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Recent Trends in African Peacekeeping in Africa
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Help Yourself
Recent Trends in African Peacekeeping in Africa

Nikolas Emmanuel, PhD

In recent years, the international community has asked a small number of African subregional hegemonic states to put into place regional and subregional security infrastructures. However, these African security organizations are not being pulled together in response either to interstate conflict or an external threat, both of which are frequently the primary motivations for forming regional security complexes. Instead, some African states are trying to counteract externalities from domestic threats emanating from civil wars and state crises in neighboring countries, primarily in their subregions. The interventions by Ethiopia or Kenya across their borders into Somalia illustrate this point. Security efforts in Africa are primarily driven by such spillover effects (e.g., refugees, insurgent groups, illegal commerce, etc.). As Edmond Keller clearly indicates, “domestic insecurity in one state has a high potential to have a destabilizing effect in neighboring states.” The African states that intervene do so frequently in reaction to these externalities. Yet, the capacity to respond is not evenly distributed in Africa south of the Sahara. Some states are more capable than others.

This article argues that an “African solution” to the problems of civil wars and state crises on the continent has crystallized around a small handful of subregional hegemonic powers. Multilateral peacekeeping in Africa is an excellent indicator of state strength and capacity. Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to name several key actors, all have militaries capable of undertaking the deployment of troops around their subregions and, in some cases, beyond. The international community would like these stronger states to form the backbone of conflict-management efforts in the region and send their troops as part of an African se-

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curity infrastructure. In return, these emerging subregional hegemons gain international legitimacy and respect as well as foreign economic and military assistance, along with pay and training for their armed forces. Furthermore, and understandably, these benefits actually serve to reinforce and enhance the material standing and hegemonic status of these pivotal states. At the root of these reactions, however, is the realization that Africans are being asked with greater frequency to help themselves in security matters.

Donald Rothchild points out that in regard to Africa, the “relatively better-functioning states are increasingly viewing some type of self-help as essential to reduce threats from violence.” Regardless of the French or United Nations (UN) interventions on the continent, Rothchild’s observation remains highly relevant. This is why we currently see a number of the relatively stronger subregional hegemons spearheading interventions into Africa’s civil conflicts. They are the most willing and the most able to construct some sort of subregional and regional security infrastructure. Francis Deng provides a more detailed analysis of this reality:

Regions generally are organized around certain states that have the power and position potentially to play the role of hegemon or act as a pole around which the security or insecurity of other states revolves. The “core state” in each regional constellation possesses key assets in the form of geographical position, military, economic, political and diplomatic resources, and recognition as a regional leader. A large and powerful state inevitably compels its neighbors to shape their security policies, and to conceive of conflict management, with reference to itself.

Yet, for all of their potential, most of the critical state actors in Africa simply need the financial and operational capabilities to respond meaningfully to armed conflict across the region. Consequently, this article addresses two important questions:

1. What are the advantages and drawbacks of relying on African troops as peacekeepers in Africa?
2. Who are the subregional hegemons, and how much are they contributing to the construction of a security infrastructure in Africa?

State Crises and Civil Conflicts in Africa

It became apparent early in the post–Cold War period that a growing trend of intrastate conflicts was emerging in Africa. Since 1989 a large number of states have experienced significant crises in sub-Saharan Africa, and the international response has been mixed. Indeed, a significant number of these state crises under-
went external military intervention organized by a wide variety of international actors including the UN, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community, the United States, France, and the European Union, along with a number of unilateral missions by African states such as Angola. As of 2013, at least 10 severe state crises were ongoing in Africa (table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ongoing Crisis</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Military Intervention?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Mar. 2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Oct. 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Kinshasa</td>
<td>Mar. 1992</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Jan. 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Mar. 2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Jan. 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>May 1988</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Jul. 2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Jul. 1983</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>Feb. 2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Seven of these 10 conflicts have some sort of multilateral organization sending troops to secure or keep the peace. Interestingly, African troops are strongly contributing to all of these peacekeeping operations (PKO).

Chapter 8 of the UN Charter is an important element of arguments for the regionalization of peacekeeping and peacemaking in Africa. Clearly, Articles 52 and 53 of the charter envision an important place for regional organizations in settling disputes. Chapter 8 also lays out legal groundwork for subcontracting the enforcement of peace under the authority of the UN Security Council. This idea has been used extensively in Africa since the early 1990s.

In building a case for this shift, former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report *An Agenda for Peace* points out that the UN should more frequently rely upon regional security arrangements to relieve its increasingly heavy peacekeeping burden after the Cold War. After this general statement, French president François Mitterrand echoed a similar sentiment in November 1994 (oddly enough, only a few months after the Rwandan genocide and the highly controversial Opération Turquoise) when he openly called for African states “to resolve their conflicts themselves and organise their own security.” By 1995, after the debacles in Somalia and Rwanda, the report *Improving Prepared-
The founders of the United Nations, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot
address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or subregional
organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the
prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing
them.\textsuperscript{11}

No other region has experienced such a massive shift towards this method
for peacekeeping. As Jonah Victor notes, “since the end of the Cold War, Sub-
Saharan Africa states have dramatically increased their participation in interna-
tional peacekeeping operations in Africa.”\textsuperscript{12} Most prominently, the Nigerian-led
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
intervention into the Liberian civil war in August of 1990 represented an impor-
tant turning point in the construction of an African response to conflict on the
continent. Since then, the vast majority of multilateral military interventions in
sub-Saharan Africa have been undertaken with a significant number of African
troops. Frequently these actions have occurred under African command and in-
creasingly under the auspices of an African organization. As Paul Williams indi-
cates, “African governments bear the primary responsibility” for dealing with and
responding to the various conflicts on the continent.\textsuperscript{13} It may make some sense to
increase Africans’ participation in activities such as peacekeeping on their own
continent because it builds a sense of ownership and responsibility. Despite the
advantages to such an arrangement, one must consider some important drawbacks
as well.

Advantages and Disadvantages of
Using African Troops in African Conflicts

The deployment of African troops in PKOs in the region has some signifi-
cant pluses over the use of extracontinental armed forces.\textsuperscript{14} Three reasons stand
out: cultural and geographic proximity, the lower cost of responding, and the clear
national interest in stabilizing one’s neighborhood and reducing the impact of
externalities. First, subregional forces may have a better understanding of the con-
licts in their own backyards. These actors enjoy a crucial advantage in that they
often have direct superior knowledge of the cultures they are dealing with and the
prevailing norms, as well as acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. This closeness
“provide[s] them with a better understanding of [a conflict’s] . . . dynamics, key players, and context-specific management and resolution options.”15 Thus, subregional forces may be better received and accepted in nearby conflict zones. Yet, this is not always the case. The current crisis in the Central African Republic shows that bordering states such as Chad risk becoming too closely linked with the actors in a given conflict, undermining their impartiality. Second, geographic proximity should facilitate a much more rapid and less expensive response. Subregional troops operating in neighboring countries do not need to be ferried across the planet. This advantage should lower operational costs considerably. Third, it makes sense that the leaders of states in the immediate vicinity of a civil war would view ending violence and restoring a functioning state as part of their direct national interest. Extraregional states are not as directly affected by the externalities of civil wars outside their own neighborhoods. Therefore, regional interveners should make a stronger commitment to remain in a neighboring country because it is in their national interest to do so.

Furthermore, being an active participant in PKOs in Africa and elsewhere could enhance national prestige in the eyes of the international community and increase the participating state’s leverage in regard to donors. The fact that troop-contributing states appear to be upright international citizens, offering a critical public good, might also give them a larger voice than they would otherwise have. Perhaps this role could boost their clout in decision-making structures in international bodies such as the UN. Furthermore, participation in such problematic places as Somalia gives intervening states like Uganda some sway over international donors. This influence over foreign-aid donors became evident when Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni recently announced that he would end the participation of his country’s armed forces in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) after a UN panel of experts indicated that Uganda was supplying weapons to the M23 rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).16 Kampala expects special treatment in return for deploying significant numbers of Ugandan troops in Somalia.

Nonetheless, relying on African troops to intervene in civil conflicts on the continent presents other clear disadvantages. Perhaps most importantly, for all of their potential, the Africanization of PKOs leads to two fundamental problems: using the armed forces of states that lack military and economic capacity, and risking legitimacy and impartiality—witness the Chadian deployment as part of the current AU International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA).17

By far, the most obvious drawback to the use of African troops in peacekeeping on the continent or anywhere else is their overall lack of resources. Many
African states simply cannot afford to fund their own military interventions abroad. Because of these financial constraints, armed forces in the region cannot commit meaningfully to conflict management and resolution through military means without significant outside assistance.\textsuperscript{18}

African armed forces are severely constrained in the critical areas of training, sustained deployment, intelligence, transportation, and logistics, significantly underpinning the autonomy of African states and multilateral organizations to mount PKOs on their own. Rather, they are forced to rely on financial and military aid from the international community. However, as John Prendergast notes, “the big money problem is that the Americans and the Europeans promised over the last decade that as long as the Africans deployed in these kinds of situations, we would pay for the soldiers and equip them. And we haven’t done it.”\textsuperscript{19}

What motivates a state to participate in a PKO? It is hard to argue that neighbors will always be objective, neutral, and impartial. Mixed motives and realist state interests can potentially overwhelm more altruistic, liberal desires to lend a helping hand in one’s neighborhood and to strengthen the overall international state system.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, geographical and cultural proximities might not always contribute to an intervention and legitimize an intervener’s behavior. As already indicated, the fact that a state is in the neighborhood does not mean that it is helping out in a benevolent manner. In fact, being from the neighborhood can become a significant drawback since local problems may directly involve the intervening neighbor. At times, subregional forces can make a bad situation worse. Note four clear examples from recent history: Ethiopia, Angola, Rwanda, and Nigeria.

Ethiopia’s unilateral military incursion into Somalia, which began in 2006 to depose the Union of Islamic Courts, demonstrates that even actors with relatively large armed forces and international (i.e., United States) support can get bogged down by legitimacy problems. During its military interventions in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997, the DRC, or more recently in Guinea-Bissau, Angola acted unilaterally, normally taking military action outside any international, regional, or subregional infrastructure. Its unilateral behavior can undermine the perceived legitimacy of any action that Luanda takes. Rwanda is another very strong military powerhouse emerging in the region. Over the past decade, Kigali has repeatedly contributed to multilateral PKOs across Africa. Rwanda has been a critical linchpin in the current hybrid AU/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). However, at the same time, President Paul Kagame’s military forces have undermined stability in Central Africa by consistently arming and intervening on behalf of various militia groups in the neighboring DRC. As Danielle Beswick points out, while Rwanda is contributing to “African solutions” in Darfur, it is also signifi-
cantly adding to “Africa problems” in the DRC. This situation only underlines the problems of legitimacy and impartiality that local, neighboring states can run into when intervening militarily in their own region. Even internationally backed multilateral interventions can be dominated by a single state aiming to protect its own national interest. Nigeria’s lead in the intervention in Liberia as a part of ECOMOG comes to mind as a relatively successful subregional operation generally looked upon with respect by the international community. However, Nigeria was not impartial in Liberia. The Nigerian military took sides and even directly armed rebel groups opposed to Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Furthermore, Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone actually took place some three months before formal ECOWAS authorization. Such unilateral action set a negative precedent for future peacekeeping missions.

Empirical Trends:
Subregional Hegemons and African Peacekeeping

After examining the pluses and minuses of using African forces in multilateral PKOs in Africa, one should look at the empirical realities and identify the states that are actually participating and doing the heavy lifting in their respective subregions. Table 2 details the current 10 PKOs involving troop deployments on the African continent and reveals the key African players involved in peacekeeping there.
Table 2. Current multilateral peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa (February 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Name (International Organization)</th>
<th>Beginning of Current Mission</th>
<th>Leading African Troop Contributors</th>
<th>Total Troop Deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic MISCA (AU)</td>
<td>Jun. 2013</td>
<td>Republic of Congo (864), Rwanda (850), Burundi (850), Chad (792)</td>
<td>4,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC MONUSCO (UN)</td>
<td>Jul. 2010</td>
<td>South Africa (1,296), Tanzania (1,257), Malawi (854)</td>
<td>19,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire UNOCI (UN)</td>
<td>Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Niger (871), Senegal (496), Togo (469)</td>
<td>7,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau ECOMIB (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>Apr. 2012</td>
<td>Nigeria (160), Burkina Faso (140)</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia UNMIL (UN)</td>
<td>Sep. 2003</td>
<td>Nigeria (1,463), Ghana (709)</td>
<td>5,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali MINUSMA (UN)</td>
<td>Apr. 2013</td>
<td>Chad (1,142), Togo (939), Niger (865), Burkina Faso (863)</td>
<td>6,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia AMISOM (AU)</td>
<td>Jan. 2007</td>
<td>Uganda (6,223), Burundi (5,432), Kenya (4,652)</td>
<td>18,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan UNMISS (UN)</td>
<td>Jul. 2011</td>
<td>Rwanda (1,001), Kenya (700), Rwanda (156)</td>
<td>7,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Abyei) UNISFA (UN)</td>
<td>Jun. 2012</td>
<td>Ethiopia (3,925)</td>
<td>3,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur) UNAMID (UN/AU)</td>
<td>Jul. 2007</td>
<td>Rwanda (3,234), Ethiopia (2,551), Nigeria (2,536)</td>
<td>14,354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


MISCA - International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMIB - ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia
MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
UNMISS - United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNISFA - United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNAMID - AU/UN Mission in Darfur
Nine states currently stand out, deploying more than 1,000 troops as peacekeepers in a single multilateral operation (Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda). Three of these states (Nigeria, Rwanda, and Ethiopia) deploy 1,000 or more peacekeepers in two operations while Uganda and Burundi have maintained over 5,000 troops each in the AMISOM mission in Somalia. (Remarkably, this has been done for the past several years with no help from the international community.) This group of peacekeeping, troop-contributing countries represents the principal hegemonic states in Africa. They are regular participants in multilateral military interventions on the continent, and the international community presently turns to them to help deal with some of the toughest trouble spots. In return, their actions are supported, and they are rewarded.

Interestingly, distinct patterns in organizational responsibility can be derived from the nine multilateral military interventions currently active in Africa (table 3). There is a great deal of diversity in the organizational framework of the various missions. However, it is wrong to state, as Hikaru Yamashita points out, that “operational collaboration is a mission-to-mission cooperation in a specific conflict situation; as such, it is essentially ad hoc.” As we can see in table 3, although each of the current peacekeeping missions in Africa represents a unique situation, there are at least four reoccurring patterns. However, these arrangements are not ad hoc; neither do they simply involve a quick deployment of African regional or subregional forces that are then transformed into blue helmets.
### Table 3. Patterns in current peacekeeping operations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern</th>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Organizer</th>
<th>Target State</th>
<th>Key African Intervener(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 1</td>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>South Africa, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sudan (Abyei)</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 2</td>
<td>Transfer Mission</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>ECOWAS -&gt; UN</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS -&gt; UN</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>ECOWAS -&gt; AU -&gt; UN</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Chad, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MISCA</td>
<td>CEEAC -&gt; AU</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 3</td>
<td>Hybrid Mission</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>Rwanda, Ethiopia, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern 4</td>
<td>Regional/Subregional Mission</td>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Uganda, Kenya, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ECOMIB</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Nigeria, Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CEEAC - Economic Community of Central African States

First, three of the 10 interventions—MONUSCO (in the DRC), UNMISS (in South Sudan), and UNISFA (in the contested Abyei region)—are strictly UN PKOs. They originated as such and did not involve a transfer of authority from any other subregional or regional African organization. Interestingly, though, we see several key aspiring African hegemons among the chief suppliers of troops: South Africa in MONUSCO, Rwanda in UNMISS, and Ethiopia in UNISFA. However, one of these deployments stands out. Ethiopia is playing a substantial role by serving in the Abyei area, a flash point on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. There, Addis Ababa currently has committed more than 3,000 of its own troops to defend this crucial mission. Ethiopia is UNISFA’s biggest contributor by far, with over 99 percent of the troops (3,925 of 3,955).²⁷

Furthermore, four PKOs in Africa have seen a transfer of operational control from a subregional body to AU or UN control. They include UNOCI (in the Côte d’Ivoire), UNMIL (in Liberia), MINUSMA (in Mali), and MISCA (in the Central African Republic). Interestingly, three of these four transfer missions have been between the West African body ECOWAS and the UN. This is not surprising since ECOWAS has significant experience in PKOs in the subregion, beginning in August 1990 with the deployment during the Liberian civil war.
The third pattern that one can derive from the current multilateral military interventions in Africa is the hybrid mission between the UN and AU in the Sudanese region of Darfur. This operation began as a purely AU mission because decisive action by the UN Security Council became bogged down by obstructive vetoes from China and Russia, considerably slowing action by the international community. Interestingly, three African states—Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Nigeria—have been major contributors of armed personnel to this operation and have sought to stop the Sudanese government and its various militia proxies from perpetrating genocide against the people of Darfur.

The fourth and final pattern includes the examples of AMISOM and ECOMIB—purely regional or subregional missions. ECOMIB is a rather small, limited operation, but AMISOM is currently the second largest deployment of troops in Africa, just behind the UN MONUSCO operation in the DRC. Some perhaps unexpected African actors contribute the bulk of AMISOM’s forces. Although it may be understandable that Kenya has become actively involved in AMISOM, the direct interests and motivations of Uganda and Burundi are less clear. In reality, these two countries have been, by far, the most significant contributors of peacekeeping troops in Somalia over the past several years. They have also received rather significant support from the international community for their commitment to the AMISOM mission.

Out of the patterns in the various multilateral military interventions in Africa today, we see the emergence of a number of “subregional hegemons.” Clearly, the unequal distribution of power among the nations of Africa is expressed clearly in troop commitment levels for PKOs. These African hegemons are states that have a primacy of power in regard to the nations around them. They have the structural power that allows them to play a central role in their subregional or even the greater African regional system. These subregional hegemons possess disproportionate military and economic power as well as influence relative to that of other states in their neighborhood.

Based on their peacekeeping deployments, nine African states are notable: Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. Many of these countries with significant peacekeeping commitments indicate an active, emerging, or aspiring hegemon. Yet, while it is easy to point to South Africa and Nigeria as natural leaders in Africa because of their disproportionate military and economic power and influence, a number of additional emerging hegemonic powers are playing important roles in their respective subregions and beyond. Table 4 compares these key African actors.
### Table 4. Profiles of subregional hegemons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,327</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>404.8</td>
<td>168.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10,780</td>
<td>563.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subgroup Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,486</strong></td>
<td><strong>144.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Saharan African Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,240</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
WDI - World Development Indicator (World Bank)
GNI - gross national income
PPP - purchasing power parity

Fascinatingly, the key subregional hegemonic nations share some commonalities. Yet, at the same time, one finds some interesting differences among the members of group. According to the literature, the African states most likely to deploy substantial numbers of peacekeepers typically have large populations, are poor, and have big militaries. The descriptive statistics in table 4, however, indicate that this is only partially true. First, African peacekeepers are predominantly from countries with large populations, at least by African standards (six of nine are above the African average). Second, the emergent hegemons sending peacekeeping troops have economies more than three times as great as the African average although the data in the table is somewhat skewed by the relatively substantial economies of Nigeria and South Africa. That is to say, five of the nine states in table 4 have armed forces bigger than the African average. Interestingly, besides South Africa and Nigeria, the other key peacekeepers on the continent are well below the 2012 World Bank World Development Indicator average of $2,240 per capita gross national income (in current international dollars at purchasing power
parity). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, about half of the emergent African hegemons that send peacekeepers in any significant number have larger-than-average armies while only three of nine spend above the 2012 African average on their militaries. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics in table 4 contradict the generalizations of Jonah Victor.33 Some interveners are poor, but some are not. Several, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, have large populations, but others, such as Burundi, Chad, and Rwanda, do not. This group is much more heterogeneous than many people expect. Such a compelling point needs to be explored in future research.

Furthermore, corresponding with their relatively high levels of military spending and big armed forces, three African hegemons are prominent: Ethiopia in East Africa / Horn of Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, and South Africa in Southern Africa. Understandably, these three key actors seem the most capable of sending their troops as peacekeepers into conflicts on the continent. Furthermore, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa have some of the most substantial economies in Africa south of the Sahara. This economic capacity also permits them to be active in various multilateral military interventions in Africa, sometimes several at the same time. Most intriguingly, though, three relatively smaller (in terms of economy and population, at least) African Great Lakes states of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda are also some of the most active participants in peacekeeping on the continent. These contradictions again suggest that a varied group of actors is interested in playing important roles in building African security infrastructures.

Conclusion

Participation in PKOs not only reveals the relatively stronger states but also actively facilitates their ascendance. This role of the international community in the rise of these nations also needs further exploration. The major powers (besides France, perhaps) in the international community do not want to commit their own armed forces in any overt way, but they do play an active role in training and supplying those African states that do intervene. The African subregional hegemons “like a sheriff . . . must demonstrate capacity and political will to gather a posse in defense of mutual regional security interests.”34 Once they do so, the funding flows in. Increasingly, the international community has tried to bolster the response capacity of these emerging African subregional hegemonic states. To build their capabilities, extra-African actors in the international community have assisted by financing interventions in Africa and enhancing the capacity of local actors to intervene. However, although a number of foreign-aid programs exist to help facilitate interventions by these African subregional hegemons into various
crises on the continent, the burden of trying to resolve a number of the planet’s most intractable conflicts remains on some of the poorest states in the world.

Notes


5. This article refers to this region as Africa.


8. Here, the term intervention refers to a coercive intrusion into the internal affairs of a state by an external third party designed to restore order (i.e., some semblance of security) in the target state. These actions utilize the armed forces of the outside state or group of states to primarily protect at-risk populations against wide-scale human suffering or death, as well as to help reestablish the central government.


30. In a material and ideational sense, the hegemonic role depends upon the actor’s capability. This article focuses on the material aspects of power although a country’s capacity to lead is also derived from its ability to act with legitimacy in the eyes of the community.


