public who disagreed with FT did not participate. The results of the “referendum” are unlikely to present any factual indication of popular opinion among the residents at Humlevænget in 1951.

Nevertheless, the referendum was considered to be a huge success and members were encouraged to organize similar referendums in their own neighborhood or workplace.

**Publishing activities.** Several front organizations published various journals and magazines. DDK published *Vi Kvinder*. A typical 16 page issue in black, white, and red included a short story, book reviews, cross word puzzles, articles on children’s upbringing or health problems, but also articles on the activities of DDK and other Danish and international front organizations or articles in support of the foreign policy of the USSR or other socialist countries. Clearly, the non-political articles were published to draw in a wider readership that would otherwise not come into contact with these messages. To some degree DDK succeed in this, as the number of subscribers for many years surpassed the number of readers, even if *Vi Kvinder* could not generate a surplus. FT published *Kæmp for Freden* that was succeeded by *Tænk i Tide*. The founder of the first paper, Bent Laybourn, stated that its purpose was to counter the negative coverage of the peace movement in the national press. The journals constantly suffered financial woes and the large majority of subscribers lived in the Greater Copenhagen area (84 %). Fredericia had as many subscribers as Århus and Ålborg put together, and despite its factories and harbor Esbjerg only had three subscribers. This indicates very little impact outside of the largest cities for the messages of the pro-Soviet peace movement.

Local committees in Frederiksberg, Nørrebro, Amager, Vanløse, and Ålborg also published their own minor journals, more often than not in duplicated form rather than printed with print runs of 2-
15,000 issues. The FT steering committee circulated a special internal newsletter carrying news stories that could be and did get reprinted in the local publications.

For space restrictions we will not discuss the contents of the journals (the DSKU journal *Sovjetunionen i Dagen* will serve as an example below in this chapter), but note that the reading several volumes of both national and local publications leave us with the impression of a position in favor of Soviet politics, defense of its foreign policy, in favor of attacks on NATO, USA, and attempts at creating a public protest against the securing of Denmark’s defensive capabilities by claiming that the money would be better spent on housing projects or building new schools or kindergartens.

## COORDINATED CAMPAIGNS

In a number of cases it is possible to identify a cooperation and coordination between campaigns, for example a number of simultaneous organized demonstrations against the nuclear bomb coordinated between FT, DDK, and DUV. The following section discusses several examples of these coordinated campaigns.

**Signature collections.** During the 1950s Fredens Tilhængere was the driving force in several attempts to promote campaigns initiated by international front organizations.

The first of these signature collection campaigns related to the Stockholm Peace Appeal adopted at the March 1950 WPC committee meeting in Stockholm for an international ban on atomic weapons. Needless to say, the appeal was adopted prior to the USSR having nuclear bombs. FT cooperated closely with DDK and DUV (both collective members of FT) during the campaign. Collectors used every opportunity to secure signatures, visiting cattle shows or packing signature lists in their summer holiday suitcases. Local committees formed collection committees, subdivided their districts, and designated members to lead the collection activities in the given area.

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777 ABA/FT/1/Messages to the local committees # 1 6.28.1951.
778 KB/II/29/Fredsnyt # 1 7.7.1950.
780 “We demand the absolute banning of the atomic bomb, weapon of terror and mass extermination of populations. We demand the establishment of strict international control to ensure the implementation of this ban. We consider that the first Government to use the atomic weapon against any other country whatsoever would be committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war criminal. We call on all men of goodwill throughout the world to sign this Appeal” (RA.UM.11.A.5.Bilag/World Council of Peace Resolutions and Documents).
781 ABA/FT/1/Newsletter 5.23.1950.
782 ABA/FT/1/Newsletter 7.1.1950.
Members were also expected to agitate for signature collections at the work places. They organized public meetings to agitate for the signing of the appeal, drove in a horse carriage across inner Copenhagen to distribute agitation materials and collect signatures, agitated amongst their peers at institutions of higher education, and even went to beach to ask sunbathers to sign. The organizations cooperated in cities all across Denmark. The DKU journal *Fremad* filled its pages with calls to collect signatures, results from Denmark and other countries, and articles presenting the USA and NATO as warmongers. DKU members who collected 10 signatures received an autographed picture of Mogens Fog, 50 signatures resulted in a book certificate, and a higher number secured the member a special diploma. Fredens Tilhængere succeeded in collecting 135,000 signatures on the Stockholm Peace Appeal. This roughly matched the number of votes for DKP at the September 1950 general elections. The campaign met considerable resistance from the conservative newspapers *Berlingske Tidende* and *Berlingske Aftenavis*. They ran a campaign on the covert methods that were used in the campaign, warned against its communist origins and propaganda value and printed a coupon that anybody who had signed the appeal could submit to the newspaper to withdraw their signature. 14,500 took advantage of the opportunity. Danish newspapers of various political observations directed harsh criticism against the chairman Mogens Fog. An attempt was made externally to give the impression that the newspaper campaign had no major negative impact on collection by publicly making a fuss over how some of the coupons received through *Berlingske* did not correspond with names on the signature lists, were unreadable, more than once came from the same person, and some from persons who had never signed and in the end Fredens Tilhængere declined to receive further withdrawals through this channel. But inwardly DKP recognized that the *Berlingske Tidende* campaign had hit hard. Inger Merete Nordentoft critically stated that a quicker response against the campaign should have taken place: "We only have so many signatures as our votes. That is unsatisfactory ". Svend Nielsen concluded in his report to the Central Committee meeting in May 1951 that DKP and DKU had promised to collect 150,000 signatures in Stockholm appeal in,
but the goal was not reached. Worldwide, 500 million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal were collected: 380 million in the USSR, Eastern Bloc countries, and China, while the remaining 120 million originated from 68 other countries.

The second signature campaign was formed on the basis of a WPC call for a meeting between the five great powers (US, USSR, UK, France, communist China). Similarly to the Stockholm appeal signature campaign, FT activists enthusiastically engaged with the assignment of collecting signatures. In some cases they printed and distributed flyers to residents in local neighborhoods. Other front organizations such as DDK took part in the campaign.

However, FT had to acknowledge the difficulties of reaching the goal of 150,000 signatures. It was especially difficult to collect signatures outside of the larger cities. In an attempt to remedy the situation FT activists spent two hours in front of every local train station in the greater Copenhagen area on one Sunday in March 1952, but only reached 90 percent of the target figures for collected signatures. A reading of the weekly FT steering committee minutes show how difficult it was to keep the momentum of the campaign going, and it took several years to reach the final count of 160,000 signatures.

Following this second campaign, the FT steering committee had had their fill of organizing signature campaigns. Instead, DKP had to take on the task (on the “Vienna appeal” with meager results.

**Accusations of bacteriological warfare in Korea.** Between 1951 and 1953 several international front organizations launched a campaign against the UN forces in Korea. North Korean and Chinese sources claimed in very detailed accounts that US military aircraft in Korea released the microbes of plague, cholera, typhus, and other frightful, contagious diseases in violation of the 1925 Geneva Convention. WFSW, IADL, and WIDF all sent fact-finding missions to Korea. The title of the WIDF report alone shows how they accepted all claims at face value without any critical

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792 ABA/DKP/74/Svend Nielsen’s report at CC meeting 5.19.-20.1951.
793 Hein Rasmussen, 24.
795 ABA/FT/1/Flyer April 1952.
796 KB/JJ/30/FT SC 4.27.1951.
797 ABA/FT/1/Circular letter 2.15.1952.
798 ABA/FT/1/Circular letter 2.23.1952.
799 ABA/FT/1/Circular letter 3.22.1952.
800 KB/JJ/30-31/FT SC minutes 1951-1953.
801 KB/JJ/31/FT SC 2.18.1954.
802 DIIS I, 374.
examination of the alleged evidence. A US call for an International Red Cross mission was denied.\footnote{803}

According to a local, duplicated FT journal it was impossible to determine who had attacked whom in Korea since neither side respected the 38th parallel. However, this did not stop the journal from accusing the US of warmongery and leading an imperialist crusade against the whole of Southeast Asia, especially China.\footnote{804} Simultaneously, FT launched a nationwide campaign of screenings of a Chinese film supposedly documenting American war crimes.\footnote{805} Ida Bachmann and Kate Fleron, both participants in the WIDF mission, reporting on the findings of their Korean journey accused the American troops of committing war crimes, bombing anything moving, and slaughtering civilians. In a direct comparison with the Lidice massacre of World War II they stated that the American troops were no better than the Nazis, that Denmark was responsible for the alleged crimes as well because Denmark had supported the UN resolution for intervention, and for good measure argued that Denmark was in danger of becoming the next Korea due to the rearmament and “re-nazification” of Germany.\footnote{806} Overall, Danish front organizations covered the Korean War from three perspectives: disbelief in North Korean aggression, critique of the American led UN intervention forces, and accusations of American bacteriological warfare.

**Against (Western) German rearment.** The 1950s saw an international Soviet-organized campaign against the rearment of Western Germany (but not Eastern) and incorporation in NATO. The main activity was a number of protest conferences\footnote{807} that included Danish participation.\footnote{808} As early as 1951 local FT committees wrote letters of protest over the very notion of German rearment to the Danish government.\footnote{809}

Modstandsbevægelsens Initiativkomite mod Tysk Genopprustning (‘The Resistance Movement’s Initiative Committee against German rearment’) was founded in December 1953 with non-communist lawyer L. Prytz as chairman, but many communists in leading positions in both FT and the Committee. The Committee had two primary functions: the publication of a journal and organizing a campaign of signatures against German rearment. The journal, published 1953-55

\begin{flushleft}
\footnote{804} Freden og Folket 1950(1):1, 1
\footnote{805} ABA/FT/2/Circular letter 5.4.1952.
\footnote{806} Kæmp for Freden 1951(2):20, 1-5.
\footnote{807} ABA/FT/1/Messages to the local committees # 2 7.12.1951
\footnote{808} РГАНИ/5/28/357/46-50/Л. Маркаченков ЦК КПИСС 2.21.1955.
\footnote{809} KB/JJ/30/FT SC
\end{flushleft}
contained numerous articles claiming a reawakening of Fascism in the governmental structures of Western Germany. The military structures of GDR did not receive any attention. The signature campaign collected 200,000 signatures demanding a national referendum in Denmark on the question of Danish support in NATO of German rearmament.\textsuperscript{810} The Soviet legation supported the committee by ordering several subscriptions of its journal and the leading communist member Frode Toft discussed it and other activities in meetings with the Soviet legation.\textsuperscript{811} However, the journal folded, and the signatures failed to impress the Danish government.

**DKSU**

As noted in the beginning of this chapter the largest, most important, and most active of the involved Danish organizations was the Danish-Soviet Friendship Society. As the largest and most active (and longest surviving) participant in Soviet cultural diplomacy DKSU merits its own case study. It is possible to identify five main activities.\textsuperscript{812}

**Sovjetunionen i Dag (SiD).** The DKSU journal started in 1947 and folded in 1955, originally it was published quarterly, but with volume 2 it became a monthly publication. It is possible to identify three recurring themes.

Firstly, as noted by Bent Jensen, the journal was a show piece for the Soviet way of life with texts and pictures of Stalin as the wise leader surrounded by admiring subjects, good-natured Soviet soldiers on guard for peace, material abundance, jubilant women in procession, child, gatherings that made unanimous decisions, workers who looked into the bright future, female pilots, cultural delegations on the Red Square and, as the icing on the cake, a cover with a little girl sewing a flag reading "Stalin is the Peace".\textsuperscript{813} Secondly, *SiD* promoted Soviet peace propaganda\textsuperscript{814} and included negative descriptions of the American nuclear policy program, but positive remarks on the similar Soviet program,\textsuperscript{815} and published full text translations of speeches on the peace cause by leading Soviet personalities at

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\textsuperscript{811} РГАНИ/5/28/225/17-18/Запись беседы с членом редакции Ф. Тофтом 4.28.1954.
\textsuperscript{812} For the fifth, delegations to the USSR, see Chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{813} Jensen (2002), 45.
\textsuperscript{814} *SiD* 1950(3):4, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{815} *SiD* 1948(1):4, 1-3.
home or at various international congresses,\footnote{SiD 1949(2):1, s. 13-15; 1949(2):2, s. 6-9; 1953 (6):2, 5.} critical remarks on NATO,\footnote{SiD 1949(2):3, 4, 5-6, 10.} accounts of the collection of signatures on the Stockholm peace appeal,\footnote{SiD1950(3):4, s. 1-3; 1951(3):9-10, s. 29.} or protests to the UN Security Council, for example regarding the Korean War.\footnote{SiD 1950(3):7-8, s. 15, 36-48.}

Thirdly, theme issues covered Danish delegations’ (positive) impressions of the USSR. As was the case with the 1950 cultural delegation, members described how conditions within their professional field were better in the USSR than in Denmark; trade union chairman Willy Brauer wrote on the conditions at work places, MD Mogens Fog on the health sector, trade union chairman Carlo Hermansen on the trade unions, editor Anker Kirkeby on the press, and stage director Evald Rasmussen on the theater.\footnote{SiD 1950(3):5-6.}

Initially, members were told that SiD was very popular.\footnote{KB/JJ/22/Circular letter 12.6.1947.} But based on comments made in the following years we have to question that statement. As early as 1948 the leading communist Gelius Lund complained that SiD did not contain information of interest for the Danish public and left readers with an overall dull impression in comparison with the lively and well-edited American Det Bedste (Reader’s Digest in Danish translation).\footnote{Jensen (1999), 151.} Following the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia book shops\footnote{KB/JJ/22/DKSU congress minutes 3.23.1951.} and kiosks\footnote{ABA/DKSU/34/Letter 6.7.1948} refused to sell SiD. The initial print run of 1200-1400 copies could not be maintained.\footnote{KB/JJ/22/Circular letter 12.4.1951.} Year by year subscription figures continued to drop.\footnote{KB/JJ/23/DKSU congress minutes 4.11.1952.} When the journal finally folded in 1955, the vice-chairman concluded in a conversation at the Soviet embassy that despite secret Soviet subvention SiD could not compete with the embassy’s own FOS.\footnote{ABA/DKSU/34/Ifirim Jensen to Hans Chr. Størensen 1.6.1948.} After all, Denmark was too small a country for two Soviet propaganda journals.

**Film screenings.** DKSU emphasized screening Soviet films and it was a major public activity, as stated in a circular to members Copenhagen in 1953: “Screenings of Soviet films is the best agitation for our association”.\footnote{Frederichsen (2012), 190-191.} Alfred Jensen hoped that Soviet films would be a way to
effectively compete with American cultural diplomacy. The majority of screenings took place in Copenhagen at various cinemas, or at special film weeks during the Easter holiday and DKSU screened all kinds of films from feature films to documentaries, to animated children’s films, and newsreels. Outside of Copenhagen screenings were possible thanks to the narrow-gauge movie projectors provided as gifts from VOKS. DKSU faced several problems regarding this activity. Firstly Dan-Ina Film and Sovexportfilm were not keen to lend out new releases free of charge to DKSU. Secondly, the owners of, for example, Copenhagen or Ålborg movie theaters were not inclined to rent out their theaters for closed screenings for DKSU members. Thirdly, both Alfred Jensen and DKSU Odense chairman Poul Jølbæk tried in vain to explain to Soviet representatives that black and white war movies did not interest Danish movie goers. In 1962, following yet another failed Easter movie festival, DKSU EC decided to cancel further screenings due to the lack of quality films. Apparently, the Soviets did not heed the warning.

**Soviet cultural delegations.** Each year a Soviet delegation of artists and intellectuals participated in the “Friendship Month” that took place following the annual DKSU congress planned in close cooperation with VOKS. Usually, VOKS also took on the expenses. A typical example of a cultural delegation was the 1956 delegation consisting of 8 people (ballet dancers, folklore dancers, an accordion player, and a balaika solist). In his welcoming address to a 1962 Soviet variety show at Tivoli, DKSU chairman Jørgen Jørgensen claimed that the visits by Soviet cultural delegations were extremely popular and convinced the Danish spectators of the high level of art and culture in the USSR. The following section discusses two cases of cultural delegations to see if they lived up to this claim.

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830 KB/JJ/23/DKSU EC minutes 10.23.1953.
831 KB/JJ/22-25/Various circular letters and festival programs.
833 KB/JJ/23/DKSU Copenhagen EC minutes 1.3.1952; 2.23.1952.
834 KB/JJ/23/DKSU EC minutes 10.25.1952.
835 ABA/DKSU/34/Helge Poulsen to Ifrim Jensen 4.10.1950.
836 Jensen (1999), 149-151.
838 KB/JJ/25/Plan for 1956 friendship month.
840 KB/JJ/22/Jørgen Jørgensen to legation secretary Nikitin 11.21.1951.
842 KB/JJ/28/Manuscript 3.15.1962.
The 1952 cultural included a delegation of six persons and an artist group of five persons. During their stay they gave 28 lectures and performances in 8 different cities. However, the press mostly covered the story that members of the delegation refused to participate in a radio broadcast because the interpreter had written critical articles on Soviet affairs. Danish press did praise Soviet performances for their artistic merit.

On the other hand, the 1954 cultural delegation was considered a huge success with participation and positive coverage outside of the usual circles, especially due to the participation of the famous author Konstantin Simonov.

Our cases studies show that the propaganda value of the Soviet cultural delegations depended too much on coincidence and did not seem to have any lasting value. However, DKSU did learn one thing. They constantly asked for artistic performances rather than lectures that had to be translated from Russian and therefore bored the audience. The language barrier discussed in chapter 1 was a constants source of problems for creating impact.

Public lectures. Eventually lecture evenings became a more and more important activity. As with other activities the majority took place in Copenhagen (in 1954, more activities took place in the Copenhagen branch than all of the other branches combined). Themes varied widely: impressions from travels to the USSR, various aspects of Soviet high culture, meetings on Soviet red-letter days, whilst Soviet lecturers spoke on various aspects on Soviet cultural, political, and economic life. Often, the lectures were followed by screenings of Soviet documentaries, coffee drinking, and lotteries.

The many difficulties of DKSU. If we move beyond the optimistic tones of Jørgen Jørgensen we see a very different picture when investigating the possible impact of the many DKSU activities. Firstly, membership figures only averaged about 2,000 members. A few trade union branches and private business as collective members artificially accounted for an additional 8,000 members. By artificially inflating the membership figure it reached 14,000 members by 1961.

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843 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1a/Memorandum 4.22.1952.
844 Socialdemokraten, Berlingske Tidende, Land og Folk, Nationaltidende, Politiken. All 1.30.1952.
845 Politiken 4.4.1954.
846 KB/JJ/24/DKSU Congres minutes 4.11.1954.
848 KB/JJ/24/Reports on activites in 1954.
849 Frederichsen (2012), 189.
850 Jensen (1999), 147.
851 Jensen (202), 45.
Secondly, as we have seen, the various activities suffered from various chronic problems both in the manner of organizing them and in the reception. Interestingly, DKSU seems to have not learnt any lessons from this. In 1952 DKSU organized a conference to discuss why their activities were so uninteresting to the general public. Following a lengthy discussion and after hearing various suggestions it was concluded that they were on the right track and the general public was wrong when it could not understand the benefits of closer relations with the USSR. Therefore, operations should continue in the same unaltered pattern.\footnote{KB/JJ/23/Conference minutes 10.26.1952.}

Thirdly, prominent non-communist members quickly began to leave the DKSU EC. Two early EC members had been the Social-democratic chairman Hans Hedtoft and CTU chairman Eiler Jensen, which is surprising in regards to their anti-communist position. However, Hans Hedtoft left the EC when he became Prime Minister,\footnote{Frederichsen (2012), 194.} and a few years later Eiler Jensen left as well,\footnote{ABA/LO/546/Eiler Jensen to Albert Olsen 3.20.1948.} whereas the later Copenhagen chief mayor H.P. Sørensen was not reelected due to disagreements over the DKSU position on Danish NATO membership,\footnote{Berlingske Aftenavis 3.1.1949.} and the Minister of fisheries Chr. Christensen left in 1951.\footnote{KB/JJ/22/Chr. Christensen to DKSU 4.5.1951.} Outside of the social-democratic circles, director Alf Ussing of the Great Nordic Telegraph Company was ordered to leave the EC by his company that would not be seen publicly as supporting one or the other side in the international conflict between the superpowers.\footnote{KB/JJ/23/Alf Ussing to Jørgen Jørgensen 10.12.1951.} Professor of English literature C.A. Bodelsen left because he would not support the direction DKSU had taken as a Soviet mouth piece.\footnote{KB/JJ/23/C.A. Bodelsen to Jørgen Jørgensen 5.8.1952.} In other words the political broad coalition of the EC that should have served to bring legitimacy to DKSU in the eyes of the general public crumbled as the Cold War intensified.

Fourthly, a reading of the minutes of DKSU congresses provides us with a depressing picture of the results of the neglect of learning from past mistakes. At the annual DKSU congresses\footnote{The following is based on ABA/DKSU/1/Congress minutes and materials 1950-1965.} Jørgen Jørgensen and his successor Carl Thomsen would initially report on how the international situation had improved, the general admiration of the scientific, economic, and cultural development had risen, and the environment for furthering international relations in general and thereby the working conditions for DKSU had strongly improved, leading to an expansion in DKSU relations with other parts of society. Visits by Soviet notabilities like major general Korotkov (commander of the Soviet

\footnotesize{\textit{DIIS II}. 380.}
forces that liberated Bornholm), minister of culture Furtseva or cosmonaut Gagarin were used as examples of how their visits improved bilateral relations. However, when the chairmen had to present the actual level of activities in the year just gone, they could not live up to the optimistic overtures. DKSU was not involved with official delegations, no new collective members appeared, and movie screenings were coming to a halt. Formerly, the visits by Soviet cultural delegations had been free of charge, but during the decade they became very expensive since deficits from performances were almost a given. DKSU lost its office space and had severe difficulties in renting a new space. DKSU only accounted for one tenth of all Danish tourism to the USSR. Non-communist members left, and overall membership figures were falling. The general report was followed by the less than encouraging news from local delegates on the activity level and impact of the local branches. They suffered from small membership basis, dysfunctional and inactive boards, lack of funding, and lack of activities. Often, they could not afford to organize events with the members of Soviet cultural delegations due to the assurance of a deficit they could not afford to carry. Following the establishment of local branches in Bornholm, Elsinore, Esbjerg, Odense, Randers, Ålborg, and Århus no new branches came into existence during the period, either because of lack of interest or a too heavy communist presence in the initiative. Only DKSU Aalborg appeared to be successful, with a language school operating under the Danish evening school legislation, well-attended concerts, and a high activity level of public lectures and film screenings. The high activity level was even reflected positively in the local press. The one negative aspect was that almost only communists were members, prompting Knud Rahbek Schmidt to ask if there were no sensible people living in Aalborg except for communists. Finally, when all the misery had been brought into the light of day, the communist DKSU vice-chairman Alfred Jensen took the opportunity to deliver his annual scolding of those assembled. Local departments were told that they were too pessimistic about economy. Not all events would create an economic surplus, but they could provide PR value for the local branches. He told the members to stop complaining, roll up their sleeves, and otherwise without complaint organize the events with artists and speakers (besides the local program), as decided by the national EC.
Fifthly, Hungary happened.

**Hungary 1956 according to the USSR.** Following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Soviet cultural diplomacy attempted to frame the incident in the Danish public’s mind as a reasonable public dissatisfaction in Hungary that had been exploited by reactionary and fascist forces. They had aligned themselves with the Imre Nagy government. Therefore a revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government had been established. It had asked the Soviet Union for help to "put an end to the scourge of counter-revolutionary elements and protect workers’ and peasants’ power". The Soviet Union had obviously been so kind as to comply immediately with the request.\(^{861}\) Subsequently, emphasis was placed on the Soviet relief effort of food, medical, and building material supplies to Hungary.\(^{862}\)

**Popular Danish reactions.** However, the general Danish public quickly acquired a much clearer and critical impression of the events in Hungary thanks to the media coverage that received more air time than the contemporary Suez-crisis. Danish Radio’s journalists Svend Ludvigsen and Villy Reunert’s coverage with the sound of gunshots in the background during the daily news broadcast had a huge influence. For the first time ever the ban on TV commercials was lifted and three shows were aired on both TV and Radio to support a Danish Red Cross collection to send an ambulance to Hungary. Several books on the Hungarian events were published. Several newspapers compared the struggle of the Hungarians with that of the Danish freedom fighters during the World War II occupation (a fundamental national narrative in Denmark) or referenced George Orwell’s *1984*. Several protest meetings were organized, 6-10,000 people participated in a demonstration in central Copenhagen in front of the University of Copenhagen, and five minutes of silence was observed at noon on November 8\(^{th}\). Riots in Copenhagen led to the smashing of windows at the Soviet embassy and the DKP headquarters.\(^{863}\)

**DKP and Hungary.** DKP was struck hard by the events. At first the leadership was confused on how to react to the Hungarian question and even voiced some critique, prior to the reception of clear

\(^{861}\) FOS 1956(6):44, supplement, 3.
\(^{862}\) FOS 1956(6):46, 5, 11.
instructions from Moscow that events should be condemned as a counterrevolution. More than 3000 members left DKP. It has been argued that it led to the formation of the splinter party SF and the subsequent DKP loss of parliamentary representation in 1960.\textsuperscript{864} Although it should be noted that DKP survived the 1957 parliamentary elections.

**International front organizations and Hungary.** The Soviet international cultural diplomacy apparatus was also severely hit by the events. Despite the WPC executive’s refusal to protest against the Hungarian events at an extraordinary executive meeting held in Helsinki for the first time strong critique of Soviet actions were heard.\textsuperscript{865} Similar critique was heard in WIDE.\textsuperscript{866} In Denmark, DDK lost most of its members. Many branches closed, and by 1958 the number of DDK branches had dwindled to 17.\textsuperscript{867}

**DKSU and Hungary.** DKSU was also hit by the popular Danish reactions to Hungary. The consequences were described in a letter to VOKS:

"On the occasion that the recent events in Hungary and the Soviet Union's intervention have caused incalculable harm to our work for the development of friendly relations between Denmark and the Soviet Union, we feel the urge to express the following to you as our partner for many years:

We deeply regret that the Soviet government has not managed or understood how to avert that the situation in Hungary before it became so critical. We consider the very serious disturbances a strong testimony that the standard of living and political conditions had been very unsatisfactory. And although we are convinced that the US and the other capitalist governments by their military, economic, and propagandistic measures bear a large share of the blame for the discontent, we believe, however, that the Soviet Union cannot be relieved of a heavy responsibility that it has come to this. Instead of strengthening the people’s democratic government’s authority by putting them in a position to raise the people's standard of living sufficiently fast, the insufficient unilateral motivated and perhaps exaggerated criticism of the former leaders has undermined confidence also in their successors and thereby fatally weakened their authority.

We urge VOKS to use all your power to work to ensure that the Soviet Union – also in its own interest – provides help to quickly and undeniably secure an upturn in living standards in the people's democracies and thus to continue the liberalization that cannot be peaceful until the necessary financial basis for mobilization exists.

Unlike many other progressive people in the capitalist countries, we condemn not the Soviet Union's intervention to provide tranquility and peace in Hungary. This intervention was possibly needed in the current situation, but we believe that a wiser policy on the Soviet government's side could have prevented that such an unfortunate situation arose. We

\textsuperscript{864} Thing (1993), 889-899.
\textsuperscript{865} РГАНИ/5/28/502/8/Всемирному Совету Мира без дата.
\textsuperscript{866} РГАНИ/5/28/503/23/Запись беседы с г-жой Андреа Андреен 1.18.1957.
\textsuperscript{867} АВА/DDK/4/EC minutes 2.3.1958.
therefore hope that the Soviet government will take changing its policy towards the people’s democracies in the direction of first and foremost effectively contributing to a satisfactory standard of living for the population into very serious consideration, since it is our belief that this is an essential condition for provision of international confidence and security, without which our work for the development of friendly relations between Denmark and the Soviet Union will be in vain.868

In other words, the DKSU EC fully supported the Soviet invasion and only regretted that it had led to a setback for its ability to operate in Denmark.

However, not all members supported this position. A planned delegation consisting of the head of department in the Ministry of Education Albert Michelsen, director of the university's hereditary biological institute, professor of human hereditary biology and eugenics, and member of the Atomic Energy Commission, Tage Kemp, professor of genetics at the University of Copenhagen. Mogens Westergaard, and professor of general pathology at Aarhus University Jørgen Bichel declined to travel following the development in the international situation in 1956.869 Overall, DKSU had to halt all activities for six months. DKSU870

Simultaneously DKSU experienced a drastic fall in membership figures, especially in the EC. Several prominent members left due to Hungary. They were Politiken journalist Anker Kirkeby,871 the translator and former chairman Ejnar Thomaasen,872 the playwright Kjeld Abell,873 stage director Sam Besekov,874 CEO Knud Korst.875 and DKSU secretary, former editor-in-chief of SiD, the painter Folmer Bendtsen.876 Associated Professor Kolstrup resigned as chairman of DKSU Aarhus because he felt Soviet actions in Hungary were inhuman and impossible to defend.877 Jørgen Jørgensen implored those who left not to hold such a narrow view of the developments in Hungary and stated that he would have preferred that they had stayed in DKSU to work for international detente and world peace.878

868 KB/JJ/26/DKSU to VOKS 11.4.1956.
869 KB/JJ/26/DKSU to VOKS 9.20.1956; Tage Kemp to DKSU 10.30.1956; Michelsen to DKSU 10.30.1956; J. Bichel to Jørgen Jørgensen 10.31.1956; Mogens Westergaard to Jørgen Jørgensen undated.
870 KB/JJ/26//Circular letter from the board of the EC to all local branches 11.27.1956.
871 KB/JJ/26/Anker Kirkeby to Jørgen Jørgensen 11.4.1956.
872 KB/JJ/26/Ejnar Thomassen to Jørgen Jørgensen 11.4.1956.
873 KB/JJ/26/Ejnar Thomassen to Jørgen Jørgensen 11.4.1956.
874 KB/JJ/26/Anker Kirkeby to Jørgen Jørgensen 11.8.1956.
875 KB/JJ/26/Sam Besekov to DKSU 11.11.1956.
876 KB/JJ/26/Knud Korst to Jørgen Jørgensen 11.29.1956.
877 KB/JJ/26/DKSU EC board to local branches’ EC 11.27.1956.
878 KB/JJ/26/DKSU EC board to local branches’ EC 11.27.1956.
Interestingly, many ordinary members stayed faithful to DKSU. In Copenhagen only 42 members left, and in Aalborg only one.\textsuperscript{879} DKSU Odense did not experience any resignations at all.\textsuperscript{880} In a letter to VOKS, chairman Jørgen Jørgensen explained the difficult situation for DKSU, but he also expressed hope that the damage would be quickly repaired and promised that DKSU would do its best to work for an improvement in relations between Denmark and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{881} VOKS vice-chairman Iakovlev offered VOKS’ understanding and support during the difficulties for Danish newspapers gave VOKS the opportunity to read the false coverage of the recent events. VOKS understood the difficult situation of DKSU, but did not doubt that DKSU could overcome them and succeed in the grand task of strengthening the friendship and cultural exchanges between the peoples of Denmark and the USSR.\textsuperscript{882}

**Dansk Fredskonference and Hungary.** DKSU was not the only Danish participant in the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus to be damaged by Hungary. The communist MD Einar Kruse, who was a driving force in Dansk Fredkonference, received several angry letters and demands to condemn the Soviet invasion. He declined and claimed that too little was known of the situation in Hungary to have an informed opinion, but in a clear case of whataboutism he stated that he considered it unfair to demand such a statement from him when no one demanded similar statements of those who were sympathetic towards Great Britain or France regarding the Suez crises or their colonial politics.\textsuperscript{883} However, in the following year Kruse joined the DKP negotiation delegation for meetings with CPSU representatives in Moscow. At this meeting he was given the opportunity to state very bluntly how the Soviet actions in Hungary had destroyed many years’ hard labor to influence the general public in Denmark.\textsuperscript{884} Sadly the minutes taken by Danish delegation members\textsuperscript{885} contain no reference to a possible Soviet answer to Kruse’s blunt criticism and deep frustration over the setback.

\textsuperscript{879} KB/II/26/ Poul Glerup to Jørgen Jørgensen 11.15.1956.  
\textsuperscript{880} KB/II/26/Aase Secher, DKSU Odense, to DKSU 12.15.1956.  
\textsuperscript{881} KB/II/26/Jørgen Jørgensen to Professor Iakovlev, VOKS 12.29.1956.  
\textsuperscript{882} KB/II/26/Vladimir Iakovlev, VOKS, to Jørgen Jørgensen 1.30.1957  
\textsuperscript{883} ABA/EK/1/Collection of letter 1956-1957.  
\textsuperscript{884} ABA/EK/2/EK speech paper 8.5.1957.  
\textsuperscript{885} ABA/EK/2/Delegation report on August 1957 negotiations.
CONCLUSIONS

The Cold War had two periods of intensified activity level among front and friendship organizations. The first of these ended in 1956.

As we have seen, the various organizations operated in very much the same manner to each other, organizing various forms of lectures, events, referendums, and publications that were very similar in content. On top of this, both on an international and national level they were able to coordinate a number of campaigns involving signature collections, the anti-American campaign of accusations of bacteriological warfare in Korea, and the anti-NATO struggle against (West) German rearmament. Had these campaigns succeeded they would have supported and strengthened the position of the USSR in international politics to a high degree. However they failed, partly because they were unable to reach a wide cross-section of the general public, and partly because the Danish authorities and the Social-democratic movement strongly opposed the various organizations and their activities.

The events in Hungary severely damaged the Soviet front organizations. Soviet cultural diplomacy could not overcome the negative consequences of the actual actions taken in Hungary, because the difference between what had been said for many years and what was, in reality, done became too great, and the USSR thereby, broke one of the golden rules of conducting cultural diplomacy.
Chapter 5: Direct Soviet Activities

“The aim of this bulletin is to provide the above mentioned representatives with objective facts and materials received directly from the USSR regarding the political, economic, and spiritual life of the Soviet peoples”. Mission statement, 1951.886

One group of activities must be categorized as cultural diplomacy executed directly by Soviet government representatives and state enterprises. These activities include publications, radio broadcasts, exhibitions, public lectures, screenings and exchanges under the Danish-Soviet cultural agreement. In this chapter we will identify and discuss some examples and whether or not the activities had any impact.

PUBLICATIONS

Throughout the Cold War the USSR published a variety of books, booklets, newsletters, and journals.

APN. Sovinformbureau/APN was the primary publisher and by 1990 circulated publications in 140 countries in 45 different languages on Soviet domestic and foreign policy, economy, science, culture, art, education, sport, and many other themes.887 In addition, APN provided articles and photo materials to external clients, in 1971, for example, APN delivered 59,600 articles and 109,400 photographs to international clients and published 57 journals and nine newspapers with an overall circulation of 2.2 million copies in 54 languages.888 According to APN chairman Vlasov, between 1967 and 1989 APN annually distributed written materials abroad free of charge that were worth 3 million rubles.889

Fakta om Sovjetunionen. One of the 30 journals and 6 newspapers with an overall circulation of 1.5 million copies published by APN in 1964890 was the Danish language version titled Fakta om

886 FOS 1951(1):2, 2.
887 Museums in the USSR (Moscow, 1990), 167.
888 Jyllandsposten 12.15.1972.
Sovjetunionen (‘Facts on the Soviet Union’)(FOS). According to the colophon the journal had various Danish editors; Erik Horskjær, Poul Hansen, Gelius Lund, Karen Kjærulf Nielsen, and Poul-Henning Laursen. The first issue was published in 1951. In 1990 the title was altered to Glasnost. This was a very different, more critical journal in line with contemporary Soviet politics.891

The page count and publication frequency changed over time. In its earliest incarnation FOS was a duplicated 10 page magazine, issued free of charge to anyone who was interested. Later, FOS extended to 16 pages in print format and eventually it became a weekly with illustrations and a cover printed in color. In 1979 it became a 64 page monthly journal.892 All decisions about changes in the format and frequency of the journal were taken in Moscow.893 FOS was widely distributed. Local DKSU branches made sure that local libraries received a copy.894

Since we are dealing with a journal published for 39 years it is impossible to give a detailed description of each volume. The first issue contained a translation of the interview with Stalin originally published in Pravda in February 1951. In the interview Stalin argued that the USSR was a peaceful nation and attacked British PM Attlee who in a speech in the House of Commons said that the USSR should remember that the war was over and begin to act accordingly. Stalin considered the UK to be an aggressive nation. In the same manner he attacked the UN sanctioned intervention forces in the Korean War. The only other article in the first issue was a celebration of the Red Army as “the army of peace”.895 This first issue set the standards and tone of the journal for its remaining years. Overall, throughout the years the key word of FOS was “quantity” through a stream of production figures about industrial, economic or cultural consumption, political commentary framing the USSR as a peaceful nation and the US in particular as an aggressive nation. The journal contained presentations of all the Soviet republics (with quantity as the main argument for improvement of living standards and of social development, or the benefits of Soviet power), Danish-Soviet relations (including coverage of Khrushchev state visit, national anniversaries, or the work of SUDK and DKSU respectively), success stories like Gagarin’s space travel, prize competitions (and coverage of the winners travelling to the USSR), claims of Soviet peace politics, numerous political commentaries on the international situation, and the publication in full of

892 FOS 1980(30):1, 1, 63.
numerous documents (speeches, interviews, addresses to the Danish governments, and even the infamous Bulganin letters to H.C. Hansen). To give a more detailed description of the contents we will utilize volume 31 (1981) as a representative example.

Table 5.A: Themes and number of articles in *FOS* vol. 31 (1981):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International politics (commentaries)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and party</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist theory</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work places and trade unions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and architecture</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social politics</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens and society</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The visual arts</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater and film</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folkloristic art</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental issues</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and technique</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobbies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish-Soviet relations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is possible to divide the articles into 25 themes and 5 permanent sections. The latter were news from DKSU, advertisements for APN booklets, Radio Moscow broadcasting schedule, news in brief, and a cultural revue.

In Table 5.A. the listings reflect the Soviet prioritization of the material. International politics was the major theme particularly in the form of commentaries on the situation in Poland or Afghanistan, criticism of NATO and the US, support of international peace movements, and promotion of the concept of “the North as a nuclear free zone”. Domestic politics were covered primarily through printing of speeches of the 26th party congress and statistics on the development within various sectors of society. Many of these articles featured the Lithuanian SSR as the Soviet cultural days organized by DKSU in 1981 centered on that republic. In the same manner many sports articles covered the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Danish-Soviet contacts covered all aspects of relations between the two countries such as presentations of new books for example Carl Scharnberg’s Nina Krymova biography. Similarly, new Soviet books on Denmark or translations of Danish literature into Russian were mentioned, and the participation of Danish publishing houses at the Moscow book fair and new contracts with Soviet publishers were also covered. Other themes covered were visits to Denmark for example by a mufti or the participation by representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate in an inter-church meeting in Løgumkloster, travels to the USSR made by high school students or rail road workers (for example), or commemorations of famous Danes such as the 300th anniversary of the birth of Vitus Bering. Overall the Soviet journal presented a large and lively cultural relationship between the two countries.

Newsletters. Sovinformburau/APN/IAN published a newsletter of 5-6 pages primarily aimed at Danish newspapers and news agencies, although some private persons and libraries also received copies. Initially titled Nyheder fra Sovjetunionen (1957-1962) it was later retitled Pressebureauet Novostis Bulletin (1962-1966), Novosti presse-nyt (1966-1990), APN-info (1990), and finally Ian-info (1990-1991). It is beyond the scope and possibilities of this dissertation to conduct a survey of the articles in these newsletters and comb through various newspapers to see if any of the stories made publication. Here we shall simply note that similar newsletters appeared in other countries such as Canada\textsuperscript{896} and that contemporary Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish sources indicate that only 1/5 of the articles were used by the national press (mostly by the communists), primarily due to

\textsuperscript{896} RA/UM.133.D.21/Legation Ottawa to UM no. 366 6.28.1955.
lack of relevance of the material in regards to the countries in question.\textsuperscript{897} It seems highly plausible that the situation was similar in regards to the Danish press.

**Booklets.** Aside from the journals and newsletters APN published numerous booklets in Danish on a number of subjects. The following table includes all identifiable editions.

**Table 5.B: Publications per year:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of publications</th>
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<td>1957</td>
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<td>1961</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The earliest titles were printed as special editions of *FOS*. They are included in this list since they were published in the same format and style as later booklets. Early publications seem to have been fairly sporadic, whereas the 1980s was the highpoint of this form of printed cultural diplomacy. The

\textsuperscript{897} ABA/DKSU/5/Interscanian meeting of friendship societies with the USSR minutes 10.13.1973.
price was very low and seems to have only covered postage. In table 5.C. we have listed the booklets according to themes.

Early publications were printed by the DKP printer Terpo-Tryk in Copenhagen, but gradually, although they were still printed in Danish, APN’ own printers in the USSR took over this part of the process.

**Table 5.C.: Booklet themes:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of editions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party documents</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet foreign policy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet peace policies</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Pact</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World communist movement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-maoist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel guides</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and culture</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perestroika</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life, times, and works of V.I. Lenin</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism in Western Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German revanchism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Early publications contained speeches by party leaders like Nikita Khrushchev, Andrei Gromyko, and Leonid Brezhnev, or published various official party documents from various congresses or drafts of new party laws. Throughout the years various speeches and party documents were continually published.

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899 Andrej Gromyko: *Sovjetunionens udenrigspolitik* (Copenhagen, 1957).
As shown in table 5.C. the overwhelming number of publications dealt with various aspects of the USSR.\textsuperscript{905} Some were general presentations of the country through long lists of production numbers on industrial output, harvest figures and other agricultural production, goods transportation, foreign trade, salaries, living costs, apartment sizes, health care, and so on.\textsuperscript{906} Such booklets could be published in updated versions,\textsuperscript{907} or give rosy pictures of the USSR regarding a specific year.\textsuperscript{908} Often they were framed as answering the most commonly asked questions by foreigners regarding the USSR.\textsuperscript{909} The numerous figures were intended not only to display the rising development figures, but also that living standards were higher and better than in capitalist countries.\textsuperscript{910} Another version of this sort of booklets included answers to questions on Soviet society. One such booklet was divided into several themed chapters: State, party, and trade unions, planning and employment, living standards, science, education, culture and sport, society and civil liberties. The first chapter explained both the qualities of living in a socialist society and the finer theoretical points on the difference between democratic centralism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, also seen in relation to the Soviet constitution. Others explained the value of the one-party system or the relationship between state and trade unions. The second chapter answered a wide variety of questions from the necessity to build the Baikal-Amur Railway to functions of kolkhozes and Sovkhozes, the procedures for producing forecasts on harvest results, the 1980 Olympics, the non-existing unemployment, and the import relations with capitalist countries. Other answers denied that Soviet oil reserves could run dry or that the country could ever plummet into a financial crisis. The third chapter emphasized the high living standards in the USSR. The chapter on science answered questions both regarding the state planning of science research and environment protection. The following chapter highlighted the quality of education, sport, and culture through the frequently applied lens of quantitative figures of consumption. The final chapter showcased how civil liberties and minority rights were fully protected – in the special understanding of these questions with a Marxist-Leninist framework, that is.\textsuperscript{911} Again, several updated editions of the same volume could be published, and as such new editions could include new questions within the aforementioned themes.\textsuperscript{912} Some booklets dealt very specifically with a geographical area such as the Soviet

\textsuperscript{905} The most comprehensive was published in 1977 (Sovjetunionen (Moscow, 1977)).
\textsuperscript{906} USSR i tal og fakta (Moscow,1979).
\textsuperscript{907} Aleksandr Zolotarev: USSR i tal og fakta ny udgave (Moscow,1983).
\textsuperscript{908} USSR 1983: Fakta om livet i Sovjetunionen (Moscow, 1983).
\textsuperscript{909} I. Georgijev: Socialisme i hverdagen (Copenhagen, 1974).
\textsuperscript{910} USSR’s forfatning er en garanti (Moscow, 1980).
\textsuperscript{911} Sovjetunionen: 100 spørgsmål og svar second edition (Moscow, 1979).
\textsuperscript{912} Sovjetunionen: 100 spørgsmål og svar third edition (Moscow, 1980).
republic Turkmenia\textsuperscript{913} or Lithuania\textsuperscript{914} to prove that life had improved immensely for the local population by becoming part of the USSR. Production figures always formed the backbone of the arguments. Similarly, a booklet on the history of Leningrad emphasized higher living standards, industrial progress, and mass education in comparison with czarist times. Special emphasis was also placed on the sacrifices of the Soviet people regarding World War II and the siege of Leningrad.\textsuperscript{915} Other booklets within this category dealt with a specific question of Soviet society. One example was a richly illustrated booklet on the Soviet education system. The booklet included an unending stream of figures on the number of students and schools all the way from kindergarten and preschool, through to public and secondary school and technical institutions and universities.\textsuperscript{916} Some proclaimed workers’ control over the means of production in the USSR,\textsuperscript{917} dealt with scientific progress\textsuperscript{918}, student life,\textsuperscript{919} freedom of religion,\textsuperscript{920} freedom of speech,\textsuperscript{921} food production,\textsuperscript{922} or environmental protection.\textsuperscript{923} A 1982 booklet on Soviet living sums up the message in this category of booklets. The Soviet society was superior to capitalistic western societies by having a different democratic system that guaranteed the right to work, the right to health care, and the right to education, as well as socialist guarantees pensions, stable prices, housing, and day care for children.\textsuperscript{924}

The advent of Perestroika led to a new category of titles dealing with this theme including a presentation of Perestroika as the return to the original ideas coined by Lenin,\textsuperscript{925} an explanation of the basic principles of Perestroika by collecting answers given by leading party members at various press conferences,\textsuperscript{926} and a summary of Perestroika’s influence on positive changes in Soviet foreign and security policy.\textsuperscript{927}

\textsuperscript{913}Bally Jaskulijev: Turkmenien (Moscow, 1987).
\textsuperscript{914}Motejus Sumauskas: Den socialhistiske sovjetrepublik Litauen (Copenhagen, 1974).
\textsuperscript{915}Leningrad i går, i dag, i morgen (Moscow, 1982).
\textsuperscript{916}Zoja Malkova: Uddannelse (Moscow, 1981).
\textsuperscript{917}Aleksandr Levikov: Hvem leder fabrikkene i USSR? (Moscow, 1984).
\textsuperscript{918}Jurij Kanin: Videnskab (Moscow, 1982).
\textsuperscript{919}Vladimir Lisovskij: Studerende i Sovjetunionen (Moscow, 1983).
\textsuperscript{920}Vladimir Kurojedov: Religion og kirke i Sovjetunionen (Moscow, 1982).
\textsuperscript{921}Vladimir Kokasjinskij: Hvad diskuteres man i Sovjetunionen? (Moscow, 1980).
\textsuperscript{922}Hele foljets sag (Moscow, 1984).
\textsuperscript{923}Jurij Sinjakov: Miljøbeskyttelse (Moscow, 1983).
\textsuperscript{924}Nikolaj Jefimov: Sovjetisk levevis (Moscow, 1982).
\textsuperscript{925}Revolutionen fortsætter. Tilbage til Lenins ideer: Oktoberrevolutionen og perestrojka (Moscow, 1988).
\textsuperscript{926}Omstillingen af det politiske system – det er hovedsagen: Oktoberrevolutionen og perestrojka (Moscow, 1988).
\textsuperscript{927}Stanislav Kondrasjov: Den sunde fornufts imperativer (Moscow, 1990).
Perestroika could also lead to changes in the contents of booklets in the general Soviet category. For example, a booklet on informal youth groups in Leningrad including the question of youth unemployment was produced. One of the cases where the fixation on official figures becomes most evident is in the booklets concerning sport. More than anything they listed various sports, the number of active Soviet participants, and a list of medals won in international competitions, especially the Olympics. In one booklet on Soviet participation in Winter Olympics this kind of listing almost leaves the reader with a sense of Soviet bragging.

Booklets on culture focused on production figures, socialist realism as genre, high art, mass participation, and the high cultural level of Soviet citizens. In one case the publication of a collection of Soviet children’s drawings was used to highlight the peaceful nature and intentions of the USSR.

We see a few examples of travel guides. One of them, published in cooperation with Intourist, included both classical elements of a travel guide: a short, basic presentation of the USSR, recommendations of sights in various cities, popular souvenirs forms of travels (from cruises to hunting trips), an account of the Intourist service desks at hotels and a list of phrases, but also detailed descriptions of border and visa regulations, customs regulations, lists of banned goods (including any Soviet currency), the mandatory reception by Intourist guides at the border (and what to do if they were not there), regulations for photography and filming, including the ban on taking photographs from planes, filming, photographing, or drawing military installations, entire industrial cities, or anything whatsoever within 25 kilometers of the border. One of the travelers visiting the USSR was the West German peace activist Fritz Immele – the only non-Soviet author in the booklet series – who visited Moscow and Leningrad and wrote a glowing report of his impressions.

928 Sergej Nenasjew: Et ståsted i tilværelsen (Et portræt af uformelle ungdomsgrupper i Leningrad) (Moscow, 1990).
929 Grigorij Reznitjenko: Sovjetisk ungdom: Spørgsmål og svar (Moscow, 1980).
930 Boris Khavin: Sport (1988); Vladimir Kirilljuk: Sport (Moscow, 1984); Oleg Spasskij: Under de fem olympiske ringe (Moscow, 1983).
931 Lev Lebedev: Fen ringe i sneen (vintersport i Sovjetunionen) (Moscow, 1987).
932 Gavril Petrospan: Kultur (Moscow, 1983); Kulturgoderne er folkets eje (Moscow, 1983).
933 Irina Bulekova: Verden set med børns øjne (Moscow, 1983).
935 Fritz Immele: Hvad jeg så i Moskva og Leningrad (Copenhagen, 1984).
Regarding Soviet foreign policy it is possible both to identify general works claiming the peaceful and cooperative nature and intentions of Soviet international relations and booklets dealing with specific themes. Naturally some existed to defend certain politics, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (explained as Soviet armed forces saving a grateful Czechoslovakian people from the evils of a counterrevolution). Others emphasized particular Soviet interests such as the respect of international borders, both those of the USSR and on an international scale.

A special sub-category within the genre of foreign policy was the booklets dealing with Soviet peace politics. They showcased the proclaimed image of the USSR as a peaceful nation by collecting Brezhnev speeches or published positive stories on Soviet active participation in disarmament and security conferences such as the 1975 Helsinki conference, as well as the following conference within the framework of the Helsinki accords, but also presented the difference between the Soviet peace policy and the aggressive US/NATO policy, both in regards to claims of illegal US buildup of chemical weapons and in campaigns against the implementation of the NATO double track decision. The deployment of SS-20s was explained as a necessary act of defense, whereas the American deployment was accused of being aggressive and the negotiation proposal as unfair. At one point APN published a translation of a booklet originally published by the publishing house of the Soviet Ministry of Defense that sought to document (through large amounts of figures) that the US was an aggressive player in world politics and as such the threat to world peace. Several publications attempted to convey this message by collecting various Soviet peace or disarmament proposals.

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936 Vadim Sagladin: *Omstilling og humanisering af de internationale relationer* (Moscow, 1989); *Sovjetunionens udenrigspolitik: Spørgsmål og svar* (Moscow, 1984).
937 *Svar på spørgsmål om Tjekkoslovakiet* (Copenhagen, 1968).
939 Stepan Molodtsov: *Fred langs grænserne* (Copenhagen, 1964); *Ro om landegrænserne: Henvendelse fra Sovjetunionens statsminister N.S. Hrustjov til stats- og regeringschefer i hele verden* (Copenhagen, 1964).
943 Kemiske våben: *Et gaskammer for menneskeheden: Dokumenter og kommentarer* (Moscow, 1984).
944 Fjodor Burlatskij: *Fred: Utopi eller realitet?* (Moscow, 1982); Leonid Fjodorov: *Hvorfor kaprurstningen fortsætter* (Moscow, 1983); Gennadij Gerasimov: *Krig og fred i atomalderen* (Moscow, 1982).
945 V.N. Popov: *Europas selvmord?* (Moscow, 1983).
946 *Hvorfor trues freden?* (Copenhagen, 1982).
947 *Det sovjetiske program for styrkelse af freden og sikkerheden i Europa* (Moscow, 1983); *Sikkerhedspolitik ved korsvejen* (Copenhagen, 1983); *Sovjetunionens vigtigste nedrustningsforslag* (Moscow, 1983).
A recurring Soviet propaganda slogan was the North (a term covering Scandinavia and nearby territories) as a nuclear free zone. During the 1980s peace campaigns against the NATO double track decision APN published booklets that framed protester against the NATO double track decision in a positive light.

Another theme dealt with various sides of the communist movement. One booklet gave an overview of the history of socialism, whereas another explained the basic theories of communism or called for unity in the world communist movement – under the leadership of CPSU. Among the booklets framed in positive tones several described COMECON emphasizing the mutually beneficial sides of the organization. Booklets dealing with Maoism gave very negative assessments and argued that it deviated from the “correct” Soviet understanding of Marxism-Leninism.

The Warsaw Pact was the theme of several booklets highlighting the military alliance as defensive and a force for world peace.

Several themes were covered within the field of history. One series commemorated Lenin, especially in the year of the centennial of his birth, both by publishing official speeches on his importance, and a collection of memoirs from people who had met Lenin. A recurring theme was the Soviet participation in World War II. In one case a former solider wrote about his memoirs of participating in the Soviet conquest of Berlin, another collected various Soviet texts on the reasons for the Soviet liberation of Bornholm. The Soviets also emphasized their country’s peaceful intentions by referring to their losses in the war. One of the booklets included in this World War II genre was a very unflattering biography of Hitler.

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948 Anatolij Antonov: *Styrkelse af freden i Norden* (Moscow, 1982).
949 Pavel Naumov: *Nej til krig* (Moscow, 1983).
951 Reinhold Wied and Viktor Saprykov: * Hvad er kommunisme (spørgsmål og svar)* (Moscow, 1978).
952 For styrkelse af kommunisternes sammenhold: *For et nyt opsving i den antiimperialistiske kamp* (Copenhagen, 1969); Vi vil styrke den kommunistiske bevægelses enhed for fredens og socialismens triumf (Copenhagen, 1963).
954 Maoismen: *Taktik og mål* (Moscow, 1972); N. Barasov: *Den forrådte generation* (Copenhagen, 1974).
956 Lenins værk: *Teser fra SUKPs centralkomité i anledning af 100-året for Lenins fødsel* (Copenhagen, 1970).
958 Vladimir Abyzov: *Den sidste storm* (Moscow, 1980).
960 Oleg Rzjesjevskij: *Den anden verdenskrigs lære* (Moscow, 1979).
961 Ernst Henry: *Et anti-menneske* (Moscow, 1989).
In the same vein one booklet collected several newspaper articles that claimed to document the supposedly revanchist currents in West Germany, especially among former officers of the Nazi armies now serving in NATO. Another booklet criticized the acts of terror of Rote Arme Fraktion and other similar organizations in Western Europe based on a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the means of mass mobilization of the people, declined any backing of such organizations, but claimed Chinese backing of them, and also found space to attack the alleged state terrorism of CIA in the third world.

Aside from these publications, booklets in English and Norwegian on subjects similar to those above were available to Danish readers.

In addition, the publishing houses Tiden and Sputnik (the DKSU book shop) published Danish language books provided by Progress. Examples are collections of speeches by Yuri Andropov (following his ascension to general secretary), a book on the history of Comintern, or a publication on behalf of the international front Generals for Peace and Disarmament. The Soviets also tried to influence the view of the USSR in textbooks for learning Russian as a foreign language by launching the publisher Russkii Iazyk.

**BROADCASTING**

During the Cold War Radio Moscow operated a worldwide program for international broadcasts in foreign languages on a variety of short-wave and medium-wave frequencies. Between 1960 and 1980 the weekly hours of broadcasting rose from 1046 to 2760. Danish broadcasts did not take up much of that time, and Denmark was mostly mentioned, for example in commentaries on the visit of Soviet cultural delegations or criticism of the Nordic Council during its meeting in Copenhagen. However, broadcasts in Russian were hindered by the language barrier, and for this reason we shall focus on the broadcasts in Danish.
Radio Moscow’s broadcasts in Danish. In 1943 Radio Moscow initiated two daily 15 minute broadcasts in Danish. Later they evolved into three daily broadcasts of 30 minutes each. Programming included several musical shows, various broadcasts on the economic, technical, and cultural development of the USSR, sport news, Q&A sessions, specialized programs on stamp collection or the workers’ movement, and a musical request program. Part of the schedule was made up of reruns.

Programming followed a weekly schedule of three daily broadcasts (17:00-17:30, 18:00-18:30, 21:00-21:30). Monday’s programs covered all developments in the USSR, Tuesday’s programs carried news on scientific and technical developments and social and economic progress, a program on the development in other socialist countries was run on Wednesdays, whereas the second show of the day included the popular Letter Box with listeners’ questions, Thursday’s early programming targeted younger listeners, followed by a program with biographies of famous Soviet citizens, and the late program was a feature on music. Friday’s early broadcast rotated among other programs for stamp collectors, news from SUDK, or targeted either trade unionists or female listeners. Saturday’s broadcasting both reran the “letter box” and a feature on art and culture. Sunday included the program “Glimpses of the Soviet Union”, a feature on recent events in Moscow, and, the final Sunday of a month, the musical request program. Participants in Danish delegations visiting the USSR participated in some programs, and listeners were encouraged to send in questions for the Q&A show, suggestions for new programs, and requests for the musical request show.

By the 1970s, broadcasting decreased to twice a day for half an hour each time (18:00-18:30 and 19:30-20:00) sent simultaneously on several frequencies. One daily program followed a schedule of news, comments on current events, and “Soviet panorama” on Soviet developments and summaries of speeches by Soviet politicians, cultural workers, scientists, other Soviet citizens, and participants in visiting delegations. From here the program varied, although regular features were news on scientific and technical developments, the letter box, Glimpse of the Soviet Union, musical features (both classical and folklore), and specified features for radio armatures, on the activities of SUDK, or “The Soviet Union through Danish eyes”. By the mid-1980s broadcasting had been collected

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973 KB/JJ/27/Radio Moscow’s Danish broadcasting winter season 1958/59; similar summer season 1960; similar winter season 1960/61; similar winter season 1961/62.
974 OF/Radio Moscow Danish broadcasting winter season 1963/64.
975 OF/Radio Moscow Danish broadcasting winter season 1972/73.
into a one hour daily broadcast in the evening (21:00-22:00) although this did not alter the contents of the broadcasts.\textsuperscript{976}

Political commentary was, as we have seen, used in coordinated campaigns. One of these was the campaign against Denmark joining in the European Economic Recovery Program and later NATO, and at the time Radio Moscow broadcasted a number of very strongly worded attacks on the Danish government’s and especially the Danish Social-democratic party’s intention to join the American imperialists in a military alliance that a majority of the population, or so it was claimed, opposed.\textsuperscript{977}

Even when that battle had been lost commentators continued to claim that NATO membership was a bad choice for Denmark. For example, it was claimed that the reason for the high unemployment rate among Danish tobacco workers was the high consumption taxes to provide means for “war preparations”, in this case the building of new hangars.\textsuperscript{978} In another case, in a special broadcast to commemorate the anniversary of the Occupation of 1940 American NATO troops in Denmark were framed as the new Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{979}

In a typical “letter box” broadcast in Mach 1966 the Q&A session answered question on income taxes and indoor ice skating rings (among other things). Between answers music was played, and the program ended with a quiz where listeners had to write in stating their opinion on the most important results of the 23\textsuperscript{rd} CPSU congress, their knowledge of the Luna-9 and Luna-10 space stations, and answer which Soviet cosmonauts had visited Denmark.\textsuperscript{980}

**SCREENINGS**

As discussed in Chapter 4, in 1962 DKSU decided to stop organizing screenings of Soviet movies in Danish due to a lack of interest among Danish viewers and a lack of quality movies.

**Soviet movie weeks.** Therefore, the Soviet representation began to initiate screenings of Soviet movies for the Danish public. The 1975 movie week was at the in Grand Theatre in Copenhagen is a representative example of the form that they took. Four different Soviet feature films were screened for seven days with five daily showings.\textsuperscript{981}

\textsuperscript{976} Frederichsen (2010a), 17.
\textsuperscript{977} ABA/HH/45/Transcripts 11.10.1948-4.8.1949.
\textsuperscript{979} RA/UM.110.D.44.A/Dan/Transcript 4.9.1951.
\textsuperscript{980} OF/Transcript 4.27.1966.
In addition to the movie weeks, those who were interested could borrow movies from the collection of the Soviet embassy.  

**EXHIBITIONS AND PUBLIC LECTURES**

Movies aside, inside Denmark the most direct forms of contact between official Soviet representatives and the Danish public were visual presentations through exhibitions or oral presentations through public lectures. In some cases they were combined.

**Exhibitions.** The Soviets organized both large and smaller touring exhibitions. The largest and most famous is the industrial exhibition held at Forum in Copenhagen between June 25th-July 11th 1954. The exhibited items included consumer goods, food stuffs and machines with an view to increase Danish-Soviet trade relations. 20 years later The State Committee for Technology and Science organized an exhibition of Soviet products and simultaneously organized a string of public lectures.

Smaller touring exhibitions often consisted of children’s drawings. In 1971 an exhibition of Soviet children’s drawings was held at the public library in Nyborg. In 1973 another exhibition of children’s drawing on a world tour made a stop in Denmark, where they were exhibited in public libraries in Aarhus, Hvidovre, Odense, and (supposedly) in Sønderborg. The same year saw the opening of a photo exhibition in Rønne commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the USSR. In 1978 another Soviet photo exhibition opened in Horsens. The Soviet ambassador participated in the openings of some exhibitions. At the opening of the aforementioned photo exhibition in Odense ambassador Yegorychev used the opportunity to promote Soviet peace politics.

**Public lectures.** In addition to the exhibitions, Soviet diplomats traveled the lecture trail. In February and March 1963, attaché S. Zhuralev gave 21 lectures in as many Jutland cities at public
schools, high schools, and seminars on the theme “Cultural developments in the USSR” to a combined audience 2350 persons, organized by the private impresario ARTE The lecture also included the screening of two documentaries and more than 7000 pieces of information materials were handed out. The lectures were followed by questions from the audience, usually not on the topic of the lecture, but on whatever themes regarding the USSR were currently under discussion in Danish media. Zhuralev concluded that the general level of knowledge among members of the Danish public on the USSR was very low. He concluded that the lecture tour had been a success because the embassy had reached a new audience that had formerly not been reached by the information service of the Soviet embassy.  

Local DKSU branches also took advantage of the offer of a lecturer from the Soviet Embassy. In 1979 DKSU Ålborg invited a lecturer to speak on “Soviet foreign and security policies” and the following year first secretary Komisarov answered the question “Does the USSR pose a threat to world peace?”. The next year DKSU Ålborg invited an embassy representative to participate in the Soviet cultural days (to be discussed in Chapter 7) including the opening of an exhibition at Hobro Library. At the opening ceremony of the exhibition he talked about the importance of Soviet-Danish cultural relations and offered the library a gift of photo albums on life in the USSR. Over the following days DKP Ålborg and DKSU Ålborg invited him to speak on the Soviet position on the NATO double track decision.  

EXCHANGES

Several Danish-Soviet activities do not fall within any of the categories in this or other chapters. The year 1956 is a very good example of this. In addition to all of the various forms of cultural diplomacy activities discussed in this dissertation 1956 was the year of a soccer match in Moscow and a match in Copenhagen, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikoian spoke at the Student Society’s building, Prime and Foreign Minister H.C. Hansen visited the USSR in March, and in May a Danish parliamentary delegation visited the USSR with the parliament chairman Gustav Pedersen as head of delegation. Moreover, the first group of Soviet tourist since the start of the Cold War visited Denmark, Soviet athletes participated in an international meeting in Copenhagen, the Soviet navy visited Copenhagen and docked at Langelinie and the Danish frigates Esbern Snare and

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991 OF/Circular letter 2.4.1979.
Valdemar Sejr paid a visit to Leningrad, a bilateral agreement on emergency rescue in the Baltic Sea was signed, the route Leningrad-Helsinki-Stockholm-Copenhagen-London operated by the Soviet passenger ship Viacheslav Molotov opened, Aeroflot opened the route Moscow-Riga-Copenhagen with two weekly departures (SAS flew out of Stockholm), and a two-year trade agreement was signed.¹⁹⁴

Likewise, in 1973 a group of Danish children played chess with peers in a cultural palace in Moscow. They received the invitation through the Danish Chess Association, and the Soviet children paid a similar visit to Denmark.¹⁹⁵

More activities began to take place within the framework of the bilateral state cultural agreements, despite Danish reluctance to engage in formal agreements finding them unnecessary and too costly. Prior to the Danish-Soviet agreement, Denmark had only signed cultural agreements with Italy (in order to establish a cultural institute in Rome) and Belgium (to accommodate an old Belgian desire in the light of Belgian dissatisfaction with Danish non-participation in the 1958 Brussels World Fair).¹⁹⁶ Denmark wished for a pure framework agreement with emphasis on state controlled student exchanges and privately controlled cultural events.¹⁹⁷ When deciding to enter into a cultural agreement with the USSR, Denmark closely coordinated with its NATO partners in the special NATO Working Group for East-West Cultural Contacts, established on British initiative in 1960 with the purpose of holding an annual meeting to coordinate, discuss and exchange experiences on cultural contacts with the Eastern Bloc.¹⁹⁸ When Denmark finally signed a cultural agreement in 1962 this also took place in adherence with the common opinion in the working group that the cultural exchange programs could also be utilized for influencing on Soviet intellectuals or keep the cultural exchange programs out of the grasp of communist dominated organizations.¹⁹⁹ When the national librarian tried to further an exchange of librarians under the cultural agreement by stating that DKSU was an another option he was told that Denmark was a country with freedom of assembly, but that the Foreign Ministry wished for exchanges to take place within the framework of the official cultural agreement, not through some sectarian movement.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1a/Memorandum 12.9.1951.
¹⁹⁹ RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1a/Memorandum 5.22.1962.
Denmark succeeded in closely adhering to the above line. Concerts by the Leningrad Philharmonics or soloists, ballet or dance performances by the Bolshoi Theater or dance troupes, and staging of the Obratsov Puppet Theater were organized by private impresarios. In addition, Soviet performers were invited to the annual Royal Danish Ballet and Opera Festival, a soviet guest composer was invited by the Danish Composers’ Association, an exhibition of photos of Moscow was organized in Copenhagen City Hall, reciprocal film weeks were organized, cooperation between Denmark and Soviet Russian language teachers started, various exchanges among clergy, youth, architects, actor students took place, and school textbooks were exchanged as well. Only the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia put a temporary hold on the exchange programs. During the early 1970s the exchange programs developed even further with a 1970 agreement on exchanges of programs between Gosteleradio and Danish Broadcasting Union, a 1971 agreement between the Niels Bohr Institute and The Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the emphasis on scientific cooperation was emphasized in the new biannual programs on the developing of the cultural agreement signed in the 1970s and prioritized these exchanges over the advancement of artistic guest performances or exchanges between youth, sports, and cultural NGOs. The focal point of the cultural agreement was the student exchange program. Denmark prioritized the establishment of Russian language classes in high school and tried to send as many young students of Russian studies as possible to the USSR to increase the skill level of future teachers. The student exchange program came into action as early as the academic year 1959/60 with 2 scholarships each for the academic years 1959/60, 1960/61, 1961/62. As seen in Table 5.D the program grew throughout the 1960s with more scholarships and the addition of opportunities for researchers (which was the primary interest of the Soviets who gave scholarships solely for researchers). Whereas Denmark almost exclusively sent students and scholars from within the humanities (all students and four out of six scholars in 1970/71), the Soviets primarily send scholars of natural sciences. Four out of five students in 1971/72 studied

14 years earlier the Danish authorities had turned down a Soviet suggestion for a similar agreement (RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.10/Memorandum 6.19.1956).
1004 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.2/Program for Cultural and scientific cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union for the years 1973-1974 signed 12.1.1972.
1006 Красовицкая, 121-123, 155-160, 264-268.
Table 5.D: Danish-Soviet student and researcher scholarship exchange programs 1962-1972:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>Student scholarships</th>
<th>Researcher scholarships</th>
<th>Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963/64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964/65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

within the field of natural sciences. This primary interest of the Soviet side is confirmed in a report by the Niels Bohr Institute for theoretical physics that listed 40 visiting Soviet scholars between 1957 and 1970.  

One former Soviet visiting scholar who visited in the 1980s has explained that he entered a special exchange program for young scholars (under the age of 35 and with a PhD degree) within the field of natural sciences. A call was published at his institution and he had to fill out an application and write a project description. Following the sorting several applicants were invited to Moscow to pass a Q&A session in front of a panel with 20 members primarily based on the academic merits of their suggested project. Following a second sorting the successful applicant had to pass an English test (following a brush-up crash course) and a test on their knowledge of the recipient country. Then, the Danish side had to approve the applicants. If approved the applicants had a briefing on how to behave themselves and were handed an emergency phone number to the Soviet embassy. The family had to stay behind. Upon returning home he had to fill out a report on the results of the scholarship, participate in an oral debriefing, and pass an AIDS test.  

In addition to the official exchange program DKSU received 2-3 Soviet funded scholarships to be awarded to students of Russian studies at Danish universities each. In 1961 DKSU could award one

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1007 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.1a/Various undated reviews.
1008 RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.2/Visitors from the USSR 1928-1970.
1009 Interview with "former participant in exchange program" 2.9.2017.
The identity is known to the author.
10 month scholarship,\textsuperscript{1010} which evolved to two\textsuperscript{1011} and later three.\textsuperscript{1012} DKSU was also charged with awarding Soviet funded scholarships to summer schools in the USSR for foreign teachers of Russian as a foreign language.\textsuperscript{1013} A Danish participant described the summer school. The participants were divided into groups based on their proficiency in Russian. The course followed a strict schedule of daily oral exercises, a lecture, excursions, homework, and a minimum of four visits to the theater. Sundays and Mondays were kept free for full-day excursions.\textsuperscript{1014}

DKP and DKU sent party members for schooling for shorter or longer periods (14 days to a full year) in the USSR\textsuperscript{1015} and other socialist countries each year, but this falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. DKP’s cultural committee had additional scholarships for scholars who were party members and wished to continue their studies in the USSR.\textsuperscript{1016}

Beginning in 1957, as part of the Danish-Soviet cultural agreement Soviet guest lecturers worked at the Slavic Studies Centers of Danish Universities teaching languages classes.\textsuperscript{1017} Their salary was paid by the Danish side.\textsuperscript{1018} The Russian guest lecturers evolved into four positions, two at the University of Copenhagen and one at Aarhus and Odense University respectively.\textsuperscript{1019}

**RECEPTION**

In this chapter various forms of direct Soviet state activities towards the Danish public have been discussed. The final part of the chapter will discuss how the public perceived these activities.

**Critical listeners.** If we are to believe internal reports Radio Moscow listeners were highly satisfied with the quality of Radio Moscow’s broadcasts.\textsuperscript{1020} But the many examples of criticism voiced by Danish listeners\textsuperscript{1021} present another picture.

DKP chairman Aksel Larsen put Christian Frahm in charge of listening to and reporting on the Danish broadcasts of Radio Moscow. Frahm sharply criticized the poor sound quality of the
broadcasts. Additionally he criticized the impossibility of following world news solely by listening to Radio Moscow, the poor language skills of some of the speakers, and the clear tone of boredom in their voices when they read the texts. Overall, he found the news shows tedious and lengthy. The responses in the radio letter box program where Danish listeners could ask questions about the USSR were often rather nebulous, and the propaganda was so crude that it hindered rather than promoted Soviet views.\textsuperscript{1022} This was not the first letter of its kind where Aksel Larsen forwarded or cited Frahm’s comments. In 1954 he had forwarded identical criticism of the poor quality of both the contents and sound.\textsuperscript{1023} But despite promises to improve both,\textsuperscript{1024} nothing happened. In the 1960s listener Ole Friis also complained about the technical difficulties,\textsuperscript{1025} and the press service of the Danish Foreign Ministry also found it troublesome to monitor and transcribe broadcasts because their listener could not hear everything said due to the poor sound quality.\textsuperscript{1026}

Critical readers. At various points, the Danish readership voiced dissatisfaction with the lack of quality of articles in \textit{FOS}. According to the criticism it did not contain information of value or interest to Danish readers because the editorial line did not reflect the interests of Danish readers, but Soviet interests. It was suggested that the journal should be edited by Danes.\textsuperscript{1027} DKSU members were not alone in voicing this critique. A journalist wrote that \textit{FOS} should be renamed "Facts on the Soviet Paradise" and after referencing the latest issue about happy Soviet children swimming, sledding, making dolls, and cutting Christmas garlands, the invention of growth hormones that would make the Soviet chickens as fat as those in America or Australia, and the result of the national Soviet acrobatics championships concluded:

"The Soviet propaganda magazines are perhaps not much worse than the corresponding publications from the western democratic states, and obviously it must be the propagandists own problem that they mainly write for the paper baskets. But it would certainly be a lot more interesting, if they also sometimes pointed out that not all conditions in the great Soviet Union are so idyllic".\textsuperscript{1028}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1024} РГАНИ/5/28/138/154/И. Виноградов, Б. Кованов ЦК КПСС 1.15.1955.
\textsuperscript{1025} OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 2.24.1965.
\textsuperscript{1026} ABA/HH/45/Transcript 2.25.1949
\textsuperscript{1027} ABA/DKSU/1/Congress minutes 1.31.1965.
\textsuperscript{1028} Information 1.11.1958.
\end{footnotesize}
In 1988 the director of the APN office in Copenhagen, Sergei Serebriakov, stated that *FOS* had a circulation of 11,000 copies, but only 4000 paying subscribers. He promised that in the future *FOS* would reflect the interests of Danish readers. The following year, in connection with the change of name to *Glasnost*, he stated that a survey of readers had shown that only 1/4 of the readers were women and that very few young people read the journal. The journal was under strong economic pressure and in desperate need of more subscribers to survive after it lost its automatic deficit guarantee from Moscow. In 1991 the journal folded. This indicates that although Danes were listed as editors the editorial line was in reality decided by APN in Moscow and implemented by the director of the APN office in Copenhagen, and that the Soviet officials ignored the complaints by the Danish readership year after year and as such were unable to attract interest outside the circle of the usual suspects.

**Critical viewers.** Another point of Danish criticism considered the screenings of Soviet films. In 1954 DKP and DKSU vice-chairman Alfred Jensen bluntly stated that Soviet war movies did not interest Danish movie goers, partly because they lacked Danish dubbing or, at least, subtitles, partly because Danish viewers were uninterested in Soviet black and white war movies. DKSU repeated these complaints on several occasions in the presence of the VOKS representative in Denmark. Interestingly, the Icelandic-Soviet Friendship Society apparently avoided war movies if possible. As we have seen in chapter 4, in the end DKSU dropped screenings of Soviet films. Once again, DKSU was not alone in its critique. In 1958 a journalist attended a screening organized by the Soviet embassy of two documentaries, the first on Sputnik and the second on the 40th anniversary of October. The journalist concluded about the latter that the showcasing of raw force through images of marching soldiers in the Red Square parade completely eroded the repeated message of the Soviet cultural diplomacy on the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy.

**The angry minister of culture and the smiling starman.** During the Cold War Denmark received prominent Soviet visitors on numerous occasions. To conclude this section on reception of direct

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1032 KB/JJ/26/DKSU Copenhagen EC minutes 1.12.1956.
Soviet cultural diplomacy we shall therefore discuss two examples of such visits, one successful and one unsuccessful and discuss the reasons for their success or failure.

**Furtseva 1961.** In 1961 the Soviet minister of cultural affairs Yekaterina Furtseva visited Denmark on her way to Iceland. In Denmark she was invited by DKSU to speak at a meeting in the Students Society’s building in Copenhagen. Even newspapers other than *Land og Folk* had great expectations of the visit and she was described in flattering tones. When she visited Prime Minister Viggo Kampmann newspaper reports stated that she had charmed him. She was the guest of honour at a dinner given by minister of culture Julius Bomholt. Her finest moment came when receiving the Bodil award on behalf of Soviet film director Grigorii Chukhrais for best European movie. However, all of this changed when she gave her lecture. At first things went well. Furtseva spoke mainly on the Soviet help to Denmark in defeating German fascism and the liberation of the island of Bornholm, her admiration for famous Danish artists, and the high level of Soviet cultural life (measured in quantitative figures). However, after her lecture a student dared to ask her why Boris Pasternak’s Nobel Prize winning book *Doctor Zhivago* had not been published in the USSR so the Soviet public could read it and make up their own minds about the book. Furtseva lost her temper and answered: “Why do you think that you are smarter than the Soviet people? If a Soviet citizen slanders his own country who can blame us for not exactly clapping our hands?” She also claimed that Pasternak had been allowed to live in peace and that he had been given 100,000 roubles so he could live well, but he had decided to sit behind a high fence so he could not see what took place in the country.

This performance from the minister destroyed the positive image in the Danish press completely. Formerly, the newspapers had praised her in high tones but now they thought that she had given away her true face as one of the evil rulers of the evil Soviet Empire. This negative framing reached numerous national and local newspapers.


Alas, the memory of the press is short. When Furtseva visited Denmark in 1964 things went more quietly and the trip included visits to the H.C. Andersen Museum and questions on her opinion on the upcoming state visit of Khrushchev to Denmark. During her third and final visit in 1971 she was flatteringly referred to as Catherine the Third, the empress of Soviet cultural life.

**Gagarin 1962.** One part of a systemic conflict consists of a struggle over international prestige. The space race was one of the battle fields in this struggle. The USSR scored the early victories thanks to the October 1957 launch of *Sputnik* and by sending the first man into space in 1961. The man of the hour to secure this cultural diplomatic victory was the cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, and following his flight into space he was send on a worldwide PR tour.

In September 1962 Gagarin’s world tour brought him to Denmark as DKSU’s guest—much to the frustration of the Danish foreign ministry which for political reasons avoided contacts with DKSU. The frustrations grew even greater when it became known that DKSU had succeeded in securing Gagarin an audience with the king. In the end the ministry had to host an official dinner for Gagarin.

During his stay Gagarin visited the Carlsberg breweries, the B&W shipyards, an observatory, several exhibitions, and participated in DKSU’s congress, a public meeting, and a DKU meeting.

Nina Krymova of Radio Moscow fame was in Denmark during Gagarin’s visit and later stated that it had been an enormous success with massive cheering crowds in the streets and that the visit had done much to improve the Danish-Soviet relationship.

For once, a Soviet cultural diplomat did not exaggerate. Danish newspapers overflowed with positive coverage of the visit and the way he conducted himself, especially during a TV interview. The popular celebration of Gagarin was repeated when he insisted on visiting Odense.
outside of the regular program. He was driven in triumph through streets full of cheering crowds, visited the H.C. Andersen Museum (the purpose for the sojourn to Odense), and was received at city hall. ¹⁰⁵³

CONCLUSIONS

The propaganda value of Furtseva’s 1961 visit to Denmark was lost due to one angry reaction to one innocent question (by the standards of any democratic country) because Furtseva’s reaction confirmed an already widely spread image of Soviet leaders, whereas Gagarin’s visit was a success, not only because of the admiration for his accomplishment, but also because of his ability to engage with wide circles of the Danish public. This goes to show that the way Soviet representatives acted hugely influenced the possibility of changing the “us-them” discourse of the general non-communist public.

Based on the examples not only of these two visits but of the entire variety of cultural diplomacy efforts directly executed by Soviet state representatives in Denmark, we have to question the effect. Danish recipients continuously over a long period of time voiced the same complaints many times, and the reason they had to repeat them was that the Soviet cultural diplomats did not pay attention to the complaints, but carried on regardless. It seems to have been more important to carry out the Soviet planned programs to the letter than to tailor the cultural diplomacy to the Danish market. This made it very difficult to attract Danish interest to the messages of the Soviet state.

Chapter 6: The hum-drum years, 1957-1974

"I am not satisfied with our activities. Usually they are a bore and our facilities are disgusting. They do not attract new members or young people ".

Stig Surland

In this chapter we shall discuss the 1956-1958 reform of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus and whether or not it had any influence or lasting effect, how the perception of the USSR following the events in Hungary in 1956 and 1958 influenced cultural contacts, and why fellow-travellers choose to remain members of the Danish front and friendship organizations, the activities of these organizations, and their possible impact.

REFORM?

Prior to the Hungarian events of 1956 the Soviet leadership had initiated a reform of the cultural diplomacy apparatus with the purpose of broadening contacts and increasing the activity level amongst both Soviet participants and foreigners. As the developments were set in motion prior to 1956 this revival was supposed to be realized at the most difficult moment for the possibility of a positive reception during the Cold War. One of the most important events to promote this change in Soviet cultural diplomacy policy was the 1957 Moscow youth festival.

Identifying the sore spot. In the mid-1950s, a string of critical reports made it clear that the system was failing. One report stated that the Soviet apparatus, in contrast to the American, was too decentralized and uncoordinated. It identified the need for an overall coordinating organization for radio broadcasts, book and pamphlet publication, and export of films with a ministerial mandate.

Another report stated that under the current system the various organizations did not keep each other informed of their efforts in various countries, and that TASS in particular should improve on the exchange of information with other organizations, as this lack of information made activities ineffective. It also pointed to the need for an overall coordinated effort and an overall master plan, preferably through the creation of a new governmental body with an overall coordinating functions.

The quality of political work, the contents of print media and distribution needed improvement.

1055 Gilburd, 362-401.
through a reduction of quantity and a new emphasis on quality. Radio broadcasts to foreign countries needed to play a greater role, and the technical quality had to improve. More press conferences for foreign journalists were needed.

There was also a need for well-argued books on political questions for publication abroad. 1057

A third report, intended for the CC, included six concrete proposals for necessary improvement. As such it tells something about what was not functioning. TASS needed to improve business relations with foreign wire services. A journalists’ association should be established. All written materials published abroad should be scrutinized. It should be possible to set up collective publishing houses in cooperation with foreign publishers abroad for the publication of political literature and fiction in foreign languages. Regular press conferences with Western correspondents should be organized to tell about living conditions in the Soviet Union. Counterpropaganda operations abroad should be improved. 1058

Reports by colonel P. Mazur written directly to Suslov 1059 and Bulganin 1060 argued that the world had changed since the founding of VOKS, but since VOKS had been unable to adapt to the changing world its organization and methods were now obsolete. Based on this line of argument, the reports suggested a number of needed changes in the organizations and operation of international friendship and cultural relations. These were: Organize a new association for friendship with foreign peoples, reorganize VOKS to be in correspondence with the current needs in a new world, create a periodical press of the friendship associations, create an international friendship prize, establish a friendship palace in Moscow, make active use of the friendship association in the propaganda for Soviet progress, the idea of peace, and peaceful coexistence, and to utilize the friendship association for the international education of the Soviet working class and for mass education in foreign languages. The reports were forwarded to VOKS to be incorporated into the work-in-progress on its reorganization. 1061

The question made it into the upper CPSU circles. Boris Ponomarev wrote a report based on the results of the findings of an ad-hoc CC commission and forwarded it to Molotov. Again, the need for the creation of a single national body for the coordination of foreign propaganda and cultural relations was highlighted. The body should not only manage and coordinate the propaganda work of the respective ministries and agencies, but also the operational organization, planning and

execution, which would allow for a much more focused effort with associated reduction of resource wastage.\textsuperscript{1062}

On this basis a draft regulation from the Central Committee "About methods for improving the Soviet propaganda against foreign countries" was prepared. The numerous surviving copies in the archives suggest that it was circulated for comments.\textsuperscript{1063}

Based on these works a new report entitled "Some observations on the organization of propaganda abroad" concluded that experience showed that propaganda worked best if the target group had been identified and it operated within in a frame that in a coordinated form utilized all modern mass media; radio, press, film, tourism, exchange of cultural delegations, etc. The solution would be the creation of a powerful, centralized, yet very flexible mechanism that worked in strict accordance with CC instructions, but without constantly having to seek permission for routine activities when coordinating radio broadcasts, the publication of written materials by TASS, the exchange of cultural and scientific delegations and tourist groups, film business and the operation of libraries,. The body would also be held accountable for the results. It was emphasized that the committee could not function effectively unless supplied with sufficient resources, although no concrete amount was mentioned.\textsuperscript{1064}

The reports are very interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, recommendations repeatedly identified the sore spots of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus and describe an inflexible and uncoordinated apparatus where the individually participating organizations had very strict, hierarchical lines of command, but did not know what other similar organizations were doing in the same geographical space as themselves. Secondly, one can glean from the reports that the principle of adopting cultural diplomacy to the circumstances of the receiving country had ultimately not been followed.

Another interesting feature of the reports is the absence of considerations of the consequences of the actual Soviet actions, such as the crushing of the uprising in Hungary, on the potential impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy and its efficiency. For example, the drawn-up plan for Soviet radio propaganda aimed at influencing the outcome of the Danish general election in 1957 in favor of DKP consisted of the familiar themes of development rates, Soviet peace versus the aggressiveness

\textsuperscript{1062} РГАНИ/5/28/383/45-46/Б. Пономарев В.М. Молотову 11.29.1956.
\textsuperscript{1063} РГАНИ/5/28/383/48-134.
\textsuperscript{1064} РГАНИ/5/28/383/139-145/Некоторы соображения об организации пропаганды на заграницу 1.25.1957.
of NATO and the United States, and the ever existing friendship between Denmark and the Soviet Union, but made no mention whatsoever of the negative reactions to the Hungarian events.\textsuperscript{1065} Finally, we have to note that despite the reshuffling, it does not appear that there were any substantial changes in the methods used in the planning and implementation of cultural diplomacy towards Denmark, or that the system had been made more flexible, quite the contrary. As discussed in Chapter 2, some parts of the apparatus (VOKS/SSOD) had been given new acronyms, and new bodies such as GKKS and the Soviet bilateral friendship societies were added to the already overflowing pool. The primary result was a power struggle between the party apparatus and the government apparatus with the new coordinating entity on the losing side.\textsuperscript{1066} The attempt at reconstruction of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus leave us with the intriguing impression that although some Soviet observers were able to pinpoint exactly what was malfunctioning in the Soviet cultural diplomacy, the system and its activities were continued and carried on more or less on the same track until the very end of the USSR. in the mid-1960s the same systemic errors as earlier could be identified.\textsuperscript{1067}

\begin{center}
HUNGARY 1958
\end{center}

As a result of the Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary the Danish Sports Federation (DIF) introduced a blockade on sports relations with Soviet and Hungarian athletes in 1956.\textsuperscript{1068} The ban was lifted in January 1958 due to an international swim meeting being held in Denmark. DIF was concerned about whether the Soviets were prepared to resume sports relations, but the Soviet side expressed its preparedness\textsuperscript{1069} and sports relations became a focal point for Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark for a short period.

**Danish-Soviet sports relations.** Knud Lundberg was among the Danish sports commentators, who expressed considerable joy when the sports blockade ended. He was aware that the USSR might exploit victories in their propaganda, but on the other hand it could be important for the possible Soviet democratization that Soviet athletes were allowed to see foreign countries regardless of their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1065} РГАНИ/5/28/238/17-21/А. Кузнцев Д.Т. Шепилову 4.13.1957.
\item \textsuperscript{1066} РГАНИ/5/30/304/54-57/Жуков ЦК КПСС 5.29.1959.
\item \textsuperscript{1067} РГАНИ/5/55/106/Отчет 1.17.1964.
\item \textsuperscript{1068} The ban was not completely observed. In 1957 a national team of student chess players participated in the World Student Team Chess Championship held in Reykjavik. Both Hungarian and Soviet chess players participated and IUS co-organized the event. (Jaroslav Sajtar (comp.): IXth World Student Team Chess Championship: Marianskie Lazne Czechoslovakia July 7th-22nd 1962: Results (Prague, 1962), 91).
\item \textsuperscript{1069} Fyens Social-Demokrat 1.3.1958; Information 1.9.1958.
\end{itemize}
political beliefs, allowing them to see the Western world, so they could go home and tell others that Danish children had clothes to wear, and despite capitalism were not completely different from Soviet children. One should not underestimate the importance of sport to objective information, so it was one of few opportunities to stamp the propaganda as lies. For these reasons he considered it worth resetting the relations. 1070

Planned exchanges for 1958 included football, table tennis, cycling, handball, tennis, swimming, and boxing matches. 1071

In May the Soviet soccer team Zenith from Leningrad visited Denmark and played several matches. Various Danish teams were invited to play Zenith in Leningrad, but the invitation came too late, and one Danish club did not want to travel to the USSR due to the tense international situation. 1072

Soviet table tennis players participated in an international meeting, 1073 and boxers in an international meeting in Aarhus, 1074 while Danish swimmers competed in a meeting with Soviet swimmers in Leningrad. 1075

However, a handball match 1076 and a tennis match 1077 were canceled with reference to the tense international situation. Six Soviet cyclists did not show up for a race in Sorgenfri, officially because they had become ill. The angered race organizers considered seeking financial compensation. The press covered the absence in critical tones. 1078

As we shall see, their sudden illness was a direct result of the tense international situation.

A friendship of broken windows. On November 4th 1956 Imre Nagy and members of his government sought refuge in the Yugoslavian embassy in Budapest, and on 10 November 10th Yugoslavia granted Nagy asylum. Following long negotiations the Soviets managed to convince the Yugoslavians that Nagy would not be prosecuted, and the Embassy agreed to let Nagy and former government members travel to Romania. As soon as they had left the embassy, they were arrested. The Hungarian Kadar government appointed Nagy as the person responsible for the "counter-revolution" of 1956 and, for good measure, added a charge of treason. In February 1958 court proceedings finally started, but the Soviets put them on hold due to the impending Soviet-American

1070 Socialdemokraten 2.2.1958.
1071 ABA/DKSU/86/unidentifiable newspaper clippings [1958]
1075 BT 7.8.1958.
1076 Aftenbladet 7.3.1958.
1077 Ny Tid 7.20.1958; Sønderjylland 7.21..1958.
summit and a desire not to aggravate relations with Yugoslavia further. The case was not resumed until June 13th, and on June 16th, Nagy and several others were sentenced to capital punishment. The sentences were promptly carried out.\textsuperscript{1079}

The executions caused outrage in the West and also in Denmark.\textsuperscript{1080} The flag flew at half pole at many private and public buildings - with the exception of state institutions, but including Copenhagen, Frederiksberg and several surrounding municipalities’ town halls. The Social-democrats and the Conservative party played a particularly active role in organizing this when news of the executions became known.\textsuperscript{1081} The Danish Association of World Federalists, The UN Association, and The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom called for the Danish government to condemn the executions.\textsuperscript{1082} The non-communist press condemned the executions as political murders.\textsuperscript{1083} Demonstrations took place in Copenhagen, one of them in front of the DKP building organized by DSU with a few hundred participants with red banners chanting “Free Hungary”. The police cleared the street and stone throwing demonstrators were immediately arrested. Speeches were given and a resolution condemning the sentences adopted before the demonstration quietly disbanded.\textsuperscript{1084} A completely different atmosphere prevailed at the demonstration Hungarian students in Copenhagen (a group of about 50) organized in front of the Soviet Embassy. Initially the demonstrators attempted unsuccessfully to deliver a letter of protest. Then the situation escalated. The few Hungarian students soon turned into a bigger crowd (about 30 Hungarian students, some 100 Danish, and a few hundred spectators). Bonfires were lit in the street, cries in Russian demanded that the Russians leave Hungary, and stones were thrown at the embassy, smashing several windows. Riot police were called in to protect the embassy and clear the street. Later in the evening protesters with a Hungarian flag wrapped in mourning crepe marched to the Hungarian embassy in Hellerup. However, the police were prepared for their arrival and after the protesters had sung the Hungarian national anthem the street was cleared.\textsuperscript{1085} Danish newspaper condemned the smashing of windows in the Soviet embassy.\textsuperscript{1086}

\textsuperscript{1079} M.B. Andersen, 53-54.
\textsuperscript{1081} Dagens Nyheder 6.19.1958.
\textsuperscript{1082} Dagens Nyheder 6.18.1958.
\textsuperscript{1083} Berlingske Aftenavis 6.18.1958; Dagens Nyheder 6.18.1958; Socialdemokraten 6.18.1958
\textsuperscript{1086} Politiken 6.21.1958.
The Soviets reacted harshly. TASS issued a statement that a band of hooligans protected by Danish police had attacked the embassy shouting insults and throwing rocks. The statement also criticized Danish authorities for not sufficiently protecting the embassy.1087

Foreign minister Gromyko summoned the Danish ambassador in Moscow, Alexis Mørch to protest, a protests note was sent to the Danish foreign ministry, the Danish foreign ministry officially apologized and promised to have the windows replaced, charge d’affaires Fedor Mikhailov demanded a meeting with the foreign ministry’s director Niels Svenningsen, but never showed up.

Only the communist daily Land og Folk supported the Soviet view of hooliganism, that justice had been served for the good of the Hungarian people, and that Danish police had not interfered during the window smashing because only communists had been hurt.1089 The non-communist press ridiculed the latter accusation.1090

The USSR found another way to demonstrate its discontent. On June 21st a so-called spontaneous demonstration was organized outside the Danish Embassy in Moscow with the participation of 200-300 workers and employees of factories and companies in Moscow, as it was stated in a TASS telegram. The demonstrators threw inkwells and eggs at the embassy, so that all of the windows of the Danish Embassy building were smashed. The protesters wrote "Down with the imperialist war provocateurs", "Down with the imperialist lackeys", and "Long live the Hungarian government" on the embassy wall. The protesters carried slogans such as "Shame on the Danish NATO lackeys", "Down with the fascists" and "Down with NATO". According to Radio Moscow the demonstration was the "Soviet peoples’ resolute protest against the shameful provocations in Copenhagen". Only when all of the windows had been shattered did mounted police disband the demonstration that lasted approximately three hours. When the protesters arrived in front of the embassy, ambassador Mørch telephoned the Soviet foreign ministry, but he was told that Gromyko could not be disturbed because of an ongoing conference with the king of Nepal, who was on an official visit. When Mørch spoke on the telephone with chief of protocol F.F. Molochkov, he claimed not to know of any demonstration in front of the Danish Embassy. Alexis Mørch formally protested to the Soviet chief of protocol over the riots in front of the Danish Embassy. He expressed his regrets but pointed out that it had been young people and that they were angry after hearing what had happened at the

Soviet embassy in Copenhagen. Molochkov offered to replace all damaged equipment. In Denmark, Prime and Foreign minister H.C. Hansen summoned charge d'affaires Mikhailov to convey his serious regret over what happened in Moscow and its expectation that the Soviet authorities would take appropriate steps to ensure that such events would not reoccur in the future.

In an editorial, *Dagens Nyheder* hit the nail on the head:

"Politics can sometimes be a strange thing. Soviet Russian politics are the strangest one can imagine. At the moment it seems to be under the formula an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a window for a window / ... / “Demonstrators appeared, even without having seen them we almost dare to say: In good order and with the right ideological setting, in front of the Danish embassy in Moscow, shouted what they should, and smashed the windows that should be smashed / ... / Now, all that remains is for the Danish side to send a protest note to Moscow. There is an easy task. You take, as it says in the cooking book terminology, the Soviet note of the day before yesterday and everywhere that speaks of ‘hostile and insulting exclamations about the Soviet Union’ shall be inserted in place of the Soviet Union the word ‘Denmark’, and wherever it talks about ‘provocations against the Soviet embassy’ it is to be replaced with ‘the Danish Embassy.’ What remains is simply to count the broken windows after parity and mutually agree on glazier costs, as well as a silent astonishment over applied Soviet diplomacy.”

*Politiken* pursued a similar line:

“Window for window when friendship must be kept, seems to have been the parole that yesterday in Moscow moved young protesters, the type probably no better or worse than those in Copenhagen, to give the Danish embassy raw realism. It is a form of diplomatic dialogue you hate to see carried on”.

The outcry of the general public following the events in Hungary in 1956 and 1958 are very telling examples how the Soviet attempts to alter the Danish popular perception of the USSR through cultural diplomacy in the form of high culture or sport failed. Ordinary Danes were quite capable of seeing through the magic mirror and based on the actual actions taken form an informed opinion on the true color and meaning of the USSR and Soviet power. As such the Soviets themselves more than anybody else undermined the possible effectiveness of their cultural diplomacy.
It is small wonder the cyclists became “ill”, as an internal Soviet document indicates, out of fear of anti-Soviet sentiments following the critical Danish reaction to the executions.\textsuperscript{1095}

SOLDERING ON

In 1956 the 6th IADL congress gathered in Brussels (including undisclosed Danish participation). One of the items on the agenda was a commission to discuss questions on penal procedures. Among the topics discussed in the commission were breaches in legal rights “in certain socialist countries”. However, the commission concluded that these breaches had been very few, that satisfactory promises of improvement were made, and that there were cases outside the socialist bloc that it would much more important to discuss and condemn.\textsuperscript{1096} This pattern repeated itself elsewhere.

**Danish front organizations after Hungary 1956.** As seen in Chapter 4, Jørgen Jørgensen and a still smaller circle of fellow-travelers in DKSU continued to cooperate with the communists. Similar DDK continued to exist. Following a long and heated debate the large majority of FBVA members decided to continue WFSW membership, despite acknowledging its communist nature. However, Professor Søren Holm left FBVA in protest, stating that he would not cooperate with communists who supported the Hungarian events, and that there was no scientific freedom in the Eastern Bloc countries.\textsuperscript{1097}

At a 1957 national committee meeting of Dansk Fredskonference the fellow-traveling members, including the chairman Thomas Christensen, who had not left DFK because of Hungary, all voiced their full confidence in their communist partners. They wanted to look forward and leave the past behind.\textsuperscript{1098} To these fellow-travelers protesting against Danish-German military cooperation and the possible stationing of foreign troops in Denmark during peace time were more important than protesting the Soviet invasion of Hungary.\textsuperscript{1099} Fredens Tilhængere dissolved in 1959,\textsuperscript{1100} at that time DFK had already taken over the position of Danish WPC affiliate,\textsuperscript{1101} although the leading

\textsuperscript{1095} Mikhail Prozumenshchikov: "Det Russiske Statsarkiv for Samtidshistorie Og det dansk-sovjetiske forhold", in Jørgensen (2012), 373.

\textsuperscript{1096} 6\textsuperscript{th} Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers Brussels: 22nd to 25th may, 1956 (Brussels, 1956); Report of Commission of Penal Procedure (Brussels 1956).


\textsuperscript{1098} ABA/EK/1/DFK NC minutes 12.8.1957.

\textsuperscript{1099} ABA/EK/1/DFK EC minutes 3.17.1957.

\textsuperscript{1100} KB/JJ/31/Circular letter 4.28.1959.

\textsuperscript{1101} ABA/EK/1/Einar Kruse to WPC 1.4.1955
communists members tried to ensure that this information was not made public as it would disturb what the communists thought was a general perception in the Danish public of DFK as a non-aligned peace movement. To further this image Dansk Fredskomite (‘Danish Peace Committee’) was established to act as the official Danish WPC affiliate and among other tasks organize Danish participation at WPC congresses. DFK turned its attention towards publishing NATO critical pamphlets promoting classic accusations of NATO’s aggressive intentions and the need for Danish disaffiliation.

**ACTIVITIES**

A reading of the available sources indicates that many of the activities organized by Danish front and friendship organizations continued unchanged from earlier years. We shall not repeat them here. However, we also see some new kinds of activities.

**Exhibitions.** During the 1960s and 1970s DKSU placed more and more emphasis on exhibitions. Exhibitions of arts and crafts or stamps did also take place earlier, but not with the same frequency and usually only at the DKSU own offices. By 1962 this had evolved into 7 exhibitions throughout the year at the DKSU offices. The themes were children’s books and drawings, Lomonosov, Pushkin, space travel Gagarin, Herzen, and a second exhibition of children’s drawings. The following year saw six various exhibitions. Gradually the exhibitions moved to other venues such as municipal institutions and libraries, mostly of children’s drawings and Soviet record covers. Even the ice skating ring in Hvidovre hosted an exhibition. Gradually DKSU built up a number of exhibitions of photos and posters that circulated among various schools, libraries, theaters, and similar institutions.

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1102 ABA/EK/1/Jørgen Jensen to Einar Kruse December 1955.
1109 ABA/DKSU/34/Report to DKSU Copenhagen EC 5.27.1970; Report on DKSU Copenhagen activities in 1972.
Open letters. Another new initiative that came into prominence was the writing of open letters to the parliament and government. DDK in particular sent an endless stream of open letters protesting Danish-German military cooperation, Danish NATO membership, NATO exercises, acquisition of new arms for the Danish military, the Vietnam War, and American nuclear testing (but not Soviet).1112

The letters do not seem to have had any effect on Danish parliamentarians or ministers. Only in a single case is it possible to document a response, when a civil servant in the ministry of defense disdainfully replied that DDK had misunderstood some factual issues associated with an ongoing NATO exercise in Denmark.1113

Solidarity movements. One of the reasons for the slow-down in the activities of the front organizations was a general change at the time towards international solidarity work. Two of the major movements focused on Vietnam and Chile. There are a number of similarities between them; DKP members played a leading role in forming them, they were mass movements, they were anti-American, and the organized events were similar to those of the front organizations (however, with an emphasis on demonstrations). Furthermore, when splits erupted within the movements over discussions on whether to form a large popular front type movement or narrow left-wing activist type, Ingmar Wagner played a leading role in forcing splintering that secured the establishments of new solidarity movements (Vietnam 69 and Komiteen Salvador Allende) of the popular front type, but effectively under DKP control.1114 The solidarity movement attracted many who presumably otherwise would have joined the classic front organizations.

OFFICIAL ANTI-COMMUNISM

The trend of a strong anti-communist policy among the Social-democratic movement and Danish authorities continued to exists during the period of this chapter. The following section presents two examples and one that does not follow the established pattern.

Exclusion. In 1959 the chairman of the Danish Preparatory Committee for the coming 1960 youth festival in Vienna was excluded from the Social-democratic youth party. The DSU leadership explained that it was considered impossible to be a member of DSU and at the same time cooperate with the communist network of front organizations.1115

Warning. In an attempt to discourage Danish youth from participating in the (later cancelled) youth festival that was supposed to take place in Algier, the Danish foreign ministry wrote to DUF to warn them about the unsanitary conditions in the Algerian capital that could endanger the health and welfare of Danish participants. The communist nature of the festival was not directly given as the reason for the warning, but can be read between the lines of the letter.1116

A break with policy. One example breaks with the established pattern. In 1960 WIDF, and officially DDK, wished to conduct a congress in Denmark. Initially, Danish authorities as usual stated that the holding of the meeting in no way served any Danish interests and that participants could not be expected to receive visas. However, the Danish authorities changed their position and issued visas. The reason given was that the congress should celebrate the 50th anniversary of The International Women’s Day (March 8th) that was organized by an international women’s congress in Copenhagen in 1910. 700-800 women participated in the congress.1117

CONSEQUENCES

Despite the new initiatives the front and friendship organizations suffered from lack of innovation. The same kind of events with the same topics and the same framing took place over and over again. This led to a decline in the membership figures and activity level.

DKSU pessimism. DSKU chairman Carl Thomsen drew similar conclusions following a 1964 tour to the provincial branches of DKSU. Some branches had as few as 20-30 members, and in DKSU Odense the membership figures had been halved to 150 members. DKSU Århus only had about 50 active members, and everywhere, with the possible exception of DKSU Ålborg, the activity level

1115 ABA/DSU/10/Circular letter 1959.
1116 RA/UM.44.G.72/Memorandum 6.23.1965.
was very low. Nonetheless he encouraged them to carry on without any suggestions on how to improve the situation.\footnote{ABA/DKSU/34/Report by Carl Thomsen on visits to the provincial DKSU branches 9.7.-11.1964.}

The reason for this lack of advice might be found in the minutes of the local congress of DKSU Copenhagen. During the debate, it was concluded that it was difficult to attract interest to travels or lectures organized by DKSU, that no advisements of activities took place, that DKSU suffered from lack of funding, that the locations were insufficient, that the youth showed no interest in the activities, and that it had proved impossible to attract famous people who wanted to engage in the activities of DKSU on an executive level, either for lack of time or interest.\footnote{ABA/DKSU/34/DKSU Copenhagen congress minutes 1.26.1963.}

\section*{CONCLUSIONS}

If the early 1950s could be seen as a high point with regard to the activity level and membership figures, the decade following the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary should be regarded as a low point.

Although it does not seem as if the Soviets themselves understood this, the invasion of Hungary caused major problems for the initiated structural reform from the very beginning and at the same time it is very difficult to see the reform as something that improved the existing system in reality. The various reports pinpointed the weaknesses of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus, but this only led to a few name changes and the addition of yet another layer of bureaucracy, whereas the activities, slogans, and foreign partners continued without alteration to the very end of the existence of the USSR.

Outside the USSR, the Hungarian events of 1956 and 1958 had an enormous influence on the willingness to engage in cultural contacts or participate in the activities of the front organizations or the friendship association.

At the same time both the Social-democratic movement and the Danish authorities continuously strove to counteract Soviet cultural diplomacy in Denmark.

Although we do see some new initiatives, the combination of the reasons stated above and a lack of ability to innovate the product, or re-frame it, meant that narrower and narrower circles of Danish participants attempted to keep the various organizations going, and public interest, even among the usual fellow-traveling circles, waned.
Chapter 7: The Second Peace Struggle, 1974-1985

“If you have shown that culture is
the sharpest weapon of the USSR”,
Ingmar Wagner

If a Danish historian wants to stir up a hornet’s nest they simply have to state that they wish to
discuss the peace campaigns of the 1980s. The question is a highly politicized and strongly debated
topic due to the 23 footnotes that an alternative parliamentarian majority made the Danish
government place so-called “footnotes” in NATO communiqués which, as some historians argue,
cast serious doubts on Danish loyalty to the NATO alliance. Nonetheless the 1980s peace
movements, DKSU, public open air festivals run by the DKP newspaper, and some case studies of
individual activities will be the major topics of this chapter.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

Based on the 1956 experiences following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, following the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, DKSU halted all public activity. However, much to the
surprise of DKSU veterans, this time only one member left the EC, and only 22 ordinary members
exited, and 43 new members even joined DKSU at the time. During the 1970s membership
continued to rise as a new, younger generation entered the association.

Early signs. One of the major changes resulting in the unexpected membership increase was an
overall change in the perception of the USSR, especially in the new, non-Soviet communist left that
perceived the USSR in a somewhat positive manner or, at least, as better than the USA.

An early example of this tendency is the WFDY organized 1961 world youth conference in
Moscow. Along the usual lines of pro-Soviet final communiqués on peaceful coexistence,
disarmament, and anti-colonialism they also suggested increased cultural cooperation among the

1121 ABA/DKSU/1/Congress report 2.9.1969.
1122 ABA/DKSU/4/Memorandum [1974].
global youth. Unlike earlier events DKU was joined by the socialist dominated organizations Clarte, Unge Pædagoger (‘Young Pedagogues’), and LLO.\textsuperscript{1124}

In 1968 the journal \textit{Ramparts} exposed the CIA financing of the international anti-communist organizations the Congress for Cultural Freedom. This was followed by the exposes of other similar anti-communist organizations such as ISC, IUSY, and WAY\textsuperscript{1125} leading to a strong anti-American denunciation in the Danish non-Soviet communist left press.\textsuperscript{1126}

\textbf{The new world view of the Social-democratic movement.} More importantly, the Social-democratic movement began to change its view of the USSR and international politics. One of the indications was the strong DSU (and non-Soviet communist left) involvement in the national preparatory committee for the 1973 East Berlin world youth festival – and generally positive participation in the festival itself.\textsuperscript{1127} As we have seen, a decade earlier such engagements led to exclusion.

As we shall discuss further, the Social-democrat controlled trade unions became more and more involved in the Soviet-influenced peace movements supporting Soviet peace initiatives and presenting positive perceptions of the USSR.\textsuperscript{1128} This was a long way from the staunch anti-communist stance of the Social-democratic movement of earlier decades.

\textbf{Stronger engagement in the cultural agreements.} Danish authorities were also changing their position on Soviet cultural diplomacy in a more positive direction. Following the 1968 events in Czechoslovakian Denmark put all activities within the cultural agreement on hold.\textsuperscript{1129} However, by 1970 Denmark complied with Soviet wishes to further develop the state exchange program.\textsuperscript{1130} By the mid-1970s the civil servant in charge of the program in the Danish foreign ministry publicly noted his satisfaction with the cultural side of the program, despite the Soviet side taking too long to answer requests and engage in the stipulated activities.\textsuperscript{1131}

\textsuperscript{1124} Голос юности мира: Сборник материалов всемирного форума молодежи (Москва. 25 июля - 3 августа 1961 года) (Москва, 1962).
\textsuperscript{1125} Kotek, 222-223.
\textsuperscript{1126} \textit{Politisk Revy} 1967:82, 8-10; 1968:104, 5.
\textsuperscript{1128} \textit{Fagbladet} 1984:6, 26-29; 1984:7, 22-23
\textsuperscript{1129} RA/UM.41.C.143/Bilag/Memorandum 8.27.1968.
\textsuperscript{1130} RA/UM.41.Dan-Sov.2/Program for cultural and scientific exchanges between Denmark and the USSR 1970-1972.
**New life to an old front organization.** Thanks to the overall positive perspective of the new left old front organizations were revitalized. By the end of the 1970s DDK experienced a revival with new local branches being founded or reestablished across Denmark, even the Copenhagen branch was reestablished as an independent entity,\textsuperscript{1132} and the previously low membership numbers rose to about 800 members.\textsuperscript{1133} This also led to a reorganization of the executive organs.

**Figure 7.1.: DDK organizational structures in the 1980s\textsuperscript{1134}**

The new higher activity level and local branches across Denmark (by 1981 there were 10 local branches\textsuperscript{1135}) led to a reorganization of the executive and planning procedures. The congress defined the strategy and the main lines of activities. The national committee decided on and planned how to implement the strategy. The various committees of the board of the national committee were responsible for the practical implementation. Five committees existed. FRESCO was responsible for international information dissemination, the committee for the women’s cause in Denmark was in charge of contacts with the local branches, the editorial committee edited the DDK journal *Vi Kvinder*, the press committee publicly promoted the position of DDK on various themes, and the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1132} ABA/DDK/4/Congress minutes 1.26.1977.

\textsuperscript{1133} ABA/DDK/4 Note late 1970s.

\textsuperscript{1134} Based on ABA/DDK/6/Organizational diagram ca. 1982

\textsuperscript{1135} ABA/DDK/5/National committee minutes 8.22.-23.1981.
\end{footnotesize}
organizational committee functioned as a service organ for the secretariat. A reading of the DDK archival sources of the 1980s gives the impression of an increased activity level, nationally, and especially locally. Major areas of activity were the journal, the peace cause, solidarity campaigns (especially solidarity with the populations in South American military dictatorships), and organizing meetings to commemorate International Women’s Day (March 8th).

**PEACE MOVEMENTS**

By the end of the 1970s and 1980s a new cause was brought forward by Soviets: the struggle against the NATO double-track decision made in 1979 to place 108 Pershing II intermediate range missiles and 462 Tomahawk cruise missiles (572 overall) in Western Europe, if the USSR did not stop the accumulation of new SS-20 nuclear missiles in Eastern Bloc countries. In 1978, President Carter suspended the building of the neutron bomb. Although the decision was not made for that reason, the Soviets saw it as the result of their international campaign against the bomb and concluded that since it could be done once, it should be possible to repeat the success in regards to the NATO deployment. This led to the creation of numerous new fronts in a campaign against the NATO missiles (also known as “the second peace struggle”). The fact that SS-20 missiles continued to be deployed, whereas NATO had given the Soviet leadership four years to reconsider before beginning its own deployment, was not problematized by the campaigners, in accordance with the Soviet tactics of playing “the peace card” to gain military advances against its military opponents.

**The second generation communist international front organizations.** To secure an international framework for the campaign against NATO a second generation of communist Cold War front organizations came into existence. The first of these was the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament (“the Dublin Committee”), founded in 1979 at the world congress of trade unions as an ad-hoc group to study the socio-economic consequences of disarmament. Due to the lack of non-communist interest it was reorganized at the People’s World Parliament held in 1980 in Sofia (organized by WPC). The final name of the committee was decided at a conference in Dublin. The leading figures represented other fronts. The committee included a Danish representative and in November 1982 organized a meeting in Copenhagen.  

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1136 ABA/DDK/6/Organizational diagram 1982.  
1137 Rose, 226-230.
The most successful of the second generation fronts was arguably International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, founded in 1980 by the American cardiologist Bernard Lown. Lown explains in his memoirs that he very much wanted to gain contact with a Soviet counterpart and at conference was lucky enough (by chance he believes) to run into to Yevgenii Chazov, who was not just any Soviet cardiologist, but the personal physician of Leonid Brezhnev and appointed Soviet minister of health in 1987. Together they founded IPPNW and in 1985 the organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.\textsuperscript{1138}

In a number of cases, on both an international and a national level, we see a trend to organize front organizations by stating a professional group and adding “for Peace”. This was the case with Journalists for Peace (founded 1981) which complied with the Soviet policy of utilizing mass media for the promotion of Soviet views. The organizational structure was fairly loose and included liaison meetings for example in Copenhagen in October 1986.\textsuperscript{1139}

Unlike most other fronts Generals for Peace was never supposed to be a mass movement. The group was formed in 1981 by eight retired high ranking NATO officers in connection with the publication of the book Generals for Peace (Cologne, 1981). The group claimed that the greatest threat to world peace was NATO’s nuclear politics, and at a press conference at The Hague in November 1981 they demanded that NATO should halt the arms race and the nuclear confrontation. No mention was made of the Soviet SS-20 missiles.\textsuperscript{1140}

Following the 1983 world parliament in Prague a loosely connected group of educators was formed with organizational support from the communist international teachers’ union. The organization was officially founded at a 1985 conference held in Cologne. In 1986 a conference on the main themes of the organization (educating for peace, disarmament, and international understanding) took place in Copenhagen. One of the leading figures was the Danish teacher Johnny Baltzersen who was closely connected with the Danish affiliate of WPC.\textsuperscript{1141} Baltzersen has later confirmed his leading role in establishing Teachers for Peace although he denies its connections with the world communist movement.\textsuperscript{1142}

\textsuperscript{1138} Lawn, passim; Rose 216-225.
\textsuperscript{1139} Rose, 230.
\textsuperscript{1140} Rose, 209-216; Peter Wivel: Drabet på Petra Kelly – en historie om Murens fald (Copenhagen, 2009), 116-119.
\textsuperscript{1141} Rose, 234-235.
\textsuperscript{1142} Jyllandsposten 4.3.2014; 5.5.2014
International Health Workers for Peace organized in connection with the 7th IPPNW conference held in June 1987 in Moscow. It has been questioned how many of the representative actually represented any national organization and how many came of their own accord.  

**Second generation Danish front organizations.** Denmark also saw a second generation of peace movements. There were two kinds. Firstly, some centered on a professional group and added “for Peace” or a similar term to the profession. Examples are Lærere for Fred (‘Teachers for Peace’), Journalister for Fred (‘Journalists for Peace’), Danske læger mod Kernevåben (‘Danish Doctors against Nuclear Arms’). Secondly, numerous local peace organizations named for a region or, more often, city followed by the “for Peace” or “Peace Committee” came into existence.

**SAK.** Having for many years played a still less important role DFK dissolved in 1972 leaving WPC without a Danish affiliate. In 1973 Ib Nørlund and Ingmar Wagner, leading DKP members, tasked Anker Schjerning with forming a new Danish peace movement in connection with the upcoming WPC congress in Moscow. During the congress, at a series of meetings in Schjerning’s hotel room of the Danish participants it was agreed to establish Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og Sikkerhed (‘The Liaison Committee for Peace and Security’). Officially SAK was founded on February 25th 1974. Although open to all, lists of memberships indicate that primarily collective members (communist controlled or otherwise left-leaning trade unions or their branches, other front organizations, and DKP and DKU) joined SAK, and as such, membership circles in the early years primarily consisted of well-known faces within Soviet influenced circles. Formally, the highest executive of SAK was the National Committee. A Presidium existed, but only as figure heads to argue the non-partisan nature. The National Committee seldom met, and the actual work was carried out by a seven persons steering committee that included Schjerning. In the beginning SAK led a quiet life, and not until the 1977 signature campaign against the US neutron bomb plans did it pick up the pace. In December 1977 SAK handed in 105,000 signatures to the

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1143 Rose, 216-217.


1145 ABA/DKP/103/Memorandum for DKP CC meeting 1.22.-23.1983.

For an overview of the local peace movements see Stine Lindhardt, Poul Mikael Allarp and Erling Pedersen (ed.): *Det alternative Danmark – Vejviser of græsuddern og venstrefløj* (Copenhagen, 1983), 79-84.

1146 Lauridsen, 176-177.

1147 Schjerning became one of the Danish WPC members (Jensen (2014) I, 630).


1150 Nielsen/Dybbro, 32.
Danish foreign minister. The campaign not only increased public awareness and membership figures, but also resulted in new local branches. For example, a branch was established in Northern Jutland in September 1979 based on an initiative taken by local communist dominated trade unions with participation of various political parties and various local branches of well-known front organizations. During 1977 Ingmar Wagner, DKP peace and solidarity secretary and DKSU vice-chairman, organized for SAK to take over the vacated DKSU offices in Reventlowsgade following DKSU’ move to “the friendship house” (see below). Wagner and the DKP chairman secured the necessary 100,000 kroner funding from GDR, and Anker Schjerning convinced a number of individuals to officially donate 500 kroner each based on a promise of having the amount refunded from the GDR funding. Later DKP approved that the DKP member Johnny Baltzersen was hired in a paid position as SAK secretary. SAK did not move into the new Peace Center alone. Other front organizations such as DDK also rented offices in the building.

The strong anti-americanism and anti-NATO position. Although the Soviet invasion in 1979 made some members leave SAK, and led to the founding of the non-Soviet communist NtA, it is possible to identify a strong anti-NATO position in the publications of various peace organizations (that might not all have been Soviet influenced) such as Danske dyrlæger mod kernevåben (‘Danish Veterinarians against Nuclear Arms’), Danske læger mod kernevåben (‘Danish Physicians against Nuclear Arms’), Fagbevægelsen for Fred (‘Trade Union for Peace’), Gymnasielærere for Fred (‘High School Teachers for Peace’), Journalister for Fred (‘Journalists for Peace’), Kunstnere for Fred (‘Artists for Peace’), Lærere for Fred (‘Teachers for Peace’) Sundhedsarbejdere for Fred (Health Care Workers for Peace’). A reading of these publications show that the NATO decision was framed negatively as an aggression, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was similarly negatively described, whereas the Soviet initiative of promoting the North as a nuclear-free zone was supported along with the congresses of various front organizations. Furthermore, reports on delegation trips contained the usual rosy pictures of the socio-economic development in the USSR and the Soviet will to peace, even voiced critique of any negative coverage of the “Whiskey on the rocks” incident when a Soviet u-boat stranded off the

1152 OF/Folder undated
1153 Nielsen/Dybbro, 33-34.
1155 ABA/DDK/11/DDK Copenhagen EC minutes 2.8.1978.
1156 ABA/DKP/103/Memorandum for DKP CC meeting 1.22.-23.1983.
1157 Trauelsen/Nielsen, 46-52.
In other words, there was a strongly voiced critique of the NATO position, but not the Soviet escalation of the arms race. One of the most active peace organizations was Lærere for Fred, with the communist Johnny Baltzersen as a central figure. LfF held numerous meetings, conferences, and published many publications and teaching materials in an attempt to promote the Soviet line of thought in the curriculum of Danish public schools.\textsuperscript{1159} Landsforeningen “Stop Atomraketterne” (“The National Association Stop the Nuclear Rockets”) was one of the most active organizations in the anti-deployment campaign and one of the best examples of a front organization covering for another front organization (SAK). LSA very clearly stated its mission as moving the Danish government to not supporting the deployment of 572 NATO missiles\textsuperscript{1160} and doing this by means of public pressure.\textsuperscript{1161} Approximately 60 of the above mentioned categories of peace organizations and some trade unions joined LSA,\textsuperscript{1162} but like in similar organizations a narrow circle ran operations through various committees,\textsuperscript{1163} and had a DKU member, Hans Henrik Kjølby,\textsuperscript{1164} in the only paid position as secretary. According to LSA the deployment of SS-20s should not be seen as arms buildup since the intermediate rockets situated in Europe could not reach American targets.\textsuperscript{1165} The fact that it was a new weapons system deployed prior to the NATO decision was also disregarded in LSA’ pro-Soviet position.

**DKP and the third generation Danish peace movements.** By 1983 DKP CC concluded that it held a very strong position within the peace movements, especially among the many new regional or city level peace movements and the second generation movements identified above. DKP CC concluded that many joined despite the leading role played by DKP in a willingness to join forces against the double track decision.\textsuperscript{1166} Anker Schjerning, as chairman of both the DKP peace (also included key members of SAK and Fagbevægelsen for Fred) and the solidarity committee, in the

\textsuperscript{1158} ABA/DKP/395/Various undated folders; Den spændende krig – den besværlige fred - fredsformidling i opdragelse kultur og medier (undated); Fagbevægelsen for Fred 1983:2, 1983:3; Freden må sikres – rapport om faglig fredsdelegations besøg i Sovjetunionen i april 1982 (Aalborg, 1982); Journalister for Fred Nyhedsbrev # 7, 8; Kultur for Fred (undated); Lærere for Fred/Gymnasielærere for Fred # 2; Medicinske konsekvenser af krig med kernevåben (Copenhagen, 1982).
\textsuperscript{1159} Jensen II (2014), 655-660; Lærere for Fred-Nyt special issue (Forslag til fredsundervisning # 2).
\textsuperscript{1160} ABA/LSA/1/Constitution 3.5.1983.
\textsuperscript{1161} ABA/LSA/1/Circular letter undated [late 1982].
\textsuperscript{1162} ABA/LSA/1/Circular letter undated [1983]; List of membership organizations 2.3.1983.
\textsuperscript{1163} ABA/LSA/1/Memorandum on organizational structure undated.
\textsuperscript{1164} Børsen 9.4.2008.
\textsuperscript{1165} ABA/DKP/395/LSA folder February 1983.
\textsuperscript{1166} ABA/DKP/103/ Memorandum for DKP CC meeting 1.22.-23.1983.
1980s became the key figure in the DKP’s control over the various peace movements. Many local communists were very active in keeping the local movements up and running.\textsuperscript{1167}

**The Social-democratic position.** As noted by Bent Jensen, the main difference between the first and second generations of Soviet-influenced peace movements was the altered position of the Social-democratic movement towards a positive view on the Soviet peace overtures and willingness to cooperate closely with the communist front organizations.\textsuperscript{1168} As early as 1977 the largest (Social-democratic led) trade union SiD stated its full support of the collection of signatures for the campaign against the US neutron bomb plans.\textsuperscript{1169} The main SiD-financed peace outlet was Fagbevægelsen for Fred, founded following a 1981 congress in Aalborg and cooperating with many of the various “professions for Peace” groups.\textsuperscript{1170} One of the most active of these was Buschauffører for Fred (‘Bus drivers for Peace’) which clearly stated their overall aim as the struggle against the NATO missiles.\textsuperscript{1171} In 1984 the SiD chairman Hardy Hansen and international secretary Claus Jensen, both Social-democrats, presented SiD’s new peace program against nuclear arms, SDI, and the stationing of foreign troops in Denmark.\textsuperscript{1172} The program made Danish NATO membership impossible. Together with the communists Frank Aaen and Carl Scharnberg, Claus Jensen promoted the new program at a conference in Sønderborg.\textsuperscript{1173}

Spokesman on political affairs Lasse Budtz was one of the main figures in altering the Social-democratic position when the party came into opposition in the 1980s. In numerous articles he attacked NATO and the double track decision.\textsuperscript{1174} In government, his party had supported this very policy. Although some MPs protested this new policy line, a majority, including party leader and former Prime Minister Anker Jørgersen, supported the new line.\textsuperscript{1175} As Prime Minister Poul Schlüttter noted in a 1983 public debate with Anker Jørgensen: “I understand that Anker Jørgensen thinks that the government should take all those precautions that he did not take in all the many years he had the chance”.\textsuperscript{1176}

\textsuperscript{1167}ABA/DKP/104/DKP CC meeting 11.12.-13.1983 various papers.  
\textsuperscript{1168}Jensen I (2014), 615.  
\textsuperscript{1169}ABA/DKP/431/SiD to SAK 10.20.1977.  
\textsuperscript{1170}Lauridsen, 230-231.  
\textsuperscript{1171}ABA/DKP/395/Presentation folder undated.  
\textsuperscript{1172}Fagbladet 8.25.1984.  
\textsuperscript{1173}ABA/DKP/395/Program [1984].  
\textsuperscript{1175}Jensen II (2014), 391-407.  
\textsuperscript{1176}Politiken 11.2.1983.
This altered Social-democratic stand was a very far cry from the earlier documented anti-communist position of the party, trade unions, youth organization, and women’s department of the 1940s and 1950s.

In Danish historiography the reasons for the change in the Social-democratic position has been the theme of a very heated debate. Non-Russian speaking Danish historians, as for example Rasmus Mariager, argue that the Social-democratic alteration of its NATO position was inspired solely by the influence of West-German Ostpolitik and the policy developed within the Socialist International and Scandilux.¹¹⁷⁷ A much more including approach is found in the conclusions on the Social-democratic change made by Bent Jensen. Jensen fully acknowledges the influence of SI and Scandilux but points to several other sources of influence, including the new left, the new generation influenced by the new left coming into power in the Social-democratic party, and, most importantly, the massive Soviet campaign seeking influence on key members of the Social-democratic movement.¹¹⁷⁸ In this respect it is very important to note that the high ranking CPSU member in charge of establishing Soviet contacts with Western Social-democratic parties and attempting to create influence on them has confirmed that this was a major priority of CPSU at the time.¹¹⁷⁹ Therefore, when discussing the role of and possible sources of influence on the Social-democratic party, the Soviet angle should not be so easily dismissed as some non-Russian speaking historians do.

**DKP surprised by Social-democratic position.** The change in position of the Social-democrats took DKP very much by surprise. DKP was unsure how deep and complete this new position was (had the Social-democrats actually given up their pro-NATO position?), and, if so, what possibilities it would then provide for the DKP-led peace movements for expanding the anti-NATO campaign beyond the question of missile deployment.¹¹⁸⁰

**Peace activities of the 1970s-1980s.** It is possible to identify four main areas of activities of the Soviet influenced peace movement; publishing (as discussed above), signature collections, peace demonstrations, and peace conferences.

¹¹⁸⁰ ABA/DKP/103/Memorandum for DKP CC meeting 1.22.-23.1983.
The most “famous” signature collections are those organized by Arne Herløv Petersen and paid for by the Soviets.\(^{1181}\)

LSA initiated the campaign “Stop the nuclear rockets – life must go on” that included a signature collection. LSA made much of the numerous non-communist cultural workers who signed the appeal by printing various folders listing their names.\(^{1182}\)

LSA was not the only ones to organize signature campaigns against the NATO missile deployment, for example, 12,000 citizens of the Ledøje-Smithom municipality signed an appeal,\(^{1183}\) and in 1982 Hjørring for Fred collected 539 signatures on the above mentioned LSA appeal.\(^{1184}\)

The first major demonstrations against NATO missile deployment took place in major cities across the country on December 4th 1982. The demonstrations were framed as a major genuinely popular protest against NATO missiles.\(^{1185}\) Only NtA dared to also criticize the SS-20s, much to the dismay of other demonstrations almost leading some peace demonstrators into fist fights in the streets.\(^{1186}\)

Demonstrations also took place outside of the greater Copenhagen area. In Hjørring, for example, the local Hjørring for Fred organization organized a 24 hours demonstration against NATO deployment,\(^{1187}\) whereas in Århus, DKU organized an open air festival, “Rock against the Rockets”, with the participation of major mainstream rock bands. The event newspaper strongly criticized NATO missile deployment and US politics in Central America, but no mention was made of SS-20s or Afghanistan.\(^{1188}\) In October 1984 a five minute work stoppage was observed, supported by the Danish (Social-democratic led) central trade union.\(^{1189}\) Another creative way of organizing peace demonstrations were for example a kite festival for peace at Amager.\(^{1190}\) Among the more spectacular demonstrations were the long-distance peace marches, such as the 1981 Copenhagen-Paris march officially organized by the non-communist, but pro-Soviet Kvinder for Fred (‘Women for Peace’), but it is well-documented today that DKP and SAK took care of the organizational preparations.\(^{1191}\) SAK also organized Danish participation in protests demonstration against president Reagan during his 1982 visit to Bonn.\(^{1192}\)

\(^{1181}\) Anne-Mette Anker Hansen: *Arne Herløv Petersen-sagen: Baggrund og fortolkning* (Copenhagen, 2010), 9.

\(^{1182}\) ABA/DKP/395/Various LSA campaign folders [1982].

\(^{1183}\) ABA/DKP 395/Undated cutting from *Ballerup Bladet*.

\(^{1184}\) *Vendsyssel Tidende* 11.29.1982.

\(^{1185}\) *Land og Folk* 12.7.1982.


\(^{1187}\) *Vendsyssel Tidende* 11.29.1982.

\(^{1188}\) ABA/DKP/395/ *Rock mod raketterne* newspaper 1983.


\(^{1190}\) ABA/DKP/395/Poster undated.


\(^{1192}\) ABA/SAK/48/Folder [1982].
In 1981 the local Odense Fredskomite organized a very typical conference. The major agendas were to discuss how to organize a campaign for the North as a nuclear free zone, and how Danish peace movements could contribute to the international campaign against the NATO double track decision. Another typical conference was organized by SAK to critically discuss Danish defense and security politics. Occasionally, international experts participated as speakers.

As in earlier decades we see examples of coordinated campaigns including a mixture of the above mentioned activities. Such examples are the 1986 “All Nuclear Weapons Away” campaign, or the 1987 “Nuclear Free Now” campaign.

The 1986 Copenhagen World Peace Congress. In many ways the 1986 peace congress in Copenhagen was the culmination point of the 1980’s peace movements in Denmark. Although formally organized by an international preparatory committee – led by DKSU chairman Hermod Lannung – DKP closely monitored the process and held meetings with the WPC chairman, the actual organizers of the congress. DKP played a role in securing funding for congress and influenced the decisions on hiring communist members as staff. DKP was not alone in its support. Among others the Social-democratic led trade unions also supported the congress as an important event in the struggle against the US Strategic Defense Initiative. The congress had 3000 participants, including 500 Danes, and was covered by 254 Danish and international journalists.

The congress took place October 15th-19th 1986. It consisted of a mixture of plenary meetings and meetings in various sub-committees discussing topics such as peace and justice, disarmament, or human rights. In addition the congress provided a networking opportunity for various organizations interested in women’s rights, youth politics, or other topics. Despite the large participation figures, non-communist organizations and parties withdrew prior to the opening to the political bias of the congress agenda that did not open for critical discussions of human rights’ violations in

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1194 ABA/SAK/48/Program undated.
1196 ABA/SAK/27/Various campaign materials.
1197 ABA/SAK/26/Various campaign materials.
1198 ABA/DKP/106/Newsletters 1986.
1200 See also Rose 74-76.
1203 ABA/DKP/106/Program undated.
Soviet Europe or the Soviet war in Afghanistan. In the end the congress became infamous for the TV transmitted forceful removal of critical speakers from the plenum podium and subsequent fist fights.\textsuperscript{1204}

Internally DKP concluded that the congress had been very successful and would form the basis for new peace campaigns.\textsuperscript{1205} DKP chairman Jørgen Jensen and Anker Schjerning travelled to Moscow to receive instructions on how to best utilize the congress in the future work.\textsuperscript{1206} However, externally there was much frustration over the negative consequences of the unruly events of the congress making headline news. 175 Danish delegates complained to the Radio Council of the Danish Broadcast Union that this had made the coverage part of a negative political campaign against the congress.\textsuperscript{1207} Based among other things on a written answer from the news department covering the conference the general director rejected this and other complaints, arguing that there had been a reasonable coverage allowing both participants and critics to have their say, and that it was not the department’s fault that it had come to violent clashes at the conference and based on ordinary journalistic principles such events during the congress should be covered.\textsuperscript{1208}

**Conclusions.** When comparing the first and second generation of Soviet-influenced peace movements we see two major differences. The first is an increased activity level. The second is the wider circles of participation by non-communists, including the Social-democratic movement, securing the Soviet influenced peace movements a much larger audience.

However when the characteristics of the main participants are closely scrutinized we see that the large majority of activists were younger female students. Only 1 percentage of the general Danish population had participated in any of the peace activities identified about and opinion polls continuously documented that a majority of Danes supported a full Danish NATO membership. Therefore, what secured the success of the second generation Soviet-influenced peace movement was the fact that the Social-democrats, for the various reasons discussed above, changed position and as such made an alternative majority on security politics in Parliament possible.\textsuperscript{1209}

As such, it is possible to conclude that despite the higher activity level and the wider circles of political orientation of the participants the Soviet-influenced peace movements were unable to turn

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1204] *PK X*, 328-333.
\item[1205] ABA/DKP/121/DKP EC minutes 10.28.1986.
\item[1206] ABA/DKP/121/Report to DKP EC meeting 12.9.1986.
\item[1207] ABA/SAK/26/Letter of complaint 11.28.1986.
\item[1208] ABA/SAK/27/Letter 1.23.1987.
\item[1209] Jensen J (2014), 660-685.
\end{footnotes}
a wider circle of contacts in the general public into a stronger political public pressure on the political decision makers, partly because the majority of the general public did not buy into the messages, and partly because the conservative-liberal government stood its ground.

SOVIET CULTURAL DAYS AND OTHER DKSU ACTIVITIES

Table 7.A: DKSU (Copenhagen) activities 1970-1977\textsuperscript{1210}:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lectures**</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8****</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lectures organized by others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensembles/guest performances</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Press meetings</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegations(visits from the USSR)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegations to the USSR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist and study groups to the USSR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of units lent out by the library</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>386***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exhibitions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian language classes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie club</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>7****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only covers 9.1.-12.1.1971
** Greater Copenhagen area only. But this was the main activity of the All-Danish DKSU (1970 covers the entire country, but not activities by the local branches).
*** Second half of 1972 only.
**** Excluding a friendship week.
***** The movie club closed this year due to technical difficulties. DKSU ran another movie club for employees of the Danish Broadcast Union.

The 1970s saw an increase not only in DKSU membership figures, but also in the activity level. Table 7.A. indicates the activity level in DKSU Copenhagen. The surviving archival sources indicate that the activities of DKSU and DKSU Copenhagen often melted together and throughout the Cold War the activity level in Copenhagen exceeded that of all the other branches combined, especially because the Soviet delegations, guests, artists, and tourists arrived in Copenhagen, and therefore always gave lectures, performed, or participated in press conferences in Copenhagen, but seldom in all the cities of local DKSU branches. This was also the case with other organizations involved in Soviet cultural diplomacy. For example in 1975, DKSU almost weekly organized a public lecture, movie screening, concert or similar activity in the greater Copenhagen area.\textsuperscript{1211} As the DKSU archives also focus on the activities in the Danish capital region it is more difficult to

\textsuperscript{1211} ABA/DKSU/4/Report July 1975.
discuss the activity level in the local branches. However, the scattered materials leave the impression of a general activity level of roughly one activity per month (with the exception of the summer months), usually in the form of a public lecture (travel experiences, cultural topics, or Soviet guest lecturers are the most common themes), movie screenings, or participation in local cultural events. Occasionally exhibitions, for example of Soviet books, were organized.\textsuperscript{1212}

**Public lectures.** The most frequent activity of DKSU continued to be the lectures. In the 1972 fall season DKSU Copenhagen organized weekly lectures in their offices in Reventlowsgade. Danish lectures often spoke on impressions from travels to the USSR or cultural topics such as Soviet ballet. Each season saw a number of Soviet visitors as guest speakers. This particular season included, for example, the vice-chairman of the Soviet Women’s Committee T. Frunze speaking on the position of women in Soviet society, army general Bartov on Soviet security policy, and SSOD vice-chairman Palshak on the work of spreading knowledge about Denmark in the USSR.\textsuperscript{1213}

**Impresario.** From 1969 and especially towards the end of the 1970s DKSU operated as impresario for various Soviet groups of singers and dancers of folkloristic arts, so-called “amateur groups”\textsuperscript{1214}. The earliest folkloristic groups to tour Denmark in this manner in 1969 were the Ukrainian group Yunost, the Moldavian group Prietnia, and the Russian group Siverko.\textsuperscript{1215} For example, Yunost toured Denmark for two weeks and gave 11 shows.\textsuperscript{1216} The 1970 tour by the group Sadko also resulted in strong turnouts and even recordings for screenings on the single Danish TV channel.\textsuperscript{1217} The DKSU chairman rightly called the amateur groups one of the most important presentations of Soviet culture to a Danish audience.\textsuperscript{1218} The success led DKSU to engage in the impresario business on an even more commercial level inviting professional groups from the Bolshoi Theatre the Obratsov Puppet Theater, and even a circus troupes to the old entertainment fair, Dyrehavsbakken,

\textsuperscript{1213} ABA/DKSU/48/Brochure 1972.
\textsuperscript{1214} It is unclear what this term means. Archival sources indicate that it has to do with the status of these artists in the USSR and, perhaps, also regarding the expenses on the Danish side for organizing their tours.
\textsuperscript{1215} ABA/DKSU/34/DKSU Copenhagen congress report 1.29.1970.
\textsuperscript{1216} KB/JJ/28/Circular letter 1969.
\textsuperscript{1217} ABA/DKSU/34/DKSU Copenhagen EC meeting report 5.27.1970.
\textsuperscript{1218} ABA/DKSU/1/DKSU congress report 2.22.1970.
in Copenhagen in cooperation with Goszirk. The main Soviet business partner for organizing the tours was Goskoncert.

Cultural days. Another important new activity of the 1970s was the cultural days consisting of various cultural performances, usually of folkloristic vein, lectures, exhibitions, and the publication of a special cultural days newspaper with information (usually with a strong emphasis on production figures) on the given republic, and the program of the cultural days. In 1984 former DKSU chairman Allan Fridericia interviewed DKSU vice-chairman Ingmar Wagner for an article in the Communist daily Land og Folk regarding the cultural days. Wagner named them the most important cultural assignment of DKSU.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet republic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>Kirgizia</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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The Azerbaijan cultural days of 1974 consisted of a group of 40 artists of the Azerbaijan State Ensemble, an official delegation including public lecturers, exhibitions of Azerbaijan

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1219 Pedersen, 5-7.
1222 Pedersen, 28.
1223 ABA/DKSU/40/DKSU to SUDK 7.4.1974.
handicrafts, graphics, and children’s drawings respectively, and a special newspaper on Azerbaijan SSR was produced. During a 13 day tour the state ensemble gave 11 shows. DKSU sold the shows to private organizers (multi-halls, local theater associations, or sport clubs) or rented a venue (for example Falconer Center in the greater Copenhagen area). The exhibitions, especially those in various libraries, established a general pattern of the exhibitions expanding the event into several months. The local press in Denmark was very engaged in the concerts, devoting long articles to them, and usually printed very flattering reviews that also indicated that large audiences attended the shows. The national press, although positive, only carried reviews if shows were organized in the greater Copenhagen area. DKSU concluded in a similar positive manner that the cultural days had been a success, with large turnouts at local events in cities where DKSU usually had no activities or influence on public opinion. Only the preparation could be improved, especially if the Soviet partners would not be so slow in answering questions and forwarding information.

The 1975 Kazakhstan cultural days took place in a similar way in regard to the late arrival of exhibition items and information, the well-attended tour of Denmark of a state ensemble performing in a folkloristic show, the tour of a delegation of public lecturers, and the favorable promotions and reviews in the local press of both the show and exhibitions – with the exclusion of Elsinore, where the floor of the multi-hall had been too slippery for dancing.

1224 ABA/DKSU/40/Memorandum undated.
1225 ABA/DKSU/40/Translation undated.
1227 ABA/DKSU/40/Printed program.
1228 ABA/DKSU/40/Various contracts.
1229 ABA/DKSU/40/Memorandum on exhibitions undated.
1234 ABA/DKSU/40/Report undated.
1235 ABA/DKSU/40/Report on the ensemble undated.
1236 ABA/DKSU/40/Delegation program undated.
1237 ABA/DKSU/40/Collection of newspaper cuttings 1975.
A pattern was quickly established. In the year prior to the cultural days of a given republic, a DKSU delegation traveled to the USSR to negotiate with the republican-level branch of SSOD regarding wishes for artists and exhibitions. The following spring, a delegation from that local branch visited DKSU to conclude the final negotiations on the contents. The artists performed in various multi-halls, schools, and local theater scenes. The organizers paid DKSU 10,000-15,000 kroners per show. During the Lithuanian cultural days in 1981 DKSU received exhibitions of photos of architecture, wooden handicrafts, amber jewelry, children’s books, children’s’ drawings, and tapestries. The exhibitions arrived by ship. The exhibitions were showcased in Copenhagen first, and then toured the rest of Denmark. At the official opening of the exhibition at the art museum in Aarhus the cultural minister of the Lithuanian SSR was present as well as the Soviet ambassador. The new, favorable view of Danish authorities on Danish-Soviet cultural relations resulted in the Danish cultural minister Niels Matthiasen on several occasions officially opened the cultural days. In his speeches Matthiasen emphasized the importance of cultural exchange in strengthening the bilateral relations. The DKSU collection of newspaper cuttings indicates the a continued favorable public opinion on the shows, exhibitions, and attendance.

The Friendship House. On May 6th 1975 the CPSU CC Secretariat approved the purchase of a building in Copenhagen to establish a Soviet cultural center in the Danish capital. The Soviets purchased a building close to the city hall square in inner Copenhagen, but due to the poor condition of the building it took several years to conclude the repairs, fully paid by the Soviet state. As documented in Chapter 2, the USSR at this time considerably increased the economic subvention of DKSU.

In 1977, when the house finally opened its doors to the public, DKSU signed a lease agreement stipulating that DKSU rented the house without having to pay any rent with the purpose to work for the strengthening of the friendly social, economic, and cultural relationship between the

1240 ABA/DKSU/43/Minutes of meating 5.17.1981.
1241 ABA/DKSU/42/Collection of signed contracts 1979.
1242 ABA/DKSU/43/Report on received artifacts from Lithuania undated.
1243 ABA/DKSU/41/Memorandum, undated.
1248 Where nothing else i mentioned the following is based on Frederichsen (2011b).
The Friendship House contained the book store Sputnik in the basement, the movie theater Kino Kosmos, rooms for receptions and lectures, and later the Gallery ØstiVest on the first floor, concert hall and meeting rooms on the second floor, library and offices at the third floor, and class rooms and an apartment for the manager on the fourth floor.

Kino Kosmos quickly had to abandon running on a commercial basis. The hired staff was let go, and volunteers operated the equipment during the weekly screenings of older Soviet and other socialist feature movies and documentaries. DKSU organized numerous concerts of Russian classical music performed by Danish and Soviet artists. The bookshop sold Soviet books, journals, records, and souvenirs. The gallery exhibited and sold works by younger Soviet artists. A Soviet language teacher, salary paid by SSOD, was one of the evening school teachers of Russian. In 1980 there were 12 classes operated under the Danish adult evening school law. The library had a collection of 8-9,000 volumes, mostly in Russian, but also in English, German, and French. In addition the library received a large number of Soviet journals and slide shows. In 1989 the library was reorganized as an information center. Thanks to a new satellite dish, the evening news program *Vremia* was taped and saved for 30 days. The main activity was public lectures. Each week saw 1-2 lectures during the season (September-May). Recurring themes among Danish speakers were, as in earlier times, travel experiences and various aspects of Soviet cultural or socio-economic life. Recurring themes among Soviet speakers were Soviet cultural life, socio-economic developments in the Union Republics and the Soviet peace will. DKSU annually commemorated various red-letter days such as the Day of the Red Army or Lenin’s birthday. In some cases, the activities were organized in cooperation with other like-minded organizations such as DDK or other friendship associations.

**Conclusions.** Although the level of activity rose, the level of active participation of the members did not follow. In March 1973 Ingmar Wagner wrote to the author Hans Edvard Teglers to thank him for the lecture he had given and to excuse the low number of listeners. Wagner explained that a weekly program of 1-2 activities more than covered the level of interest in information about the USSR in the greater Copenhagen area and that the great number of events meant that DKSU was not able to prepare for them probably. More often than not no more than a handful of listeners turned up for the lectures. As seen, Kino Kosmos abandoned running on commercial terms. In

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the local branches the level activity continued to vary greatly from branch to branch and from year to year. By 1967, work in the local branches had almost come to a complete stop. Only the performance of a cultural ensemble from Tomsk stirred them to action. DKSU Bornholm stated that they could not organize public lectures with Soviet guest lecturers because their technical level of the lectures was too high for ordinary people to understand. In 1969 DKSU Randers chairman S.A. Nielsen complained that it was impossible to organize anything without funding. He suggested that the central EC should organize lecture tours in the provincial cities, since the local branches were unable to organize anything of their own accord. National chairman Allan Fridericia declined to do this. A few years later the DKSU Aarhus chairman complained about the low turnout at shows of Soviet ensembles, such as Sadko that had recently visited.

Ingmar Wagner, who had taken over Alfred Jensen’s role of communist whip in DKSU, complained about the lack of activity in the various local branches. Wagner also complained about the Soviet guest lecturers because they did not understand how to give lectures in an interesting manner but simply listed unending strings of production figures. Several local branches (for example in Frederikshavn, Silkeborg, Slagelse, and Brøndby) had to close after promising starts, while attempts at reestablishing the Elsinore branch failed. Even the most active and successful branch in Aalborg had crumbled, only to be reanimated at a later point.

In relation to the general public the failing recognition of DKSU was exemplified in 1976 when it was decided that the DKSU secretary should contact the popular TV host Otto Leisner regarding a show aired on October 23rd and demand that DKSU should be mentioned in the broadcasts of performances of Soviet ensembles they had promoted.

As such, the biggest success story of DKSU was the cultural days that reached a wide audience in public circles and areas of Denmark that DKSU usually did not come into contact with and received favorable notice in the local press.

1254 ABA/DKSU/1/Congress report 2.25.1968.
1256 ABA/DKSU/3/EC minutes 1.17.1971.
1259 ABA/DKSU/3/Congress report for the years 1987-1990.
At the time only one TV channel existed in Denmark.
LAND OG FOLK FESTIVALS

In the years 1976-1989 DKP organized an annual open air festival under the name of the newspaper *Land og Folk* in the large public garden, Fælledparken. According to the DKP leadership the criterion for success were that the festivals became a major Copenhagen event and presented an accurate picture of DKP activities through speeches, screenings, exhibitions, music, and theater. The whole event was framed within a setting of folkloristic art, food, and drink. DKU and Komm.S. organized their own part of the festival, foreign communist parties sent delegations and performers, and the various friendship and solidarity organizations had the opportunity to sell goods for the benefit of their economy and attract new members.

Table 7.C: Land og Folk Festivals’ accounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>- 185,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>- 300,000</td>
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<td>1981</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>- 271,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>- 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>- 305,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>- 423,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
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<td>1990</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1262 Where nothing else is mentioned the part of the chapter is based on Katrine Madsbjerg, “Land og Folk Festival 1976-1989”, Arbejdsmuseet & Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkv Årbog 2009, 108-122; Madsbjerg (thesis).

These organizations jumped at the chance to participate and for many of them, the festival became one of the most important activities of the year, including from a financial perspective.\textsuperscript{1264}

By 1978 the festival had become routine with a director, Sven Broe, in charge of the overall planning of the annual event. Together with representatives of the DKP executive and various peace and solidarity committees he formed the central leadership of the preparation for each year’s festival.

In 1980 the CPSU CC secretariat approved a request and decided to help DKP with the successful realization of the festival by sending a 15 person delegation for 15 days to the festival. The delegation included cosmonauts, the ID representative Vladimir Savko, a photo exhibition on the exploration of space, and handcraft items worth 4,000 rubles to be sold for the benefit of DKP at the festival.\textsuperscript{1265}

Although the festivals did not break even, this was not the most important issue from a DKP point of view. DKP even operated with an expected deficit each year of 300,000 kroner. Of greater importance was the annual participation of between 100,000 and 250,000 persons, far exceeding DKP membership figures. Even newspapers critical of the communists had to acknowledge the organizational capabilities of the party.

The festival grounds consisted of a village setting of sales booths, bars, and stages for artistic performances, political debates and speeches. Popular Danish artists and bands played at the festival. Each year the USSR sent a famous chess player who played with anyone who was interested. This and the musical performances, rather than the political messages DKP tried to sell during the festival, were the most popular parts of the festival among the audience.

\textbf{Conclusions.} Overall, it is possible to conclude that the Land og Folk festivals show how DKP was able to create one of the major cultural events during the summer in Copenhagen. However, the general public seemed to have been attracted by the cultural events themselves and did not become supportive of the communist or Soviet political positions by participating in this manifestation of cultural diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{1264} ABA/DBS/2/Protocol 1971-1983; DKP/104/Paper on the festivals for DKP CC meeting 11.12.-13.1983;
\textit{Kvartalsnyt} 1979:January, 2.
INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES

So far in this dissertation, we have primarily discussed mass activities. However, as noted in chapter 1, some activities were carried out outside the usual structural frameworks. In the following we discuss some examples.

*Unknown Neighbors.* In 1977 the DKSU EC member Erik Vagn Jensen published the only textbook written in Danish intended for primary school students on the Soviet Baltic republics, based on a trip to the three Soviet republics. The initiative for both the book and the preliminary study trip was taken by Erik Vagn Jensen on his own accord, but the case also shows how the Soviet apparatus nursed such individual foreign initiatives to their fruitful completion.

Although the author supported Soviet positions, there are no indications that he received any financial support from the Soviets. Instead both APN and SSOD promised Ingmar Wagner to support Erik Vagn Jensen in any way possible, provide him with the necessary picture materials, and a guide during his stay. DKSU played a central role in his preparations by forwarding lists to their Soviet partners of what he wished to see during his trip and ordered his tickets, advised SSOD, the republic SODs, and SUDK of his wishes and travel plans, and secured him special permission to bring a tape recorder into the USSR. The Soviet representation in Denmark told DKSU to contact them if any problems arose that they themselves could not solve.

In the textbook Erik Vagn Jensen declined to conclude on whether the republics had become Soviet, but otherwise he followed the official Soviet line of describing the inter-war Baltic states as fascist, and elections in the current republics as democratic (despite the one candidate system), because the politicians he had met apparently seemed friendly and democratic. According to Erik Vagn Jensen Estonia was an agricultural wonderland. The collectivization had been voluntary and the resistance movement against the Soviet occupation was consequently put down as nazi collaborators and nationalists. Elsewhere he exemplified the great progress and increased welfare through production.

1267 ABA/DKSU/4/Negotiations in Moscow minutes 4.7.1975
1268 ABA/DKSU/99/DKSU to SUDK 5.27.1975.
1269 ABA/DKSU/99/DKSU to Folketurist 5.23.1975.
1270 ABA/DKSU/99/DKSU to SUDK 5.27.1975.
figures and in this manner sought to document that positive developments had happened thanks to Soviet power.\textsuperscript{1273}

In his book he did not thank the Soviet institutions for their help, but this was done deliberately as it would otherwise have hampered the possible impact of the book and hindered its dissemination which he wanted to be as broadly as possible.

**American Pictures.** One of the most, if not the most, successful individual campaigns was *Amerikanske Billeder* (‘American Pictures’) by the photographer Jakob Holdt. In his book (first edition published in Danish in 1977) Holdt presented a bleak picture of poverty among African-Americans and racism in the USA. The book was an enormous hit. In Denmark the book has been published in 13 editions (with 87,000 copies sold). By 2010 his multimedia show based on the book had been shown more than 5000 times across Denmark. For ten years it was shown at a Copenhagen movie theater. Photos from the show have been exhibited at the prestigious Danish galleries Louisiana and Aros. Holdt has been awarded a lifelong subsidy from the Danish fiscal budget. The book and multimedia show also made it to the USA, where the book sold more than 3.5 million copies. The translation into German version was done by the convicted East German spy Jörg Meyer from his cell in a Danish prison. The show also made its way to England. Jakob Holdt has on several occasions confirmed that he came into contact with the KGB in 1976, prior to the publication of the first edition, that he received money from the KGB, and that there was KGB subvention of the dissemination the book and multimedia show in various Western countries. Because his project undercut the human rights campaign initiated by President Jimmy Carter, KGB considered Holdt a huge asset and listed him as an agent under the code name Prist.\textsuperscript{1274} Due to this the case of ‘American Pictures’ must be considered one of the most successful cases of individual activities. However, in 2015 Jakob Holdt had to admit that ‘American Pictures’ contained untrue information and that he had not been present at all the events described in the book. This led the gallery Louisiana to withdraw Holdt’s pictures from their exhibition and other printed materials.\textsuperscript{1275}

**The Ole Friis case.**\textsuperscript{1276} As a young person still in school Ole Friis happened upon Radio Moscow’s Danish broadcasts. He engaged in a long correspondence with Radio Moscow’s Danish desk, who

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1273] Erik Vagn Jensen: *Vore ukendte naboer – Sovjetrepublikkerne Estland/ Letland/ Litauen* (Copenhagen, 1977).
\item[1276] Where nothing else is mentioned the following is based on an interview with Ole Friis. Ole Friis handed over his personal papers and asked that they be made use of in this dissertation.
\end{footnotes}
worked very hard to keep the dialogue going by answering all of his letters. They asked him to send in questions for the letter box, sent him questionnaires, asked him to participate in listeners’ competitions, wrote to tell him even if he did not win, and then sent him consolations prizes anyway, and asked him to comment on the contents of the broadcasts.

Over several years, Radio Moscow nurtured their relationship with him. They sent him pictures of sports stars, tapes with a course in Russian and book parcels free of charge, they answered his questions in the letter box broadcasts and even made sure to write to him in advance when they would be answered and then to mail him copies of the transcripts including the answers to his questions should he have missed the show. Finally, they invited him for a two week stay in Moscow as their guest, free of charge (except for the travel costs to the Soviet border) Though he was never a member of DKP he became chairman of DKSU Aalborg and in this capacity wrote letters to the editor that got published in various local Aalborg newspapers. In his comments he defended Soviet foreign policy such as the invasion of Afghanistan and supported the campaigns for the North as a Nuclear Free Zone and the campaign against the NATO double track decision.

In the end, Ole Friis left DKSU and broke off all contacts with the Soviet fellow-traveling circles and his Soviet contacts, because he felt that Soviet agencies tried to recruit him by offering to pay him to write various articles, and this made him very suspicious of the intentions of his Soviet contacts. However, his story is still one of very few examples of success for the Soviet state-directed cultural diplomacy that it has been possible to identify. They “cultivated” a Dane who was not a DKP member and through a very long period of continued contact he became a member of the largest and most important of the mass organizations supporting the USSR in Demark and even publicly supported Soviet positions in his local area.

In agreement with Ole Friis his papers will be turned over to an archival institution upon the completion of this dissertation.

1277 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 3.16.1967.
1278 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 5.20.1967.
1279 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 6.4.1964; Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 12.18.1970.
1280 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis June 1965.
1281 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis July 1965
1282 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis undated.
1283 In this case a model of a locomotive.
1284 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 2.24.1965.
1285 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 8.24.1964.
1286 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 4.3.1975.
1288 OF/Various transcripts undated.
1289 OF/Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 2.10.1964, Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 2.15.1966; /Radio Moscow to Ole Friis 10.26.1972
1290 OF/undated newspaper clippings.
Ole Friis’ story also tells us how difficult it was for Soviets to achieve their goals through means of cultural diplomacy. Every time, a lot of hard work – and presumably funds – went into winning just one person over, if the stream of letters and gifts are any indication of the normal level of contact.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In this chapter we have discussed three important venues of Soviet cultural diplomacy roughly covering 1974-1985; the second peace struggle, DKSU, and the Land og Folk Festivals. In addition we have discussed a number of examples of the individual activities. The overall impressions of the higher level of activities are that the mass-oriented activities were able to reach a much wider and more positive audience than earlier both, within the general public and within certain political circles such as the Social-democrats. The higher turnout became the major success of the discussed organizations, but they were unable to reach the final aim of turning the popular interest into a larger public pressure on the political decision makers. Therefore, the case studies of individual activities, despite the high financial costs as documented in the Ole Friis case, leave us with the impression that these activities were more influential as regards specific issues such as the Baltic States or alleged human rights violations in the US. Based on this, it could be argued that the Soviet ratio of value for money would have been higher had more efforts been placed not on running narrow-circle organizations, but on promoting issues through well-known individuals.
Chapter 8: Delegations and tourism

“If you want to know about the world today it is no use to go to familiar holiday destinations like Mallorca, Rhodes and so on”.

Eva Hansen

Two forms of travels took place during the Cold War. The first was participation in delegations, the second tourism. What they had in common was a group travel only policy of Soviet authorities and the idea that every trip should contain something beyond leisure.

In this chapter we will discuss both forms of travel including incoming Soviet delegations and tourism, and discuss both the experiences of the travelers and their dissemination of the experience upon returning home.

Due to the lack of surviving archival sources it is very difficult to establish any general overview of the traveling. Of all the Danish businesses involved only DKSU have partly surviving files. Therefore, we shall primarily discuss cases relating to DKSU. DKSU shared the Soviet authorities’ position on the role of delegations and tourism. Traveling was not only a business activity, but also an activity of political and cultural importance.

DELEGATIONS

The main difference between delegations and tourist groups was that members of delegations were invited and that they only had to cover travel costs to the Soviet border from where the hosts covered all expenses.

Delegations were invited through various channels. CPSU and DKP had their own agreements on party delegations visiting the USSR. For example, a 1988 delegation traveled to study the role of CPSU during Glasnost. In other cases delegations, such as the 1952 youth delegation, were invited directly by Soviet public organizations. However, most delegations were invited by VOKS, officially through DKSU. VOKS was very thorough when deciding upon whom to invite, often to the severe dissatisfaction of DKSU who did not feel that they had any say on the candidates.

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1293 ABA/DKSU/32/Letter 4.11.1950
whom they were officially inviting, that DKSU’ recommendations were not given the proper attention, and that DKSU received the directives on the invitees too late to secure their actual participation.  

The following shall discuss three case studies of delegations. They were all invited by VOKS through DKSU. The first is a very typical example. The second is a very atypical example. The third is an example of the more business-like delegations of later years.

**The small-holder farmers’ delegation.** The 1953 small-holder farmers’ delegation consisted of 14 members. Since the Soviets insisted on inviting the delegation in August, in the middle of the harvest season, very few small-holder farmers had the opportunity to participate. The participants represented various small-holder farmers’ organizations, or worked in professions such as plantation ownership or crop consultant that made it possible for them to travel. Nevertheless, the Soviets insisted on calling it the small-holder farmers’ delegation. Six delegation members belonged to DKP, including delegation leader Villy Fuglsang (MP) and his wife Elna Fuglsang. The rest were either members of or belonged to the circles of the social-liberal party. Due to its traditionally pacifist and NATO critical position the social-liberal party was of great interest for Soviet influence campaigns.

Although DKSU officially invited the delegation, the decision to invite the delegation was initiated by VOKS and the Ministry of agriculture with CKPSU CC approval. In line with the techniques of hospitality (discussed in Chapter 1) the Soviet hosts presented an extensive program for each day, a cultural program for the evenings, and long journeys that was amended during negotiations following the arrival to the USSR.

Between August 9th and 28th the delegation traveled from Leningrad (where they had been sightseeing and participating in a culture program in the evenings) to Moscow and the Moscow Region (where activities included visiting an agricultural academy including a tour of an experimental tomato fields, various collective farms, as well as the cultural and sightseeing

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1297 Sovjetunionen i Dag 1953:10-11, 3.
1298 As was usually the case, Fuglsang carried several letters with to be handed over to CPSU (РГАНИ/5/28/72/95/Aksel Larsen to VOKS leadership 8.4.1953).
1299 РГАНИ/5/28/72/91-93/Информационная записка о пребывании в Советском Союзе делегации датских мелких крестьян 8.27.1953.
1300 РГАНИ/5/28/72/84/Брио Председателя Праления ВОКС Яковлев, министр сельского хозяйства и заготовок СССР А. Козлов секретарю ЦК КПСС Хрыщеву Н.С. 8.6.1953.
program), to the Ukrainian SSR calling at the greater Kiev and Kharkov areas (where they visited collective farms, state farms, and exhibitions of agricultural machinery, culminating with a party in the culture house in the village of Mathusii), and finally to Kostroma, 300 km northeast of Moscow (where they visited cattle breeding stations and other collective and state farms).\textsuperscript{1303}

Two days after the delegation's departure one party official from the Department of contacts abroad produced a report directly to Mihail Suslov, who was party secretary with special responsibility for ideological issues. The evaluation was very positive. The delegation members had shown great interest, especially in livestock, milk benefits, the organization of work, and material conditions for collective farmers and state farm workers. Participants had subsequently expressed their satisfaction with the Soviet planning system and its implementation. They expressed that the trip would help to strengthen both the mutual relations as well as the cultural and commercial relations between the Danish and Soviet peoples. The report also highlighted some problems. At first, the social-liberal delegation members had been careful not to publicly express their views on the state of agriculture in the Soviet Union, and Thomas Christensen\textsuperscript{1304} had said that representatives from a Danish social-democratic newspaper had tried to dissuade him from participating in the trip. The delegation had to wait at the train station in Kiev for two hours because Intourist had forgotten they were coming, and for the same reason they had to live in a train coach for a day and a half due to a lack of available hotel rooms. In the offices of the Voroshilov collective farm there had been no pictures of the Soviet leader. Some of the female members of the delegation had insisted on photographing poorly dressed people and asking critical questions. However, delegation leader Villy Fuglsang had on several occasions succeeded in persuading other members of the delegation to reevaluate their impressions, and nine members of the delegation commented positively on the journey and their impressions in a Danish language broadcast for Radio Moscow.\textsuperscript{1305}

This report is a very typical example of the kind of reports drawn up on all delegations visiting the USSR. Typically they start by reporting something positive, then they point to some problems before ending once again on a positive note. The joint VOKS and ministry of agriculture report was framed in the same manner, and also pointed to the same positive and negative aspects of the visit. It ended by stating that it was very likely that the participants would report truthfully about the

\textsuperscript{1303} РГАНИ/5/28/103/109-119/Отчет о пребывании в СССР датской делегации мелких крестьян без даты; Sovjetunionen i Dag 1953:10-11, 4-37.

\textsuperscript{1304} Future chairman of Dansk Fredskonference as discussed in earlier chapters.

\textsuperscript{1305} РГАНИ/5/28/72/91-93/Информационная записка о пребывании в Советском Союзе делегации датских мелких крестьян 8.27.1953.
USSR upon returning home. In Soviet “newspeak” truthfully meant “positively”. Later in this chapter we shall discuss whether this wish was fulfilled, so for now we shall only conclude that the tour fell within the framework of how the Soviet techniques of hospitality usually operated.

**The journalists’ delegation.** In the same year, a Soviet legation attaché compiled a list of journalists that might be invited to participate in a delegation. In each case a short resume of the person in questions was drawn up and the attaché sought to consider whether, if chosen, the person in question would report “loyally” on the experience. “Loyally” being yet another Soviet “newspeak” term for “positively”. When the delegation finally did go in 1955 it was a very atypical delegation, firstly, because they were invited by TASS, secondly, because they refused to be considered a delegation, and, thirdly, because they rejected the entire original program suggested by TASS. The delegation of seven newspaper editors substituted a weekend in Kiev, Sochi, and Stalingrad with a journey to a state farm in “the virgin lands”. It was a very dramatic excursion. Following the 14 hour flight to the airstrip in Kokchetav the delegation drove for six hours by jeep, only to get lost in the dead of night and be forced to light an emergency bonfire on the steppe. Fortunately, the bonfire was seen by state farm employees who came to the rescue. Less dramatically, the delegation also attended the Kremlin banquet in honor of Konrad Adenauer’s state visit, and, more interestingly, they visited “Kryukowo” a Potemkin GULag camp used for impressing foreign visitors with the qualities of the Soviet penal system. This was similar to the Bolsjevo camp that had been in operation with this purpose since the 1930s. Impressions of the camp will be discussed later in this chapter.

**The multi-hall and theater directors’ delegation.** Eventually, many delegations evolved to have a more businesslike purpose. One of these business delegations was the 1975 delegation of directors of multi-purpose halls and theaters, with Ingmar Wagner as head of the delegation and with the purpose of familiarizing themselves with Soviet cultural life and considering how to strengthen the Danish-Soviet cultural relations and possibilities for cooperation on a greater scale – for example,
by inviting ballet troupes, folklore ensembles, or music ensembles for a commercial purpose. Therefore, the delegation members, besides enjoying evenings at various theatres, ballets, operas, were engaged in negotiations with representatives of Goszirk, Goskoncert, the ministry of culture and so on. The overall conclusions of the delegation was that although the negotiations did not end in any concrete contracts the trip had been very fruitful and positive, not the least thanks to the Soviet hospitality and Ingmar Wagner’s many excellent connections in the USSR.

**TOURISM**

Each of the three Soviet travel agencies, Intourist, Centrotourist, and Sputnik, cooperated with various Danish business connections. Intourist primarily operated in cooperation with Danish commercial travel agencies. One of them was Folketurist, whereas Sputnik’s primary business partner in Denmark became Fremadrejser, although this did not hinder their relationships with commercial agencies. Although it had offered travels to the USSR from an earlier point, DKSU opened a specific travel department as part of its operations in 1973. DKSU did have commercial ties to Intourist but was dissatisfied both with the prices and Intourist’s lack interest in the wishes of the traveling groups wishes for the professional content in the tour. Instead, DKSU cooperated closely with Centrotourist, which could deliver on the professional content by arranging visits at factories, institutions, trade unions and whatever specific or specialized interests a group might have or wish for regarding meetings or destinations. In 1992 the DKSU travel company became an independent company under the name Eurasia Rejser ApS. DKSU was the single shareholder and this was done with the explicit purpose of avoiding a situation similar to that of the Swedish-Soviet Society, where the financial collapse of the travel department pulled the entire friendship

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1316 ABA/DKSU/54/ Intourist brochure undated.
1317 FOS 1961(11):12, 2-4
1320 ABA/DKSU/6/DKSU to VOKS 1.31.1956.
society down with it. Later, the former national secretary and the former treasurer took over Eurasia free of charge. Eurasia finally closed its doors in 1995.\textsuperscript{1324}

DKSU also offered travels through Sputnik, but never large numbers. Therefore Sputnik sought other business partners in Denmark. Aside from a few commercial agencies close contacts were establish with the DKU travel agency Fremadrejser.\textsuperscript{1325}

Additionally, Aeroflot operated a sales office in Copenhagen (known today as Alt Rejser),\textsuperscript{1326} but next to nothing is known of their activities. DKSU and Aeroflot were very competitive towards each other, despite the substantial number of flight tickets DKSU ordered from Aeroflot.\textsuperscript{1327}

**Danish tourists.** Based on the above, Danish travelers had the opportunity to choose between a fairly large number of agencies when traveling to the USSR. Sadly, no Danish sources have survived to give us any indication of their number, favorite destinations, price levels, and so on. This lack of sources includes Folketurist and HANSA Folketurist, although we know that Folketurist\textsuperscript{1328} organized both tourist travels and specialized groups with a particular professional interest to various destinations, including the USSR. It is reasonable to assume that HANSA offered similar services. Fremadrejser organized travels for the Danish and Norwegian communist parties, their local branches, youth organizations, students’ organizations, various NGOs such as Folkebevægelsen mod EF (‘The Popular Movement against EEC’) or Nej til Atomvåben, Next Stop Sovjet, front organizations such as SAK, friendship associations, and solidarity committees, numerous high schools, youth schools, youth clubs, institutions of education, five rock groups and a youth orchestra, other travel agencies, and many sports clubs, including a group of carrier pigeon breeders competing in the World Championships in Katowice.\textsuperscript{1329}

As noted in Chapter 1, it took close to a decade for the Soviets to rebuild their tourism infrastructure and abandon their isolationist position. Following this we see an influx in the figures of tourism to the USSR.\textsuperscript{1330} In the opinion of the Soviet authorities, foreign travelers should be offered trips that were a mixture of educational and leisure activities, where relaxation was alternated with a comprehensive program of visits to companies, collective farms, film screenings, and lectures composed in such a manner that tourists developed a positive understanding of the socialist system,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1324} Interview with Asger Pedersen.
\item \textsuperscript{1325} ABA/DKU/427/Report undated.
\item \textsuperscript{1326} ABA/DKSU/101/DKSU to Aeroflot 6.12.1986.
\item \textsuperscript{1327} ABA/DKSU/101/DKSU to Sergei Shuravlev 8.1.4.1985.
\item \textsuperscript{1328} ABA/DKF/699/Folketurist Winter catalogue 1972-1973.
\item \textsuperscript{1329} ABA/DKU/427/Report to DKU executive organs 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{1330} Иванов, 223.
\end{itemize}
Soviet foreign policy, and counteracted the damages wrought by the bourgeois propaganda in the tourists’ home countries. For the same reason Soviet guides were schooled in the answers to the most frequently asked questions, and CPSU approved guidelines for lines of argument when faced with critical issues. In the case of particularly critical guests the security services were to step in and subsequent travel restrictions were to be enforced, so critical tourists did not come to spoil the image of the USSR for other visitors. In 1969, the Intourist office in Lithuanian SSR was instructed to recount the magnificent progress in Lithuania since the socialist revolution’s victory in 1940, and in 1972 they were ordered to be active propagandists of the Soviet reality and life, and they were handed lists of tendentious issues and how they could detect foreign agents among the tourists. As such KGB played a very active role in relation to foreign tourism and Soviet guides. KGB scrutinized guides before they were approved to work with foreigners, tapped hotels, restaurants, and cafes visited by foreigners, and constantly called for improvements in the counter-intelligence operations among tourists.

While the Soviets continued to build new hotels one possibility of increasing the tourism influx was to let the tourists arrive by ship and stay onboard the ship during the stay, with excursion programs on land. A group of French tourists utilized this possibility in 1955. In the same year DKSU organized its first tourist trip to the USSR following World War II and also made use of the possibility to stay onboard a ship and go ashore for excursions. In October The Dania called at Riga and Leningrad. The tourists visited factories, schools, kindergartens, rest homes, museums, and cultural houses. Among the highlights were tours of the State Hermitage and evenings in various theaters. Although the trip resulted in a financial deficit, it was considered a success by DKSU. Therefore, they organized two trips the following year; to the first Danish-Soviet soccer match in May 1956 in Moscow, and a “theater trip” in the fall, both in in cooperation with Politiken.
Table 8.A: DKSU tourist groups.\textsuperscript{1341}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Travellers</th>
<th>Destinations</th>
<th>Surplus (kroners)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,747.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
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*January-July only  
**February-December only.  
***February-August only.  
****1983-1986  
*****January-October only

\textsuperscript{1341} ABA/DKSU/3, 4, 34, 54/Various circular letters, accounts, telegrams, and reports; 55-77/ Surviving files of DKSU travel department; KB/JJ/25-28/Various circular letters, accounts, telegrams, and reports; OF/Report on activities 1979-1982.
The theater trips were very popular among DKSU members and consisted of a combination of seeing the sights and spending the evenings at the theater, ballet or opera.\(^{1342}\)

As seen in table 8.A., in the early years the trips were few and primarily organized for members of DKSU. One such trip was a 1967 summer vacation in Kirgizian SSR with vice-chairman Alfred Jensen as tour leader.\(^{1343}\) The tour made headlines in the local newspaper where the visit was framed as foreign support of the USSR and admiration of the progress made in the cultural and financial life.\(^{1344}\) Although the trips were very popular among members\(^{1345}\) and for this reason oversubscribed\(^{1346}\) we do see some years where no trips took place. There were several reasons for this. The 1958 summer trip was canceled due to lack of registrations and several cancellations as a result of the Soviet Union's latest attack on Hungary,\(^{1347}\) or because the Scandinavian state owned airline SAS challenged the price policy of Aeroflot.\(^{1348}\) Table 8.A. suffers from a lack of surviving sources, but what we do see is an expansion of activities that includes new customers among non-members, resulting in the establishment of an actual travel department with several employees and a semi dependence on the income from travel sales. In around 1970 DKSU began selling package travels to the USSR for schools, trade unions, and work place clubs.\(^{1349}\) 9 out of 14 travels were sold to external travel groups, and one new year’s group was organized in cooperation with Folketurist.\(^{1350}\) The vast majority of business was conducted with Centrotourist, but DKSU cooperated with Sputnik on summer language classes and friendly matches between youth sport clubs.\(^{1351}\) Overall, the travel department offered a number of prearranged tours to major cities like Moscow or Leningrad, and round trips visiting several cities such as the Central Asian tour calling at Moscow, Fergana, Tashkent, and Samarkand before returning to Moscow. Most of these package tours were open to the general public, but some trips were prearranged for special interest groups such as hospitals

professionals (who participated in activities such as visiting hospitals, sanatoriums, polyclinics, and trade unions in Moscow and Piatigorsk), teachers (who visited a 10-year school, kindergartens, pioneer palaces, and trade unions in Moscow and Smolensk), or women only tours (calling at

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\(^{1346}\) KB/JJ/28/Circular letter undated.
\(^{1349}\) ABA/DKSU/34/Report at DKSU Copenhagen EC meeting 9.16.1971.
\(^{1351}\) ABA/DKSU/34/Memorandum 1975.
Moscow, Tashkent, and Samarkand to study the status of women in Soviet society). But all groups consisting of at least seven persons could order customized tours covering their special interests at 60 various destinations in the USSR.\textsuperscript{1352} In the late 1980s business expanded with bus trips to Prague and Rostock.\textsuperscript{1353} Programmed tours included a Danish tour leader, a Danish speaking Soviet local guide/interpreter, comfortable modern means of transportation (airplane or buses), daily tours, and a visa.\textsuperscript{1354} The various groups appointed one of the participants (often the initiator) as tour leader with responsibility for presenting the proper papers and negotiating with the local Soviet guides. The latter was often a frustrating experience since the Soviets often made changes to the pre-approved schedule much to the frustration of the Danish travelers.\textsuperscript{1355}

The most complete set of data of travels to the USSR are the files of the DKSU travel department between 1986 and 1990, consisting of filled out order forms, copies of the vouchers to be presented to the Soviet travel agency representatives, and various letters. At the time most of the communication with Centrotourist took place via telefax and this made communication much more flexible and efficient than in the earliest years. The material gives us a very good impression of the customers. First and foremost there were many high schools and other educational institutions going on study trips, another large group consisted of work place clubs and trade unions, various associations also made use of DKSU, and in some cases private couples wanted to celebrate their silver anniversary during a holiday in the Soviet Union.

Thanks to the nature of the associations and its relations in the USSR DKSU could often secure visas with very short notice, or arrange for special program points. The latter was the case in 1986 when the National Theatre School went on a study trip to Moscow and Leningrad. The specially organized program included a city tour, visits to the Kremlin, Lenin Mausoleum, Bakhrushin Theater Museum, State Theater School, Central Children’s Theater, behind the scenes of an ordinary theater, and possibly a circus school in Moscow. The trip to Leningrad included a city tour and visits to The State Hermitage, Lenin Museum, Pavlotsk Theatrical Institute, and a meeting with a costume maker and scenery painter at the the Kirov Theatre, as well as a meeting with students of Danish language studies at the university.\textsuperscript{1356} When a group of DKP members visited Leningrad Centrotourist was asked to organize a tour of the Leningrad shipyards, and meetings with a local

\textsuperscript{1352} ABA/DKSU/34/Various brochures 1983-1989.  
\textsuperscript{1353} ABA/DKSU/48/Brochure 1990.  
\textsuperscript{1354} ABA/DKSU/48/Brochure 1988.  
\textsuperscript{1355} ABA/DKSU/60/Report 7.20.1987.  
\textsuperscript{1356} ABA/DKSU/55/DKSU to Soviet consulate 2.3.1986; DKSU to National Theater School [February 1986].
party branch, a pioneer camp, and an evening in a culture house.\textsuperscript{1357} When another group from DKP traveled to Moscow, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Frunze, Dushanbe, and back to Moscow the journey included visits to a party department, a newsprint, a watch factory, a collective farm for wine making, a collective farm, a nursery, a collective cotton farm, a pioneer camp, a carpet factory and an evening at the circus.\textsuperscript{1358} A 1986 language course in Volgograd included four hours of Russian language classes five days a week as well as lectures on Soviet culture, politics, history, and literature, various excursions, meetings with Soviet youth, a stay at a Soviet college, and a leisure program. There was a Danish tour leader and a Soviet guide/interpreter.\textsuperscript{1359} When the public school Tjørnelyskolen in Greve travelled to Leningrad, DKSU sold them a package tour and through the local SUDK branch helped organize concerts for the school’s band at institutions of higher education and smaller concert houses.\textsuperscript{1360} Similarly, when the orchestra of the Copenhagen postal service visited Moscow and Leningrad DKSU helped them with the necessary contacts to stage three concerts.\textsuperscript{1361} When Finland played Denmark in a soccer match in Helsinki, DKSU organized a tour that included a “stay of culture” in Leningrad.\textsuperscript{1362} A lecturer at Aarhus University praised the high quality of the program, when he and a group of students visited central research institutes of social sciences, local administration institutions, the Danish Embassy and a Danish journalist. The cultural highlight was an evening in the newly restored Bolshoi Theatre with a performance of Swan Lake, though the lecturer had to acknowledge that he probably should have explained the storyline prior to making a group of political science students watch classical Russian ballet.\textsuperscript{1363} It has not been possible to identify detailed descriptions of tour programs in the surviving DKSU records. However, a detailed plan from a commercial operator of the, generally speaking, popular and “classic” tour among Danish tourists to both Leningrad and Moscow has survived. The trip lasted seven days and included a return flight, a Danish speaking guide, and all meals. The first stop was Leningrad with sightseeing including the Peter and Paul Fortress and the State Hermitage, as well as an evening at the Kirov Opera. In Moscow the program was also divided between

\textsuperscript{1357} ABA/DKSU/56/Telex 6.3.1986.
\textsuperscript{1358} ABA/DKSU/56/Travel plan undated.
\textsuperscript{1359} ABA/DKSU/56/Brochure 1986.
\textsuperscript{1360} ABA/DKSU/58/DKSU to SUDK Leningrad 12.20.1986; newspaper cutting undated.
\textsuperscript{1361} ABA/DKSU/57/DKSU to SSOD og SUDK 5.9.1986.
\textsuperscript{1362} ABA/DKSU/58/Circular letter undated.
\textsuperscript{1363} ABA/DKSU/63/Journal cutting undated.
sightseeing including the Pushkin Museum, various political-economic exhibitions, the Red Square and the Kremlin and evening at the circus and Bolshoi Theatre.\textsuperscript{1364}

**Incoming delegations and tourism.** During October and November 1955 a delegation of Soviet school teachers traveled Denmark and visited several schools and other educational institutions.\textsuperscript{1365} During the early Cold War delegations were the only form of Soviet travel to Denmark, and the above mentioned delegation is a very representative example of such a delegation (the cultural delegations were discussed in chapter 4).

During the mid-1950s Soviet authorities opened for larger scale Soviet tourism abroad.\textsuperscript{1366} Incoming Soviet tourism to Denmark was primarily handled by commercial travel agencies such as Folketurist,\textsuperscript{1367} but at various times Fremadrejser (especially Sputnik group)\textsuperscript{1368} and DKSU\textsuperscript{1369} operated tour services for Soviet tourists onboard Soviet cruise ships calling at Copenhagen. In some cases Folketurist and DKSU cooperated in the form of public lectures by members of Soviet tourist groups or friendship evenings at the DKSU premises.\textsuperscript{1370} In other cases, tourism was mixed with peace propaganda. In April 1979 the *Mikhail Kalinin* called at Copenhagen as part of a so-called peace cruise to various Baltic Sea ports. Following a press conference for the 300 passengers who were all members of local branches of the Soviet peace committee, they all went on a sightseeing tour in Northern Zealand that included both Kronborg and The Thorvaldsen Museum.\textsuperscript{1371} At a similar visit in 1973 some of the passengers onboard the “peace cruise” (they were to attend a peace conference in Oslo during the cruise) performed Russian folkloristic singing and dancing at the DKSU premises.\textsuperscript{1372}

A 1988 6 day Fremadrejser program for Soviet tourists included visits to the Workers’ Museum, a movie theater, sightseeing in Copenhagen including a visit to Tuborg, a tour of Northern Zealand including the Lousiana art museum and Kronborg Castle, tours of The National Museum and The Royal Porcelain Factory, a trip to Roskilde including the cathedral, political meetings with DKSU

\textsuperscript{1364} RA/UM.35.D.65/Program 1971.
\textsuperscript{1366} РГАНИ/5/30/225/53-54/Председатель правления ВАО “Интурист” В. Анкудинов Микоян А.И. 1.10.1957.
\textsuperscript{1367} ABA/DKP/558/Internal management accounts 1971.
\textsuperscript{1368} ABA/DKU/427/Report on negotiations with Sputnik 12.3.1986.
\textsuperscript{1369} ABA/DKSU/81/DKSU to Sovjetresor 12.19.1989.
\textsuperscript{1371} ABA/SAK/29/Press release 4.10.1979.
\textsuperscript{1372} *Land og Folk* 5.22.1973.
and the Next Stop movement, and a night of partying at a disco. The tourists stayed at a youth hostel and during their stay they were accompanied by a Russian speaking guide.1373

**DISSEMINATION**

The final question to consider in this chapter is the question of dissemination. As discussed in Chapter 1, dissemination could take place in oral or written form. A reading of the archival collections gives the impression that many delegation participants were very active upon returning home. This is, for example, suggested by the attendance figures on public lectures given by members of the 1950 cultural delegation (although, the round numbers do seem somewhat artificial).1374

**The lecture trail.** However, what is important about the 1950 report is the variety of venues for public lectures. They included not only “the usual suspects” such the DKP and DKSU branches but also trade unions, professional interest organizations, and the numerous non-political open lecture societies. This was also the case with the participants of the small-holder farmers’ delegation. By April 1954 the delegation participants had given 284 public lectures in total.1375 Most of them had taken place in non-communist circles, especially within the circles of the social-liberal party movement.1376 For example, one participant had given public lectures in numerous small-holder farmer’s local associations, social-liberal party branches, and popular high schools across Western Funen and Central Jutland.1377

However, we still have to answer the most difficult question – whether the lectures influenced the listeners. The only study of its kind, based on a reading of the coverage of these public lectures (by delegation participants and tourists) in the non-communist local press in the 1950s, concludes that the listeners mostly perceived the speakers and their impressions of life and the development of the socialist society in the USSR as curious or downright exotic in a time before traveling abroad became a more common activity.1378

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1374 ABA/DKSU/32/Report of Meetings arranged with speakers from the may 1950 delegation. undated
1375 ABA/DKSU/32/Thomas Christensen to VOKS [April 1954].
1376 ABA/DKSU/32/A. Laisen to DKSU 3.9.1954.
1377 ABA/DKSU/32/Elbæk Petersen to DKSU [later than 3.2.1954].
Communist and non-communist press. As was the case with oral dissemination, written dissemination sought outlets outside communist circles. David Hejgaard of *Land og Folk* who participated in the small-holder farmer’s delegation wrote articles for the communist newspaper just as his colleague Leif Gundel, who participated in another delegation a few months earlier, wrote about the Volga-Don Canal in the DKP Christmas annual. In the same manner Villy Fuglsang wrote a glowing appraisal for Soviet collective farming for the DKP theoretical journal *Tiden* and the delegation members produced a collective presentation of the experience for the DKSU journal.

However, it was more important to publish among non-communist circles, or the participants would only be preaching to the choir. One example of this is the above quoted tourist Eva Hansen, who wrote an op-ed for her local newspaper in order to convince readers that the non-communist press’ coverage was false and that, in reality, the USSR was a powerful and democratic society that was developing rapidly (argument by production figures) and that Danes should go there themselves to alter their perception of the USSR.

Regarding the delegation of small-holder farmers the most interesting case is the articles written for non-communist journals by Thomas Christensen. He managed to place articles in *Husmandshjemmet* (the journal of the small-holder farmer’s national association), *Pacifisten* (the journal of the Danish affiliation of War Resisters' International), and *Ungdom og Idræt* (the journal of the Danish Gymnastics Associations). Thomas Christensen's article in *Husmandshjemmet* followed Soviet propaganda themes closely. Collective farmers were satisfied because material living conditions had evolved considerably since czarist times and the collectivization had happened by voluntary association. All farmers were, like the rest of Soviet society, a peace-loving people who desired nothing but friendly relations with the surrounding world. The article might as well have been printed in *FOS*. The article in *Pacifisten* was framed in the same manner. It was emphasized that there were no real differences of the living conditions and interests between Danish and Soviet peasants. Once again the Soviet will to live in peace was emphasized and he also repeated the claim of completely voluntary participation in the collectivization process. Thomas Christensen published several articles in *Ungdom og Idræt*. This gave him space for more extensive

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1379 PGANH/5/28/72/99-100/David Hejgaard to Aksel Larsen undated.
1380 *Folkets Jul* 1953, 33-34.
1382 *Sovjetunionen i Dag* 1953:10-11.
descriptions of the impressions from Leningrad and Moscow (in highly positive terms). The author seemed impressed by the subway, art museums, and the then relatively new MGU building. In this context, he argued that queues outside shops in the capital were not due to production shortages, but too few shops. Furthermore, he argued, again, that the collectivization process had been completely voluntary, that state farms were model farms, and that the quality of the farms was much higher than the small dark peasant sheds of czarist Russia. Finally, he claimed that the all-encompassing propaganda of the Soviet state towards its own population was just normal public education activities and that the USSR had genuine gender equality (exemplified by female construction workers and female police officers regulating the traffic). According to Thomas Christensen, it would be "both wise and useful" if people showed greater open-mindedness towards, understanding of, and confidence in the Soviet Union.\(^\text{1386}\)

Two important points come to mind when reading Christensen’s articles. Firstly, the techniques of hospitality seem to have worked, although he must be considered to have traveled with a predisposed positive view of the USSR. Secondly, his articles succeed in reaching a circle of readers normally not exposed to communist views.

This was also the case with the impressions of the members of the journalists’ delegatoin of the Krjukovo “Potemkin village” labor camp. As expected the communist paper only mentions the visit in passing in a positive manner.\(^\text{1387}\) More importantly other participants also had positive views. This included the otherwise staunch anti-communist Erik Seidenfarden of Information.\(^\text{1388}\) This led to a strongly worded critique by Margrethe Buber-Neumann, one of very few people to survive both Stalin’s and Hitler’s KZ camps, who compared his impressions with the” Potemkin village” sceneries in Ravensbrücke, established to fool international press.\(^\text{1389}\) Erik Seidenfarden half-heartedly tried to defend himself by stating that one camp could not be said to represent the entire prison system.\(^\text{1390}\) His double standards did not serve him credit. Similarly, based on this singular visit Einar Skov of Politiken claimed that Soviet prisoners experienced a freedom and self-governance that Danish inmates could only dream of and he dismissed the entire idea that inmates should be counted by the millions.\(^\text{1391}\) Furthermore, both Næsselund Hansen of the Ritzau news

\(^{1386}\) Ungdom og Idræt 1953(57):37, s. 453-455, 38, s. 469-471, 41, s. 501-503.

\(^{1387}\) Land og Folk 9.27.1955.

\(^{1388}\) Information 10.1.1955.

\(^{1389}\) Information 10.18.1955.

\(^{1390}\) Information 10.18.1955.

\(^{1391}\) Politiken 10.2.1955.
agency\textsuperscript{1392} and Knud Madsen of \textit{Fyns Tidende}\textsuperscript{1393} believed the fairy tale and conveyed this message to their readers. Only Terkel M. Terkelsen of \textit{Berlingske Tidende}\textsuperscript{1394} and Peder Tabor of \textit{Socialdemokraten}\textsuperscript{1395} managed to keep a clear head.

\textbf{The Danish press and the Soviet guests.} The question of how members of Soviet delegations and tourist groups might have disseminated their experience upon returning home falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, we do know something of the perception of the Soviet guests in Danish print media. When the first groups of Soviet tourists began to arrive in the late 1950s it was almost a sensation, to the degree that the tourists almost felt that they were being stalked by the Danish press.\textsuperscript{1396} However, this interest quickly faded, and stories on Soviet visitors focused on the unfairness of their negative perception of Denmark, for example, in the case of a 1963 youth delegation that found Denmark to be an uncultured and unmoral capitalist nation.\textsuperscript{1397} This example shows how articles on the Soviet representatives sought to confirm the already established position on the USSR already established in Danish non-communist media.

\section*{CONCLUSIONS}

In this chapter we have discussed delegations and tourism. Through several examples we have seen how delegations followed a fairly specific pattern. Often, members were selected on the basis of how they were expected to be willing to disseminate their experience upon returning home, and it was hoped this would be in a positive manner. This was only somewhat the case. As the case of the delegation of journalist show, participants could be somewhat moved, but mostly they held on to their predisposed view.

In contrast to the delegations, tourism has a much more fluid character and it is not possible to conclude on the experiences of the travelers. However, it is possible to note that both the Soviet tourism agencies and DKSU placed great emphasis on tourism as a means for promoting the USSR and project an image of socialism as the superior form of society.

\textsuperscript{1392} \textit{Middelfart Venstreblad} 10.6.1955.  
\textsuperscript{1393} \textit{Frederiksborg Amts Avis} 9.27.1955.  
\textsuperscript{1394} \textit{Berlingske Tidende} 10.23.1955.  
\textsuperscript{1395} \textit{Socialdemokraten} 10.3.1955.  
\textsuperscript{1396} \textit{Demokraten} 7.31.1958.  
\textsuperscript{1397} \textit{Politiken} 2.10.1963
It is very difficult to conclude anything definitive based on the available sources. Some travelers were clearly very positive prior to traveling and sought to confirmation of this position. However, we have to ask if the many repeated problems with poor guides, changes to the schedule, and the experience of Soviet reality actually changed the position of the travelers in a positive direction. The various references in newspapers to public lectures by returning travelers and the few surviving sources on this question in the DKSU files indicate that the travel experience had very little chance of influencing or altering the already existing deep frames of the travelers. This conclusion is more important than the usual Soviet emphasis on the quantity of travelers of both delegations and tourists groups.

“Putting Glasnost to the test”.
Next Stop Soviet slogan.\textsuperscript{1398}

The final years of the Cold War correspond with the years of Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of perestroika and glasnost. It is possible to interpret these years in two different ways. The first is that the supposed changes in Soviet policies, including its foreign policy created a new energy and positive interest in the USSR. The second is to perceive his policies as leading to a collapse, and that this collapse included the cultural diplomacy sphere and apparatus.

In this chapter we will start from the position that the old apparatus showed serious signs of fatigue, but that time also created new opportunities. However, in the end the USSR collapsed, and although it is important to bear in mind that the actors at the time had no way of foreseeing this the chapter will end on the note of the ramifications of the collapse for the various parts of cultural diplomacy apparatus, both internationally and in a Danish context.

\centerline{DKSU}

During the mid-1980s DKSU business continued as usual, as discussed in Chapter 7, in regards to the high level of activity in the friendship house, the lower level of activities in the local branches, and the cultural months.

For example, the 1986 cultural days centered on the Estonian SSR. In connection with the cultural days an Estonian cultural group toured Denmark. The group consisted of 35 people. 11 were folk musicians, and there were 4 vocalists, 8 dancers, 4 jazz musicians, 1 piano soloist, and 1 opera soloist. The group gave 26 shows with an overall audience of 5,500 persons performing in Copenhagen, Slagelse, Horsens, Åle, Vejle, Silkeborg, Them, Assens, Svendborg, Voldum, Århus, Frederikshavn, Svoegerslev, and Roskilde. They performed in sport centers, schools, high schools, public institutions, music halls, theaters (including Musikhuset (‘The Concert Hall’ in Århus), and jazz clubs. Across the country they met with local political dignitaries and local members of DKSU and co-organizing associations, primarily folk dancers.\textsuperscript{1399} Additionally 3,110 cultural days newspapers and 820 posters were distributed to schools, adult evening schools, theaters, and local

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1398}ABA/NS/1/Sheet of stickers.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1399}ABA/DKSU/46/Report on the tour 11.13.-17.1986.}
DKSU branches. In Copenhagen alone 210 posters were distributed to libraries, collective members of DKSU, lecture societies, and schools.\textsuperscript{1400} The Estonian SSR organized cultural days in 3-4 other countries and in Denmark, simultaneously.\textsuperscript{1401}

However, by 1988 every Soviet republic had been represented in the cultural days.\textsuperscript{1402} DKSU had to decide whether to continue hosting cultural days or try something new. There was a great unwillingness to continue, partly because the public had lost interest in the folklorist presentations,\textsuperscript{1403} partly because by starting over DKSU would have to begin anew with Azerbaijan SSR, and DKSU did not want to be perceived as picking sides in the Azerbaijan-Arminian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless the Azerbaijan cultural days took place and much to the relief of DKSU no one accused them of picking sides in what DKSU considered to be an internal Soviet question.\textsuperscript{1404} However, the 1990 Latvian cultural days ended in scandal when a Latvian rock group refused to perform at the Land og Folk Festival.\textsuperscript{1405} Cultural days with the usual broader program were altogether canceled.\textsuperscript{1406} Public lectures also lost their appeal. Although the high frequency of public lectures organized by DKSU Copenhagen continued,\textsuperscript{1407} fewer and fewer people showed up. Often they could be counted on one or two hands.\textsuperscript{1408} A 1990 panel with participation of seven peace movements had an audience of just 14 persons,\textsuperscript{1409} and only eight persons showed up for a lecture on the Soviet legal system.\textsuperscript{1410}

THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The sudden 1987 Soviet acceptance of the double track decision took the wind out of the peace movements.\textsuperscript{1411} This was also the case with SAK, although it tried to find a new purpose such as environmental questions and the protection of the rain forest.\textsuperscript{1412} The leading (and employed by SAK) communist member of SAK Johnny Baltzersen complained to DKP peace secretary Anker Schjerning that SAK lacked funding (including for his continued employment) despite DKP writing

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1400] ABA/DKSU/3/Undated statistics.
\item[1401] ABA/DKSU/3/DKSU EC minutes 1.31.1987.
\item[1402] Pedersen et. al., 17.
\item[1404] ABA/DKSU/105/EC minutes 11.18.1989.
\item[1405] ABA/DKSU/105/EC minutes 9.29.1990
\item[1406] ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenhagen EC minutes 8.9.1990.
\item[1407] ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenhagen EC Minutes 212.1991.
\item[1409] ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenhagen EC minutes 10.25.1990.
\item[1410] ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenhagen EC minutes 10.4.1990.
\end{footnotes}
off a loan to SAK, and he could not see how it would be possible to raise new means for the
continued activities of the peace movement.\textsuperscript{1413} In 1988 SAK had to move out of Fredscentret (‘The
Peace Center’).\textsuperscript{1414} In an internal evaluation DKP concluded that the peace cause had lost its ability
to inspire popular mobilization, primarily, according to DKP, because the social-democrats no longer
seemed affected by popular peace activities.\textsuperscript{1415}

**THE NEXT STOP MOVEMENT**

However, the Soviet-influenced peace movement had one final ace up its sleeve. In September 1989
approximately 5000 young Scandinavians “invaded” the USSR to participate in cultural dialogue
meetings with Soviet youth. The youth movement was known as “Next Stop Soviet” (NSS). In the
following we shall discuss who they were, how the idea came to be, and why it culminated in a rock
conzert at the Lenin Heights opposite MGU.

**Unge for Fred.** As was the case with the “adult” movement the youth communists were also
expected to contribute to the struggle for peace. Their activities sprang from DKU Copenhagen
following a 1983 discussion on how to recreate the slumbering peace activities. In order to gain
momentum DKU members, who ran Unge for Fred (‘Youth for Peace’), put aside emphasis on
traditional peace slogans in line with Soviet communist ideology and instead focused on activism
such as theater, concerts, street performances, painting and so on. A major event was a successful
operation to stop the clock at Copenhagen City Hall at 5 minutes to 12. Although UfF seemed
apolitical and able to co-opt movements with different views or negative opinions on the USSR and
the Eastern Block they were not willing to accept a policy that placed equal blame on the USA and
USSR for the arms race. DKU continued to be frame NATO and the USA as the villains of the
international systemic conflict.\textsuperscript{1416}

\textsuperscript{1413} ABA/DKP/432/Johnny Baltzersen to Anker Schjerning 9.11.1988.
\textsuperscript{1414} ABA/DKP/432/Circular letter 8.29.1988.
\textsuperscript{1415} ABA/Sohn/3/Paper on the current situation and tasks at hand for DKP CC meeting 4.1.-2.1989.
\textsuperscript{1416} Knud Holt Nielsen: *Giv mig de rene og ranke... Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom 1960-1990* (Copenhagen 2008),
176-182, 275-282, 298.
**Next Stop Nevada.** At some point the idea of sending a delegation of peace guards to protest at the American nuclear test site in Nevada came up. On an organizational level this meant that DKU, Youth for Peace and Next Stop more or less mixed together and became a singular movement. Next Stop Nevada (NSN) presented the project at the October 1986 World Peace Congress in Copenhagen in October 1986. Next Stop representatives came primarily into contact with American church organizations participating in the congress. These contacts formed the logistic backbone of the Nevada odyssey. In Denmark, NSN mobilized youth participation by having schools, various institutions, trade unions, and organizations select their own representative. In April 1987 55 peace guards traveled to the US as representatives of Next Stop Nevada. Following conversations with advisers of several congressmen the peace guards were divided into two teams traveling in Greyhound buses on a Northern and Southern route to Las Vegas. Along the way participants engaged American youth at various public schools, high schools, universities, and even military schools. They met with grass root organizations, trade unionists, church representatives, local politicians, mayors, governors, and the would-be Democrat presidential candidate Jesse Jackson to discuss the nuclear test ban, disarmament, and world peace. In Nevada the tour culminated in an evening concert just outside the fence of the Nuclear Test Site where Søs Fenger and the band Moonjam played the Next Stop “theme song” *Ticket to Peace* and an inflatable globe was thrown across the fence surrounding the actual test site. From there the tour continued to San Francisco before returning to New York and departuring for Denmark.

**Next Stop Soviet.** In many ways Next Stop Soviet (NSS) was a multifaceted, multi-activities and multi-directed movement reflecting the UfF years. However, it is possible to identify four major directions or tasks of NSS: establishing the structures of the organization and promoting NSS in Denmark, creating an international Next Stop Movement, engaging Soviet Youth, and planning the culmination. Having returned from Nevada, it was concluded that NSN had been a success, especially because it had resonated in the Danish press and had received attention in the non-communist press (that

1419 ABA/NS/1/Circular letter 11.15.1986; Minutes of Nevada Project meeting 12.3.1986.
1420 ABA/NS/2/Map; 21/Draft program for US trip undated; Curt Lindstrøm: *Next Stop Nevada – om det USA, fredsavgterne mødte* (Århus, 1987).
usually ignored the peace movements), as well as among various sub-cultures through rock concerts and theater performances, and even among youth organizations and trade unions (who gave economic support) that usually did not support the peace movement. It was decided the movement would continue with three purposes: to organize a lecture tour to popularize the experiences and results of NSN, to develop ideas for a new project, and to establish the organizational foundation for a new project. The Coordination Committee concluded that a new project should not focus solely on the negative (US nuclear testing) but contain an element of adventure, appeal to individual actions and collective sense of responsibility. In other words it had to be able to mobilize both local and central activists one more time. Several suggestions were put forward: the North as a Nuclear Free Zone, Next Stop the Baltic Sea, Next Stop Muroroa, or Next Stop Thule.

However, interest quickly gathered around Next Stop Soviet, which was seen as the logical follow up to NSN. The key argument of NSS was that youth on both sides of the Iron Curtain had to take responsibility and engage in dialogue and establish a new kind of logic that would remove the threat of future nuclear war. In other words, DKU wanted to turn an anti-American protest movement into a dialogue forum. An internal DKU memorandum clearly stated that NSS should not be a protest movement, since the sole culprit of the arms race and nuclear testing (according to DKU) was the USA, and therefore any critical statements from the peace movement could only be directed towards that country. The USSR was still perceived as the leader of a coalition of reason that promoted ideals of common security, global responsibility, and a total abandonment of traditional power politics thinking in terms of strength and deterrence policies. For these reasons DKU had to place itself as the organizational center of the NSS movement.

**Organization.** NSS initially inherited its organizational structure from NSN. 120 local groups mainly based on local UfF groups elected representatives for the national conference that in turn elected a national Coordination Committee that in turn elected an Executive Committee for managing the day-to-day running of the campaign. However, most of the work and decision making

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1421 Opråb.
1426 ABA/NS/1/Circular letter 11.30.1987
Table 9.A.: Next stop chronology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Danish movement</th>
<th>Public activities in</th>
<th>International movement</th>
<th>USSR activities and movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Promoting Next Stop Nevada</td>
<td>Promoting Next Stop Nevada</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>April: Next Stop Nevada</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November: National Conference decides on Next Stop Soviet Project</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>January: National Conference in Svendborg</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April: National Conference in Kolding</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May Light up Denmark bonfires</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August: Hiroshima Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October: National Conference in Copenhagen</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>January-February: Collection for victims of the earthquake in Armenian SSR.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February: National Conference in Aarhus</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February: Swedish national conference in Stockholm</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April: Dialogue Meeting in Copenhagen</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July: Dialogue Meeting in Stockholm</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August: National Conference in Copenhagen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Inactivity then dissolution</td>
<td>Inactivity</td>
<td>Dissolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
process took place within the Secretariat of NSS Copenhagen of approximately 20 people, the most active (or core) group of DKU and UfF activists. This did not stem from an insistence on staying in overall control alone. The NS archives are full of minutes and letters complaining that the representatives of other organizations or local groups did not attend the meetings of the executive organs.

The scope of the NSS project quickly expanded, and so did the organization. A number of activity groups planned concrete projects to take place in the USSR, while support groups provided the logistic support for the realization of the projects. The project groups covered the themes rock music, theater, sports, photo, art, youth clubs, public school, high school, seminars, universities and young scientists, apprentices, young workers, trade unions, environmental issues, sailors, the handicapped, city twinning, and media dialogue. The support groups included the Soviet group (negotiations in the USSR), economy, travels, Nordic coordination, and internal and external communication. All groups included members of the secretariat and, formally, also of the coordination committee. A few groups were both planning and supporting groups. One example is the environmental group that at the same time produced thick booklets on environmental issues such as the negative impact of Freon on the greenhouse effect, organized conferences on environmental questions in Denmark, and protested against conventional private car use, and organized projects to be realized in the USSR.

One of the most important support groups was the partnership dissemination group tasked with finding partners for potential projects. Those interested in NSS filled out a project form describing the general idea behind the project, what kind of partner it wanted, and where in the USSR the dialogue meeting (as the partnership projects were called) would hopefully take place. 49 local NSS groups were established across Denmark with local constitutions similar to those of the national organization. Some of the local groups were in charge of coordination contacts with specific geographic areas, for example NS Elsinore with the Baltic republics or NS Århus

1431 ABA/NS/30/Folder undated.
1433 ABA/NS/17/Registration form.
1435 ABA/NS/21/Various constitutions for local groups.
1436 ABA/NS/21/Meeting minutes 2.7.1989.
with Leningrad\textsuperscript{1437} (Aarhus’ twin city). Various trade unions and political youth organizations joined NSS as well.\textsuperscript{1438}

To maintain the feeling of a coherent movement with local influence on activities and the overall development of NSS several national conferences took place. However, more often than not, as was the case with the Kolding conference in April 1988, no actual decisions were made at the conferences. Following this, local groups had a perception of national conferences as forums for too-late and too-little one way communication from the secretariat, and they considered it a “junta” that made all the decisions during conspiratorial meetings in far-away Copenhagen, whereas the secretariat felt that it had to lost any overview of the entire movement and that this endangered the entire campaign.\textsuperscript{1439} In the middle of threatening economic ruin, extremely difficult negotiations in the USSR, and huge problems with establishing a transnational movement the entire organization of NSS was restructured to try and save and renew the democratic basis of the organization and the dynamic flow of the campaign.\textsuperscript{1440} The new constitution made two important changes. It changed NSS membership from an activity based criteria to a membership fee paying based criteria and established that all decisions had to be based on the principle of full consensus. Other than that the Coordination Committee changed its name to Consultation Committee, but it still had to elect an Executive Committee.\textsuperscript{1441} The Consultation Committee, elected at each national conference, consisted of representatives of the working groups, local groups, and affiliated organizations.\textsuperscript{1442} However, the Executive Committee elected after a conference in Århus still consisted of the same DKU members and fellow-travelers who formed the inner core in the still independently existing Secretariat in Copenhagen,\textsuperscript{1443} which became the headquarters of the international movement discussed below.

Throughout its existence NSS struggled financially. It was estimated that the entire cost of NSS Soviet amounted to 20,000,000 kroner.\textsuperscript{1444} In May 1988 a debt of nearly 120,000 Kroners threatened to put an end to NSS. NSS took place before the Internet, so NSS developed a substantial debt to the telephone company (KTAS). In addition, there were many unpaid printing bills, and a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1437] ABA/NS/21/Circular letter undated.
\item[1439] ABA/NS/1/Memorandum May 1988; Report on the Kolding Conference undated
\item[1440] ABA/NS/1/Draft constitution undated.
\item[1442] ABA/NS/2/Circular letter 11.4.1988.
\item[1443] ABA/NS/1/National Conference minutes 2.24.-26.1989
\item[1444] ABA/NS/3/Project description undated
\end{footnotes}
debt to DKSU for travels to meetings in the Soviet Union. In the end, two people were appointed to clean up the financial matters and a group was organized to find solutions to secure a monthly income of 250,000 kroner for the budget to balance. NSS received substantial financial support in the form of subvention from various private foundations, the Ministry of culture, and trade unions accounted for almost 643,000 kroner. A credit line was opened. DKSU wrote off the debt for unpaid purchased travels. The Copenhagen Municipality paid a monthly subsidy to cover the running expenses of rent, taxes and renovation of the sign factory (see below) and a separate subsidy for the operation of the café. Most travel funds were collected through a national fundraising effort titled "Go East". Each participant received a ticket roll attached to a personal bank account opened specifically with the trip in mind. When the entire roll was sold the travel costs were covered.

In the middle of its financial crisis NSS suddenly had to find a new lease. Following negotiations with the Copenhagen Municipality they rented an 850m² former sign factory in Guldbergsgade consisting of two buildings with an inner courtyard. The building contained offices and various workshops including a sound studio and a theater hall. A special part of the house was Café Rust (later Cafe Rust) named in honor of the West German pilot Mathias Rust who landed his plane just off the Red Square. The café opened in October 1988 and continues to exist.

Promotion. To make the general Danish public aware of the NSS campaign several activities took place in Denmark. Among them were a bonfire night on the anniversary day of Danish liberation from Nazi occupation at the end of World War II to mark the responsibility of Denmark in a moving world and the right to say no to nuclear arms. It was considered an enormous success with more than 200 bonfires across Denmark.

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1445 ABA/NS/1/Accounts May 1988.
1446 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 5.18.1988.
1449 ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 3.4.1989.
1451 ABA/NS/18/Memorandum undated.
1454 ABA/NS/29/Manuscript for phone chain instructions on the Go East Campaign undated.
1456 ABA/NS/21/Memorandum undated.
1458 ABA/NS/29/Press release undated.
1459 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 5.18.1988
Each year Fredsfonden (‘The Peace Foundation’) marked Hiroshima Day. But in 1988 it turned the event over to NSS to give the movement a possibility to present itself to the public. The day was marked in Kongens Have (a large public garden in Copenhagen) with political speeches and Q&A sessions about NSS. Additionally, there was a “balloon sea”, readings in front of the H.C. Andersen statue, a music stage, a dance stage, and a theater stage, while the younger audience members could participate in creating a giant painting.

Local groups also engaged in activities to gather support and participants for the dialogue meetings to take place in September 1989 in the USSR and to make the local public aware of the campaign. In Elsinore, for example, a festival called Baltitur took place with participation of bands from the Baltic Soviet republics.

**International movement.** From the very beginning NSS was envisioned as a transnational movement. NSS representatives traveled to the capitals of the Nordic countries to promote the idea and find potential partners and organized a special Nordic meeting with two additional meetings later on. Archival sources suggest that a full NS movement was only successfully established in Sweden, whereas participation in the other countries was based on initiatives by individual organizations or individuals, and that the Finns in particular were very skeptical to the entire idea.

**Engaging the Soviet youth.** NSS was keenly aware of the necessity to engage both public and actual grass roots (informal) organizations in the USSR if the project was to succeed. This meant that NSS had to both acquire permission from the top of the Soviet political hierarchy and develop contacts very broadly in the Soviet society to find partnerships for the intended projects and hosts for the participants, as the idea was that NSS participants should stay in the private homes of Soviet citizens as a means of strengthening the dialogue aspect of the project.

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1460 ABA/NS/29/Circular letter undated.
1462 ABA/NS/21/Flyer undated.
1463 ABA/NS/1/Memorandum March 1988.
1464 ABA/NS/19/List of participants undated; Meeting program undated.
1465 ABA/NS/19/Nordic Meeting minutes 10.1.-2.1988;
1466 ABA/NS/19/Various minutes, reports, telexes, and letters 1988-1989.
1467 ABA/NS/1/Memorandum February 1988.
1468 *Opråb.*
Following a meeting at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen, a letter was sent to the Soviet Peace Committee to present the project and ask for negotiations in Moscow. The negotiators’ report suggests that both sides of the negotiation table experienced a cultural shock. The Soviet public organizations, The Peace Council and KMO (where the Peace Council referenced NSS), clearly did not intend to break with the principle of mono-organizational socialism. KMO tried to present itself as the sole possible partner and initiated a delaying tactics by pointing to difficulties of practical matters. The second purpose of the negotiations was to engage informal groups, and here the negotiators were met with all the warmth, sympathy, energy, ideas for cooperation, and enthusiasm the official meetings lacked – mixed with a skeptical view of the realistic chances of ever actually realizing the project. NSS Denmark’s Coordination Committee insisted on keeping both tracks of negotiations open, but would not accept that the public organization took control of the project in the USSR and continued to work for broader contacts on a grass roots level. To further this agenda and secure official sanctioning of direct grass roots level contacts, a second negotiation delegation traveled to Moscow in May. The second round of negotiations followed the same pattern. KMO continued to evoke delaying tactics to secure acceptance on their monopoly on organizing international meetings within a tried and tested formula, by continuously pointing to practical problems. KMO demands were considered deeply problematic and a danger to the realization of NSS, as without direct contact with the Soviet informal groups the entire idea behind NSS would fail and the project would not be worth the effort. The NSS’s demand for the right to communicate with any organization, group, or movement – and that this had to be reflected in an eventual Soviet Coordination Committee – was not open for negotiation. The Coordination Committee concluded that KMO attempted to pressure NSS by its insistence of being the sole host of a dialogue meeting in Moscow and sole right to decide on which Soviet organizations and groups were to participate, and that NSS therefore had to get access to higher powers: for example, CPSU. To further the process the chairmen of the involved youth communist, various socialist and social-liberal youth parties traveled to the USSR to negotiate directly with Komsomol at the top level, resulting in a promise that KMO and Komsomol would

1469 ABA/NS/1/Memorandum March 1988
1470 ABA/NS/20/NS Soviet to Soviet Peace Committee February 1988.
1472 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 4.13.1988.
1473 ABA/NS/1/Circular letter undated [April 1988].
1475 ABA/NS/1/Circular letter undated.
1476 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 5.18.1988.
agree to take part in the Soviet movement on equal terms with the informal groups. Based on this breakthrough, NSS Denmark organized a July 1988 Dialogue Meeting in Moscow with the participation of 18 Danes, 2 Swedes, 3 Norwegians, and 150 Soviet citizens invited based on formerly established contacts. Komsomol and KMO participated on equal terms with rock musicians, environmental activists, young scientists, actors, journalists, artists, construction workers, and other representatives of informal groups. The meeting agreed on the basic principles of the campaign, discussed partnership dissemination, including concrete projects, and prepared for a new meeting in November. Informal NSS preparation groups were formed on an informal basis in several Soviet cities (see Table 9.B.). A permanent NSS representative office opened at the Moscow youth computer club center “Variant,” staffed by a rotating group of Danish and Swedish NSS activists. A preserved appointment book leaves the impression of a very busy schedule with numerous meetings with official authorities, informal contacts, and journalists, phone calls, material production, and internal strategy meetings. KMO, the CPSU International Department, the peace committee, and KGB still attempted to control the Soviet part of the movement. In a final attempt to regain control of the NSS Movement inside the USSR, KMO sent a delegation to Denmark in September 1988. Officially the delegation’s assignment was to find out more about NSS, whilst unofficially its assignment was to put pressure on the participating Danish organizations to make NSS withdraw from the campaign. Leading members of NSS Denmark concluded that KMO was in a weak negotiating position since KMO could not tolerate the loss of prestige by not being part of Next Stop Soviet in the USSR if NSS became a success. The following days KMO met with NSS representatives and affiliated organizations. KMO did not receive the hoped for support for a role as the sole Soviet organizer and still refused to partake on an equal level with the informal organizations. Following the second meeting with KMO it was decided that the various projects and initiatives in Denmark should start sending their own negotiators to the USSR. For example, NSS Århus negotiated with KMO in Leningrad in November 1988. Typical of negotiations outside of Moscow,

1477 Kudsen, 18-19.
1479 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 9.3-4.
1480 Kudsen, 21.
1481 ABA/NS/20/Appointment book.
1483 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 8.17.1988.
1484 ABA/NS/1/Coordination Committee minutes 9.3-4.1988.
1485 ABA/NS/20/Memorandum undated.
they took place in a positive and constructive manner. This was also the case of meetings between NSS Denmark and Soviet representatives of informal groups.\textsuperscript{1486}

Table 9.B: List of Soviet NSS groups by city or area:\textsuperscript{1487}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City/area of local NSS group</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City/area of local NSS group</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City/area of local NSS group</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City/area of local NSS group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Verkhne-Volzhsky</td>
<td>Gorky Yaroslavl Kalinin Vologda Vladimir Kostroma</td>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Alma-Ata Semipalatinsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Russia</td>
<td>Smolensk Kaluga Tula Oryol Briansk Kursk Belgorod Voronezh</td>
<td>Volga-Donsky</td>
<td>Saratov Rostov-Na-Donu Penza Ulianovsk Volgograd Sverdlovsk Cheliabinsk Kurgan</td>
<td>Moldavian SSR</td>
<td>Kishinev</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Tashkent Frunze Dushanbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>Leningrad Petrozavodsk Novgorod Pskov Kalingrad</td>
<td>Novosibirskii</td>
<td>Novosibirsk Omsk Barnaul Kemerovo Tomsk</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>Simferopol</td>
<td>Krasnoiarskii</td>
<td>Krasnoiarsk Kisil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>Siktivkar Vuktil</td>
<td>Lithuanian SSR</td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
<td>Georgian SSR</td>
<td>Tiflis Sotchomi Batumi</td>
<td>Kamchatka</td>
<td>Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka Magadan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiumen</td>
<td>Yamal</td>
<td>Latvian SSR</td>
<td>Riga</td>
<td>Armenian SSR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>Khabarovsk Vladivostok Sothern Sakhalin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>Murmansk Aparity</td>
<td>Belorussian SSR</td>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>Azerbaijani SSR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The constructive role of KMO and Komsomol was also visible in role they played in the establishment of local NSS organizations, for example in Novosibirsk where KMO, Komsomol, and the Komsomol Regional Railway’s Committee partook on equal terms with informal groups such as

\textsuperscript{1486} ABA/NS/20/Various reports undated.
\textsuperscript{1487} ABA/NS/21/List of Soviet NS groups undated.
as “Bachna” and “GTS NTTM” in establishing a regional NS Soviet branch. The present NSS Denmark representative played a central role in the founding meeting.\footnote{ABA/NS/22/Report undated.}

A second Dialogue Meeting took place in Moscow in November 1988. As well as partnership meetings and dissemination activities to connect potential partner groups, the meeting decided on an international structure with national affiliations based on the same principle of equality of all partners and consensus in the decision making process.\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Draft programme; Draft constitution.} Additionally the meeting established five international working committees on preparation of the following meetings, financial management, information dissemination, “Rock on the Red Square”, and other activities in September 1989.\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 11.30.1988}

In the spring of 1989, Soviet authorities finally gave in. The CPSU CC voted in favor of a secret decision to support NSS, a special Soviet Support Committee was established, and the foreign ministry set up a set of special set of rules easing NSS traveling restrictions to the USSR.\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 4.2.1989.} The chairman of the Soviet Next Stop Support Committee was Svetlana Savitskaia (the second woman in space and high-ranking member of the peace committee) and included high-ranking participation from various ministries, state committees, public organizations and Mossoviet. The committee was tasked with solving all practical problems in relation to the realization of Next Stop Soviet.\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Report undated.}

An official Soviet NSS Coordination Committee was founded in May at a conference with 120 participants of both public and informal groups on equal terms, organized primarily by NSS Denmark representatives. A July national conference formally founded NSS Soviet.\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Report undated.}

A third Dialogue Meeting took place in Denmark and a forth in Stockholm, both with participation of Soviet representatives of the informal groups. The meetings were spent in discussions on the culmination in September, the future of the NS movement, meetings between project partners, and dissemination of partnerships.\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Memorandum undated; International working plan undated; Various programs undated.}

**First Step/Culmination.** In the end the word “Culmination” was exchanged for “First Step” as a sign of goodwill towards the Soviet partners who felt more like objects of the campaign than participants and feared that Western NSS national affiliations would burn all bridges following the culmination events,\footnote{ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 3.16.1989.} whereas the Soviet participants did not consider the September events a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/22/Report undated.}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Draft programme; Draft constitution.}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 11.30.1988}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 4.2.1989.}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Report undated.}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Report undated.}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Memorandum undated; International working plan undated; Various programs undated.}
\item \footnote{ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 3.16.1989.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
culmination, but the beginning of long term relations.\textsuperscript{1496} Despite Glasnost it was not without danger to engage in contacts with foreigners and Soviet participants feared being abandoned to the mercy of Soviet authorities.

### Table 9.C: Dialogue meetings during Next Stop Soviet\textsuperscript{1497}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Danish</th>
<th>Swedish</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
<th>Icelandic</th>
<th>Greenlandic</th>
<th>Finnish</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltics</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian SSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian SSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian SSR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Regional</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

269 dialogue meetings were held with the participation of at least 4690 Nordic non-Soviet participants.\textsuperscript{1498} The USSR had been divided into 12 regions with both foreign and Soviet coordinators in each region.

Some dialogue meetings were realized prior to September. In July, an “armada” of sailing ships sailed to Leningrad under the project title “The Wind Knows No Borders”\textsuperscript{1499} to visit a Leningrad yacht club. After receiving visas at the very last minute, the armada of 25 ships gathered in the Helsinki Harbor and sailed to Leningrad to spend a week in dialogue with ordinary Soviet citizens.\textsuperscript{1500} Another early dialogue meeting was an ethnological expedition to Yamal to assess the

\textsuperscript{1496} ABA/NS/2/Speech manuscript 3.18.1989.
\textsuperscript{1497} ABA/NS/2/First Step Plan final version undated.
\textsuperscript{1498} The aforementioned plan does not indicate the number of Soviet participants anywhere nor the number of non-Soviet participants in Georgian SSR.
\textsuperscript{1499} ABA/NS/30/Invitation undated.
\textsuperscript{1500} ABA/NS/21/Report undated.
negative impact on indigenous peoples caused by drilling for oil and gas.\textsuperscript{1501} A third special project was the rock album Laika, made up of 12 Danish and 12 Soviet rock songs. The Soviet songs had been recorded in a Danish mobile sound studio in Leningrad. It was the first album to be released in the USSR on a different label than Melodya.\textsuperscript{1502}

Five projects were cross regional. That is to say that they were mobile dialogue meetings moving across the USSR through one or several of the established regions. 

*The Theatre Caravan* followed the route Copenhagen-Warsaw-Minsk-Rudinsk-Smolensk-Moscow with several longish stops en route to engage directly with ordinary people through the medium of street performances. The Caravan consisted of 20 individual groups including Danish street performers, circus artists, comedy acts, a puppet theater, variety singers, West German musicians, Dutch street performers and a transvestite, and the Danish punk and beatcore bands *Stalin Staccato* and *Kluge Kinder*.\textsuperscript{1503}

*The Culture Train* was a train with 50 Danes and 25 Soviets, who were jugglers, mimes, street artists, musicians, painters and a silversmith. They took part in a railroad journey along the route Leningrad-Vologda-Perm-Sverdlovsk-Tobolsk-Omsk-Novosibirsk-Cheliabinsk-Ufa-Kubichev-Uljanovsk-Moscow with the purpose of opening a dialogue through the languages of culture between ordinary people in Scandinavia and the Soviet Union on common problems and how to build a society in ecological balance with nature and of freedom, security and opportunities for development for all. NSS had to cooperate with Komsomol, who still operated agitprop trains, on the project. The journey resulted in meetings with enthusiastic local audiences at both pre-arranged events and spontaneous festivities.\textsuperscript{1504}

On the upper floor of a Vilnius Technical School a Dungeons and Dragons Club from Albertslund played D&D with members of a local science-fiction club. The age difference did not seem to play a role. Several Danish youth clubs were active in NSS. Elsewhere in the Baltic Soviet republics, in Pärnu, members of the youth club “Hullet” (“The Hole”) from Ballerup met with peers, lived with them in their homes, went on field trips, and discussed the pollution of the Baltic Sea. Another group ran a cafeteria. An ecological project planted trees at phosphate mines. A specific point of the demonstration was that the trees would inevitably die.\textsuperscript{1505} Members of a youth club from Roskilde

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\textsuperscript{1501} ABA/NS/28/Memorandum undated; list of participants undated.  
\textsuperscript{1502} ABA/NS/24/Circular letter undated.  
\textsuperscript{1503} ABA/NS/22/Brochure.  
\textsuperscript{1504} ABA/NS/22/Memorandum undated; Agreement undated.  
\textsuperscript{1505} Knudsen, 70-79.
brought a circus tent to Tallinn where they performed together with the local youth both in the tent and at local youth clubs. The acts included dancing, fire juggling, singing, and clowns.\textsuperscript{1506} Although protesting was not the central theme it had been during NSN, participation in protests at the Soviet test site in Semipalatinsk did take place.\textsuperscript{1507} In Ukrainian SSR NSS activists participated in a three day protest march against the Chernobyl atomic power plant, despite strong concerns about the possible health consequences. Following a visit to Pripiat the march ended with a party in front of the barracks of the workers of the still operating parts of the plant.\textsuperscript{1508}

In Leningrad youth groups also met with their peers. Danish rock bands performed together with Soviet bands, and dance acts met with and performed together with Soviet dancers.\textsuperscript{1509} Another participant in Leningrad was the social-creative project on the struggle against youth unemployment “Frontløberne,”\textsuperscript{1510} including the theater group Kronstadt 89 with a combination of stage plays and dancing.\textsuperscript{1511} Another participating organization Cirkus Tværs, primarily consisted of immigrants from the Gellerup social housing project performing various forms of acrobatics.\textsuperscript{1512}

In Siberia groups of Russian studies and social science students from Aarhus University participated in a seminar with Soviet students in Akademgorodok outside Novosibirsk.\textsuperscript{1513} In Krasnoobsk a group of social workers visited a local youth center and the local youth prison. When visiting the latter they became very inspired by its re-education program based on Makarenko’s principles.\textsuperscript{1514}

The largest center of activities was Moscow. This was due to the location of the NSS headquarters in Izmailovskaia, the majority of activities taking place there, and the idea that all Next Stoppers would gather in Moscow for the final concert. Among the participating projects in Moscow was the first hot air balloon to grace the Moscow skyline since the 1920 October celebrations. The first flight took place in Gorky Park. The second flight took them along the River Moscow and over the Kremlin only to be grounded by the commander of the Moscow air defense forces, who was not pleased that he did not have an answer when Mikhail Gorbachev phoned him to ask what it was that flew by his windows in his Kremlin office.\textsuperscript{1515}
Arriving in Moscow, the various performers gathered for a festival in Gorky Park. However, this became the first of two anti-climaxes of NSS. The park had officially closed for the season, no advisements were made, and only very few, if any Soviet, spectators showed up for the shows.\footnote{Knudsen, 92; Fallesen, 6-8.}

One of the last problems, and the largest, that NSS faced with Soviet authorities was the rock concert on the Red Square with Lars HUG as the main Danish act.\footnote{ABA/NS/23/Telefax undated.} Danish State TV had agreed to broadcast it and a simultaneous concert in Copenhagen live.\footnote{ABA/NS/23/Agreement signed 9.1.1989.} Mossoviet gave permission for a concert at the Vassilii Heights just off Red Square in late August 1989\footnote{ABA/NS/23/Translation of decision made by the Mossoviet Executive Committee 8.10.1989.} only to withdraw the permit, which led to hard negotiations between the Danish concerts organizers and the Supporting Committee, with the Danes threatening to sue for lost profits. In the end the Danes received a take-it-or-leave-it offer for a concert at the Lenin Heights opposite The Moscow State University (MGU). On a cold and dark autumn evening, with almost no Soviet participation the concert took place within an iron ring of 8,000 Soviet riot police officers. In many ways the concert was considered the anti-climax to NS Soviet.\footnote{Knudsen, 60-62, 92-96.}

However, as Jørgen Knudsen rightly highlights in his book on NSS, the actual culmination had been the many personal dialogue meetings, so the anti-climax of the concert should be of little relevance for the overall evaluation of Next Stop Soviet.\footnote{Knudsen, 108-109.}

**NSS as a (rare) success story.** Three conclusions should be drawn to indicate that NSS was one of the greater success stories of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War.

Firstly, because DKU broke with decades long traditional forms and content of organizations involved in promoting images of the USSR to the Danish public, it succeed in establishing a peace movement that resonated outside of the usual communist and fellow-travelling circles.

Secondly, Next Stop, despite the organizational and, especially, financial chaos in 1988, succeeded in establishing the possibility for direct people to people diplomacy to take place all across the USSR during September 1989 in a form that had previously been unheard of in the USSR.

Thirdly, it could be argued that Next Stop, perhaps unintentionally, played a pivotal role in strengthening the democratic forces in the USSR that played a role in the mostly peaceful dissolutions of the Soviet Union, through the insistence on negotiating with both public and
informal Soviet organizations on equal terms, despite them being two distinct groups of Soviet actors.

EVERYTHING COMES APART

In 1991 the USSR dissolved peacefully and ceased to exist. The demise of the USSR strongly affected DKP and the front organizations in various manners, and the following section shall discuss the consequences and survival strategies for various parts of the movement.

**DKP collapse.** More than any other change of politics of the USSR throughout the years, Glasnost had a negative impact on DKP and in the end fractured the party. Ole Sohn, as any other DKP party leader before him, loyally followed the CPSU general line. However, there was a strong sentiment in DKP against Glasnost, and in the end the majority of members voted with their feet. Many chose to join Kommunistisk Forum (‘Communist Forum’), an orthodox communist circle, instead. DKU dissolved. Without the Soviet financial support *Land og Folk* folded. The remains of DKP joined the current party Enhedslisten (‘The Unity List’), a cross-socialist cooperation.\(^{1522}\)

**DDK collapse.** Among the first casualties we also find DDK. Following the collapse of WIDF, DDK immediately dissolved as they could not perceive a continued existence without their affiliation to WIDF.\(^{1523}\)

**SAK’s final years.** Although most of the Soviet-influenced peace movements (discussed in Chapter 7) collapsed, SAK continued to operate under more meager conditions for a number of years. Materials published in the 1990s indicate that SAK continued its anti-American and anti-NATO positions by protesting The Gulf War, attacking the concept of a missile shield, and arguing for Danish disarmament and withdrawal from NATO.\(^{1524}\) At some point after the turn of the millennium SAK dissolved.

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\(^{1523}\) ABA/DDK/6/EC minustes 2.24.1990.
\(^{1524}\) ABA/SAK/48/Report 6.16.1999; flyer undated; folder undated; 30/Folder undated.
**Next Stop Nowhere.** Following Next Stop Soviet the core group had burned out all energy.\textsuperscript{1525} All that was left was debt and inactivity.\textsuperscript{1526} Three former members of NSS bought Cafe Rust that still exists to this day as one of most popular concert venues in Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{1527} However, whereas the overall project died out, it continued to exist on a personal level. One example is the 1990 return visit of Siberian social workers.\textsuperscript{1528}

**From DKSU to DRF.** If we take a look across the field of pro-Soviet organization a single survivor stands out, DKSU.

By 1991 DKSU had to acknowledge the end of the former glory days both qualitatively and quantitatively. The friendship work lost its ideological meaning, the traditional lines of communication broke down, and the traditional Soviet partnership organizations collapsed. Therefore, the DKSU leadership concluded that future activities had change from a clearly propagandistic angle to a more humanitarian perspective.\textsuperscript{1529} This new angle emerged for the first time at the 1990 congress when DKSU dared to criticize the USSR for the first time ever, even though it was carefully formulated, in casu, on the nuclear tests program at Novaia Zemlia. National secretary Asger Pedersen even publicly acknowledged in several newspaper interviews that up to that point DKSU had been to propagandistic in its work.\textsuperscript{1530} Meanwhile more than 600 members had left DKSU due to disillusion with the developments in the USSR.\textsuperscript{1531} Following an end to Soviet subvention the staff of the Friendship House had to be fired. The new Russian state took over running the building as an ordinary cultural institute. Only the book shop and the travel department (in the form of a new company, Eurasia Rejser) continued to exist until the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{1532}

Based on the developments described we should expect yet another story of a closure. However, this was not the case. Following a seminar on the possibilities to either continue as a new association for bilateral relations with Russia, or the CIS countries, or to dissolve entirely\textsuperscript{1533} DKSU decided at a 1992 extraordinary congress to change their name to Dansk-Russisk Forening

\textsuperscript{1525} Aktuelt 2.5.1991; Opråb.
\textsuperscript{1526} ABA/NS/2/Consultation Committee minutes 2.10.1990.
\textsuperscript{1527} Opråb.
\textsuperscript{1528} Vi Klubfolk 1990(32):#13, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{1529} ABA/DKSU/3/Congres report 1987-1990.
\textsuperscript{1531} ABA/DKSU/3/Congres report 1987-1990.
\textsuperscript{1532} Interview with AsgerPedersen.
\textsuperscript{1533} ABA/DKSU/105/Seminar minutes 1.19.1992.
(‘Danish-Rusisan Associaton’).\textsuperscript{1534} Despite the organizational continuation, DRF was in spirit a
different association from DKSU. This was also the case regarding the financial situation. Not only
did the annual budget decrease, so did the annual deficit.\textsuperscript{1535} DRF more or less hibernated for
several years,\textsuperscript{1536} however, by the late 1990s various local DRF branches became active once
more\textsuperscript{1537} and DRF continues to exist as an association for bilateral relations with the Russian
peoples. As such it stands out as the lone survivor of the Soviet-influenced Danish organizations of
the Cold War.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The Glasnost years of Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark bear three specific trademarks.
Firstly, despite the optimism that the Glasnost years inspired in the general public they were
difficult years for the Soviet-influenced movement as regards organizational relations and
financing.
Secondly, the movements lost momentum partly due to the Soviet acceptance of the terms of the
double track decision, and partly due to the end to Soviet subvention of at least part of the Soviet-
influenced movement. During these years the Next Stop movement is the exception to prove the
rule as the only story of success during these years, but only because it broke completely with the
form and contents of the way Soviet cultural diplomacy had traditionally operated up to that point.
Thirdly, with one notable exception the Soviet-influenced movement was unable to survive the
collapse of the USSR, and this fact tells us much about its nature and purpose.

\textsuperscript{1534} Pedersen et.al., 18-19.
\textsuperscript{1535} ABA/IW/1/Various DKSU accounts 1990-1993.
\textsuperscript{1536} ABA/IW/1/DKSU EC minutes 8.28.1993.
\textsuperscript{1537} KF/Plastic bag containing various DRF materials received from a former DKSU local branch chairman.
Conclusions

“Regimes based on extreme ideologies also have a habit of obscuring their true intentions through a smokescreen of propaganda, twisting otherwise benign values to their own ends”. Robert Johnson.1538

This dissertation presents an analysis and discussion of Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark during the Cold War seen from three perspectives presented in the initial research questions: a sender perspective (organizational structures, financing, and decision-making), an activities perspective, and a reception level perspective (the possibility of measuring an impact). The conclusions follow these three perspectives.

STRUCTURES

Although this dissertation primarily considers the question of the Danish case study, we strived, to present a full picture of the many nooks of the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy on all three levels and argued, based on the model presented in Chapter 2, that there was very strong connections between the three levels (Soviet, international, and national). It is very important to acknowledge these tight relations between the three levels when discussing the organizations and activities on a national, in our case in Danish, level. The discussion of the national level must not take the international context and relations out of considerations.

We see a very strong hierarchical system within the USSR with the central CPSU structures as the center for making final decisions on the governing of the USSR, including on cultural diplomacy, based on established procedures of recommendations made by the various departments of the CPSU secretariat. Based on the study of documents from the Soviet archives, we argue that these decisions were made within a tightly defined ideological frame of Marxism-Leninism, as it was defined at any given time, and that in other parts of the apparatus it was necessary to accept this framework of an ideologically based world view to participate in the various involved organizations, either as communists or fellow-travelers. The approved lines of cultural diplomacy filtered down through a system of public organizations, ministries, state committees, and state enterprises.

1538 Jonhson, xi.
Outside the USSR the network of Soviet satellite organizations, the front organizations, should be divided into cause oriented and culture oriented organizations. Causes included peace, women, youth, students, trade unions, and various professional interest groups resulting in corresponding front organizations such as WPC, WIDF, WFDY, and so on. Two generations of front organizations are identified. The first generation front organizations were established following World War II in the spirit of the grand alliance, but it quickly became clear that they were utilized by communist and fellow-travelers to promote Soviet foreign policy positions. For this reason we see a repeated pattern of establishment of a front organization, communist and fellow-traveling control, democratic membership organizations leaving, and the forming of counter-organizations. The second generation front organizations were established in connection with the second peace struggle against the NATO double track decision and deployment of Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles. Through a line of indirect elections the front organizations came under the control of a small core group of communists and fellow-travelers active in a central executive organ with powers to formulate the policy positions of the entire organization.

At the national level we also see the establishment of first and second generation front organizations. However, there are some differences. Regarding the first generation of organizations we see a difference between front organizations established with the purpose of functioning as Danish affiliates of international front organizations (Fredens Tilhængere, DDK, DFK, etc.) and already well-established organizations and institutions (the central trade union, Danish Broadcasting Union, DSF etc.) that initially joined or considered joining international front organizations, recognized their communist and non-democratic nature, and withdrew, more often than not to join the new international counter-organizations. In some cases second generation front organizations such as SAK took over the role of national affiliation of an international front organization (in this case WPC). Second generation front organizations were closely connected to peace activities, typically centered on a specific profession or geographic locality with the words “for Peace” or “against Nuclear Arms” attached and engaged in the struggle against the deployment of NATO missiles.

Another aspect of the network focused on the promotion of Soviet culture. The primary medium for this promotion was The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union. DKSU should be considered the primary and most important channel promoting Soviet culture and points of view in Denmark. Other private companies such as Dan-Ina Film/Folkefilmen centered on a
specific area (e.g. movies), and several communist controlled travel agencies worked on promoting the USSR through tourism.

DKP was one of the most loyal communist parties during the Cold War. They received an endless stream of instructions, financial and other forms of material support from the USSR. The available sources strongly indicate that this support continued to the very end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Based on this direct link DKP promoted a pro-Soviet position in the various Danish organizations and associations. On a Danish level, several communists repeatedly show up in one organization after the other. The most prominent were Ingmar Wagner and Anker Schjerning (and prior to them, to some degree Alfred Jensen), and communists often worked in capacities such as vice-chairman, secretary or treasurer. In the cases of Ingmar Wagner and Anker Schjerning this meant that DKP employed them to work as volunteers in various front organizations, enabling them to take on work-heavy positions that, at the same time, made it possible for them to control and direct the developments and policies of these organizations. In other cases, DKP members, for example Asger Pedersen (DKSU), Johny Baltzersen (SAK) or Hans-Henrik Kjølby (LSA) took on paid positions in the organizations enabling to work in a similar manner in their respective organizations.

Archival evidence shows how throughout the Cold War DKP monitored and discussed developments in various peace movements and front organizations that had fallen under their influence. This does not mean that each and every member of these organizations was a sympathizer to communist or Soviet positions, but it does show a clear intent on the communist/Soviet side to control these organizations and utilize them in the promotion of Soviet positions.

Regarding the question of financing, the available archival sources document that DKP was financed by the USSR both through direct subvention (whitewashed through the annual collections for the newspaper), paying overpriced bills for orders placed with the DKP owned printer, and various forms of non-currency support. The archival evidence also supports the claim that these forms of subvention continued until the collapse of the USSR. Similarly, the available sources document financial and material support of DKSU. Regarding the front organizations, it is possible to document financial support to the international front organizations, but on a national, Danish, level, the only documented case, is the financial support for the establishment of the SAK Fredscenter (‘Peace Center’) in Copenhagen. Sources indicate that Danish front organizations
received support in other ways such as free delegation trips or the translation and publication of materials in Danish free of charge.

**ACTIVITIES**

In order to establish a pragmatic definition of the term culture we identified eight forms of cultural activities to be discussed throughout the dissertation. They were: performing arts, musical arts, visual arts, tourism and exchanges, print media, mass media, sports, and the spoken word.

Cultural diplomacy executed directly by the Soviet state in Denmark centered around mass media (Radio Moscow broadcasts), print media (*FOS* and the various ANP journals), and to some extent sports exchanges and exhibitions, although it is also possible to identify some lecture tours.

The ideologically motivated commercial Danish travel agencies operating on the Soviet market seem to have shared the position of the Soviet view on this activity that it had both a financial-commercial aspect and an ideological aspect, that of generating sympathy for the Soviet project by showcasing the socio-economic progress made and the cultural level of the USSR. Similar cases are the delegations that included an extra layer of an expectation that the participants would disseminate a positive impression to a wider public audience upon returning home.

The front and cultural organizations utilized a wide variety of the forms of cultural activities through public lectures, various publications, exhibitions, screenings, and concerts, or through a combination of these, for example, in the form of the DKSU organized Soviet cultural days.

In addition, it is possible to identify a number of cases where activities were coordinated between the Soviet, the international, and the national level. Examples are the Stockholm peace appeal, the accusation of American bacteriological warfare in the Korean War, or in the campaigns against NATO deployment of new missiles in the 1980s by the Soviet-influenced parts of the peace movements.

In Chapter 1 we discussed the three colors of Soviet cultural diplomacy (white, gray, and black). Having identified the various forms of activities it is possible to conclude that Soviet state executed cultural diplomacy was white. The various publications, Radio Moscow broadcasts, and exhibitions had a clear sender and most of the contents were either truthful or truthfully in line with Soviet opinions and views.

The activities of the front organizations are of a more dark gray variation because front organizations were utilized as an attempt to camouflage the origin of the messages, but at the same
time a majority of the general public was able to figure out its actual origin and the contents mostly truthfully represented the position of the senders and should for these reasons not be placed in the same black category as the disinformation campaigns of KGB (they fall outside the themes of this dissertation).

Similarly, it is possible to measure examples of individual propaganda activities on our color scale. Erik Vagn Jensen did not receive financial support for his book, but prior to travelling to the Baltic Soviet republics he already shared the Soviet version of the condition in the three Soviet republics. However, he did receive a substantial helping hand from APN and other Soviet organizations during the research process and in collecting picture materials. As such we can speak of a “light gray” case. On the other end of this scale we find a very dark gray case, the multimedia show American Pictures. The project’s reliance on assistance from the KGB and Jacob Holdt’s willingness to participate in a whataboutism campaign to discredit President Carter’s international human rights’ campaign place American Pictures in that darker end of the gray category. Our Ole Friis case study (of a young man who came into contact with the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus, later becoming an active participant) exemplifies more than anything the substantial financial costs of winning over individuals to a pro-Soviet position. An important conclusion therefore has to be that in our Danish case study the most successful examples of cultural diplomacy were based on individual actions, but despite this the overwhelming amount of activities belonged to the category of mass activities because the Soviet cultural apparatus focused on executing activities through the channels of public, front, and friendship organizations.

**IMPACT**

As shown in Chapter 1 the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus aimed at influencing the general public in any given country so individuals could in turn influence the political decision makers from a pro-Soviet position. Therefore, the success or failure of Soviet cultural diplomacy should not be evaluated on whether or not it succeeded to directly influence the decision making level in a foreign country, but rather how it was received or perceived in the general public based on a combination of sources including Soviet planning and evaluation, evaluations of the national front and friendship organizations, and evaluations by the general public opinion as primarily seen through a lens of print media (as we have seen examples of in the various chapters).
Based on the available source materials we conclude that the Soviets were extremely frustrated over the lack of success, defined as a broad public support of the general public in Denmark of the Soviet initiatives and messages, measured by quantity of participants over quality of the activity. The support for Soviet agendas was generally limited to the various front organizations and the friendship society, and despite a growth in membership figures towards the mid-1980s they still had very little support compared to Danish overall population figures.

There are several reasons for this:

Firstly, the Soviet messages were framed in a manner alien to the general public in Denmark and therefore they were unable to latch onto the deep frames of the large majority of the Danish population.

Secondly, the actual actions of the USSR in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968, in Hungary in 1956 and 1958, and in Afghanistan in 1979 caused substantial damage to the possible impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy because the difference between what was said and what was done became too great, thereby breaking one of the golden rules of successfully executing cultural diplomacy.

Thirdly, Danish authorities, whether it was on a governmental level, in the civil service, or in the Social-democratic movement (that we include since it was in government for most years during the Cold War) did not respond to the attempts of pro-Soviet public pressure because they were strongly opposed to the Soviet position. Even when the leadership of the Social-democratic party and trade unions (for a number of reasons) changed its position on the central question of peace and security politics in the 1980s, Soviet cultural diplomacy did not create the hoped for success through public pressure because the government and the civil servants still did not alter their position.

Fourthly, it is necessary to also factor in the question of economics in the equation. The various organizations were not able to sustain themselves through the commercial success of the activities. If anything, a history of Soviet cultural diplomacy is a history of unending deficits. In the end, the various organizations survived partly on Soviet subvention, and partly on the willingness of the same smallish group of communists and fellow-travelers to support various collections or purchase scarves, special stamps, lottery tickets and so on to time and again to salvage the financial situation of the various organizations. This lack of ability to survive on commercial terms is one of the strongest indicators of the lack of a broad impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy on the general Danish population.

Naturally there were some examples of success on the general public level: Erik Vagn Jensen’s book, Jacob Holdt’s multimedia show, the 1980s peace movements (to a certain degree), and the
Next Stop movement are cases where various activities led to new participants joining in. However, each of these cases seems to have been very cost inefficient. The Soviet apparatus seems to have been very large, bureaucratic, inflexible, and cost-heavy.

DENMARK WAS NOT A SPECIAL CASE

As Olov Wennell has shown, in the strategic and tactical planning of VOKS operations it was constantly highlighted that the form of content of Soviet cultural diplomacy should be adapted to the country were the activities were to take place. However, as he also concludes in his Swedish case study, in the annual evaluation reports this problem was repeated year after year as something that had to be improved the following year, indicating that it never was.

For a similar reason it is possible to argue that our Danish case study is not a special case. This conclusion is strengthened when we look at Soviet cultural diplomacy from a center-periphery perspective.

If we discuss cultural diplomacy from a perspective of the center it is possible to conclude that just as in the Swedish example above nothing was done in a serious attempt to frame messages in a way that could be considered to best correspond with the mind-set of “the average Dane” and the possible general Danish perceptions of Soviet statements and actions.

If we turn the perspective on its head and discuss the question from a periphery perspective by comparing the works on the various friendship ship societies listed in the historiographical discussion in Chapter 1, or compare Danish and Italian reactions within communist and fellow-travelling circles to the 1956 Hungarian events, there are a considerable number of similarities in regard to origin, structures (in the names, forms and causes of the front organizations and friendship associations), activities, problems, and general reception and perception. When, for example, Simo Mikkonen argues that the Soviet-Finnish friendship association moved from an early, post-war very propagandistic position to a position of broadly promoting culture, exchanges, and tourism in a more somber tone, and that this transformation should be seen within a frame unique to a Finnish national case, we simply have to note that it is possible to pinpoint exactly the same change in position and methods to the same point in time with the Danish-Soviet friendship association despite national differences and differences in the national position vis-à-vis the USSR. This places

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1539 Wennell, 45-60.
a serious question mark over the validity of the comparative school’s insistence on focusing on national differences within communist studies.

The overall conclusion of this dissertation are that the Soviet cultural diplomacy failed because the Soviets were not able to frame their messages in a way that resonated with the deep frames of the general Danish public, but only a minor group of communists and fellow-travelers that were in turn unable to apply any real popular pressure to the political decision-makers.
### Appendix 1:

### List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Danish translation</th>
<th>English translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APN</td>
<td>Agenturet for Pressenyheder</td>
<td>Agency of Press News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Centralkomite</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMEA</td>
<td>Den internationale komite for børn og unge foreninger</td>
<td>International Committee for Children’s and Adolescents Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cominform</td>
<td>Det kommunistiske informationsbureau</td>
<td>The Communist Information Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comintern</td>
<td>Den kommunistiske internationale</td>
<td>The Communist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Sovjetunionens Kommunistiske Parti</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFK</td>
<td>Dansk Fredskonference</td>
<td>Danish Peace Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDK</td>
<td>Danmarks Demokratiske Kvindeforbund</td>
<td>Denmark’s Democratic Women’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti</td>
<td>Communist Party of Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKSU</td>
<td>Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen</td>
<td>The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKU</td>
<td>Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom</td>
<td>Denmark’s Communist Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSF</td>
<td>Danske Studerendes Fællesråd</td>
<td>Danish Students’ Joint Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUV</td>
<td>Demokratisk Ungdoms Verdensforbund</td>
<td>See: WFDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBU</td>
<td>EBU</td>
<td>European Broadcast Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Hovedbestyrelse</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBVA</td>
<td>Foreningen til Beskyttelse af Videnskabeligt Arbejde</td>
<td>The Association for the Protection of the Rights to Scientific Work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Den Internationale Føderation af Modstandsfolk</td>
<td>International Federation of Resistance Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOS</td>
<td>Fakta om Sovjetunionen</td>
<td>Facts on the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Fredens Tilhængere i Danmark</td>
<td>Partisans of Peace Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GKKS</td>
<td>Den statslige komite for kulturelle forbindelser med udlandet</td>
<td>The State Committee for Cultural Connections Abroad under the Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goskino</td>
<td>Statens filmskomite</td>
<td>The State Committee for Cinematography under the Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosteleradio</td>
<td>Statens fjernsyns- og radiokomite</td>
<td>The State Committee for radio and television broadcasting under the Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GKKS</td>
<td>Den statslige komite for kulturelle forbindelser med udlandet under Ministerrådet</td>
<td>The State Committee for Cultural Connections Abroad under the Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAN</td>
<td>Det internationale nyhedsagentur</td>
<td>The International News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>Den Frie Fagforenings Internationale</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Den Internationale Afdeling</td>
<td>The International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFDL</td>
<td>Demokratiske Juristers Internationale forbund</td>
<td>International Association of Democratic Lawyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOJ</td>
<td>Det Internationale Journalistforbund</td>
<td>International Organization of Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPNW</td>
<td>IPPNW</td>
<td>International Association of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Den International Studenterkonference</td>
<td>International Student Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUS</td>
<td>Den internationale Studenterføderation</td>
<td>International Union of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komiteen for Statens Sikkerhed</td>
<td>The Committee for State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLO</td>
<td>Lærlingenes Landsorganisation</td>
<td>Apprentices National Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Sovjetunionens udenrigsministerium</td>
<td>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Atlanterhavspagten</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSN</td>
<td>Next Stop Nevada</td>
<td>Next Stop Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>Next Stop Soviet</td>
<td>Next Stop Soviet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIRT</td>
<td>Det Internationale Radio of Fjernsynsforbund</td>
<td>The International Organization of Radio and Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politburo</td>
<td>Politbureuaet</td>
<td>The Political Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSTA</td>
<td>Det russiske telegrambureau</td>
<td>Russian Telegram Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAK</td>
<td>Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og Sikkerhed</td>
<td>The Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovinformburo</td>
<td>Det Sovjetiske Informationsbureau</td>
<td>The Soviet Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovmin</td>
<td>Ministerrådet</td>
<td>Council of ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovnarkom</td>
<td>Rådet af folkekommisærer</td>
<td>Council of People Commissars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Den sovjetiske fredskomite</td>
<td>The Soviet Peace Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Danish Name</td>
<td>English Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSOD</td>
<td>Forbundet af Sovjetiske Foreninger for Venskab og Kulturelle Forbindelser med Udlandet</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Connections Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDK</td>
<td>Foreningen Sovjetunion-Danmark</td>
<td>Soviet-Danish Friendship Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
<td>Sovjetunionens Telegrambureau</td>
<td>Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Amerikas Forenede Stater</td>
<td>The United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Unionen af Socialistiske Sovjetrepublikker</td>
<td>The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOKS</td>
<td>Det Alunioniske Selskab for Kulturelle Forbindelser med Udlandet.</td>
<td>The All-Union Organization for Cultural Connections Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFDY</td>
<td>Demokratisk Ungdoms Verdensforbund</td>
<td>World Federation of Democratic Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFTU</td>
<td>Den Faglige Internationale</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIDF</td>
<td>Kvindernes Internationale Demokratiske Verdensforbund</td>
<td>Women’s International Democratic Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPC</td>
<td>Verdensfredsrådet</td>
<td>World Peace Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2:

### List of archival abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Danish translation</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABA</td>
<td>Arbejderbevægelsens bibliotek og arkiv</td>
<td>Library and Archives of the Worker’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIIS</td>
<td>Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier</td>
<td>Danish Institute for International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB</td>
<td>Det kongelige Bibliotek</td>
<td>Royal Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KF</td>
<td>Kim Frederichsen’s privatarkiv</td>
<td>Kim Frederichsen’s private papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>Litauens Særlege Arkiv</td>
<td>Lithuanian Particular Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Letlands Rigsarkiv</td>
<td>Latvian National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF</td>
<td>Ole Friis’ privatarkiv</td>
<td>Ole Friis private papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Rigsarkivet</td>
<td>National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vladimir Pimonov’s privatarkiv</td>
<td>Vladimir Pimonov’s private papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ГАРФ</td>
<td>Det russiske rigsarkiv</td>
<td>Russian State Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>РГАНИ</td>
<td>Det Russuske statsarkiv for nyere historie</td>
<td>Russian State Archives for Current History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>РГАСПИ</td>
<td>Det Russiske Statsarkiv for Socio-Politisk Historie</td>
<td>Russian State Archives for Social and Political History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>Alfred Jensen</td>
<td>Alfred Jensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJRA</td>
<td>Alfred Jensen og Ragnhild Andersen</td>
<td>Alfred Jensen and Ragnhild Andersen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Centralkomite</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Børge Houmann</td>
<td>Børge Houmann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Carl Madsen</td>
<td>Carl Madsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danica</td>
<td>Samling af arkivalier om danske forhold fra udenlandske arkiver</td>
<td>Collection of archival documents concerning Denmark originating from foreign archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dannato</td>
<td>Dansmarks repræsentation ved NATO</td>
<td>Denmark’s NATO mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBS</td>
<td>Dansk-Bulgarsk Selskab</td>
<td>The Danish-Bulgarian Friendship Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDK</td>
<td>Danmarks Demokratiske Kvindeforbund</td>
<td>Denmark’s Democratic Women’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFK</td>
<td>Dansk Fredskonference</td>
<td>Danish Peace Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti</td>
<td>Communist Party of Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP-Gladsaxe</td>
<td>Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti Gladsaxe afdeling</td>
<td>Communist Party of Denmark, Gladsaxe Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKSU</td>
<td>Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen</td>
<td>The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKU</td>
<td>Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom</td>
<td>Danish Communist Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejendomsselskabet</td>
<td>Ejendomsselskabet af 25. september 1945</td>
<td>The Property Company of September 25th 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Hovedbestyrelse</td>
<td>Executive committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>Einar Kruse</td>
<td>Einar Kruse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Foreningen Folkepressen</td>
<td>The Peoples’ Press Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridericia</td>
<td>Allan Fridericia</td>
<td>Allan Fridericia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Fredens Tilhængere i Danmark</td>
<td>Partisans of Peace Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Hans Hedtoft</td>
<td>Hans Hedtoft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>Ingmar Wagner</td>
<td>Ingmar Wagner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jensen</td>
<td>Jørgen Jensen</td>
<td>Jørgen Jensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJ</td>
<td>Jørgen Jørgensen</td>
<td>Jørgen Jørgensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komintern</td>
<td>Danske personsager fra Komintern arkivet</td>
<td>Personal files from the Comintern archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Landsorganisation i Danmark</td>
<td>Danish Central Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSA</td>
<td>Landsforeningen “Stop Atomraketterne”</td>
<td>The National Committee “Stop the Nuclear Rockets”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Next Stop</td>
<td>Next Stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Landslelse</td>
<td>National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Ole Sohn</td>
<td>Ole Sohn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAK</td>
<td>Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og Sikkerhed</td>
<td>The Liason Committee for Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Arbejdsudvalg/Forretningsudvalg</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SiD</td>
<td>Sovjetunionen i Dag</td>
<td>The Soviet Union Today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>Udenrigsministeriet</td>
<td>Danish Foreign Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÅJ</td>
<td>Aage Jørgensen</td>
<td>Aage Jørgensen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This dissertation is primarily based on Danish archival sources supplemented with Soviet archival materials. They are stored in various Danish and foreign archives. As this dissertation deals with events and activities in Denmark, the archival sources of the involved Danish organizations and persons are considered the most important.

Concerning the Danish archival materials, there are two different types of archival materials. In some cases Danish organizations (for example in the case of The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union) involved in the network for Soviet cultural diplomacy left behind more or less complete archives. In other cases only a scattered material (for example in the case of the Danish national affiliation of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers) spread across various personal papers is available. This material is supplemented by the archives of the Danish Foreign Ministry, which contains materials from the period up until 1972. The following Danish archives store materials of interest for this dissertation: Rigsarkivet (The National Archives), Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv (The Library and Archives of the Workers’ Movement), and Det Kongelige Bibliotek (The Royal Library). In a few cases I have been allowed to access to personal collections and these materials have filled central gaps in the materials stored in Danish archives.

Due to the restraints on time and financing for a PhD dissertation in Denmark I chose to make use of available plentiful copies of Soviet archival material located outside of Russia. This material mostly stems from the central party organs in the party apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the key party departments involved in carrying out Soviet cultural diplomacy. These sources originate from the Russian State Archives for Current History (RGANI), and they have been supplemented with copies of source materials stored in other Russian archives; the Russian State Archives (GARF), The Russian State Archives for Socio-Political History (RGASPI), and The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), as well as source materials from The Lithuanian Particular Archives (LPA) and the Latvian National Archives (LVA). Copies of documents related to Denmark originating from foreign archives are in Danish called “Danica”. Inside Denmark such Danica collections exist in the collections of The National Archives and the library of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). However, when using the
collection at DIIS it was noted that a number of folders containing the physical paper copies of
Soviet documents roughly corresponding to the contents of an average moving box were missing.
Neither I nor the library staffs were able to identify the whereabouts of the missing folders, and,
therefore, it has to be noted that for an unknown reason the collections of DIIS are incomplete.

The largest and most important collection of copies of original Soviet documents stored outside of
Russia are, in my opinion, the collections of micro films stored at Lamont Library, one of the
university libraries at Harvard. Due to the availability, accessibility, and opportunity to make PDF
copies of the contents of the micro film reels stored at Lamont I decided to use the EliteResearch
PhD research grant (EliteForsk Ph.d. rejsestipendie) that I was awarded in 2015 on a research trip to
Lamont. Within the aforementioned restraints on a Danish PhD dissertation it would simply have
been impossible to utilize the same amount of materials in Russia, even if I was granted access.

I have utilized two kinds of published sources for this dissertation. Since the end of the Cold War
Russian historian have published numerous volumes of original, previously unpublished
documents. I treat these publications as similar to the unpublished archival documents. Throughout
the Cold War the participants in Soviet cultural diplomacy produced endless pages of printed
materials. I consider these printed materials to be published sources and have primarily used them
in cases where either no archival sources were available at the time of research or when discussing
and analyzing these printed materials as an activity of cultural diplomacy. Likewise, in a few cases I
have made use of oral interviews by conducted by myself.

Finally, a few words on the filling systems of Danish and foreign archives, as they are reflected in
the manner that references are made in the footnotes of the dissertation. For Danish archives I have
made use of the conventionally accepted abbreviations of the various archival institutions followed
by an abbreviation of the organizational archive or personal papers in question followed by the box
(in Danish “kapsel”, “kasse” or “pakke” depending on the archival institution in question). As each
box contains any given number of sheets I adhere to the tradition of giving a short headline to the
document in question and recording its date of origin. However, the archival files of the Danish
Foreign Ministry do not follow this system, but are labeled by a combination of numerals and
letters. I observe the tradition of referring to these combinations. Russian archives use a different
system that I also respect in my footnotes. An abbreviation of the archival institution in question is
followed by the number of the collection ("fond"), finding aid (opis’), case number ("delo"), and sheet number (lista). Other archives of the former Soviet Union also utilize this combination to identify the exact document in question. However, AVPRF also includes a number of the folder ("papka") between the number of the opis and the delo. I follow this principle as well. In principle, this numeral code would be sufficient to identify a given document in the footnotes. However, as with the Danish references I include a short headline and date. The references to the Russian archives (and also monographs and articles) are in Russian when the original document is in Russian. In some cases documents are written in another language and in these cases the references are written in English. I have decided not to transliterate references in Russian to the Latin alphabet as this would make no difference to a non-Russian speaker. I am unable to provide a translation of the headline due to the space restrictions.

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Børge Houmann
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Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti
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LO
Next Stop
Ole Sohn
Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og Sikkerhed
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Aage Jørgensen

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(http://www.opo1.no/Lundkommisjonen/Lundkommisjonen%20komplett.pdf)
http://www.mk-sp.ru/history.html (retrieved 6.15.2014)
I denne afhandling foretages en analyse af de sovjetiske kulturdiplomatiske aktiviteter rettet mod Danmark under Den Kolde Krig, defineret som perioden 1945-1991. Afhandlingens overordnede sigte er at besvare tre spørgsmål
1: Hvordan blev virksomheden organiseret og finansieret?
2: Hvilke typer af aktiviteter fandt sted?
3: Hvordan blev de modtaget, og hvad kan der siges om deres gennemslagskraft?

Afhandlingen er opdelt i en indledning, ni kapitler og en konklusion.

I kapitel 1 diskuteres en række teoretiske og metodiske spørgsmål vedrørende udøvelsen af kulturdiplomati samt af forskellige skoler indenfor forskningen i internationale relationer, kulturdiplomati, sovjetoologi, Den Kolde Krig, fredsbevægelser og kommunismen, hvilket afslutningsvis fører til formuleringen af et teoretisk grundlag for den empiriske del af afhandlingen, der værger at undersøge; hvordan budskaber blev formet, og hvilke kanaler de blev fremsat igennem, hvilke former de antog, og hvordan de blev modtaget, opfattet og vurderet fra såvel sovjetisk som dansk side. Samtidig understreges vigtighed i at inddrage overvejelser af de sovjetiske intentioner og ideologisk betingede verdenssyn for vurderingen.

I kapitelne 2-9 diskuteres det sovjetiske apparat for kulturdiplomati og dets aktiviteter.


Med hensyn til modtagelsen og gennemslagskraften konkluderes det, at den sovjetiske direkte og støttede virksomhed havde til formål at påvirke den offentlige mening og derigennem skabe et indtryk af et offentlig pres, der kunne påvirke de politiske beslutningstagere, men at det var meget vanskeligt for de deltagende parter at formulere et budskab, der havde klangbund i en bredere offentlighed eller ikke blev undermineret af faktiske sovjetiske handlinger som i Ungarn i 1956 og 1958.

Afhandlingens overordnede konklusion er derfor, at trods enkelte succeshistorier og en lidt større succes med at sprede budskabet fra midten af 1970’erne havde Sovjetunionen meget vanskeligt ved at opnå bred offentlig sympati for sine budskaber, da de var for fremmede for størstedelen af den danske offentlighed og derfor lykkedes det heller ikke at øve indflydelse på beslutningstagene.
Summary in English

This dissertation presents an analysis of the Soviet cultural diplomatic activities towards Denmark during the Cold War, defined as the period 1945-1991. The overall aim of the dissertation is to answer three questions:

1: How were the activities organized and financed?
2: What forms of activities took place?
3: How were they received and what can be said about their impact?

The dissertation is divided into an introduction, nine chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter 1 discusses a number of theoretical and methodological questions regarding the practice of cultural diplomacy and various schools within the fields of research on international relations, cultural diplomacy, Soviet studies, the Cold War, peace movements, and communism. Based on this, a theoretical approach for the empirical based discussion is formulated. The dissertation investigates how messages were framed and through which channels they were disseminated, which forms they assumed and how they were received, perceived, and assessed by both the Soviet and the Danish sides. At the same time, it emphasizes the importance of incorporating considerations on the Soviet intentions and ideological worldview in the overall assessment.

Based on this approach, chapters 2-9 discuss the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy. Based on the theory of mono-organizational socialism, a model establishes a Soviet apparatus of three levels: Soviet, International and National, seeking to incorporate all the participating organizations. The Soviet level contains various parts of the Communist Party, ministries, state committees, state enterprises, and the so-called public organizations. The International level contains various international front organizations (e.g. the World Peace Council or Cominform), and the national level contains the national affiliates of international peace organizations (e.g. “Fredens Tilhængere”), the Danish-Soviet friendship association, and various businesses. An important point is to emphasize the role played by various communists as initiators and driving forces.

In the dissertation a variety of initiatives and activities are discussed. They include public lectures, conferences, participation in international manifestations, opinion polls, publications, film screenings, delegation visits and tourism, radio broadcasts, exhibitions, exchanges, open letters, and demonstrations. In addition, a number of coordinated campaigns are identified, for example, signature collections (e.g. on the Stockholm Appeal), accusations of American bacteriological warfare in Korea, or the campaign against (West) German rearmament.

Regarding reception and impact, it is concluded that the Soviet direct and supported activities were aimed at influencing public opinion and thereby give the impression of a public pressure that would in turn affect policy makers, but that it was very difficult for participants to achieve this aim. It proved very difficult to frame messages in such a manner that they resonated with the broader public or were not undermined by actual Soviet foreign policy actions such as the events in Hungary in 1956 and 1958.

The overall conclusion of the dissertation is that despite some success stories, including a wider audience form the mid-1970s on, it proved very difficult for the Soviet Union to achieve broad public sympathy for its messages as they more often than not seemed alien to the majority of the Danish public and therefore failed to influence the decision-makers.