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“All Yugoslavia Is Dancing Rock and Roll”

Yugoslavness and the Sense of Community in the 1980s Yu-Rock

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Introduction

“Igra rokenrol cela Jugoslavija,
sve se oko tebe ispravlja i savija”

(“All Yugoslavia is dancing rock and roll,
everything around you is straightening and bending”)

The point of the departure for this study is Eric Hobsbawm’s dictum that nationhood and nationalism, although constructed from above, cannot be understood unless also analysed from below – i.e. “in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist.” Drawing on this dictum, the present thesis examines the sense of community in Yugoslav society through the analysis of Yugoslav rock music culture. My focus is on the Yugoslav-ness of this culture – a culture commonly referred to as Yu-Rock or Yugo-rock – in the specific socio-politico-economic situation of 1980s Yugoslavia. My argument is that the Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock was inextricably connected to a larger, over-arching, web of knowledge and ideas to which it related, most importantly those concerning different conceptions of Yugoslavism as an “imagined community.” The point here is that the sense of Yugoslavness should not be reduced to any particular form of Yugoslavism, because Yugoslavism meant different things for different people. Thus, the concept of “Yugoslavness” that I operate with in the thesis is influenced by the work of anthropologist Stef Jansen, who argues that Yugoslavness was not always openly “Yugoslavist,” but rather more about open interethnic boundaries and thereby most often assuming a pronouncedly tolerant, antinationalist and cosmopolitan character.

In this regard, I want to underline that the existing research on rock music in the former Yugoslav lands has recognised the antinationalist character of Yu-Rock and has stressed its role as

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1 Elektični orgazam, “Igra rokenrol cela Jugoslavija” Letim, sanjam, dišem (Belgrade: PGP RTB, 1988). This is a direct translation from Serbo-Croatian, which corresponds to the English phrase “twist and turn.”
an alternative to nationalism of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the existing research has dealt with the issues concerning Yugoslavness of the 1980s Yu-Rock only in passing, either peripherally or from the perspective of the dissolution of the common Yu-Rock scene in the 1990s. Thus, very few of the central questions concerning its agency, origin and causality in the 1980s have been asked.

This study is an inquiry into this issue – the issue concerning questions of agency, origin and causality of Yugoslavness in 1980s Yu-Rock. This is not an easy task. Yugoslav history is a complicated subject – not least because, as Metthew McCullock puts it, Yugoslav identity is contradictory, located at the crossroads of “nowhere” and “everywhere.” This means that locating Yugoslavness can easily ends up by being arbitrary, defined either too rigidly or too loosely that “nothing” or “everything” can meet the qualifications set up by these definitions. My solution for this problem is to place focus on the socio-politico-historical context, that is, in other words, to examine how the Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock was caught up in the system of references to the country’s specific geopolitical position and its nationality policies, including the state-organisation, political mythology and identity politics.

The study is carried through micro-historical analyses of the local scenes in the country’s four principal rock centres: Belgrade, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Zagreb. Stressing that these local scenes are used as platforms for discussing broader issues, not necessarily limited to any individual scene, this approach seeks at the same time to acknowledge diversity within the larger Yugoslav rock scene. This diversity is defined both by a plurality of tendencies, of which some, at least partly, were related to the territorial and national diversity of the country (most notably language) and by differences within the socio-politico-economic situation in different Yugoslav republics. Nevertheless, in the next section’s discussion on the relevant literature, I place focus on issues concerning a broader Yugoslav context and deal with the literature on the individual scenes, when relevant, in the respective chapters.

Relevant Literature and the Thesis’ Contribution to the Field

Although the field of Yugoslav rock music has received much less attention than research concerning politics and economic issues, it has nevertheless been relatively well covered. The conducted research has stressed the antinationalist character of Yu-Rock and approached Yu-Rock as an alternative to the rising nationalism in the 1980s Yugoslavia – an alternative that had to be destroyed during the years of the country’s dissolution and the wars of its succession, in order to attain national homogenisation in the newly-established post-Yugoslav states.\(^5\) The later nationalists were undermining Yu-Rock because it generally stood for values that they despised: critical thinking, cosmopolitanism, openness and personal autonomy.\(^6\) Nevertheless, as an alternative to the emerging nationalist discourses and policies, Yu-Rock continued to function integratively throughout the 1980s.\(^7\) Despite ambivalent and sometimes opposing standings on the political issues concerning the future of the Yugoslav federation, travelling around the country, visiting concerts and friends in other cities and listening to the music from other republics “helped most members of Yugoslav rock culture in not falling for the xenophobic nationalist discourse” and stay clearly opposed to nationalism even in the early 1990s.\(^8\)

However, despite recognising Yu-Rock as an important force of integration in the 1980s and 1990s Yugoslavia, the distinctive Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock has rarely been emphasised as explicitly as it should have been in the existing research. Instead, scholars have often defined Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock only implicitly, as a trans-national, inter-urban or apolitical and practical sense of community among the members of the scene, leaving the issue of connection between Yu-Rock’s antinationalism and its Yugoslavness either untouched or at best only peripherally treated. In fact, the most direct argument on Yu-Rock’s Yugoslav character has been presented in a recent


non-academic book by rock critic Ante Perković, *Sedma republika. Pop kultura u YU raspadu (The Seventh Republic. Pop Culture and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia).* The title, *The Seventh Republic,* has clear connotations to Yugoslavia’s constitutional structure, according to which the decentralised socialist federated Yugoslav state was divided into six republics with a considerable level of political and cultural autonomy. According to the author, the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia was an imagined space, bounded by music, sharing with Yugoslavia only its geographical territory and developed away from the cultural and political elites’ interests. It was urban, cleansed of any folklore and populated by characters from popular culture.

Although not real in the material sense, Perković argues, this utopian land strongly influenced a sense of community among Yugoslavs, in which different nations and traditions were not a problem but a “comparative advantage.” Its development started in the two principal metropoles of Yugoslav popular culture, Belgrade and Zagreb, in the 1960s, and evolved in its full form with the rise of the Yugoslav New Wave scene, culminating in the last decade of Yugoslavia’s existence. Perković does not stop here, but argues that because rock music was a non-elite popular-cultural form, the Yugoslav rock scene could stay autonomous from the cultural elites and the political establishment, what, according to him, made Yu-Rock culture more cosmopolitan and culturally more integrated than the elite cultures in Yugoslavia. In accordance with this central argument in the book is that the Seventh Republic, i.e. Yu-Rock, was *Yugoslav* in the “real sense of the word,” being indeed the only “real” Yugoslav phenomenon in the multi-ethnic and multicultural country.

Perković’s ideas about a close relationship between Yugoslav New Wave and the development of strong pro-Yugoslav popular sentiment in the early 1980s are not novel. Twenty years before he published his book in 2011, in her work on the youth subcultures in the 1980s Belgrade, ethnologist Ines Prica addressed the issue. Arguing that a full-grown pan-Yugoslav youth culture emerged in the early 1980s very much under the influence of New Wave, she had

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9 As Perković explains, the idea about the Seventh Republic came from the American rock critic Marcus Greil’s book *Invisible Republic: Bob Dylan’s Basement Tapes,* in which the author describes a mythical, invisible America that only exists in fiction and song. This invisible republic is compressed into a single town, narrowing America to the size that makes it effective, profit-oriented and unaware of what it was created from. Ante Perković, *Sedma republika. Pop kultura u YU raspadu* (Zagreb-Beograd: Novi liber/Glasnik, 2011), pp. 38-40.


nevertheless treated the issue only peripherally, as her focus was rather on the differences between different youth subcultures in the country’s capital Belgrade.\footnote{Ines Prica, Omladinska potkultura u Beogradu. Simbolička praksa (Beograd: Etnografski institut SANU, 1991), p. 96.}

The main problem with Perković’s argument is that it ascribes too much autonomy to rock music and popular culture in general. In doing so, he does not only end by misinterpreting and simplifying the otherwise complex relationship between popular culture and society in Socialist Yugoslavia. It also leads him to the conclusion that the seventh republic only shared the geographical territory with Yugoslavia, and that the sense of community among the members of the scenes in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana etc. would have developed even without the existence of common state.\footnote{Ante Perković, Sedma republika. Pop kultura u YU raspadu (Zagreb-Beograd: Novi liber/Glasnik, 2011), p. 21.} My argument is that this conclusion divorces Yu-Rock from its socio-historical context, exotifying thereby Yu-Rock as the only “real Yugoslav phenomenon.” By doing so, it fails to recognise that although unifying forces like Yu-Rock were rarities in Yugoslav society, Yu-Rock was still far from the only such force.\footnote{Some other examples are the attendance of official patriotic rituals, or participation on the Yugoslav consumer culture, as Vjekoslav Perica and Patrick Hyder Patterson respectively argue. See Vjekoslav Perica, “United We Stand, Divided We Fall. The Civil Religion of Brotherhood and Unity,” Balkan Idols. Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 99-103 and Patrick Hyder Patterson, Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011). In addition, it should be stressed that this was not only the case with rock music, but also the other genres of popular culture, like film and sport. For film see Vida T. Johnson: “From Yugoslav Cinema to New Serbian Cinema,” KinoKultura (Special Issue 8: Serbian Cinema, August 2009) http://www.kinokultura.com/specials/8/serbian.shtml. For basketball see Vjekoslav Perica, “United they stood, divided they fell: Nationalism and the Yugoslav school of basketball, 1968-2000,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Volume 29, Issue 2 (2001), pp. 267-291.} For this reason, the study of Yu-Rock’s Yugoslavness needs to proceed by contextualising this phenomenon by localising its convergences and divergences from the greater society.

This is what Dejan Jović has done in his 2001 article on different approaches to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In the article, Jović draws attention to the specific socio-political situation of the 1970s and 1980s Yugoslavia with the growing sense of “Yugoslavism” among the population occurring at the same time as ethnic nationalism was increasing. According to his argument, in this period Yugoslavia experienced “the (re)-emergence of a Yugoslav culture” and the first demands to establish institutions of representative democracy. While this (re)-emergence of a “Yugoslav culture” resulted in the significant growth in the number of people declaring themselves as “Yugoslavs” at the 1981 census, the demands for democracy would have eventually
“result[ed] in the creation of a Yugoslav political nation.” However, Jović further argues, this development provoked a reaction of ethnic nationalists and conservative Communists, resulting in a situation in which, in the last period before the country’s collapse, Yugoslavs witnessed a struggle between the forces of integration and of polarisation. It is quite noteworthy, in the context of this study, that although Jović does not explicitly define “Yugoslav culture,” which was, according to him, “emerging in the young and more educated generation,” he nevertheless refers to the research done on the Yugoslav rock scene by Eric D. Gordy and Sabrina P. Ramet.

I will return shortly to Jović’s article but before that I want to expand on some important points presented in Gordy’s and Ramet’s works. In his research on the 1990s Belgrade, Gordy emphasises rock’s antinationalist character and its role as an alternative to nationalism. He stresses the role of urbanity, arguing that “Yugo-rock” had an interurban character, with number of republican and regional centres developing strong local scenes, yet with intensive contact with one another. However, as a rural- and regional-oriented nationalist elite overtook the place of an urban-oriented communist elite, peasants and “urban peasants” colonised the cultural space that used to be dominated by urban rock and roll youth.” Drawing on his analysis of the marginalisation of rock in relation to the more nationalist oriented musical forms, my focus is however on the 1980s scene and on a broader Yugoslav context.

Sabrina Ramet’s approach is rather different. Stressing that during the 1980s different bands started commenting on, reflecting and to some extent even affecting interethnic behaviour, Ramet argues that Yu-Rock was not immune of the nationalist turn in Yugoslav society of the 1980s. In her major work on Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia (The Disintegration Of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic), she observes, that already by the end of the 1980s, just “like everything else in the country, rock music too was affected by the ‘national question.’” In this situation a number of bands had given up the

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ambition to play outside their own republic. This argument is in line with the central argument in the book, according to which Yugoslavs lost the ability to communicate with each other even before the wars of the 1990s. Still, Ramet is cautious not to exaggerate, adding that “this was not hard and fast” as the interrepublican exchange continued. Finally, in the same regard, she has also emphasised the importance of pacifist-minded bands and different anti-war concerts in Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia.

When it comes to Jović’s article two important points need to be emphasised. First, Jović’s central purpose of presenting the argument about the emerging “Yugoslav culture” – resembling very much the aforementioned argument presented ten years earlier by Ines Perica – and its relationship to the rising nationalism in the Yugoslav society is a criticism of what he defines as “the nationalism approach to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.” According to Jović, this approach focuses strictly on one side of the story, that of the rise of nationalism and the fragmentation of Yugoslav society, while turning a blind eye to the sources pointing in direction of the rise of “new Yugoslavism” occurring at the same time. In this study I very much share this view on “the nationalism approach” and proceed to Yu-Rock in my analysis as a force of integration, stressing that “although opposing views in the politics led to ever greater nationalisation of Yugoslav cultural and political space, Yu-Rock became a trans-national (sic) forum for expression of discontent with contemporaneous state-of-things that Yugoslavia found itself in,” as Martin Pogačar has put it. From this point of departure, my thesis focuses on the antinationalist agency in Yu-Rock. In doing so, it does not seek to underplay the role of nationalism in Yugoslavia of the 1980s. Rather it seeks to tell the other side of the story – the side that, in Ljubica Spaskovska’s wording, must not be

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22 It is unclear to which extent Jović’s criticism is directed towards Ramet’s approach to Yu-Rock, as he nevertheless criticises Ramet elsewhere in the article.
23 Martin Pogačar, “Singing Cities: Images of the City in Ex-Yu Popular Music,” Blesok issue 45 (2005), p. 4. I however do not agree with Pogačar in defining this forum as trans-national, as there is a problem with the transnationalism approach to the interethnic relations in Yugoslavia. This approach assumes Yugoslav nations (narodi i nacionalnosti) as ethno-national groups clearly demarcated from each other. As I will discuss in Chapter I this interpretation does not take into account that prior to the conflict and wars of the 1990s ethnic borders in Yugoslavia were rather dynamic, fluid and open.
ignored in the study of Late Socialist Yugoslavia’s history, if we are to understand the complexity of that history and avoid reducing it to its results.  

Second, the main problem with Jović’s argument lies in his assumption that this new Yugoslavism emerged in the first place as a reaction against the general trend of fragmentation of Yugoslav political and cultural space that started some twenty to thirty years earlier. This reductionism is problematic because it does not recognise the role that the country’s specific geopolitical position played in creating popular sentiment, especially, but not exclusively, in the sphere of Yugoslav popular culture – of which “the young and more educated generation” that Jović writes about was the main consumer. In this regard, an interesting argument proposed by Martin Pogačar needs to be mentioned. Drawing attention to Yugoslav interfilmic referentiality – meaning, the same characters in different films appearing in characteristically very similar roles – Pogačar has argued that the relationship between Yugoslav popular culture and the country’s unique geopolitical position in the Cold War world led to the emergence of a specific symbolic Yugoslav cultural universe, or Yuniiverse. The purpose of introducing the concept (of Yuniiverse) is to stress the development of a common cultural experience created through popular culture in relation to Yugoslavia’s unique geopolitical position. As this thesis will show there is enough evidence in the sources pointing in direction of this development, and that is precisely why it is problematic to reduce the “(re)-emergence of Yugoslav culture” to the reaction against the fragmentation of domestic Yugoslav political and cultural space, as Jović frames it.

Finally, I want to stress that placed in the context of the existing research, the present study seeks to offer a somewhat different reading of the relationship between Socialist Yugoslavia’s rock music culture and the country’s ideology and political mythology. The existing research has stressed the specific position of Yu-Rock in the socialist federated multi-ethnic state. Explaining the complexity in relationship between rock music and the authorities in the socialist states in Eastern Europe, and in Yugoslavia in particular, Sabrina Ramet has argued that we need to acknowledge that “there is nothing automatic about the social content of rock music. It is a medium open to

diverse uses.” In line with this observation, and her criticism of the assumption of rock and socialist authorities being natural-born enemies, Ramet has also argued that authorities in the Communist countries “eventually came to the conclusion that if rock music could not be suppressed, perhaps it could be put to work for socialism.”28 Very much in line with this observation, Peter Stanković has argued that the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) tolerated Yu-Rock, as it – due to rock music’s antinationalist and universalist ethic – corresponded to the country’s proclaimed policy of equality among Yugoslav national groups.29 Drawing on these works’ arguments, my approach to this relationship is however rather the other way round, from below. Due to the same perspective, my work focuses not on the explanatory function of Socialist Yugoslavia’s ideology and political mythology, but rather on their identity-building function, which will be explained in the next section.

Theoretical and methodological considerations

My theoretical approach has been inspired by theorists in the fields of studies of nationalism, ethnicity and identity, cultural studies, socio-psychology and political science. I have taken, used, and sometimes transformed their works in order to create my own theoretical and methodological framework. My focus is that of a historian interested in the relationship between popular music and society. More precisely, I intend to examine Yugoslav rock music in order to give some answers and pose new questions concerning the sense of community in the multinational and multicultural Yugoslavia from the perspective of rising nationalism in the 1980s.

In my approach to nationalism I am influenced by Benedict Anderson’s definition of nation as an imagined political community. One of the main points in this definition is that “nation” is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.\(^{30}\) Thus, nation is socially constructed and ultimately imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of a national community. In practice, this means that the fundamental question about nation inevitably concerns nationalism, which, as Ernest Gellner has put it, “is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness” but “invents nations where they do not exist.”\(^{31}\)

In analysing nationalism in the 1980s’ Yugoslavia, I stress rapidity, by which nationalism often can and does rise to a central stage of everyday life. My theoretical foundation is based on theories that have been advanced from Anderson’s. For example Lisa Wedeen, who in an Andersonian way, sees nationalism as having its own life independently from the historical agents. Yet, in this regard, Wedeen argues against those scholars who view national solidarity as all encompassing, because “it can happen episodically, be conveyed anonymously, and solidify suddenly, only to collapse once again in apathy or discord,” as she puts it.\(^{32}\) From a similar point of departure, Mark Beissinger and Rogers Brubaker argue for “an eventful analysis of nationalism.” In the eventful analysis of nationalism the emphasis is on nationalism activated in particular conditions. It is so, Brubaker argues, because nationalism and national identities can, and most often do, quite suddenly move to centre stage of political and social life, rather than emerge slowly as an experience passed down through generations.\(^{33}\)

In respect of my approach to popular music I want to emphasise that popular music is a shifting cultural phenomenon that does not allow us to attach it too precise a meaning. In fact, as Roy Shuker points out in his discussion on approaches to popular music, this cultural phenomenon defies precise, straightforward definition. Frequently, he continues, the term “popular music” is equated with the terms “rock” and “pop,” when these stand for meta-genres within a broader

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musical soundscape. Shuker concludes on this discussion, that according to the most general
definition, popular music consists of “a hybrid of musical traditions, styles, and influences, with the
only common element being that the music is characterised by a strong rhythmical component, and
generally, but not exclusively, relies on electronic amplification.” This being said, we should – as
Catherine Baker aptly observes – be wary of imposing a Western European or North American
concept on (post-) Yugoslav entertainment with different politico-economic origins. This is most
certainly the case with the so-called Newly Composed Folk Music (NCFM), which no one in
Socialist Yugoslavia would have subsumed under the category of popular music, although as a
musical form it will easily fit into Shuker’s definition. Instead, Yugoslavs saw NCFM as a form of
folk music, grouping it together with folklore and the more traditional folk style musical genres.

In considering the relationship between nationalism and popular music, my primary interest is
the apparent divergence of Yu-Rock from the specific socio-politico-economic situation in the
Yugoslav society of the 1980s. The decade that began with the country’s life-long president Josip
Broz Tito’s death in May 1980 was primarily marked by a prolonged economic crisis and the
revival of nationalism, leading eventually to the break-up of the country and the bloody wars of
1990s. However, the 1980s were not altogether “a highway to hell” and only about sliding into
ethnic hatred and violence. Readings of Yugoslav popular culture very much indicate that a certain
critique and rejection of the politics of nationalism, which dominated Yugoslav society in the
1980s, was very much in currency throughout the decade. In this respect, it is important to
remember that, having the capability of grouping people and, by doing so, creating a unifying
experience, popular music is an obvious tool for constructing or (re)-inventing national identities.
At the same time, however, popular music also has the capability of grouping people in categories
other than national ones. This means that popular music in fact should be approached as an arena
for conflict and struggle, for the negotiation of cultural and political identities. This is indeed a very
important point, because unifying forces like popular culture, and rock music in particular, were
rarity in Yugoslav society, where ethno-religious, linguistic and economic differences hindered
development of pan-Yugoslav identities.

35 Catherine Baker, Sounds of the Borderland. Popular Music, War and Nationalism in Croatia since 1991
(Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), p.2.
36 Mirjana Laušević, “The Ilahiya and Bosnian Muslim Identity” in Retuning Culture, Musical Changes in Cental
This being said, I can hardly stress enough that I am very much not arguing that Yugoslav rock music generated any kind of a pan-Yugoslav identity, because my understanding of “identity” does not correspond to explicit self-identification as a member of a particular group. As Chiara Bottici argues, the subjects of social identities are always singular human beings. They are because there is no single narrating body in group identities that can tell the whole story, and because there is always a possibility that there is no common story at all. This means that “only singular human narrating bodies can tell the stories of group identities, and there is never a guarantee that all these stories can be reconciled into a single plot.”

For this reason, my approach to “identity” is a problem-specific one that stresses personal senses of values of what is really important about life.

I have focused my analysis on the relationship between popular music and identity, and in this respect a specific point needs to be emphasised: my primary interest in the thesis lies in Yu-Rock as a popular music culture rather than as popular musical form. With the term popular music culture I want to indicate that my approach is in line with the general approach in the field of cultural studies and thus recognises that the analysis of institutions, readings, texts and discourses and audience is best understood in their social, economic and political context.

Accordingly, this is not an analysis of musical scores, but rather one that addresses the relationship between the social beings of those who produce and consume popular music, the musical texts and the relevant institutions.

My methodological approach to the musical texts is intertextual. It proceeds from the idea that a text can only communicate its meaning when situated in relation to other texts, or, as Theodore Gracyk puts it, text’s meaning “arises” between texts. Basically, this means that there frequently exists a preferred reading in the text. However, as Roy Shuker has argued, we must keep in mind that this is not necessarily true for the audience as a whole. It is therefore possible that some people have read and interpreted the song lyrics differently than the messages I bring to attention in the thesis. Moreover, I want to stress that I point at general trends; I do not claim that the audience as a whole, consciously or unconsciously, have understood these texts in the way I describe here.

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In this respect, another important point needs to be highlighted: songs and musical styles do not simply “reflect” or “express” the lives of audience members or musicians. Nor is there any intrinsic or straightforward link between the meaning of musical texts, the lives of fans and the identity of a particular artist. Rather, as Keith Negus has observed, a sense of identity is created out of and across the processes whereby people are connected together through and with music. On this subject, Theodore Gracyk has argued that the construction of a meaningful identity demands a historical perspective on the music as a dialogue with both present and past. This is the case in regard of both musicians and audience. Since meanings always are contested, muddled or “misunderstood,” there is no stability in this process of identity-construction. This is the case both with personal and with collective identities.

This being said and remembering the previously highlighted argument proposed by Catherine Baker that we should be wary of uncritically imposing of Western European or North American concepts on Yugoslav rock music, I would like to point out that emerging and functioning in quite different politico-economic situation, musical text played different role in Socialist countries than they did in the West. In their work on rock culture as state enterprise in East Germany, Peter Wicke and John Shepherd have emphasised that state bureaucracy and non-market character of DDR rock strengthened importance of the verbal, lyrical side of the song – in contrast to the West, where the individual band’s success was defined primarily by its sound. This may be at least partly explanation for why, as Sabrina Ramet writes, all performers she talked to agreed that the lyrics were more important than the music in Yu-Rock. Without going into further discussion on the subject of commercialisation, I want to point out that when studying Yu-Rock we need to pay special attention to the lyrics, not least in relation to the sense of community created through rock music.

When it comes to the concept of community, my point of departure is Anthony Cohen’s definition of community as being closely related to the idea of boundaries that mark the beginning

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43 Peter Wicke and John Shepherd, “’The cabaret is dead’: rock culture as state enterprise – the political organisation of rock in East Germany” in *Rock and popular music: politics, policies, institutions*, eds. T.Bennet et al. (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 34.
and end of a community. According to Cohen, people’s consciousness of community is encapsulated in their perception of community boundaries. These boundaries are themselves largely constituted by people in interaction and are thus symbolic in character. This implies that communities are defined relationally, drawing inextricably on similarity and difference at the same time. In practice, this means that both community boundaries and communities themselves are defined by the meanings that people give to them. In other words, the idea of community implies that its members have something in common with each other, and that things held in common distinguished them from the members of other possible communities. Therefore, sense of community is defined by “community membership,” which is, according to David W. McMillian and David M. Chavis’s socio-psychological definition of it, “the feeling of belonging or of sharing a sense of personal relatedness.” In this respect, we should keep in mind the close relationship between sense of community and political myth, the central role of which is to unite community and instil a feeling of belonging.

In my understanding of political mythology I depart from Christopher G. Flood’s argument that we should approach political mythology by exploring and highlighting the political ideology behind it. Political ideology uses political mythology in order to make the ideological message more easily accessible to the populace by stressing narratives through which the populace orients itself, feels about its own political world and acts in it. In the analysis I emphasise the way in which political myths work within society and not their claim for “truth.” Following George Schöpflin, I stress that it is the content of the myth and not the accuracy of the statement that matters. Thus, it is possible that members of community are aware that the myth they accept is not necessarily strictly accurate. Still, they accept it, as the myth is not history, meaning that the statement’s accuracy is not important. It is so because the myth provides them with significance.

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48 This definition is to a large extent my own summary of arguments presented in Chiara Bottici, *A Philosophy of Political Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-17.
Stressing this aspect of political myth, Chiara Bottici defines political myth as “the work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group (or society) provide significance to their political experience and deeds.”

Bottici’s definition is indeed analytically very fruitful as it helps us understand why members of a community would accept the content of the myth, without resorting to concepts like false consciousness and manipulation that reduce them to passive objects in their own history. In other words, this definition enables us to approach the members of a community as active subjects. Moreover, and even more important, it enables us to recognise the role that myth plays in the constitution of common identity – as myth is not only an ideological product, but also the producer of collective identities. In this sense, as George Schöpflin argues, myth is a set of beliefs, held by a community about itself, and it is therefore about perceptions rather than historically validated truths. Regarding certain propositions as normal and others as perverse and alien, myth seeks to establish sole way of ordering the world and defining world-views. Myth is therefore one of the crucial instruments in cultural reproduction.

It is therefore noteworthy that the research on Late Socialist Yugoslavia has approached the (re)-emerging national myths by focusing on their function as producers of collective identities, while Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology – quite to the contrary – is much more often than not still approached without the same theoretical reflections concerning its identity-building function, and therefore either ignored or reduced to the analyses of its ideological content and explanatory function. Without reducing it to a study of political mythology, this thesis pays special attention to the way the distinctive Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock was created through everyday life in relation to the country’s political mythology. Given that Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology was shaped by a twofold need to maintain a balance between centralist and decentralist forces within the country and to maintain ideological differentiation from both Cold War blocs, my primary interest is to examine the way in which the Yugoslavness of 1980s Yu-Rock was caught up in the system of references to the country’s specific geopolitical position and its nationality policies.

Against this theoretical background, I approach the sense of community among Yugoslavs and the Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock by stressing the relational aspect of identity. In doing so, I rely

on Gerd Baumann, who argues that identity is inextricably connected to the notion of difference, meaning that identity-formation should be understood as two interconnected processes – differentiation and identification. In his discussion on the subject, Baumann aptly points out that identity-formation processes are closely related to the commonsense understanding of culture, which can best be expressed in the dictum: “This is what We do, and that is Our culture; and that is what They do, so that is Theirs.”\(^{53}\) In other words, this means that our personal and collective identities emerge in a double movement: bonding, or the building of the solidarity around the common “we” and bordering, that is, separating people from “others.” This thesis is about the symbolic construction of “We, the Yugoslav Rock Community” in relation to different aspects of the (domestic) socio-politico-economic and geopolitical contexts of the 1980s Yugoslavia.

**Sources**

Writing a thesis on Yu-Rock implies that song lyrics are one of the central sources for the analysis. I have followed the tradition of presenting the song titles and lyrics in their original languages along with English translations – which all are mine. The individual songs used for the analysis are presented in the text and footnotes as an integral part of the methodology of presentation, and for that reason, I aim not to present or further discuss them here. However, some general comments on my research methodology need to be set out. First, I have applied systematic, critical text analysis to the songs’ lyrics. Second, my approach has been defined by the theoretical assumption of intertextuality, stressing that songs and musical styles do not simply “reflect” or “express” the lives of musicians or audience members. Rather, they are related to larger issues (and vice versa) and connected to other *texts*, including different film and video material and journals. In the thesis, I present over 40 analysed songs. However, the number of actually analysed songs is much bigger. In addition, I have analysed several documentaries, TV series and films from the studied period. The methodology of identification of these sources is situated within cultural and media studies and associated with what can be termed “archaeology of popular culture,” implying

\(^{53}\) Gerd Baumann, “Culture: Having, Making, or Both?” *The multicultural riddle, rethinking national, ethnic, and religious identities* (New York: Rutledge, 1999), p. 95.
that our sources are being “excavated” on modern electronic media. In the case of this study, they are most notably “excavated” on Youtube, Wimeo, Lost FM and Svaštara, as well as different electronic media in the former Yugoslav lands.

In respect to debates about Yu-Rock, my main sources have been different periodicals, ranging from the official journals of youth branches of the Communist Party to popular magazines of a more entertaining character. My analysis has centred on following periodicals: Džuboks, Ritam, Polet, Mladina, Student, Duga and Start. I have analysed several hundreds of articles from these periodicals.

According to Radina Vučetić, the “rock’n’roll magazine Džuboks (Jukebox) had an important role in bringing the spirit of the West to Yugoslav society as the first rock’n’roll magazine in [a] socialist country.”\textsuperscript{54} In relation to other analysed periodicals, Džuboks distinguishes itself by focusing more on foreign, western, rock music. Most of the issues printed between 1974 and 1985, are accessible online through Popboks – web magazin za popularnu kulturu (Popbox – web magazine for popular culture).\textsuperscript{55} I have reviewed all accessible issues and analysed a great number of articles. Džuboks was published in the country’s capital, Belgrade, until 1985, when it ceased to exist. Ritam (Rhythm) can be seen as Džuboks’ heir. It was published from 1989, and today also accessible on Popboks. I have reviewed all issues published in the period from 1989-1991 and analysed a number of articles.

Polet (Enthusiasm)\textsuperscript{56} and Mladina (Youth) were official periodicals of respectively the Leagues of Socialist Youth of Croatia and Slovenia. They are a very interesting source closely mirroring very much the position of youth in Yugoslav socialist society, paying most attention to two particular subjects: (youth) politics and rock music. The first volume of Polet’s was published on October, 11\textsuperscript{th} 1976 and was a herald of the new Yugoslav youth culture that would emerge with New Wave in the early 1980s and which is at the centre of this thesis. I have reviewed all 426 numbers published until March, 30\textsuperscript{th} 1990, when Polet ceased to function as an official weekly of the League of Socialist Youth of Croatia, and analysed many articles from this periodical.

Mladina did not only play an important role for the new youth culture, associated with the 1980s rock scene in Slovenia, but was also widely viewed as one of the most important independent

\textsuperscript{55} http://www.popboks.com/
\textsuperscript{56} As Polet was youth periodical, its name alludes to “mladalački polet” (youthful enthusiasm).
political magazines in the country in the mid and late 1980s. In fact, *Mladina* is held to be the bellwether of democracy in Slovenia. It wrote extensively on music and youth subcultures in the early to mid-1980s, but moved its focus more in the direction of political discussions by the end of the decade. I have reviewed all numbers from 1979 (approximately the time when the periodical’s redaction began mimicking *Polet*) to 1989 and analysed dozens of articles and thematic appendices. This time frame was chosen because, as one source in my portrayal of the scene in the Slovenian capital put it in 1990, by the end of the 1980s *Mladina* completely stopped writing on the music, and focused almost exclusively on the political issues.

I intended also to review *Mladost* (*Youth*), a Serbian counterpart to *Polet* and *Mladina*, but found *Student*, Belgrade’s students’ periodical, both being more in line with *Polet* and *Mladina* and serving more like a “missing link” between Džuboks and Ritam.⁵⁷ For this reason I have focused my analysis of *Student* on years 1986-1988. Belgrade’s *Duga* (*Rainbow*) and Zagreb’s *Start* were popular magazines, oriented rather towards Yugoslav *estrada* (“showbusiness”) than to Yu-Rock culture. In the course of the 1980s the former became more nationalist, while the latter assumed a rather pro-Yugoslav position by the end of the decade. I have randomly sampled these two periodicals for the period from 1979-1990.

With regards to the primary sources, it is noteworthy that there recently has been a rapid growth in interest in everyday life and popular culture in Socialist Yugoslavia. Accordingly, there have been published many interviews with the scene members and several documentary films dealing with Yu-Rock. Although these are valuable ethnographic and oral history sources, I have focused my analysis on the interviews published in the periodicals as well as documentary films from the period in question here: starting in the mid-to-late 1970s and lasting about a decade and a half. For the same reason, I also chose not to conduct interviews with the scene members myself.

Finally, I have used different statistics concerning Yugoslav demography and economy in the 1980s, and the results from different sociological research on Yugoslav youth conducted in the second half of the decade. In respect of the former, I have focused on the official census

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⁵⁷ For instance, one of the most renowned rock critics in Yugoslavia, Dragan Ambrozić, wrote for *Student* before he switched to the newborn *Ritam* in 1989.
publications (Knjige popisa stanovništva) and Statistical Yearbooks (Statističke godišnjake). In respect of the latter, I have focused on the mid-1980s research called Položaj, svest i ponašanje mlade generacije Jugoslavije (Position, awareness and behaviour of Yugoslav Youth). The background research for the study was done in late 1985 and early 1986 and sought to answer different questions concerning social position, values and social praxis of Yugoslav youth. The “youth” was defined as those between 14 and 27, with an exception of those employed in agriculture, where the upper limit was 29. The total number of the interviewed was 6,531. Of this number 6,215 were analysed. All Yugoslav regions were fairly represented in relation to their general share in Yugoslavia’s population. The researches were also sensitive to other issues. In relation to this thesis it should be mentioned that the proportion of informants from urban areas (48.5%) responded to the Yugoslav average (46.5% at the 1981 census), while the rural-urban consideration was also taken into account (55% of the informants were born in the rural areas). Several other social aspects were taken into account as well. I refer to this research as the 1985-1986 research.

The content and the methodology of presentation

At the centre of this study is the youth culture that evolved in the early 1980s under the influence of Yugoslav New Wave. As several researchers, whose works have been presented in this introduction have argued, one of the most distinctive characteristics of this youth culture was its pan-Yugoslav scope. This is one of the reasons why I chose to name the thesis All Yugoslavia Is Dancing Rock and Roll after the 1988 song “Igra R’N’R cela Jugoslavija” by Belgrade’s Električni orgazam (Electric Orgasm). In the early 1980s Električni orgazam was one of the central bands of Yugoslav New wave, while the band’s frontman Srđan Gojković Gile was one of the leading personalities in the antinationalist and anti-war movement in the early 1990s. Thus, calling the thesis All Yugoslavia Is Dancing Rock and Roll. Yugoslavness and the Sense of Community in the

58 Some of the results from these sources were reprinted in the 1987 The Great Atlas of Yugoslavia – Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije. Ed. Ivan Bertic (Zagreb: Liber, 1987), which I have used extensively in order to attain overview of Yugoslav economic and demographic situation in the decade.
1980s Yu-Rock also seeks to emphasise the integrative role that Yugoslav rock music culture played in the specific socio-political situation of 1980s Yugoslavia. While the song itself will be discussed in detail later in the thesis, a point concerning the popularity of New wave and rock music in general should be highlighted.

Although by choosing this title I also do want to address criticism of the reductionism of Ante Perković, who argues that rock and roll, and New Wave in particular, were reserved to a relatively small audience,⁶⁰ I do not mean for a moment to suggest that – in practice – all young Yugoslavs ever were listening (or dancing) to rock and roll. Sources point clearly in direction that rock and roll was music of those under the age of twenty-five.⁶¹ And among them, according to the results of a mid-1980s sociological study discussed later in this section, only about one half listened to the broadly defined “pop and rock music,” while another half preferred classical or folk music.⁶²

However, as this thesis will demonstrate, rock music and the youth culture that emerged around it played a role much more important in the 1980s Yugoslav society than the size of its audience may suggest. It did so because Yu-Rock was transformed through the 1970s, from a marginal socio-cultural phenomenon to a central popular-cultural referent of Yugoslavia’s urban youth, as the Džuboks’ Branko Vukojević described it at the dawn of the 1980s.⁶³

This development was crowned with the emergence of Punk and New Wave - two inseparably interlaced music movements that reached the country in respectively mid and late 1970s. By the turn of the decade these movements spurred a new self-confidence of Yu-Rock, as the Yugoslav rock scene, for the first time ever, now saw itself as being equal to or even better than the scenes in the West. Having its share in youth’s identity-formation, not least, by functioning as common pan-Yugoslav identification-referents, Punk, New Wave and their musical heirs reached far beyond a strictly musical level, playing in fact an important socio-cultural and even political role in the Yugoslav society of the 1980s.

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⁶¹ An indeed interesting experiment done by a reader of Džuboks in 1980 showed that only 4% of those reading the magazine were older than 25 years of age. In “Ko kupuje Džuboks?” Džuboks 83, 29 Feb. 1980, p.22.


Now it is almost a custom to begin a study of Yugoslav New Wave with reference to the death of the Socialist Yugoslavia’s president for life, Josip Broz Tito, who died on the 4th of May 1980. In this respect, Tito’s death is widely viewed as a historical milestone, marking the beginning of the end of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. New Wave, on the other hand, is seen as an annunciation of new times and the beginning of the break with the hitherto unquestioned political and social values of the society. In the short period after Tito’s death, the most important New Wave records were released in the period between 1980 and 1982.

Right in the middle of this period, in March 1981, Yugoslavia carried out its fifth post-Second World War census of population. The most notable result of the census was an explosive rise in the number of people who chose to declare as “Yugoslavs.” In the ten-year period from 1971 to 1981, their number grew no less than 4.5 times. However, despite this growth, there was still only about one in twenty (5.4%) Yugoslavs that chose to declare under that category. The low percentage of those declared as “Yugoslavs” led some commentators in the early 1990s to claim that Yugoslavia dissolved because Yugoslavs were not ready to give up their national identities for the Yugoslav one, and that Yugoslavia in fact was a country without Yugoslavs. Accepting this argument, despite it being theoretically problematic because it assumes that people only have, or can have, one “identity,” can easily lead the observer to believe that any Yugoslav identification – whether it was supranational or non-national – was necessarily opposed to the national ones. Nevertheless, this view was subsequently also been proposed by some scholars. As a reaction to this paradigm of “Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs” I will argue, in line with Stef Jansen, that in order to explain the phenomena which they are representing, nationality statistics need to be critically examined and contextualised, and not uncritically accepted as a starting point for analysis.

Thus, the thesis’ first chapter proceeds by contextualising the statistics concerning the rise in the number of people declaring as “Yugoslavs” in place of ethnic identity in response to the census questions on nationality. Stressing that this phenomenon provoked a discussion whether or not

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65 For example Paul Lendvai and Lis Parcell, who in 1991 claimed that “[Yugoslavia] lacks people prepared to declare themselves as belonging to a Yugoslav entity as opposed to a specific nationality.” Paul Lendvai and Lis Parcell, “Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs: the roots of the crisis,” International Affairs Vol. 67 No. 2 (April 1991); p. 253.
66 Most recently by Vesna Drapac in Vesna Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, a transnational history (Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 248
Yugoslavs should be recognised as the Seventh Nation of Yugoslavia, the chapter draws attention to Ante Perković’s argument about Yu-Rock being the Seventh Republic of Yugoslavia, revealing ultimately several important similarities between the Seventh Nation and the Seventh Republic—most notably that they occurred at the precisely the same time among the same portion of the population. Arguing that these similarities indicate that we need to pay closer attention to politico-historical context in which these phenomena emerged, the chapter continues by outlining the development of the Yugoslav idea (jugoslovenstvo) and placing it in a broader context of the interethnic relations in the Late Socialist Yugoslavia. Concluding that jugoslovenstvo meant different things for different people, the chapter ultimately seeks to provide a definition of the concept of Yugoslavness that is not reduced to any particular form of Yugoslavism.

Chapters II – V deal with the individual scenes in the four principal centres of Yu-Rock. The connecting thread is the pan-Yugoslav youth culture that developed with New Wave. Therefore, the methodology of presentation follows the logic of the spreading of New Wave from Zagreb to Belgrade, and then to Ljubljana and Sarajevo. Thus, the first of the chapters focuses on the scene in the Croatian Capital Zagreb, which was not only first to develop strong New Wave scene, but which also, in several ways, could be seen as the number one New Wave scene in the country. The chapter is critical of the interpretations of Croatian rock music from the perspective of Croatian national identity being omnipresent but harshly suppressed, waiting for the repressive Communist system to lessen its grip, so the national spirit of Croatness could (once again) appear at the surface in the late 1980s. The chapter argues that this interpretative “genre” does not only overethnicize history of the 1980s Croatian and Yugoslav rock music culture, but also fails to recognise the role that Socialist Self-Representation had for the identity-formation in the Croatian capital in the larger part of the 1980s. The chapter pays special attention to the geopolitical articulation among central members of the scene in the first half of the decade and to the articulation of Yugoslavness in different songs, interviews and articles in the mid and late 1980s.

Chapter III concerns the scene in the country’s and Serbia’s capital Belgrade. As Ante Perković picturesquely explains, although a bit delayed, Belgrade’s New wave joined the scene

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68 As already explained Polet is commonly seen as a herald of New Wave and the Yugoslav youth culture that developed under its influence. Zagreb Punk/New Wave band Prljavo kazalište (Dirty Theatre) was the first in the country to record a single. Furthermore, as we will see in the subsequent discussion on the Zagreb scene, another early Zagreb New Wave Azra (a Serbo-Croatian version of the title of Heinrich Heine’s verse “Der Asra”) was the first New Wave band in the country. The city’s record company Suzy recorded the first compilation New Wave in 1979, while another company Jugoton (meaning Yugo-sound) was the leading New Wave label in the country in the early 1980s.
very self-confidently and boldly.\(^{69}\) In this chapter I focus on the processes of bonding and bordering, through which social identification is perpetually constructed. In respect of the former, I pay special attention to the way the sense of identity is created out of and across the processes whereby people are connected together through and with rock music. More precisely, I focus on the special relationship that the members of Belgrade’s scene developed with their counterparts in other republics, yet with particular emphasis on the relationship between Belgrade and Zagreb and Belgrade and Ljubljana bands. In respect of the latter, the chapter highlights pronounced antinationalism of Belgrade New Wave and post-New Wave rock community and pays special attention to its conflict with nationalist intellectuals. The final for the chapter is to explain a specific “anational” Yugoslavness of the rock scene in the country’s capital. This Yugoslavness can best be defined as an emergent force among those who were searching and finding an alternative to the narrow national identity.\(^{70}\)

The scene in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana is at centre of Chapter IV. Although punk rock arrived in Ljubljana before it reached Zagreb and Ljubljana band Pankrti (Bastards) is often viewed as the first punk band formed in the country in 1977, it would take another four to five years before the first New Wave bands would appear in the city.\(^{71}\) The chapter proceeds by highlighting antinationalism and cosmopolitanism of the early 1980s punk scene in the city. However, due to punk being stigmatised in Yugoslav media, and due to Slovenia often being seen most at odds with the Yugoslav federation, it is rarely acknowledge that Ljubljana punks were some of the first to raise their voices against rising intolerance and nationalist exclusiveness in the country. In contrast, the city’s “alternative scene” that developed in the mid-1980s from punk movement is often recognised as a bellwether of civil society in Slovenia.\(^{72}\) Acknowledging the importance that “The Alternative” had in the process of democratisation of Slovenia, the chapter nonetheless reflects critically on the interpretations that link it directly to the Slovenian independence. In doing so I argue that the Ljubljana Alternative Scene, in fact was marginalised through the very process that led to the independence. It however never completely lost its Yugoslav orientation, defined by its antinationalism and cosmopolitanism.

\(^{71}\) Ljubljana would however remain number one Punk city in the country throughout the 1980s.  
Finally, in the thesis’ last chapter I turn to the scene in the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. Here, just like in Ljubljana, development of New Wave scene was delayed several years and even then it developed in specific local form, called *New Primitivism*. Although the existing research recognises strong pro-Yugoslav and antinationalist sentiment on the Sarajevan scene, it either seeks to divorce it from its ideological content or to subsume it under the meta-narrative of Bosnia and Herzegovina being most dogmatic among Yugoslavia’s republics. This is what the chapter’s two sections respectively deal with, seeking ultimately to explain how the Yugoslavness of the scene was conditioned by the “non-national” ideology promoted by the Communist elite, yet still not reducing it to a matter of manipulation and indoctrination. The first section draws attention to the identity-building function of the Socialist Yugoslavia’s central founding myth, according to which the country emerged from the partisan resistance during the Second World War. The primary interest is the way in which the ideological message behind this mythology was made accessible to the 1970s and 1980s youth through popular culture. The second section focuses on the relationship between the image of the city as “Yugoslavia on a smaller scale” and the pronounced antinationalism and Yugoslavness of the youth culture in the city.
Yugoslavs, *Yugoslavism* and the Notion of Yugoslavness

The purpose of this chapter is to provide socio-politico-historical context necessary for the discussion of Yugoslavness and sense of community in the individual scenes dealing with in the subsequent chapters. The chapter relates to de-contextualisation and *exotification* of Yu-Rock in Ante Perković’s interpretation of the phenomenon, to which I have addressed criticism in the introduction. In the introduction, I have argued that the analysis of Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock needs to proceed by placing Yugoslav rock music culture in the broader context of the 1980s Yugoslavia. In this respect, I have referred to Dejan Jović, who has drawn attention to the relationship between what he calls the (re)-emergence of Yugoslav culture – which was, as we saw, closely related to the Yugoslav New Wave – and the growth in number of people declaring “Yugoslav” in place of an ethnic identity in response to the census questions on nationality at the 1981 population census. Influenced by Jović, yet – as the chapter will show – diverging from his arguments in several important points, my ultimate goal is to explain the socio-political context within which the 1980s Yugoslav youth culture emerged, operated and had been articulated.

The chapter comprises two sections. At the centre of the first section is the dramatic rise in numbers of people declaring as Yugoslavs at the 1981 census. The section analyses the phenomenon, its meanings, its social and geographical distribution, and reveals that this formal self-identification as Yugoslav was almost exclusively an urban phenomenon, most widespread among youth – especially those better educated and of “mixed” parentage – in the ethnically mixed areas of the country. The section proceeds by contextualising Yugoslav nationality statistics, before turning to the phenomenon and drawing attention to the discussions about potential recognition of Yugoslavs as the country’s *Seventh Nation*. It concludes by drawing attention to several important similarities between this (potential) *Seventh Nation* and the (imaginary) *Seventh Republic* that Perković writes about. The point for drawing this attention is not to argue that there is in any way a direct connection between the two phenomena. Nor is it intended to reduce the popular sense of Yugoslavness in Yu-Rock or elsewhere to the formal self-identification as Yugoslav. Rather, my intention is to highlight the phenomena emerging in the specific socio-politico-historical context and thereby problematize the argument of popular sentiment of Yugoslavness expressed in the
1980s Yu-rock, that is the imaginary Seventh Republic, being a self-grown and autonomous phenomenon.

Thus, the second and the third section place the rise of these phenomena in the broader historical and socio-political context. The second section proceeds by outlining the complex and convoluted history of the Yugoslav idea, without attaching too precise a meaning to it because, as the section will show, it was indeed a shifting historical phenomenon. The section pays special attention to Socialist Yugoslavia’s state structure and organisation and to the process of decentralisation that started in the 1960s. Arguing against equalisation of national affirmation with the fragmentation of Yugoslav community, the third section contextualises and theorises Yugoslav affiliation and places it in relation to the different national affiliations in the country – with the focus on four nationalities that constituted the majority in the four republics, which the subsequent chapters are dealing with: Croats, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes. The ultimate goal for the section is to come up with a definition of the notion of Yugoslavness.

Who Were the Yugoslavs? “The Seventh Nation and the Seventh Republic”

As promised in the introduction, in order to explain the emergent phenomena related to the rise of popularity of “Yugoslav” identity in the 1970s, this chapter proceeds by contextualising Socialist Yugoslavia’s nationality statistics. In this respect, the primary interest is the census category “Yugoslav-undeclared” and its socio-geographical distribution. As a preliminary, it will set out a few specificities regarding nationality and the census category “Yugoslav.” First, concerning the issue of nationality in Socialist Yugoslavia, it is important to remember that in contrast to the USSR, another major multinational socialist country, where the concept of nationality was “objective,” that is, determined by birth, not choice, in Yugoslavia the “subjective” concept was dominant. In other words, it was in the end, the choice of every individual to decide his or her nationality. However, several researchers have drawn attention to the leniency of the official Yugoslav policy to opt nationally, rather than not. In this manner, Steven L. Burg

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73 The exception were the children of ethnically “mixed” parentage.
and Michael L. Berbaum have argued that “Yugoslav” was not an easy answer to give in response to the census question on nationality because the official policy on this issue was, if not anti-“Yugoslav,” at the very least pro-national.\textsuperscript{75}

Second, Socialist Yugoslavia conducted altogether six censuses of the population, in respectively 1948, 1954, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991. Yet, as I will argue more in detail in the next section, prior to the 1971 census, the category “Yugoslav” was intended and primarily opted by the Slavic speaking Muslims\textsuperscript{76} in order to avoid being classified as Serbs or Croats.\textsuperscript{77} Thus in a way this was a negative declaring or avoiding identifying nationally as Serb or Croat. After the introduction of the national category “Muslim” in 1971, the category “Yugoslav, nationally undetermined” was retained, primarily as an option for the persons from so-called ethnically mixed marriages and those who did not want to declare their nationality.

Therefore, in considering the percentage of nationally undetermined Yugoslavs in 1981, it is important to remember that this was indeed a new census category, and thus a new option, as it acquired its meaning only at the census ten years earlier. Nevertheless, the option quickly became popular, rising from 1.3% to 5.4% of the total population in only ten years.\textsuperscript{78} Said another way, between the censuses in 1971 and 1981, the number of persons who choose to declare under the category increased from 273.077 in 1971 to 1,219.024 ten years later, while their percentage in total Yugoslavia’s population—as we saw—rose more than four times.\textsuperscript{79} This “unexpected phenomenon,” as historian and Croatian politician Dušan Bilandžić labelled this increase in 1986, attracted a lot attention in the post-census years.\textsuperscript{80} Accordingly, a number of panels on the subject were held, while several books and scholarly articles inspired by these panels or the phenomenon itself were written and published—both in Yugoslavia and abroad. They offered different interpretations but most agreed that the number of Yugoslavs-undeclared would continue to grow.


\textsuperscript{76} This applies both to those who would later declare as Muslim and to those who preferred Goranci identity.

\textsuperscript{77} The decline in the percentage of “Yugoslavs” and the corresponding rise in percentage of “Muslims” (on the federal level, as well as in the regions of Bosnia, Sanjak and Kosovo), after this possibility was introduced, support this argument. \textit{Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije}. Ed. Ivan Bertic (Zagreb: Liber, 1987), p. 48.


Relaying on the different analyses of the phenomenon, Bilandžić assumed that the number of those declaring as “Yugoslavs” would reach five millions by the time of the next census, that is, in 1991. Others, like Dušan Ičević, expected that this explosive increase would lead to claims for recognition of “Yugoslavs” as a nation on its own – Yugoslavia’s seventh. The international researchers anticipated as well that the development would continue. Thus, as late as in 1989, Burg and Berbaum concluded in their study of the phenomenon, although somewhat more cautiously than Bilandžić, that declaring as “Yugoslavs” was likely to become even more widespread. They supported this argument by pointing to a number of surveys carried throughout 1980s, all of them showing the continual increase in number of those identifying as Yugoslavs throughout the 1980s.

It is therefore rather noteworthy that quite contrary to these predictions, the results from the 1991 census showed that the number of declared Yugoslavs declined to 700,394 (3.0%). This development should however not lead us to the conclusion that all these scholars have failed in their analyses. Rather, as I will show in this thesis, the reasons for the decline should be sought in the rapid nationalist mobilization that swept the country in the last couple of years before the 1991 census. Before that we need to establish a clearer picture of who were “Yugoslavs.”

Scholars working on the subject have traced a number of different factors that might have spurred the formal self-identification as Yugoslav. These factors can be grouped under three analytical categories: 1) ethnic composition of a region or federal units, 2) ideological and political factors and 3) socio-economic modernisation, including educational level. The majority of those who chose to declare “Yugoslav” in place of an ethnic identity in response to the census question on nationality, were to be found in the ethnically mixed areas with a majority of the population speaking Serbo-Croatian. The ethnically mixed regions of Slavonia and Istria in Croatia, Boka kotorska in Montenegro, Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina had all above average percentage of “Yugoslavs.” Still, not only the Serbo-Croatian speaking population chose the census option to declare as “Yugoslavs.” The case of Vojvodina is very indicative here. By analyzing the results of the 1981 census, demographers and sociologists found out that the number of declared Hungarians, Romanians, Rusyns and Slovaks was 6-10% lower than they would expected on the basis of the

84 Rusyn is an ethnicity in Yugoslavia generally associated with the historic region of Ruthenia.
results from the 1971 census. Based on these results they concluded that this 6-10% was most probably “absorbed” into the category “Yugoslavs.” The corresponding percentage for Serbs was “only” 3.4%.  

Similarly, other researchers have argued that the mother tongue or the parents’ ethnic affiliation were of lesser importance than the majority/minority status in the respondent’s republics. For instance, Sekulić, Hodson and Massey have pointed out that personal strategies aiming to avoid minority status in different federal units was one of the major reasons for declaring as “Yugoslav.” Based on the results from their research, they argued that persons of Serbian parentage in Croatia were more likely to declare as “Yugoslavs” than those of Croatian parentage. Yet, as they stressed, persons of Croatian parentage in Vojvodina were even more likely to do the same, compared to their counterparts with Serbian parents, because Croats constituted a smaller proportion of the population in Vojvodina than the Serbs did in Croatia. Finally, they have argued that the high number of nationally undeclared Yugoslavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be explained by the fact that there was no clear ethnic majority in this republic.

As it was primarily the younger portions of the population that chose the option to declare as “Yugoslavs,” scholars dealing with ideological and political factors causing this formal self-identification have approached these factors from the perspective of generation. Yugoslav political scientists and sociologists have attributed this phenomenon to different ideological impulses. Dušan Ičević has argued that it was closely related to the youth’s internationalism, while Aleksandar Raič has highlighted Yugoslavian socialist patriotism as being most widespread among Yugoslav youth and intelligentsia. According to Sergej Flere, one of the central mechanisms behind self-identification as Yugoslav among the younger generations was their utopian ideological aspiration towards a single human community, in which all societal relations would be free of any division of interests, conflicts and struggles, and would thus present a move towards a non-nation. As such, this ideological impulse was fundamentally opposed to the fragmentation of the Yugoslav

community. Hence, the formal self-identification as Yugoslav could be seen as a protest against certain forms of such fragmentation, as Dejan Jović argues. However, as the following discussion will show, it should not be reduced to it. The basic problem with Jović’s argument is that its logic cannot explain why the number of Yugoslavs eventually fell at the census in 1991. In order to understand this we need to pay closer attention to the last set of factors – those relating to the socio-economic modernisation of Yugoslav society. In this respect, I will argue that three factors that can be grouped under this category were the most important factors for the formal self-identification as Yugoslav.

These three factors are the so-called ethnically mixed marriages, educational level and city-residence. As historians Predrag J. Marković, Renata Jambrešić Kirin and Sonja Dujmović have demonstrated in their respective work on Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first of the factors – the so-called mixed marriage – was inseparable from the process of modernisation and its sub-processes of secularisation and the emancipation of women. All scholars working on the subject agree that “mixed” parentage was, if not the single most important factor, than at least one of the most important factors for choosing the option of not identifying with any specific nationality at the census. This is not surprising for at least two reasons: first, as we saw it, the 1981 census category “Yugoslav-undetermined” was from the beginning (that is 1971) intended to this segment of population and second, living in or being born into a so-called mixed marriage is more generally associated with the idea of not belonging to any particular nation and thus not declaring nationally. However, we should not equate formal self-identification as Yugoslav with “mixed marriages.” In fact, research done on the subject indicates that most people from the so-called ethnically mixed marriages indeed declared nationally, either by choosing their patrilineal or their matrilineal identity. Inversely, many nationally undeclared Yugoslavs came from ethnically homogeneous


marriages, contrary to the common assumptions that mostly, if not exclusively, children of “mixed” parentage declared as “Yugoslavs.” “Mixed” parentage was nevertheless still one of the most important factors for formally declaring “Yugoslav” identity.

Concerning the educational level, those who chose the option of declaring under the category “Yugoslav” were both underrepresented in regards of the level of illiteracy and lack of elementary education and overrepresented in regards of accomplishing a higher education. In 1971 the percentage of illiterate “Yugoslavs” was among lowest of all nationalities, only surpassed by Slovanes, Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns, while the percentage of the “Yugoslavs” who were literate, yet without any education was the lowest of all nationalities.\(^91\) One of the most probable reasons for this underrepresentation was that “Yugoslavs” were overrepresented among the population under 40 years of age, while most of the illiterates (almost 2/3) were over 50 years of age.\(^92\) In this respect, Ruža Petrović’s has observed that the illiteracy among Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Rusyns and Yugoslavs was to be found almost exclusively among the “oldest generations,”\(^93\) while it was more broadly distributed among other nationalities. Given that Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns lived almost exclusively in the most developed parts of the country, with the lowest illiteracy rates, while Yugoslavs were more geographically dispersed, we can conclude that it is reasonable to hypothesise that there is a relationship between education and declaring under the category “Yugoslav.”

Petrović’s research supports this argument, as it shows that Yugoslavs-undeclared were more likely than any nationality to have completed an education higher than primary school. While only one fifth of Yugoslav population as whole had done so in 1971, this was the case for almost one-half of Yugoslavs-undeclared.\(^94\) Finally, according to Burg and Berbaum, completion of a higher education was the next-most-powerful predictor for the formal declaration as Yugoslav – next to

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\(^91\) According to the 1971 census the illiteracy rates for different nationalities were as follows: Slovenes 1,0%, Czechs 1,9%, Slovaks 2,8%, Rusyns 3,0%, Yugoslavs-undeclared 3,4%, Hungarians 5,1%, Italians 6,0% Croats 9,9%, with 15,1% as the average for Yugoslavia. Ruža Petrović, *Etnički mešoviti brakova u Jugoslaviji* (Beograd: Institut za sociološka istraživanja, 1985), p. 43. The percentage of the population that was literate but had not completed elementary school was: Yugoslavs-undeclared 4,80%, Slovenes 5,51%, Macedonians 6,38%, Montenegrins 8,03% etc. Boris Vušković, “Tko su Jugosloveni?” *Naše teme Časopis za društvena pitanja Godina XXVI*, broj 10 (1982), p. 1710.


what they have termed “level of interethnic contact.” Compared to the Yugoslav average, those who declared as “Yugoslavs” were twice as likely to study at one of the Yugoslavia’s nineteen universities in the 1979-1980 school year.

Urbanisation is yet another process inseparable from socio-economic modernisation, if not the most central one. In this respect, based on the results from the 1981 census concerning ethnic composition of municipalities and settlements, I have come to conclusion that it is reasonable to hypothesise that there is a strong correlation between urban-residency and formally self-identifying as Yugoslav. In fact, urban residency was the single most important factor for doing so. First, the overwhelming majority of those who declared under the category “Yugoslav” were urban dwellers (76.4%). In comparison, less than a half of Yugoslavia’s population was living in urban areas by the time of the 1981 census (46.1%). This meant that the urban population was more than three times more likely to declare as “Yugoslavs.” This characteristic was especially pronounced in the less developed and less urbanised regions, where the differences in life style between the city and countryside were largest. Thus, in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, urban dwellers were approximately six times more likely to declare as “Yugoslavs” than their counterparts in the rural areas.

Second, the level of urbanisation played a major role for the proportion of “Yugoslavs” in individual municipalities. There are very few exceptions were the surrounding area had a higher proportion of Yugoslavs-undeclared than the central city. Thus, in Yugoslavia’s big cities, composed of several municipalities, the proportion of Yugoslavs-undeclared was higher in the core municipalities than in the suburban ones. In the larger towns and cities in ethnically mixed areas, this proportion could easily surpass 15%, becoming thereby three times higher than the Yugoslav average. Moreover, in some of them, Yugoslavs-undeclared constituted more than one-fifth of their total population. Some of these were: Vukovar, Mostar and Sarajevo, which all suffered heavily in the wars of 1990s; or Pula and Tuzla, which became symbols of multi-ethnic tolerance due to the absence of ethnic violence in the same wars.

The measure that they used was based on ethnic composition and percentage of the mixed marriages in individual federal units combined. Steven L. Burg & Michael L. Berbaum, “Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia,” The American Political Science Review (June 1989: 83.2), p. 548.


In Bosnia and Herzegovina this ratio was 75.4% to 34.2% and in Kosovo 74.5% to 32.5%.
Based on the discussion in this section we can conclude that declaring as “Yugoslav” was predominantly an urban phenomenon. It was most widespread among younger and better educated portions of the population. In this context, it is quite noteworthy that the large mid-1980s sociological study on the social position, values and social praxis among Yugoslav youth points very much in the direction of Yu-Rock being most popular among the same portions of the population.

In analysing the youth’s preferred interests and leisure time activities from this research (the 1985-1986 research), sociologist Vlasta Ilišin came to conclusion that, going to the movies and listening to music were the most prevalent “non-creative” leisure activities among Yugoslav youth. In regard of music, it is indeed very interesting that pop and rock music was only slightly more popular than folk music. Thus, while 49.0% “often” listened to pop and rock, 44.7% of the respondents gave the same answer about folk music. Similarly, 15.9% “never” listened to pop and rock music, compared to 18.4% that “never” listened to folk. There were, nevertheless, some important differences in relation to the social background of the respondents that need to be stressed. First, those who grew up in the cities (65.2%) and those who lived in urban areas (62.1%) most “often” listened to pop and rock, compared to those living in rural areas where 55.1% most “often” listened to folk music. Second, pop and rock was clearly more favoured among high school and university students (with 62.6% respondents answering that they “often” listened to it) than among those working in agriculture (33.1%).

Thus, social background, education and urban residence in particular, defined musical preferences of Yugoslav youth.

Against this background, I will argue that when analysing Yugoslav rock music culture of the 1980s we need to proceed by drawing a parallel between the potential Seventh Nation of Yugoslavia and its imaginary Seventh Republic that Ante Perković writes about. The similarities between them are so obvious that it is problematic to assume that they are a coincidence. The point here is not that Yu-Rock’s audience should be reduced to those formally identifying as Yugoslav. Rather, the point is to problematize the argument that Yu-Rock was the only true Yugoslav phenomenon, as Perković’s interpretation leaves impression. Thus, not considering the broader context of Yugoslav rock music culture, including potential emergence of a new Yugoslav

nationality, is problematic. Not considering this connection is also the most probable reason why Perković concludes that the Seventh Republic, as an imagined state of spirit, would have emerged, even if Yugoslavia never was created. The fundamental question here concerns the extent to which the popular sentiment of Yugoslavness in Yu-Rock (or Perković’s Seventh Republic) was capable of growing and moving independently of the political and historical contexts that led to its emergence.

**Yugoslav Idea from Illyrian Movement to “New Yugoslavism”**

The idea of Yugoslav unity, has its roots in the *Illyrian movement (Ilirski pokret)* – an intellectual movement brought about in Croatia in the 1830s in order to fight for a South Slav linguistic autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The designation *Illyrian* alludes to the presumably Illyrian origin of South Slavs – a widespread idea among the Monarchy’s South Slav intellectuals in the age of National-romanticism of the nineteenth century. The ideas about linguistic unity and common *Yugo-Slav* origin were the first steps toward Yugo-Slav identity-formation. In practice this means that the starting point for the construction of a proto-Yugoslav identity can be traced to *Illyrianism* of the first half of the nineteenth century, which preceded the creation of the first common South Slav state by almost 100 years.

However, the development of the Yugoslav idea was much more convoluted and complex than presented in the official Yugoslav historiography, which portrayed the creation of the Yugoslav state as directly linked to the sprouting Illyrianism of the 1830s. As several scholars have suggested, the process was not straightforward. At the middle of the century Illyrianism ran out

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101 The intellectuals believed that the South Slavic language(s) was endangered by the *magyarization* of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy, a process that started with the rise of national conscience among Hungarian political and cultural elite in the early nineteenth century.

102 *Yugo-slaw* and *Yugo-savia* are derivatives of a Serbo-Croat and Slovenian words *Jug/Jugo/Južno slo(a)venski*, meaning South Slav(ic).

of steam, while the ideas of separate Slovene, Croat and Serb identities gained their strength among the intellectuals and general populace. These ideas were already developing from the beginning of the century and offering different narratives on the origin of South Slavs than Illyrianism. Thus, throughout the nineteenth century several competing national ideas developed in the region and even though the Yugoslav idea gained again its strength at the beginning of the twentieth century, it did not eradicate Slovene, Croat and Serb national ideas. Hence, by the time of the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1st 1918, the Yugoslav idea attained a kind of a poly-ethnic character – as the very name of the first Yugo-Slav state suggests. Ever since – throughout the approximately three quarters of a century a common Yugoslav state existed – the so-called “national question,” dealing with the relationship between different Yugo-Slav nationalities and their relationship to the Yugoslav idea, remained one of the most problematic political issues.

Two different models for the resolution of the issue had been tried in two Yugoslavias. In the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941), Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were seen as three tribes of the same Yugoslav nation. This idea culminated in 1929 with the imposition of a single national identity for all South Slavs living in the Monarchy – now renamed The Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The ideology of the new-named kingdom, termed “People’s unity” (narodno jedinstvo) aimed at fusing all Yugoslav tribes into a single supernation.104 In its cultural policy the kingdom pursued the so-called “integral Yugoslavism” (integralno jugoslovenstvo) – an idea of effacing cultural differences and creating a single Yugoslav, state-culture.105 However, this policy was unpopular in most of the country, resulting in its gradual abandonment in the period between 1935 and 1938.106 The year after the

104 Well aware of a possible criticism of reductionism concerning the complexity of this issue, I will not go into a more detailed discussion in the thesis. The reason for doing so, is that any attempt to answer the issue will require for a thesis on its own, without being compatible with the chronological and/or thematic domain of this thesis, even though I acknowledge that the “failure” of the nationality policies in the First Yugoslavia had played very important role for the Second Yugoslavia’s nationality policies and, potentially, even its ultimate “failure.”

105 In order to wipe out the historical and cultural differences, the kingdom was reorganised by abolishing the historical provinces and creating 9 banovinas (plus the capital city including Belgrade, Zemun and Pančevo) cutting across the previously existing borders. However, giving in for the Croatian claims, the Croat Banovina was created in 1939, uniting vast majority of the Catholic Serbo-Croat speaking population of the Kingdom into a single autonomous province. For more on “integral Yugoslavism” see Ljubodrag Dimić, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941 (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 1996), p.247-328.

106 The policy was especially unpopular within Croat and Slovene clergy and among the political oppositions outside Serbia, in particular in Bosnia and Croatia.
kingdom was even territorially redefined, so it could meet the rising Croatian claims for territorial autonomy. Less than two years later, immediately after the attack of the Axis-powers on the country in April 1941, the First Yugoslavia was disbanded altogether.

In the Second Yugoslavia (1943-1991), which, according to its political mythology, emerged from the partisan struggle against fascist occupation during the Second World War, the idea of forging a common Yugoslav national identity was abandoned and replaced by the idea of generating a sense of community among several distinct Yugoslav nations. As Vjekoslav Perica argues, the tenet for the new patriotic ideology was the idea of “brotherhood and unity” (bratstvo i jedinstvo), which emphasized “the necessity as well as fruitfulness of ‘fraternal’ relations among several distinct groups,” rather than introducing “a new supranational ‘Yugoslav’ nationality.”  

Hence, by the time the new Yugoslavia was liberated in 1945, the Yugoslav idea once again attained a poly-ethnic character, yet with the difference that the constitutive nationalities were now elevated to the level of distinct nations. Although there is a tendency to describe the Yugoslav idea pursued in the Second Yugoslavia as a multiculturalist Yugoslavism based on the ideological axiom of “brotherhood and unity,” the idea proved once again to be anything but stable and clear. In fact, the idea of Yugoslav unity in Socialist Yugoslavia was rather ambiguous, perplexing and, at times, even contradictory.

In the immediate post-war years, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist theories about nationality, Communists leaders assumed that the development of a socialist consciousness and patriotism would bring Yugoslavia’s national groups closer together. Thus assumed as a counterpart to nationalism as a political force, supranational socialist patriotism was conceived as a solution for national insecurities and rivalries experienced in the First Yugoslavia. However, attaining the non-national “socialist Yugoslavism” was anything but an easy task. The first problem emerged as the federal settlement made during the Second World War gave each Yugoslav nation its “own” federal unit, satisfying thereby the claims for self-determination and distancing the new Yugoslavia from the old at the same time. The problem was that according to the 1946 Constitution, both federal units and nations become bearers of sovereignty.

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This situation was further complicated with the introduction of the development strategy known as the Workers Self-management (radničko samoupravljanje) after Socialist Yugoslavia’s break-up with the Soviets in 1948. In its attempt to distance itself from the East European state socialism, Socialist Yugoslavia promoted this development strategy as its own specific model for realising a socialist order. At the same time, in the field of domestic policy, self-management was assumed as a basic mechanism for decentralization and “de-etatisation” of Yugoslavia. It was so because Workers’ Self-management was introduced as a means of direct democracy and decentralisation of both workplace and society as a whole. As such, it signified the relegating of political control from the federal level to the republics and local units (opštine), and later in 1974 also to workplaces. What is important in this context is that self-management, since its introduction in the 1950s, was seen as the necessary presupposition for the attainment of equality among the nationality groups. It could therefore be concluded that by pursuing the Workers Self-Management and including it in the 1953 revision, the socialist government – at least in principle – recognised the nation-based politics at all levels.

This being said, it is important to underline that Communist leaders remained consistent in their “socialist” definition of Yugoslavism as non-national socialist community. With the exception of a brief attempt to encourage a “(supra)national Yugoslavianism” in the late 1950s, creating a new “Yugoslav nation” instead of the existing nations was never on the Communist authorities’ agenda. Rather, with the new approach that started in the early 1960s the idea of forging a new sense of community that would overcome traditional ethno-national differences was gradually abandoned altogether, giving in for the affirmation of national diversity and economic


110 This is however a debatable subject. Yet, according to Paul Shoup, in 1958 the LCY leaders advanced a formal theory of nationalism and adopted a party program, calling for the emergence of a supranational, Yugoslav identity. However, with the devolution of increasing power to the leaderships in the ethnically based republics in the early 1960s, this attempt to encourage ‘Yugoslavism” – the concept that Shoup uses in his book – was abandoned (Paul Shoup, Communism and Yugoslav National Question (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 201-211). Hannes Grandits proposes a similar argument that in the 1958 the LCY was “speeding up efforts in the formation of ‘socialist Yugoslavism’ as a ‘national feeling.’” For this reason, Grandits has called this short period in the late 1950s “National Yugoslavism.” (Hannes Grandits. “Dynamics of Socialist Nation-Building: The Short Lived Programme of Promoting a Yugoslav National Identity and Some Comparative Perspectives” in Dve domovine. (Ljubljana: Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo ZRC SAZU, 2008), pp. 20-21.)
decentralisation. This was enshrined in the new constitution, adopted in 1963, stressing cultural and economic decentralisation of the country. Thus, this shift can be seen as an abandonment of what Jasna Dragović-Soso has called “Partisan Yugoslavism.” This Yugoslav idea emerged during the wartime struggle and was closely associated with the idea of “brotherhood and unity.” According to Aleksa Djilas, “brotherhood and unity” was enshrined in the 1946 Constitution, because the latter was founded on “the four equalities:” 1) all citizens had equal rights and duties regardless of nationality, race or religion; 2) all republics, their majority as well as minority population had equal rights and duties as well; 3) all nations of Yugoslavia were defined as equal and 4) all were presumed to have made an equal contribution to the war effort.

Constitutional decentralisation and the affirmation of national diversity spurred several important controversies in the late 1960s. These controversies need to be mentioned here. First, in Serbia where leadership of the regional branch of the LCY, latter known as Serbian liberals, offered full support for the decentralisation – especially the economic one – many prominent intellectuals responded by trying to redefine the relationship between the (Socialist) Republic of Serbia and the nation of Serbs. At the same time, in Croatia, affirmation of national diversity led to the emergence of a national political movement, supported by intellectuals, students, workers and the liberal faction of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC). Due to the scale of popular support, the movement was named maspok – an acronym for “masovni pokret,” that is, mass movement. The movement focused on the republic’s relation to the federation and sought increased autonomy within Yugoslavia. These developments occurred in the period that is often assumed the most

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112 It is possible to argue that both these strategies concerning potential Yugoslav identity were initiated by the fundamental reorientation of the country’s geopolitical position after the Soviet-Yugoslav split. On one hand, the option of (supra)national Yugoslav identity became actual in the period of the consolidation after the split. On the other, the affirmation of national diversity gained its ground in accordance with Yugoslavia’s position as a leader of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) – a movement that strongly supported the right for national self-determination in the decolonising Third World of the 1960s.


114 Aleksa Djilas, Osparavana zemlja: jugoslovenstvo i revolucija (perevela s engleskog Vera Vukelić u saradnji s autorom) (Beograd: Književne novine, 1990), pp.229-233.

liberal in Socialist Yugoslavia’s history, meaning that the debates over the issues discussed here were fairly open. However, in 1971-1972 the Party top quashed maspok, removed liberals and arrested or repressed its opposition, while at the same time installing more hard-line conservatives in power.

Silencing the debates and re-imposing ideological orthodoxy did not mean renewed centralisation of governmental power or the suppression of national identities. Rather it led to further reification of “the nation” and the equation of nations with republics, as Audrey Budding puts it in her discussion on the concept of self-determination in Socialist Yugoslavia. In pursuing her argument, Budding has compared the republican constitutions of 1963 and those of 1974, concluding that there occurred a clear shift towards the republics’ role as national homelands, instead of the previously favoured role as socialist communities.

With the rise of economic prosperity and political repression many of the controversies accompanying the constitutional decentralisation faded into the background during the 1970s, only rising to prominence again in the 1980s. Yet before these controversies became actual again, the late 1970s and early 1980s Yugoslavia experienced an emergence of a quite different phenomenon – the one of the dramatic growth in the number of people formally self-identifying as Yugoslavs, described in the previous section. This leads me back to Dejan Jović’s argument, according to which the phenomenon emerged in the first place as a reaction against general trend of fragmentation of Yugoslav political and cultural space that started 20-30 years before. In the previous section I argued that the problem with Jović’s argument is that it cannot explain why the number of people declaring as “Yugoslavs” in place of ethnic identity in response to the census

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questions on nationality eventually fell at the time of the 1991 census. In the next section I will
direct yet another criticism towards this argument. It concerns the reductionism of equating
decentralisation and affirmation of national diversity with political and cultural fragmentation. The
following section will expand on this argument, in order to set up a definition of Yugoslavness that
is not reduced to any form of Yugoslavism, that is, to any particular strand of the Yugoslav idea.

**Jugoslovenstvo as Yugoslavism and as Yugoslavness**

The recognition of the nation-based politics and the definition of the republics as national
homelands should not be confused with the assumption that there were a number of internally
bound and externally-demarcated national groups in Yugoslavia, each with its own specific ethno-
cultural identity. The recognition of nation-based politics at all levels does not mean that the
proponents of such politics were representing “their” nations. Rather, they were at best only
representing their national organizations (such as regional branches of the LCY, different cultural
movements or latter political parties), even when they were claiming otherwise. In fact, as I have
argued initially in this thesis, because there is no single narrating body in group identities and
because there always is a possibility that there is no common story at all, the subjects of social
identities are always singular human beings. This means that in practice bounded groups, including
those concerning ethnic affiliation, are not the basic constituents of social life and hence ethnic
groups are never homogenous. For this reason we should always proceed with our analyses of
ethnicity and national identity by problematizing the relationship between social categories and
social groups. Thus, as Rogers Brubaker argues, the existence of categories does not automatically
imply the existence of corresponding social groups. In other words, even though the existence of an
ethnic category is an obvious basis for group-formation, it does not necessarily lead to the creation
of a corresponding, enclosed and clearly demarcated, ethnic group. This is a very important point
for the study of interethnic relations and sense of community in the multinational socialist federated
Yugoslavia – not least in the context of the country’s nationality policies described before.

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Based on this discussion, I will argue that although “Yugoslav” identity constituted an emergent social force in the early 1980s, “Yugoslavs” never constituted a “national group.” As the number of declared Yugoslavs grew bigger, they came to be perceived as “Yugoslavs by nationality” – despite the official designation “Yugoslavs-nationally undeclared.” Yet, a high proportion of people declaring as “Yugoslavs” did not necessarily mean that there was a rise of a new national group in the country. In fact, the importance of “Yugoslavs” does not depend on their de facto size as a group, and thus they should not be viewed as a “national group,” but rather as an indicator of ethno-national identification being only one among several relevant forms of identification in 1980s Yugoslavia, especially in its cities in ethnically mixed regions. High proportions of Yugoslavs by nationality thus became a highly visible structural characteristic of interethnic relations in Yugoslavia. It showed that in the periods of balanced interethnic relations, ethnicity and identity were dynamic, inconstant, floating and, above all, always open to individual strategies and negotiations.

This approach to the phenomenon does not only help us understand how and why, in the years of nationalist mobilization and upheaval in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of people claiming Yugoslav nationality plummeted, as the interethnic relations worsened drastically and the ethnic borders became increasingly closed. It also helps us avoid generalising about “real” life in Late Socialist Yugoslavia by drawing uncritically on nationality statistics. In this respect it is important to remember that nationality does not work only in and through bounded groups, but also in and through categories, institutions, narratives, networks, encounters and especially events. As the population censuses can be seen as events, actualizing nationality – not least in plural, multi-ethnic states, such was Yugoslavia – they should not be viewed as neutral representations of the ethno-national reality of everyday identification. In fact, through its actualisation in relation to the conduction of the population censuses, nationality gains rather more attention and becomes inevitably more important than it is in everyday life. This is especially true in the periods of balanced interethnic relations, when ethnicity borders are fluid and open. For this reason, surveys – being as a rule less official than the census – carried out by different Yugoslav research institutions are very valuable sources for the research dealing with nationality and ethnic relations in everyday situations. Moreover, because they very often consciously leave possibilities for more flexible responses than the population censuses, surveys also create a less ethnicizing image of ethnic “reality” than the official censuses. Research on the Yugoslav youth’s attitudes toward ethnos,
including the level of national affiliation, interethnic relations and national identification done in the mid-1980s (the 1985-1986 research) support this argument substantially.\footnote{The research was based on interviews carried out by the sociologists from all over Yugoslavia in late 1985 and early 1986. Based on the results from the research Sergej Flere analysed attitudes toward ethnos, including level of national affiliation, interethnic relations and national identification. His findings point very much in direction of duality, and even multiplicity, of ethno-national identification in the mid-1980s Yugoslavia, as well as to a relatively high level of interethnic tolerance. Sergej Flere, “Odnos mladih prema etnosu” in Položaj, svest i ponašanje mlade generacije Jugoslavije. Preliminarna analiza razultata istraživanja (Beograd-Zagreb: IDIS, 1986), pp. 131-149.}

Being aware of the possible duality of identification, the researchers distinguished between, what they called, “declared” and “preferred” nationality in the questionnaires. The result was very interesting indeed. While 15.6\% answered that their declared identification was Yugoslav by nationality,\footnote{It is indicative, that the research used the category “Yugoslav by nationality,” what was, according to my previous argument, far more favourable than a category Yugoslav-undeclared.} more than twice that number (36.2\%) responded that Yugoslav by nationality was their preferred national identification. Taking in account that another 26.5\% that either did not want to answer this question, answered “undeclared” or declared regionally etc., we can conclude that the proportion of those who opted nationally (37.3\%) was very similar to the proportion of those who preferred Yugoslav by nationality as their option. This gives a very different perspective than the results of the 1981 census, according to which only one-out-of-twenty declared as Yugoslavs-undeclared. In fact, seen from the perspective of the 1985-1986 research among Yugoslav youth, Yugoslavs probably became the third largest nationality (15.6\%) in the country, only slightly smaller that Croats (16.9\%).\footnote{Sergej Flere, ”Odnos mladih prema etnosu” in Položaj, svest i ponašanje mlade generacije Jugoslavije. Preliminarna analiza razultata istraživanja (Beograd-Zagreb: IDIS, 1986), p. 148.} Given that the category Yugoslav-undeclared only acquired a meaning different than that of a substitute category for the Yugoslav Muslims in the beginning of the 1970s, it is reasonable to argue that the proportion of “Yugoslavs“ was surprisingly high, at least among the country’s younger generations. This would however change through the course of the following three to four years with the rise of nationalism in the country, as by 1990 the nationalist discourse would symbolically monopolise the right to define what it meant to be Yugoslav. This happened both through Slobodan Milošević’s “pro-Yugoslav” rhetoric advocating the reestablishment of the pre-decentralisation concept of Yugoslavia, which was basically Serbian centralist-nationalist position, and through anti-Yugoslavist agency of nationalist intellectuals all over the country. I will return to this process of ethnicization in the subsequent chapters. Before that
I would like to present a few other interesting results from the 1985-1986 research, in order to proceed defining the concept of Yugoslavness.

The first of these results concerns the youth’s attitudes to Yugoslavia. According to these results – when asked about their attitudes to Yugoslavia – 61% of respondents agreed with the statement: “Senses of affiliation to Yugoslavia and national affiliation were not same senses, but were both equally valued.” Here, it is noteworthy that the differences between nationalities were rather small, ranging from 56% for Albanians to 69% for Macedonians. Thus, as these results show, dual ethno-national identification with one’s nationality and Yugoslavia was widespread among all nationalities in Yugoslavia. These results allow us to draw the conclusion that, if multiple entries, seen for instance in Canadian censuses, were possible in Yugoslavia, the number of declared Yugoslavs would most probably be much bigger. Thus, it is possible to argue that the Yugoslav policy concerning ethno-national identification was, indeed, designed to preserve Yugoslavia’s ethno-national diversity – rather than to enhance creation of a single, Yugoslav, ( supra)-nationality. Precisely for this reason, the clichés about Yugoslavs not being ready to give up their national identities for the Yugoslav supranational one, were just that – decontextualized clichés. Contrary to these clichés, I will argue that due to the leniency in Socialist Yugoslavia’s official policies to discourage creation of any kind of supranational identity and due to the incompleteness of the Yugoslav idea – both dealt with in this chapter – being Yugoslav in practice took on different forms and interpretations.

In order to understand this situation, we need to proceed by stressing the so-called productive aspect of modern state’s power. As among others Max Weber, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu have argued, the productive effect of a modern state’s power is manifested in its established, formalized, codified, objectified systems of categorization. The modern state seeks to monopolise, not only the legitimate physical force but also the legitimate symbolic force. It does so by naming, identifying, and categorizing, who is who in the state. The case of Yugoslavia’s Slavic-speaking Muslims is very indicative here. In the first five censuses of population that were conducted in Socialist Yugoslavia, they were categorized in five different “ethnic” categories. 

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125 The sixth category Bosniak (Bošnjak) has been used since 1993 – In accordance with my theoretical argument that nation and ethnic groups are socially constructed categories, I use designation Muslim, which was in use in the period this study deals with.
In 1948 they were listed as “indeterminate Muslim” (neopredjeljeni muslimani); in 1953 as “indeterminate Yugoslavs” (neopredjeljeni Jugosloveni); in 1961 as “Muslims in the ethnic sense” (muslimani u etničkom smislu); in 1971 “Muslims in the sense of nationality” (Muslimani u smislu narodnosti); and in 1981 as narod, that is, nation – “Muslims” (Muslimani). The first three categories were intended for those who did not want to subsume into categories of “Serbs” and “Croats.” In contrast to Macedonians and Montenegrins who gained recognition as “nations” (narodi) during the Partisan struggle under the Second World War, Slavic Muslims were treated as Serbs or Croats of Islamic faith. Thus in the census of 1948 those who did not want to declare under these two categories could declare as “indeterminate Muslims”. However, this meant that they had been identified primarily by their religion, which was not a desired option in the socialist state.

The situation changed in 1953 when they were recognized as Yugoslavs. By doing that the Yugoslav state formalized Slavic-speaking Muslims’ belonging to a corpus of South Slavs. In 1961 muslims were (again) recognised as a distinct group, not by virtue of their religion but their assumed ethnic affiliation. The most notable result thereof was that their number declined slightly in the relation the census of 1953. The most plausible reason for this decline was that this category was an ethnic minority category. In order to avoid minority status, many choose to declare as “Yugoslavs” – a category that no longer went as “indeterminate”. It is noteworthy that it happened in the period that many scholars regard as the most integrative period of Socialist Yugoslavia. For instance Hennes Grandits, who argues that the the LCY support of this option for a supranational Yugoslav identity had very much to do with the general development in the period of consolidation after the split with Stalin.

The number of Muslims rose dramatically at the 1971 census, almost doubling from 1961. The rise was not a result of a natural increase, but the consequence of the political recognition of Yugoslavia’s Slavic-speaking Muslims as an equal member in the multinational Yugoslav state, as

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127 In Serbo-Croatian this is expressed by using small “m” in contrast to the majority, or national, categories that are written with the capital “M”.

128 Instead, the category was now called nationally-undeclared Yugoslavs.

the ethnic category “muslim” was elevated to the nationality category “Muslim”. However, it was only after Muslims gained political recognition as narod in the 1974 Constitution and they become Yugoslavia’s sixth constitutive nation that the national category “Muslim” was introduced. The category appeared the first time in the census of 1981 and was also kept in the Socialist Yugoslavia’s last census in 1991. This recognition was crucial for the Muslim political elite because both the republics and the “nations” had constitutive rights in Socialist Yugoslavia. However, according to the 1974 Constitution, five nations, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes had their “own” national republics, while Bosnia and Herzegovina presented an exception, having three constitutive nations: Croats, Muslims and Serbs.

As this case of Slavic speaking Muslims in Socialist Yugoslavia shows, it was of profound importance to be recognized as “nation” in the state where politics since the introduction of Workers Self-Management was nation-based. This process should however not be uncritically equalized with the fragmentation of Yugoslav community or connected directly to the process of nationalist mobilization that occurred in the 1980s. The issue is much more complex. First of all, as Rogers Brubaker has argued, an institutionalized ethno-national classificatory system makes certain categories readily and legitimately available for the representation of social reality, the framing of political claims, and the organization of political action. Yet the formal institutionalization and codification of national categories, no matter how strong it may be, implies nothing about the depth, resonance, or power of such categories in the lived experience of the persons so characterized.

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130 At the census of 1981, the nationality classification used by the Yugoslav Federal Bureau of Statistics selected individual’s affiliation to one of the nations (narodi), nationalities (narodnosti), ethnic groups or “nationally undeclared” groups. The first category, “nations”, consisted of “nations of Yugoslavia” (Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes). The second category was an option for those “whose nation (narod) was outside Yugoslavia (Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Italians, Turks etc.)”. The distinction between these two categories is thus if their “national home” was Yugoslavia or some other country. The “ethnic groups” category constituted those without “national home” (Romani people, Vlachs, and quite noteworthy Jews etc.). What is common for all three categories is that they all covered “The persons who declared their ethnic nationality”. The last category of “nationally undeclared” was divided into three subcategories: “Persons who didn’t declare or opt according to the 1974 Constitution”, “Persons who declared as Yugoslavs” and “Persons who declared in the sense of regional affiliation.” Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Nacionalni sastav stanovništva SFR Jugoslavije. Knjiga I. Podaci po naseljima i opštinama (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku), p. 8.

131 According to the 1974 Constitution (p.242), the Socialist Republic of Croatia was constituted as “a national-state of the Croat nation, a state of the Serb nation, and a state of the nationalities living in it.” From this point of departure, Zdenko Radelić has argued, that the Serbs were a constitutive nation in Croatia, but Croatia was not their “nation-state.” Zdenko Radelić: Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), p. 485.

Put more simply, the institutionalized categories leave marks in people but they do not determine their affiliations and actions.

Second, and probably even more important, the emancipation and institutionalization of distinct national identities in the 1960s and the early 1970s were still carried in the spirit emphasizing common faith of all Yugoslav regardless of their nationality, that it, the faith in “unity in diversity.” Thus, as Esad Čimić has argued in his work on the subject, some people experienced their Yugoslav affiliation as a common consciousness of belonging to a broader Yugoslav community. They felt no need to declare as “Yugoslavs” because they saw themselves as Yugoslavs by being Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims and so on.

Thus, fighting for the national rights of one’s nation did not necessarily mean that the person had given up his or her Yugoslav affiliation. On the contrary, these two could also be seen as enforcing each other. Far from being the only example, it is probably Vlado Gotovac who has probably expressed this most eloquently. As a one of the leading intellectuals of maspok, the Croatian mass-movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Gotovac latter claimed that:

One thing is sure: Not a single one of those who meant something in 1971, was representing any kind of separatism, or in any way questioned the existence of Yugoslavia. Quite contrary, I have never believed so much in Yugoslavia as then… What we saw as being good for Croatia, we also understood as being good for Yugoslavia.

The idea of “something being good for Croatia was also good for Yugoslavia” was not reserved for the political and cultural elite in the country – nor was it reserved for Croatia alone. The aforementioned 1985-1986 research among Yugoslav youth is very illustrative here. Asked the questions concerning their preferable form of identification, no less than 72% of the respondents agreed that they were Yugoslavs and could no give primacy to any other form for identification. However, there were some interesting differences among nationalities in the proportions of those giving primacy to their Yugoslav affiliation above the national one. Thus, while 80% of Muslims,

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135 Understandingly, most Yugoslavs by nationality did not answer these questions, and were thus not included in this part of analysis.
78% Macedonians and 76% of Montenegrins and Serbs agreed with the statement, “only” 49% of Slovenes and 61% of Croats did so. One of the probable reasons for the difference is that national emancipation of Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins started only in Second Yugoslavia, and these nationalities were not recognized as separate nations before either during or after the Second World War. Thus, their national affiliation was very much undistinguishable from the Yugoslav one. This was especially the case with the Muslims, whose national elite, as we saw, did not emerge before the 1960s, while their final national emancipation and recognition occurred only in the 1970s. Moreover, as we saw, in the period from 1953-1971, Muslims were associated with the category “Yugoslav”. For all these reasons, it would be rather surprising if Muslims did not top the list.

Quite differently from the nationalities that attained their national emancipation after the Second World War, as we saw in the first section, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian national emancipation started well before creation of the first common South-Slav state. The decisive difference between the three was that also Serbs’ national-state and, thereby, the process of Serbian nation-building, predated creation of such state. Moreover, Serbia came out of the Balkan wars and the First World War as a winner and played a central role in the creation and state-building process of the First Yugoslavia. All this nurtured a sense of continuity, which was very much institutionalised in the official schooling – not only in the First but as well in the Second Yugoslavia. A direct result of this situation was that the collective memory of the Serbian national liberation process and the establishing of the common Yugoslav state was inseparable. This development led therefore to equating Yugoslav and Serb national ideas as well as Yugoslav and national Serb affiliation, explaining the large proportion of Serbs who gave primacy to their Yugoslav identification. In addition, it is also important to remember that almost one-out-of-four Serbs lived outside Serbia, and more than 40% of them, if the two autonomous provinces were not counted.

Just as in the Serbian case, the Croatian national emancipation started well before the creation of the first common Yugoslav state. However, as Dejan Djokić and Tihomir Cipek have argued, the

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137 The creation of the modern Serbian state and the recognition of its independence from the Ottomans were in Socialist Yugoslavia’s textbooks integrated into larger narrative of South-Slav liberation from the yoke of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.
development of *Croatism* and *Yugoslavism* cannot be easily separated since they went hand in hand, at least until the Serb-dominated Yugoslav kingdom stripped Croatia of all its state symbols, provoking increasing disillusion with the common state. For this reason, Croats had the most reasons to accept the restored Socialist Yugoslavia that would recognise Croatia as one of its six republics.\(^{138}\) Placed in this context, the proportion of young Croats giving primacy to Yugoslav identification above the Croatian one was in fact rather high. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the results showing that less than two thirds of Croats gave primacy to Yugoslav identification does not mean that the last third of the Croats disapproved the idea of common Yugoslav state or gave up on their Yugoslav affiliation. Rather, quite many of them probably assumed the position similar to that of the widely popular leaders of *maspek* and expressed in the above quotation of Vlado Gotovac, that fighting for Croatia was nothing but believing fully in Yugoslavia.

Finally, a low proportion of Slovenes responding to the survey question that they were Yugoslavs above all has several probable explanations. The Slovenian case resembles the Croatian one as the process of Slovene national emancipation had begun well before creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, but without having attained statehood prior to it. In the common Yugoslav state, “preserving” national identity and culture was very important for Slovenes from the beginning, not least because more than one-third of Slovenes remained outside the newly formed kingdom.\(^{139}\) In this respect, the Slovenian language became a very important issue in relation to the neighbouring Italy and Austria and their assimilationist policies. Moreover, as Slovene was different from Serbo-Croatian, it also became an important issue in relation to both the Kingdom’s and the Socialist federated republic’s cultural policy, serving as a central marker of Slovene distinctiveness. Yet another important factor here was that a vast majority of Slovenes lived in the north-western corner of the country. This part of the country after the Second World War became the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and thereby encompassed most of Yugoslavia’s Slovenes in its territory. This meant that in contrast to Croats and Serbs, a vast majority of Slovenes were concentrated inside their “mother” republic.\(^{140}\) Such territorial delimitation enforced Slovenes’

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\(^{140}\) According to the 1981 census, 97.6% Of Yugoslavia’s Slovenes lived in Slovenia. Corresponding numbers for Croats and Serbs were respectively 78.5% and 75.9% (59.7% when only Serbia proper was counted).

national-territorial consciousness described before, focusing on their distinctiveness from other nationalities in Yugoslavia. However, this did not mean that young Slovenes were anti-Yugoslav, as half of them still primarily identified as Yugoslavs and, as we saw in this section, no less than three-out-of-five Slovenes valued their Yugoslav and their Slovene affiliations equally.\footnote{Sergej Flere, “Odnos mladih prema etnosu” in \textit{Položaj, sVEST i ponašANJE mlADE generACije jugoslAViJe. PreliminarNA analiZA razultATA istražiVanja} (Beograd-Zagreb: IDIS, 1986), p. 140.}

This chapter’s discussion has so far showed that the Yugoslav idea was a very complex and stratified idea, containing different, often incomplete, stands about Yugoslav unity, meaning only political or ethical and cultural community, as Sergej Flere has put it.\footnote{Sergej Flere, “Nacionalna identifikacija i preferirana nacionalna identifikacija kod mladih – pitanje jugoslovenstva,” \textit{Migracione teme. Časopis za istraživanja migracije i narodnosti}, god. 4, no. 4 (1988), pp. 450-452.} Due to this complexity, being Yugoslav took on different forms, which were often ambiguous, perplexing and even contradictory. Seeing themselves as Yugoslavs by being Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims etc., many people felt no need to declare as Yugoslavs, argues Esad Čimić. In other words, Yugoslav affiliation could still mean different things to different people. For this reason we should not equate formal self-identification as Yugoslav with being, and feeling as, Yugoslav. Otherwise, we will not only 	extit{ethnicize} Yugoslavia’s past, a past that is much more complex, contradictory and ambiguous than we will be led to believe. We will also risk depriving many people of their feeling of belonging or of sharing a sense of personal relatedness to the Yugoslav community – that is, their Yugoslav-ness.

This argument is fairly similar to the one proposed by Predrag Matvejević in 1982. In his book on the subject, \textit{Jugoslovenstvo danas. Pitanja kulture (Yugoslavness Today. Questions on Culture)}, Matvejević, argued against the equation of social praxis of being Yugoslav with any national or even supranational category, Matvejević concluded that “in most cases Yugoslav orientation is a sense of community, [and] not a national sentiment in the common sense of word” (emphasis mine).\footnote{Predrag Matvejević, \textit{Jugoslovenstvo danas. Pitanja kulture} (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), p. 68.} It is quite clear in his argument, that Matvejević uses the designation Yugoslav orientation to cover the term Yugoslavness. He does so because Serbo-Croatian does not differentiate between Yugoslavism and Yugoslavness, as both concepts are covered by a single Serbo-Croatian term, jugoslovenstvo.

\footnote{Original text: U većini slučajeva jugoslovensko opredjeljenje je osjećaj zajedništva, a ne nacionalni osjećaj u uobičajenom smislu riječi.}
This present both an analytical and normative problem, as it situates Yugoslav “identity,” as Matthew McCullock puts it, at the crossroads of “nowhere” and “everywhere.” In her attempt to define the term, historian Branka Prpa has offered a powerful argument that tolerance was one of the central characteristics of jugoslovenstvo ever since the first Yugoslav state was formed in 1918. This tolerance was based on the idea of the existence of a Yugoslav miniature universe filled with diversities, yet interconnected by a collective fate. Quite similarly to Prpa, yet working on the subject of anti-nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the post-Yugoslav states, anthropologist Stef Jansen has argued that in these states many informants imagined Yugoslavness as a discursive space with a distinct, diverse, open character and only sometimes openly “Yugoslavist.” It is so because Yugoslavness is, as Jansen accentuates, the opposite of nationalist segregation and exclusiveness. And as such Yugoslavness is about “open [inter-ethnic] boundaries in a mosaic nationality in a mass.” Stressing its antinationalism and cosmopolitanism, in the following four chapters, I will approach Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock from different angles, both in order to answer the posed questions and in order to raise new questions concerning this complex, but interesting issue.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the constitutional decentralisation and the introduction of new policies regarding affirmation of national cultures in the 1960s Yugoslavia provoked the emergence of the mass national political movement in Croatia known as maspok. Seeking greater cultural autonomy within Yugoslavia and supported by the liberal faction of the LCC, the movement addressed grievances regarding Croatia’s position in the federation. Soon it attained wide popularity among the population, including some of the most popular pop musicians in the republic.¹⁴⁷ However, in 1971, the Party top quashed the movement and instated conservatives in power. The Croatia that in the 1960s had experienced the most intense national movement of all republics in the country, found itself now – in regards of all discussion concerning nationality issues – in the proportionally more harsh suppression than other republics. Commenting on the situation in the republic in the early 1980s – that is the period when Yugoslav youth culture influenced by New Wave was brewing – Yugoslav media dubbed it “Croatian silence,” alluding thereby to the absence of any debate on the issue. Against this background, it has become common to interpret the absence of nationalism in Croatia, including its rock scene, in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of suppression of the Croatian national feeling.¹⁴⁸ Accordingly, once suppression was gone, the national sense of Croatness instantly resurrected. In this regard the 1989 song “Mojoj majci” (“To my Mother”) by one of Punk/New Wave pioneers Prljavo kazalište (Dirty Theatre) came to be seen as a milestone,¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Most notably Vice Vukov, who was commonly viewed as one of the best pop singers in the country in the early phase of Yugoslav pop in the 1950s and 1960s.

¹⁴⁸ Some historians, like Dean Vuletić, went even further, arguing that the absence of nationalism in the Croatia rock music during in the 1970s can be explained by the fact that the Croatian rock had not yet been developed from a cultural import into a stable domestic tradition. According to this argument, popular music goes intensively through a series of phases before it before it develops from a cultural import into a stable domestic tradition. This process starts with the consumption of the foreign music, what can be termed as the stage of importation. From there it develops into the imitation – that is the second stage of the process – done by local artists, before it reaches the final stage of linguistic nativization and musical re-ethnicization. Although this argument may have some validity concerning the development of popular music through a series of phases from a cultural import into a stable domestic tradition, it nevertheless suffers from the retrospective ethnicization of the past as it treats national identity as primordial, perennial and authentic. Dean Vuletić, “The Silent Republic: Popular Music and Nationalism in Socialist Croatia,” EUI Working paper (Florence: European University Institute, 2011), p. 14 (accessed through http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/18635)
due to a line in the song addressing the band’s leader and guitarist Jasenko Houra’s mother, which song is about, as “The Croatian Rose.”

The following chapter is critical of these nation-centric interpretations because they suffer from a “retrospective ethnicization.” In other words, by approaching Croatia in the period of the eighteen years between 1971 and 1989 as “The Silent Republic” and turning all eyes to nationalist movements in the beginning and at the end of the period, they ethnicize the past that is much more complex, contradictory and ambiguous than we are led to believe. In doing so, they not only fail to recognise that national identity is a social construct, and not primordial, perennial, original or authentic in any way. They also ignore a number of sources clearly indicating the complexity of this history.

Against this background, the chapter explores this complexity focusing on a specific Yugoslav Socialist Self-Representation created through everyday life in relation to the country’s unique geopolitical position in the divided Europe of the Cold War years. The argument is that we can never fully understand Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock, nor what it meant to be Yugoslav more generally, without considering how Yugoslav geopolitical exceptionalism, caused by the Cold War, affected identity-formation. The chapter focuses on the scene in the Croatian Capital Zagreb, which was the first to develop a strong New wave scene.

The chapter comprises three sections. The first section focuses on the topic of growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia. For this purpose it uses the examples from the early phase of Prljavo kazalište, a band widely most closely associated with the city of all Zagreb New Wave/rock bands and the first Punk/New Wave band in the country to release the LP record. As Yugoslav youth was oriented towards the West, seeing their cultural universe as a part of the western popular-cultural hemisphere, the section pays special attention to the sources’ depiction of the differences between the West and Yugoslavia.

While the first section is focused on the period prior to the President Tito’s death, at the centre of the second section are the early years of the 1980s. Moreover, while the first section is focused on the relation to the West, and in particular British punk, the second proceeds by discussing the geopolitical expressions of Yugoslav exceptionalism in relation to the Eastern Bloc. The primary interest in the section is the geopolitical and social articulation expressed in the songs of Azra (a Serbo-Croatian version of the title of Heinrich Heine’s verse “Der Asra”), a band that is commonly assumed as one of the most political bands in the country. After analysing the geopolitical
articulation in the band’s songs in relation to the popular unrest in Poland in the beginning of the 1980s, the section turns to a discussion about the band’s social critique concerning the economic and social crisis in 1980s Yugoslavia.

Finally, the chapter’s last section deals with the second half of the 1980s. It is structured around Polet’s commentary on the nationalist euphoria relating to “Mojoj majci (Ruža hrvatska),” that is “To My Mother (“The Croatian Rose”). The section reveals Yugoslavism of the several central agents in the scene, often overlooked in the studies of Zagreb’s 1980s rock, and places the expressions of Croateness in the late 1980s in the context of rising nationalism in the country. I finish the section by paying special attention to Polet’s antinationalist agency, relating it to the concept of Yugoslavness.

“The Best Punk East of England”

In her work on ideology in Communist Yugoslavia’s prior to 1953, Carol Lilly concludes that in the period after the Soviet-Yugoslav split, LCY leaders gradually assumed position according to which the transformation of society and culture was relegated to the distant future, when this transition would be achieved not by their own heroic efforts but by the inevitable forces of history, in accordance with the teachings of historical materialism. Therefore, the main task for the LCY was to stay in power and ensure social ownership of the means of production long enough for those forces of history to develop. The most immediate consequence of this development was that from the early 1950s Yugoslav citizens acquired much greater freedoms than their counterparts in the Eastern Bloc countries, as well as controlled but broad possibility of expression in the non-political sphere.

This was the situation in which rock and roll reached Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s. It would however take another two decades before rock music developed into the central cultural reference

of Yugoslav youth. This meant that the final establishment of Yugoslav rock music culture, which occurred sometime during the 1970s, coincided chronologically with the (re)dogmatisation of the 1970s described in the previous chapter. This interesting chronological coincidence requires some further considerations in order to fully understand the position Yu-Rock culture assumed within the greater society.

After two decades of progressive liberalisation that reached its peak in the late-1960s, with a wide-ranging filmic, philosophical and literary criticism of the country’s development being tolerated, the 1970s started with the Party leaders sending a young filmmaker Lazar Stojanović to prison and thereby reintroducing repression as a means of correcting, of what they saw as the undesirable currents in Yugoslav culture. With the same regard of correcting potential “cultural deviations,” the authorities introduced the so-called “porez na šund” (“trash tax”) in 1972. The logic of labelling something as šund (trash) was that an artist or a band would not be qualified for the necessary tax-exceptions, putting them thereby in an unfavourable economic position. This meant that “porez na šund” aimed mostly to abet auto-censoring. It would, however, soon prove not to be a very effective strategy in the field of the emerging Yugoslav rock music culture, which was, as Sabrina Ramet puts it, always political at some level. In fact, by the end of the decade the method lost its meaning altogether, as labelling bands’ records as šund became something that the bands rather were proud of, even despite potential economic losses. Against this background, it makes


153 As Zoran Janjetović puts it, the actual censorship bodies – the so-called *komisije za šund* (Trash Commissions) – were introduced not as a tool for political censorship but rather in order to watch musical and literary tastes of the populace. The main implication thereof was that the decisions that different Commissions made varied to a large degree. Most importantly, due to the high degree of political and cultural decentralisation of the country, different standards developed in different republics. However, we should not exaggerate this aspect of the development, as the work of the Commissions never proved to be effective. Zoran Janjetović, *Od “Internacionale” do komercijale: Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011), pp. 160-161.


155 Although its effect was minimal from the beginning, it was especially due to some of the early Punk/New Wave bands, like Prljavo kazalište and Paraf (Initials), that labelling a record “Šund” lost its qualitative dimension and
sense to argue that Yu-Rock “managed to survive [the (re)dogmatisation of] the 1970s undamaged,” as Gregor Tomc puts it.\textsuperscript{156} This is not an unimportant point, in particular when seen from the perspective of rock music becoming the youth’s central cultural referent at the precisely same time.

Yugoslav youth culture and the Zagreb New Wave scene that this chapter deals with developed in this politico-historical context. Yet, this argument should not be read as an invitation to approach New Wave as a “revolt” against the dominant socialist culture. In doing so, we will fail to recognise the complexity of the situation, because – as Ljerka Rasmussen aptly puts it – “with the exception of Yugoslavia’s Cominform period of 1945-1948, none of the subsequent periods have offered the convenience of being viewed in static terms of a state/popular culture opposition.”\textsuperscript{157}

For this reason it is analytically much more fruitful to approach youth culture that evolved under the influence of New Wave by emphasising its position within the dominant socialist culture. In exploring the popular sentiment of Yugoslavness as Yugoslav socialist self-representation, this section expands on this argument, focusing – as already stressed – on Prljavo Kazalište and the topic of growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia.

To begin with, I will emphasise that Yugoslav New Wave would not be the same without Polet – the official organ of the League of Socialist Youth of Croatia and the herald of Zagreb’s and Yugoslav New Wave. Polet was the first to recognise the emerging New Wave scene, offering it full support in its writing. Probably the best example of this is two complimentary articles about a rock marathon held in Zagreb in early May 1978. Here, already in 1978, Polet claimed that Yugoslav punk was the best punk east of England, meaning in fact outside the Anglo-Saxon world. The articles’ titles were interconnected, having it that: “Bio nam je potreban! / Najbolji punk istočno od Engleske. Prijelomni trenutak našeg rocka,” (“We needed [it]! / Best punk east of England. The turning point of our rock”). The first of the articles was a review of the participating bands and their individual performances at the marathon.\textsuperscript{158} The second article dealt with Punk in

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\end{itemize}
Yugoslavia and abroad, yet with many references to the review, claiming prophetically that the event was “the turning point in the history of Yugoslav rock.”

This utterance is indeed very important in the context of this thesis. Not because Polet’s journalists proved to be right. It is rather the optimism and self-congratulation in Polet’s articles that needs to be emphasised. First of all, it is important in this context that this happened in the period of a general sense of buoyancy, self-congratulation and confidence in Yugoslav society of the 1970s, as it was described by scholars working on the topic. Yet besides this general enthusiasm in the 1970s’ Yugoslavia, Polet’s self-congratulation and optimism should also be seen from the perspective of Punk rock reaching Yugoslavia with insignificant delay in relation to the Anglo-Saxon world – in contrast to the earlier periods’ musical trends that would reach the country with a substantial delay. Arriving into Yugoslavia’s northern republics approximately at the same time as it did in the non-English speaking countries of Western and Northern Europe, this development spurred optimism and self-confidence in the country that had always seen itself lagging culturally behind the West.

In their description of the event, the articles did not leave the slightest doubt that their interest lay with the three punk bands performing at the marathon. It was these bands that the journalists put their hope in as the agents of *the turning point in the history of Yu-Rock*, “which could have bigger importance in [Yugoslavia], than ‘new wave’ in the Anglo-American world.” Despite mixing terms “punk” and “new wave,” the journalist distinguished between Paraf (Initials) from Rijeka, which they defined as punk, and Prljavo Kazalište and Azra from Zagreb, which they placed somewhere between punk and new wave, rather closer to the latter than the former. This description of Zagreb bands would prove to be so characteristic of the whole Zagreb scene, which was always more New Wave than Punk sounding. Both articles leave an impression that Prljavo Kazalište was the band they liked least. Yet, they stressed that it was not the last time the Yugoslav rock audience would hear of the band, as they were preparing for the recording of their debut. Although they could

161 This is also the main impression in the recent documentary on the early development of Zagreb and Yugoslav New Wave scene. Igor Mirković, *Sretno dijete* (Guerila 2003) (DVD film)
not be more correct, they probably never thought that less than two years later, the renowned UK music newspaper *Melody Maker* would write about the band. Not too differently from *Polet, Melody Maker*’s journalist Chris Bohn described Prljavo Kazalište’s “fashionably controversial new-wavish format,” contrasting it with the more underground-oriented musical style of another Yugoslav punk pioneers, Pankrti from Ljubljana. Bohn underlined that although still at school, the boys from Prljavo Kazalište already had a record deal and were backed by a record company. However, what was particularly interesting in this symbolically entitled article, “Non-aligned punk” – alluding Yugoslavia’s position of being neither West nor East – is that the journalist observed that in their songs, the Yugoslav punk bands (both Prljavo Kazalište and Pankrti) dealt with topics relevant for them. In other words, they articulated their home-grown problems, rather than reiterating *Britpunk* topics.\(^{163}\)

One of these topics, and in fact, the occurring most in the early Prljavo Kazalište’s songs was the topic of growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia. Nowhere was this exemplified as well as in one of the band’s major hits, the song symbolically called “Sretno dijete” (“The Happy Child”). It was released on the band’s eponymous 1979 debut LP and was arguably the Yugoslav New Wave song, which most eagerly sought to articulate the topic of growing up. The title “Sretno dijete” itself is impregnated with indeed very clear connotations to the issue of *growing up in Communism*. As Ildiko Erdei tells us in her work on the subject, “The Happy Child” was an icon of socialist transformation in Yugoslavia and other socialist countries. In order to get transformation done, a variety of activities for “correct creative development” and “encompassing personality” was set up, accompanied with the necessary “material support.” Social improvement was one of the main goals with little or no room left for fun.\(^{164}\) However, the lyrics of Prljavo kazalište’s song show that, at least according to the band, growing up in Communist *Yugoslavia* was not all like that in practice:

| Ja sam odrastao uz ratne filmove u boji | I’ve grown up with the War colour films |
| už česte tučnjave u školi | with frequent fights at school |
| už narodne pjesme pune boli | with folk songs full of pain |
| Ja sam stvarno sretno dijete | I really am a happy child |

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Ja sam odrastao uz predivne vojne parade
uz studentske demonstracije
(izgubio sam sliku iz legitimacije)
Ja sam stvarno sretno dijete
I've grown up with wonderful military parades
with the student protests
(I've lost the picture from my I.D. card)
I really am a happy child. 165

There is no doubt that it is Yugoslav War films – popularly called Partisan films, due to their focus on the partisans’ struggle against the Axis powers during the Second World War – that the opening line refers to. This was easily recognisable by every Yugoslav, as watching Partisan films was one of the central components of growing up in Yugoslavia – becoming thereby an inseparable part of their cultural capital. It is therefore not surprising that the song opens with this reference to Partisan films. This being said, I do not mean to suggest that this particular song has anything to do with the partisan’s struggles during the War, and certainly not directly. The phrase “the War films in colour” indicates that it was rather a specific generation that the song addresses. These were the generation growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, that is, the generations that Prljavo kazalište belonged to. Bringing up the student demonstrations (of 1968) in the second verse intensifies this image of the specific generation, as it implies that it is about those who were born before the demonstrations and excludes thereby those born in the early 1970s.

Most for this song, yet not exclusively for it, the contemporaneous domestic rock critic immediately recognised the band’s message, praising the band for bringing the topic into Yu-Rock. In this manner, Džuboks’ Branko Vukojević ascribed Prljavo kazalište (the album) the importance of being the first in Yugoslav rock and roll to introduce “the spasm of growing up,” which, according to Vukojević, was “the foundational theme of rock expression and the one of the quintessential reasons for its existence.” 166 Although Džuboks addressed the Universal rock topic of growing up, the album had a number of clear connotations to the specific Yugoslav way of growing up in Communism – not only in the title and in the content of “The Happy Child” but also in relation to other songs from the LP and other relevant texts of the time. In fact, departing from the theoretical assumption of intertextuality, which stresses that a text can only communicate its meaning when situated in relation to other texts and to larger issues, I want to draw attention to

165 Prljavo kazalište, „Sretno dijete,” on Prljavo kazalište (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1979)
three other relevant texts. These texts are an interview in *Polet* with the band’s members, conducted in 1978 in relation to the recording of the LP and two other 1979 songs.

The same journalists that half a year earlier had written the two aforementioned complimentary articles in *Polet*, Sven Semenčić and V. Fras, conducted the interview in relation to the recording of the band’s debut LP. It is particularly interesting that when asked to compare New Wave (which in this case was understood as Punk rock) in the UK and in Yugoslavia, the band drew special attention to the different socio-economic contexts British and Yugoslav youth were growing up in. According to the band’s members, the situation in Yugoslavia was much more favourable in at least two respects. Yugoslav youth was in a much better social position (including better job possibilities) than their British counterparts, and the Yugoslav audience was more liberal in its musical tastes. Although the band’s assumption could have had to do with the fact that in the UK punk rock emerged among the working class, while that their counterparts in Yugoslavia belonged rather to the middle class, I will argue that this utterance has more to do with growing up in the system that officially promoted social justice and that was built on the political mythology stressing social equality. As I will show shortly, the band’s songs and interviews support this argument. Before that an important point concerning Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology should be highlighted.

As already stressed, the political mythology in Socialist Yugoslavia revolved around the country’s experience of the Second World War. According to it, Yugoslavia emerged from anti-fascist struggle during the war and served therefore as Socialist Yugoslavia’s founding myth – the myth of the People’s Liberation Struggle (*the NOB*). Plurality of local resistance movements was lumped together under a single grand narrative of the NOB. What is probably more important, the NOB was depicted as a mutually integrated struggle against the Axis powers’ occupation and an ongoing social revolution. For this reason it was often referred to as *the People’s Liberation Struggle and the Socialist Revolution* (*NOB i socijalistička revolucija*). Yugoslav youth’s self-image was shaped by this political mythology – not least through the aforementioned Partisan films, which as

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169 Kevin Morgan, “From Infantile Disorders to the Fathers of the People: Youth and Generation in the Study of International Communism” (paper presented at the conference *Communism and Youth in the Twentieth Century* at University of Reading, UK, on April, 5th 2011).
170 In the Marxist-Leninist tradition this narrative was however integrated in the long-term, nation- and class-based liberation of the South Slavs from the yoke of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian imperialism.
171 Accordingly, German and Italian collaborationists were always to be found among rich capitalists, the clergy and especially officials from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – an image diligently reproduced in the Yugoslav War films.
we saw had central position in the process of growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia. This was not a result of manipulation or false consciousness. It was rather that Socialist Yugoslavia’s political myths provided significance to the country’s youth’s socio-political experience and deeds.

The two 1979 songs mentioned before will serve to illustrate the point. The first song, with yet another very symbolic title, “Moj je otac bio u ratu” (“My Father Was in the War”), was released as a single on its own, not on Prljavo kazalište. The lyrics have it that:

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Moj je otac bio u ratu
Nosio je pravu granatu
Mrzio je carsku plaću
Zato se i borio

Vjerujem mu, bilo je teško
Borit se za tako nešto
Sada mu je sigurno bolje
Jer vidi kako stvari stoje
Zato se i borio

My father was in the war
He had a real grenade
He hated the Royal salary
That is why he fought

I believe him, it was hard
To fight for such a thing
Now he is better for sure
‘Cause he sees the way things are
That is why he fought
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It is quite noteworthy that the song’s two verses point in respectively slightly different directions, yet clearly articulating an overall point. The first verse corresponds quite accurately to the official narrative of the NOB and the Socialist Revolution (“He hated the Royal salary. That is why he fought”), indicating as well the break with the First Yugoslavia, the Royal one – again very much in accordance with the official political mythology. Yet, when seen together with the second verse, the song produces an impression of being written from a perspective of generational conflict and in this respect, it is rather ironic (“I believe him, it was hard…Now it is certainly better,” implying that this was something his, and other fathers, would tell their kids).

The impression of irony is further intensified when placed in relation to the second song, “Čovjek za sutra” (“Man for Tomorrow”). This song is the opening song on Prljavo kazalište (the album). Once again, just as in the case of “Sretno dijete,” the issue, which the song addresses, is clearly stated in the very title. It alludes to “the better future” that Socialist government promised from the beginning. Yet, it is the criticism presented already in the opening line of the song (“They

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tell me, tomorrow I will get a new apartment”), addressing one of the most important social
issues that Socialist Yugoslavia never managed to solve – not even in the prosperous 1970s – that is
particularly interesting. This was the issue of scarce housing possibilities, which along the
unemployment and emigration (in search for work), was the authorities’ chronic ailment:

This analysis indicates that the band was not blind for the social problems in Socialist
Yugoslavia. Yet, as the interview shows, they still believed that they were growing up in belief that
they were living in the best of all worlds, as Zoran Janjetović puts it. This world allowed critical
production of meaning on and different interpretations of even central social problems, not allowed
in the Eastern Bloc countries, and yet at the same time provided better social security than it was the
case with Western Bloc countries. Finally and arguably most important, they were growing up in
the prosperous 1970s in the last decade of President Tito’s life, after which – as many studies have
argued – many things would change drastically.

“And Still, We Would Like To Be the Centre of the Universe”

The following section will explore the change in the Yugoslav society in the period that a
recent study has called the Decadent Socialism (1979-1987). My focus is on the band that
commonly is assumed as one of the most important Yu-Rock bands, Azra. The section discusses
both geopolitical and social articulation in the band’s songs, seeking ultimately to explain the self-
image of “trećosti,” that is, exceptionality of Yugoslav socialism and its importance for the
Yugoslav Socialist Self-Representation. After discussing Azra’s representativeness in relation to the
broader context of Yugoslav New Wave and the youth culture that emerged from it, the section

173 Original text: “Kažu mi, sutra cu dobiti novi stan.” Prljavo kazalište, “Čovjek za sutra” on Prljavo kazalište
(Zagreb: Jugoton, 1979).
175 In this context Dean Duda has drawn attention to the framing of decedent socialism with three international
turns to textual analysis of the band’s song texts. Here, the focus is first on the situation related to the civil unrest in the early 1980s Poland and the way the Polish regime chose to handle it. The chronological coincidence between this development and Yugoslav New Wave that peaked in these years makes it an interesting topic for the study of the self-image of “*trećosti*” of Yugoslav socialism. At the same time, it provides us with an insight into the origins of Yugoslav youth culture that developed with New Wave. From here, the section turns to the band’s social critique developed in relation to the economic and social crisis in the 1980s Yugoslavia. As a preliminary, the section will set out a few specificities concerning the band’s representativeness and importance in the context of Yugoslav New Wave and the youth culture that developed around it. In this regard, the section pays special attention to the band’s popularity, its position in the Yugoslav New Wave scene and finally Johnny Štulić’s self-identification.

Considering Azra’s popularity among the Yugoslav rock audience, it should be noted that no band associated with Punk/New Wave managed to achieve as broad popularity as Azra. In fact, Azra did not only manage to become the most important band that emerged from the New Wave scene, but was arguably one of the central bands of the 1980s Yu-Rock more generally. After releasing their eponymous debut LP in 1980, *Džuboks*’ readers voted Azra the second most popular band in the country, next to the country’s leading mainstream rock act, Bijelo dugme. The following year, Azra came again second, after another mainstream rock band, the country’s best-selling, Riblja čorba (Fish Chowder), while its second LP *Sunčana strana ulice* (*The Sunny Side of the Street*) was voted the best album of the year. Finally, in 1982, Azra was the most popular band in the country, having two records (one studio and one live), both released the same year, voted in *Džuboks*’ top ten. In the first four years of the 1980s Azra was the second best-selling rock band in the country, surpassed only by Riblja čorba.

177 Measured by the number of sold records, it can be concluded that no other band associated with New Wave come even close to Azra – neither in the numbers of the total record sale or in the number of the records on the top 200 most sold albums in the early 1980s. See Zdravko Hudelist, “Jugoslovenska diskografka laž,” *Start br. 401* (2.6.1984), pp. 50-55, 69.
178 *Džuboks* 109, 27.2.1981, p. 16.
In relation to New Wave and the youth culture that developed around it, sources indicate that Azra in fact deserves a very special place in every analysis of this culture. From the very beginning, Azra was associated with Zagreb’s and Yugoslav New Wave. This comes clearly to expression in the two complimentary articles about the 1978 Zagreb rock marathon, which I have discussed in the previous section. It is very telling that Sven Semenčić’s review of the band, probably one of the first ever written, had it that:

After [Prljavo kazalište], we had Azra playing, a band that I would without hesitation claim to present by far the strongest of the Zagreb groups. It is hard to specifically define the style of Azra. Although it has some punk elements, such as the extreme simplicity of the songs, engaged lyrics and great vigour in the performance, I think it would be wrong to put them in a box with punks. Catchy melodies and raw energy of the band seems remarkably good mixture. I think that Azra is the best example of New Wave adjusting to our musical landscape.182

Probably being aware of this review, interviewed by the same Sven Semenčić couple of years later, the band’s leader and songwriter Branimir Johnny Štulić argued that Azra was, in its idea, the first New Wave band in the country.183 Thus, if pan-Yugoslav youth culture, as several scholars have observed, emerged from Yugoslav New Wave, then Azra played an obvious role in this development.

Finally, in the context of the relationship between Yugoslav youth culture and the sense of Yugoslavness, discussed in the previous chapter, it is very interesting that Štulić was rather very explicit about his self-identification, declaring in an interview in 1981:

Yes, ok, I am Jugović (Yugoslav), but I have never been determined. I am mundane, I am my own, and that I love this Juga (Yugo-slavia) – that’s my problem... 184

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Now that we have established that Azra in many ways was synonymous with Yugoslav New Wave and youth culture of the 1980s, I will turn to geopolitical articulation in the band’s songs. Given that social actions are always larger than themselves and speak to larger issues and vice versa, I start by providing some further consideration on the country’s geopolitical position.

Having achieved substantial popular legitimacy through their position as leaders of the resistance movement during the Second World War, Yugoslavia’s new Communist rulers enjoyed more of a mandate to implement radical change than their counterparts elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe. However, the break with the Soviets in 1948 led to a fundamental reorientation of the country’s geopolitical position, contributing ultimately to the rise of a strongly Western-inspired Yugoslav popular culture. Although Communist leaders did not give up on their ideological commitments, with regards to popular culture, from the early 1950s on, Yugoslav socialism proved to be open, experimental and extraordinary amenable to practices and values that the political leaders of other communist states were much more likely to reject as undesirable ideological deviations.

Several scholars working on the topic of Yugoslav popular music in the 1950s and 1960s have emphasised how Yugoslavia’s particularity caused by the Cold War division of Europe led to the emergence of an image of the country being a Different East. In this context, Predrag Marković has argued that already in the 1950s and 1960s popular music was the most “Westernised” cultural phenomenon in Socialist Yugoslavia.185 Similarly, yet focusing on the establishment of Džuboks, the first rock magazine established in a socialist state, Radina Vučetić has argued that “Americanisation” of the 1960s Yugoslav society emerged from the ideological struggles and strategies of the Cold War Europe, of which popular culture was never immune. According to this argument, in order to retain the image of Yugoslavia being Different East, meaning indeed being different from the East, the Yugoslav press and literature dealing with popular culture regularly omitted the existence of Western popular music in the Soviet-dominated Central- and Eastern Europe. While at the same time overemphasizing Yugoslavia’s cultural openness to the West, they

produced an image of the country as being *The West of the East*. One of the most interesting results of the country’s openness to the Western cultural influences, Marković has argued, was that Yugoslav cultural products became “popular” and “overvalued” in Eastern Europe, as they were experienced as “windows” to Western cultural currents.

This was probably one of the main reasons why touring Eastern Europe was popular among Yugoslav rock bands. Thus just at the time as Punk reached Yugoslavia, the first Yugoslav mainstream rock band established in the mid-1970s, Bijelo dugme (White Button), went on a tour to Poland in the spring of 1977. The audience’s enthusiasm led other Yugoslav bands to follow. Soon after, Poland became a kind of testing ground for Yugoslav Punk and New Wave. Several of the most popular Punk and New Wave bands, like the aforementioned Yugoslav punk pioneers Pankrti or Šarlo Akrobata (Serbo-Croatian version of the name Charlie Chaplin, used during the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), Električni orgazam, Idoli (The Idols), and Otroci socializma (Children of Socialism) all toured Poland in the early 1980s. This connection with Poland was probably one of the reasons why Yugoslav bands were among the first to express support for the Polish independent union, *Solidarity’s* (*Solidarnošć*), in the early 1980s and protest against the Polish government’s suppression of the civil resistance that *Solidarity* initiated during the summer and autumn 1980.

Thus, in February 1982, two months after the introduction of Martial law in Poland (December 13th 1981) a concert with a very symbolic name, *Solidarity concert* (koncert Solidarnosti), was organised in Ljubljana. The concert was organised under the patronage of the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS), with the intention to show solidarity with *Solidarity* (solidarnost z *Solidarnost*). It is quite noteworthy, that all participating bands were either punk (Pankrti, Paraf, Šund, Buldogi and d’Pravda) or New Wave bands (Martin Krpan). The same year, Električni orgazam released a live record entitled “Warzsawa ‘81,” recorded at a concert during their Poland tour a year before, while one of the most controversial Yugoslav bands of the

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189 This support for *Solidarity* among the Yugoslav New Wave community was recognised by the Polish rock community in 2001 with the release of a symbolically entitled album *Yugoton*. *Yugoton* is a tribute to the Yugoslav rock scene, containing covers of Yugoslav rock songs.
190 For more see: Project “Slovenian Youth in the 1980s” – an official homepage at Ljubljana’s Contemporary History Museum [http://www.slovenskapomlad.si/1?id=9](http://www.slovenskapomlad.si/1?id=9)
1980s, Laibach (German version of the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana’s name), expressed their political stance in the song “Jaruzelsky.” The song satirised the new-appointed Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski’s statement that however unpopular, the authority’s handling of the situation was the only way to attain peace and stabilisation.\(^{191}\) In this respect, Natalja Kyaw has argued that even a distorted bass guitar solo, playing the Yugoslav national anthem “Hey Slavs” in the 1983 song “Pečati“ (“Stamps”) by the pioneers of Yugoslav noise rock Disciplina kičme (Spinal Discipline) could have been an allusion to the situation in Poland, as “Hey Slavs” also was Polish national anthem.\(^{192}\) Still, no band was as direct in supporting Solidarity and criticising the Polish government’s handling of the situation as Azra – the band that is at the centre of this section. At least in three songs had the band addressed the issue, while Johnny Štulić, the band’s leader and songwriter, openly criticised Soviet interventionist policy in Poland, in several interviews.

The first of the songs is “Poljska u mom srcu” (“Poland in My Heart”), a quite bold political commentary on the Polish government’s handling of the civil resistance that developed during the summer and autumn 1980. It is noteworthy that the song was released while the situation was still under development. It was released on the aforementioned LP Sunčana strana ulice, which was voted by Džuboks’ readers the best album of the year, in fact, very shortly after the introduction of the Martial law in Poland (December 13\(^{th}\) 1981). In the song, Štulić offers full support to Solidarity, stating in the opening lines:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Gdanjsk osamdesete,} & \quad \text{Gdansk [Nineteen]Eighty,} \\
\text{kad je jesen rekla ne.} & \quad \text{when the autumn said no.} \\
\text{Gdanjsk osamdesete,} & \quad \text{Gdansk [Nineteen]Eighty,} \\
\text{držali smo palčeve.} & \quad \text{we kept our fingers crossed.} \\
\text{Rudari, studenti} & \quad \text{The miners, students} \\
\text{brodogradilište, svi mi} & \quad \text{the ship-yard, all of us} \\
\text{Gdanjsk osamdesete,} & \quad \text{Gdansk [Nineteen]Eighty,} \\
\text{uzavrele tvornice} & \quad \text{heated fabrics} \\
\text{dva puta se ne šalju} & \quad \text{they don’t send twice} \\
\text{tenkovi na radnike} & \quad \text{tanks on workers}
\end{align*}\]

nisu se usudili they didn't dare
pobjedili smo, svi mi we won, all of us 193

From here, Štulić goes even further, and, by using words like “we won” and “all of us,” identifies with *Solidarity*. While expressing sympathy for *Solidarity*, Štulić at the same time openly criticises the Polish Government, questioning possible suppression of *Solidarity* in the lines “tanks on workers, tanks on us.” 194 In relation to “trećost” of Yugoslav socialism, it is interesting that Štulić’s sympathies lie with “miners,” “workers” and “boiling factories.” Yet, with the imminent threat of Soviet intervention, he warns, “Poland never, ever, bestowed quislings.”195 It is clear that he does not have much sympathy for the Soviets. This comes to expression even more clearly in another song from the same album, “Kurvini sinovi” (“Sons of the bitches”). Here he warns possible Soviet intervention indirectly, yet completely openly and rather boldly:

lutke od krvi bez trunke ideje puppets of blood without the slightest idea
ubice na cesti murderers on the road
loša noć bježim iz grada bad night, I am running away from the city
oni dolaze they are coming

kurvini sinovi those sons of the bitches196

As Štulić's biographer Hrvoje Horvat notes, “They are coming” was among Yugoslav audiences both understood and sung as “The Russians are coming.”197 In this context, I want to call to attention a theoretical argument, proposed in the introduction, according to the construction of a meaningful identity always demands a historical perspective on the music as a dialogue with both present and past. This is the case in regards of both musicians and audience.198 The point here is that the audience only could recognise Štulić's intention because the meaning of the song’s text was related to a larger issue and vice versa concerning Soviet interventionism, which in the historical perspective was related to the actual interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as to the

193 Azra, “Poljska u mom srcu” on *Sunčana strana ulice* (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1980).
194 Original: “pobjedili smo/svi mi” “tenkovi na radnike/tenkovi na nas”
195 Original: “Poljska nije nikad, nikad nije dala kvislinga” and
196 Azra, “Kurvini sinovi” on *Sunčana strana ulice* (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1980).
threat of invasion on Yugoslavia after the Soviet-Yugoslav split. In expanding this argument – in accordance with my methodological commitments to the approach of intertextuality – I will place the song in relation to other texts. These are two other Azra songs, several of Štulić’s interviews and the narrative of Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology.

The first of the songs is Azra’s first recorded, called “Balkan” and having much to do with political mythology. The sequence from the lyrics will serve as a point of departure for this argument:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Mi smo ljudi cigani sudbinom prokleti} & \quad \text{We are [like] gypsies, cursed by fate} \\
\text{uvijek netko oko nas dodje pa nam prijeti} & \quad \text{always, someone around us, comes and threatens us}^{199}
\end{align*}
\]

In this sequence we see an appropriation of Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology in a way that it became a bearer of identity. In this context, we need to remember that contemporary research on nationalism indicates that patriotism is always closely related to the myths of a nation’s origin and particularity.\(^{200}\) As we saw in the preceding chapter, Socialist Yugoslavia rejected idea of origin and particularity based on the ethnic criteria. Instead of a national narrative, the myth of her origin was based in what was officially labelled the People’s Liberation Struggle – the NOB. At the same time, as we saw in the preceding section, the NOB was depicted as a mutually integrated struggle against the Axis powers’ occupiers and an on-going socialist revolution. This meant that the NOB as the country’s founding myth placed Yugoslavia among the socialist states of Central – and Eastern Europe. However, the myth of the Socialist Yugoslavia’s particularity was grounded in the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 and in that regard the Workers Self-Management was seen as being the Yugoslav model for socialism, differing substantially from the East European state socialism.\(^{201}\) Thus, during the Cold War in Europe divided between two blocs, Capitalist West and Communist East, Socialist Yugoslavia attained a position of being neither of them. From this position of Yugoslavia’s geopolitical uniqueness, that is, Yugoslav exceptionalism, Yugoslav school kids

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\(^{199}\) Azra, “Balkan” (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1979).

\(^{200}\) Pál Kolstrø, “Procjena uloge historijskih mitova u modernist društvima,” Historijski mitovi na Balkanu (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 2003), p. 20.

\(^{201}\) Subsequently, from the early 1960s, the country’s position as one of the leaders of the Non-Alinement Movement and its only European member was integrated in the country’s myth of particularity, intensifying thereby the image of Yugoslavia’s exceptionality in Europe divided between the two ideologically opposing blocs.
learned in school that the country was surrounded by enemies, that they always should be ready to be attacked and that the neighbouring countries presented nothing but worries.\textsuperscript{202}

The above quotation from the song should be seen from this perspective – the perspective of Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology, not as a question of indoctrination based on fear production and geopolitical paranoia. Rather I want highlight the identity-building function described in the introductions’ section on theory, according to which myths are accepted by the members of community, not on the basis of their accuracy. Rather they work on a common narrative by which the members of community provide significance to their political experience and deeds. In the previous section we saw how the myth of the NOB and the Socialist Revolution formed the specific Yugoslav Socialist Self-Representation when contrasted with the Capitalist West. Here, in this section, I want to draw attention to this Self-Representation in relation to the Soviet-Yugoslav split. In that respect, it is important to remember that when comparing themselves to the citizens of the Western Bloc, and in particular with the Anglo-Saxon counties – as we saw in the case of Prljavo kazalište – Yugoslavs often boasted with greater social justice. Quite to the contrary, the relationship with the East Bloc countries was structured around the idea of Yugoslavia being the most free and most liberal socialist state. It is in this context that Štulić attacked the USSR and the Soviet Communism in several interviews given to different Youth and Rock magazines during 1982. Among other things, Štulić labelled Soviet Communism as “totalitarianism of the worst kind,” provoking an official protest from the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{203}

Yet, even before these interviews he addressed Soviet Communism. He did so in a song that came out just a few months after the introduction of the Martial law in Poland on December 13\textsuperscript{th} 1981. Calling the song “Proljeće 13. u decembru” (“Spring on December, 13\textsuperscript{th}”) leaves no doubt what it is about. In fact, the song presents a very bold criticism of the Polish government for imposing the martial law and suppressing Solidarity. It as well attacks government’s choice to side with the Soviets instead of with “own children.”

\textsuperscript{202} Teachers taught Yugoslav children in elementary schools that their country Yugoslava was surrounded by B.R.I.G.A.M.A. (Serbo-Croatian for concerns or worries). The word itself was made up of the initial letters of the names of the countries with which the territory of Yugoslavia bordered. The following letters represent the seven neighbouring countries: B-ulgaria, R-omania, I-taly, G-reece, A-lbania, M-adjarska (Hungary in English) and A-ustria.

The spring, even in December
the thirteenth
or at any other date

The spring stands behind the barricades
with raised hand
do you doubt your own children
do you think they don’t remember

Tell me, if they ask you for the road to Heaven
the fare must be high
tell me, if they ask you furiously
not hiding anything
not desiring nothing but life

What does one with just wiped out face think about
between the two smiles
and with the intention darker than the night
what does one think about while staring at your wife
a creature from nowhere, perhaps provoking you

Here “wiped out face” and “the intention darker than the night” have strong connotations to Soviet Communism. The former is contrasted with “Communism was with human face,” as both Yugoslav form for socialism was commonly described. The later (“the intention darker than the night”) relates to Štulić’s view on the Soviet Communism as “totalitarianism of the worst kind.” In common they also relate, at least indirectly, to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to quash the reforms attempted by Dubček’s Government. In this regard, Štulić would explain to Polet in 1986 that he lost all his sympathy for the Soviets due the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

However, after 1982, Poland and the Soviets disappeared from Štulić’s lyrics. That happened partly because Poland lost its actuality and partly because the situation in Yugoslavia had changed in the meantime. With the omnipresent sense of economic crises that had replaced the optimism of the late 1970s, Štulić also now turned more towards social criticism of contemporaneous state-of-

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204 Azra, “Proljeće je 13. u decembru,” Filigranski pločnici (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1982)
things that Yugoslavia found itself in. His lyrics would now address the issues concerning the deepening economic crisis and the growing social stratification in the Yugoslav society. With this shift Azra gained even bigger popularity among Yugoslavs and became arguably the most broadly popular among Yugoslav rock bands – crossing easily the barrier between mainstream and alternative rock audience. As Hrvoje Horvat argues, through his politicising, Štulić “worked on the audience as a form of a hypnotising spokesman who dared to say what they did not.”

It is quite noteworthy that in same respect, Horvat has also argued that Štulić, when criticising and mocking the Eastern Bloc countries’ regimes was indeed as much talking about the situation in Yugoslavia. In that case, stronger social criticism in the early-to-mid-1980s indicates a change in relation to the years around 1980. Judged by the unobstructed recording and sale of the bands records, it is reasonable to argue that Yugoslavia could now, a couple of years after Tito’s death, withstand even stronger criticism that it was the case in the late 1970s. In this regard, I want to draw attention to two 1982 songs, both indicating Yugoslav Socialist Self-Representation.

The first song is “Nedeljni komentar” (“Sunday Commentary”) in which Štulić critically addressed Yugoslav exceptionalism and the self-image of “trećosti” of Yugoslav socialism in a line that I use as a title for this section:

investicije su probile the investments have skyrocketed,
plafon troše se krediti loans being spent
svuda mnogo paranoje paranoia all around,
svi su do grla u krizi everybody is in the crisis up to the neck
a mi bi htjeli and still, we would like
da budemo centar svijeta to be the centre of the universe

As Dean Duda aptly puts in his recent article on Azra’s frontman, the line (“And Still, We Would Like To Be the Centre of the Universe”) leaves an impression of “Yugoslav exceptionality,” which emerged in the decades of geopolitical division of the world in two blocs. Even if it was without any real base, the idea of “slatka trećost” (“the sweet exceptionality”) played an important

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208 Azra, “Nedeljni komentar” Ravno do dna I (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1982).
role as an interesting “mental figure” in Socialist Yugoslavia, and is still smouldering in the states that emerged after Yugoslavia’s dissolution, as Duda further argues.  

However bold, Štulić’s criticism should not be confused with criticism of the exceptionality of Yugoslav Socialism, but rather with the state-of-things in the country. In other words, he did not criticise Yugoslav “trećost” from the perspective of being against “the system,” but against its decadence. This becomes more pronounced when placed in relation to the second song, “Tko to tamo pjeva” (“Who’s That Singing Over There”). The song is conceived as addressed to Tito. In the song Štulić ridicules Tito’s political heirs, yet clearly asking Tito, “what next, brother?”

| kamo dalje | what next |
| rodače | brother |
| iz pijeska vire krunisane glave | out of the sand the crowned heads stick out |
| što to rade | what are they doing |
| prde u prašinu | farting in the dust |


210 Štulić’s songs show a very articulate criticism of the West and the western consumerism. For instance in “Hladan kao led” (“Cold as Ice”), in which he criticises Western materialism (“klasni mir i slične trice,” that is, the thesis of “classless society and similar truisms”) and concludes that in the end the West is not all that good, but rather “ustajala žabokrećina” and “beznađe” (“stagnant backwater” and “hopelessness”). Azra, “Hladan kao led” on Filigranski pločnici (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1982).

In this respect, as Dean Duda puts it, it is clear that Štulić had it much better with the East, as the title of the discussed “Poljska u mom srcu” indicates. It is here Štulić feels at home, at his own territory, preferring “uzavrele tvornice” (“boiling factories”) and “nezavisni sindikati” (“the independent unions”) to the presumed peace between the classes and “stagnant backwater” of the West. According to Duda, it is so because Štulić wants to be where the change is — and that is in Poland. Dean Duda, “‘Užas je moja furka:’ Socijalistički urbani imaginarij Branimira Štulića,” Devijacije i promašaji. Etnografija domaćeg socijalizma Eds. Lada Čale Feldman & Ines Prica (Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 2006), pp. 113-114.

211 Note on translation: Directly translated the first two line would sound “Where to go further, cousin?” — Yet, in a Yugoslav slang “cousin,” in this context, corresponds to English “brother,” while the meaning of the question “Kamo dalje?” translates rather into “What now/next?”

212 Azra, “Tko to tamo pjeva,” Filigranski pločnici (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1982).
“Let the Tunes Go for the Nations in Love”

In the introduction to this chapter, I have argued against the nation-centric assumptions that see rock music in the 1980s Croatia through a prism of the allegedly suppressed but omnipresent Croatian national identity waiting for the fall of Communism to resurrect. From that point of departure, the two preceding sections have demonstrated why the study concerning identity-formation in Socialist Yugoslavia should not be reduced to a study of national identities. In this section I return to the situation concerning ethnicization of everyday life in the late 1980s Croatia.

Given that Polet – as we saw in the previous sections – had a central place in defining the scene from its very beginning and thereby also in the crafting of Yugoslav youth culture, it is important to pay closer attention to the journal’s stance on the nationalist euphoria that swept Croatia in 1989. This powerful manifestation of will of the people coincided with the release of “Mojoj majci,” which soon would become a kind of Croatian national song, giving the band huge popularity and culminating in a concert at the central Zagreb square with a biggest audience ever seen in the Yugoslav rock music history. In this situation, Polet published a lengthy article about the concert, stating indeed very clearly its view on the development in the republic. Overtly negative to the nationalist euphoria, the author of the article, Boris Gregorić, offered several indeed very insightful comments concerning Yugoslav Socialist Self-Representation and its relationship to nationalism. For instance towards the end of the article, where he addressed the issue:

We are left with a question, where the hell are we going and why are we – by we, I mean the children of Communism (on that issue see Jasenko Houre’s song “Sretno dijete”) – condemned to rush into the 19th century, accompanied by a huddle of mediocrities, at the time when Europe not only is rushing into the 21st, but seriously tends to for us unthinkable, transnational, non-national and mega-national societies. 213


Original text: Ostaje nam da se – barem u kolumnama – pitamo gdje to, do davola, idemo i zašto smo baš mi osuđeni, pri tome mislim na djecu komunizma (o tome pogledati ranu pjesmu J. Houre pod nazivom „Sretno dijete„, op. p.), da zajedno s gomilom mediokriteta srjamo u rano 19. stoljeće doista u času kada Evropa ne samo da juri u 21. vijek, nego opasno tendira ovdje nezamislivo utopiističkim transnacionalnim, anacionalnim i paranacionalnim mega-društvima.
Holding that our personal and collective identities are constructed through the process of building solidarity around common “we” and separating it from the significant “others,” it is quite noteworthy how Gregorić defines this “we” as “the children of Communism” and the “others” as nameless pile of nationalists (“the huddle of mediocrities rushing into the 19th century”). I will return to these “others” and Polet’s relationship with nationalism later in the section. Before that I want to pay more closer attention to Socialist Self-Representation that comes to expression in the article.

To begin with it is rather noteworthy that in defining “we, the children of Communism” Gregorić refers to the previously analysed “Sretno dijete.” This is a very telling example, because, as I argued in the first section, that the song addressed the issue the growing up in Communism already in its opening line, “I’ve grown up with the War films in colour.” In this respect, I argued that growing up with Partisan films had a central importance for growing up in the Socialist Yugoslavia in the 1970s. In regards of this issue, a very popular 1986 song “Rođen u Zagrebu” (“Born in Zagreb”) by Zagreb’s ITD Bend (The ETC. Band), indicates that the same was still the case in the mid-1980s.

Resembling very much Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the USA” musically, the song’s lyrics could hardly be more explicit in their reference to Partisan Film. This was not done with a general reference as in the case of Prljavo Kazalište (“the War films in colour”), but referring to a particular 1982 partisan TV series. Named very symbolically Nepokoreni grad (The Unconquered City), the series dealt with the Communists-led resistance movement in the Second World War’s Zagreb and was based partly on true events and persons and partly on fiction. In the song ITD Bend evoked the TV series in several verses. First, in the second verse, having it that:

noćne patrole me ne nalaze
traže me gdje sam da me nagaze
pitanje je rođen mali gad
nepokoren k’o njegov heroj grad

the night patrols are not finding me
seeking me, to trample me
asking where the little sucker was born
unconquered like his city of heroes

The text stresses the relation between the person, that is, the band’s singer (and hence, the band, as well as the audience), to the city in a way that their identities merge into one. Yet, in the context of this thesis’ focus on Yugoslavness of Yu-Rock, it is even more important that the next verse adds Yugoslavia to all this:
Born in the city, as the title has it, and identifying with it, as the second verse stresses, being “true” Zagrepčanin (Zagreb native) then become equated with Yugoslavia and being Yugoslav. The song’s pronouncedly Yugoslavist message should therefore also be seen in relation to a broader social context. Here it is very indicative that “Rođen u Zagrebu” is contemporary to the 1985-1986 research on the social position, values and social praxis of Yugoslav youth, discussed in the previous chapter. As we saw, the results of the research showed that more than one-third of young Yugoslavs claimed “Yugoslav” to be their preferred identity and almost two-thirds of them valued their national and Yugoslav affiliations equally.

Moreover, the research showed that 61% of the young Croats responded that they were Yugoslavs and could not give primacy to any other form for identification. It is interesting that a year after the research was conducted, a very popular song by one of the most important Zagreb New Wave bands, Film, released a song that corresponded almost verbatim to the results of the research. The song was called “Dom” (“Home”) and was one of the biggest hits in 1987. Film was formed in 1978 by an ex-member of Azra, Jurislav Jura Stublić. When asked about the song by a Polet journalist about the meaning of the song, Stublić responded quite similarly to his former band mate Branimir Johnny Štulić six years earlier:

Polet: Well, when you speak about home, you indeed think Yugoslavia?
Stublić: Yes, the song tells it. “There is only one place on Earth called home.” I feel this country as my home. It is my home.

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214 Trnje, Dubrava and Trešnjevka are Zagreb’s city districts.
216 In this respect, it is important to remember that not only Croats lived in Zagreb, nor were ITD bend’s audience necessarily exclusively Croat. Yet, the point here concerns the broader context of the development in Croatia in the period between 1985 and 1989.
217 Film, “Dom” on Sunce sjava (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1987).
Although Stublić’s pronounced Yugoslavism is not unimportant, I want to draw attention to Polet’s question, and assumption that “Dom” must be about Yugoslavia. It indicates that, although readings of musical texts are individual, the audience would assume that “Dom” is a song about Yugoslavia. The audience would assume it so because the meaning of song texts, as argued several times before, arose in relation to larger issues, in this case the idea of Yugoslavia as a home or a homeland. This indicates a rather strong Yugoslav affiliation among the Yugoslav rock audience, and Polet in particular.

This happening in the summer of 1987, just a two years before the nationalist euphoria swept across Croatia, supports the argument about rapidity by which nationalism rose to a central stage of Yugoslavs’ everyday life, proposed in the introduction to this study. Surveys on ethnic identification carried in the last half of the 1980s do the same. In this regard, we need to remember, as argued in the previous chapter, that these surveys led several researchers in the 1980s to conclude that the number of people declaring as “Yugoslavs” in place of an ethnic identity in response to the census questions on nationality would continue to rise. Yet, as I also stressed, this, however, did not happen. Rather the results from the 1991 census showed sharp decline, from 1.2 million Yugoslavs in 1981 to 700,000 ten years after. Regarding this decline, it is possible to locate the turning point to the period of the second half of the 1980s. In this respect, some researchers have compared two surveys from Croatia – one from 1985 and one from 1989 – and concluded that the proportion of declared Yugoslavs began to fall in this period. The results show that in 1985 10.6% of the respondents would have declared as Yugoslavs by nationality. By the time of the later survey, in 1989, this percentage had fallen to 9.0. Yet in accordance to my argument about rapidity by which nationalism rose to a central stage of Yugoslavs’ everyday life, I believe that we can narrow this development to the very last year of the decade, as the fall was most drastic in the period between after 1989. Thus, while the proportion of “Yugoslavs” – despite the being lower than in 1985 – was still higher in 1989 than at the time of the 1981 census (8.2%), by the time of the census

- Dakle kad govorиш o domu ti zapravo misliš na Jugoslaviju
- Da, pa to je rečeno u pjesmi „samo jedno mjesto na svijetu se zove dom” Ja ovu zemlju osjećam kao svoj dom.

in 1991 – barely two years later – shrank to only 2.2%. This rapid development indicates that the cause for the fall is to be sought in the years 1989-1991. They were the years of nationalist mobilisation and upheaval, pushing the Second Yugoslavia toward its end. During these years, the structure of interethnic relations was altered, resulting in ethnic polarisation. As the interethnic relations worsened drastically, producing less dynamic and more fastened identities the number of people claiming Yugoslav nationality plummeted.

It was in this situation that the song written as “To My Mom” (“Mojoj majci”) gain its popularity, not only for its original message, but even more for the line addressing the mom as “the last Croatian rose” (“Zadnja ruža hrvatska”). A late 1989 interview with Jasenko Houra, the author of the song’s lyrics, supports this argument. Asked by Polet about ethnicization of Yugoslav rock and roll, he explained that by that time, everything in Yugoslavia had become “national.” Accordingly, he argued, with a very few exceptions, the same applied to Yu-Rock. Asked further, if the song could be seen as “substitute for the previously forbidden Croatian national songs,” he explained that that was not his intention with the song. He wrote it for his deceased mom. Nevertheless, it soon gained quite a different meaning proving that the texts always acquire their meaning in relation to other texts and larger issues. The most important large issue at the moment was without any doubt the rapid ethnicization of every sphere of life in Yugoslavia.

Considering the ethnicization of the country’s rock music culture, I would argue that although Houra’s comment on the issue has a certain validity, not everything in Yugoslavia became “national.” In fact, in order to prove the opposite, we do not need to look further than Polet, what leads me back to the article by Boris Gregorić on Prljavo kazalište’s concert, quoted earlier in the section. As argued, the quotation clearly indicates an antinationalist attitude. Yet, the logic of Gregorić’s argument contrasts “the will of people,” as the Croatian nationalist describe the situation

220 Zagreb experienced similar fall from 8.8% in 1981 to 2.0% ten years later.
221 The common Serbo-Croatian term for ethnicization – also used by Houra – is “becoming nationally coloured” - nacionalno obojeno.
222 Mate Bašić & Zoran Simić, “Jasenko Houra: Ja ne mogu biti ban!” Polet 416, 10.11.1989, p. 31.
223 In fact, other bands and personalities associated with the core of Zagreb New Wave assumed a rather antinationalist stance. For instance, Darko Rundek from Haustor (Lobby) and the band Vještice (The Witches) that will be discussed in the next chapter. During the wars in the 1990s Darko Rundek engaged actively in work of Radio Brod (Radio Boat) which sailed in the Adriatic Sea, sending to all Yugoslavia in order to break through the media blockade made by the dissolution of the country. On Rundek see for instance Ante Perković, Sedma republika. Pop kultura u YU raspadu (Zagreb-Beograd: Novi liber/Glasnik, 2011), p. 61 or Branko Kostelnik, Moj život je novi val. Razgovori s prvoborcima i dragovoljcima novog vala (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2004), p. 241.
in 1989-1990, and the development in Europe “tending towards transnational and non-national societies.” Seen from perspective of Socialist Yugoslavia’s official nationality policies, promoting non-national Yugoslavness, and placed in relation to the reference on growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia, this argument becomes not only antinationalist, but also rather a form of an “anationalist” Yugoslavism, which I will discuss in the following chapter in relation to the scene in the country’s capital Belgrade. The point is, as the next chapter will show, that in 1989 Belgrade’s and Zagreb’s youth cultures had more in common than it is assumed in the nation-centric interpretations.

In the context of these interpretations Houra’s comment on the state-of-things in the late 1980s Zagreb rock scenes should be highlighted. According to Houra, while Zagreb was not lagging behind London in 1980, as the same the music was played in both cities, by 1989 Zagreb was “ten years behind.” In this respect, the interview leaves an impression that one of the main reasons for this development was that in the late 1980s people in Zagreb clearly preferred folk to rock music and that folk records were selling much better than rock. This is an indeed very interesting point, because, as Catharine Baker has demonstrated in her research on popular music and nationalism in relation to the nation-building process in Croatia, during the 1990s, the state-backed popular music broke down social reality and reconstituted it in ethnic terms by drawing on the depictions of presumed civilizational differences between Croats and Serbs. These depictions associated Croats with western rock music and Serbs with eastern folk. The discussed interview shows clearly and very much in line with Baker’s argument that neither Polet nor Houra shared this view as late as in 1989.

Finally, in the context of rising nationalism and concerning the relationship Zagreb bands had to Belgrade and Serbia, as well as to other nations in Yugoslavia, the song “Dobre vibracije” (“Good Vibrations”) by Jura Stublić and Film should be mentioned. In 1989, in the time when the media in Yugoslav republics were turning against each other, spreading nationalist and chauvinistic messages, they recorded a song about only sending good vibrations for Zagreb (Radio Sljeme) and Belgrade (radio Studio B) “for the [Yugoslav] nations in love:”

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Kad bih bio radio antena
Slao bih valove s vrha Sljemena
Na sve strane ove zemlje ludi ritam neka krene
Neka struje melodije za ljubav generacije
Dobre vibracije
Kad bih bio Studio B
Slao bih samo dobre vibracije
Na sve strane ove zemlje ludi ritam neka krene
Neka struje melodije za zaljubljene nacije
Dobre vibracije
If I was a radio antenna
I would have sent waves from the top of Sljeme
To all sides of this country let the crazy rhythm go out
Let the tunes go for the love of a generation
Good vibrations
If I was a studio B
I would have sent just the good vibrations
To all sides of this country let the crazy rhythm go
Let the tunes go for the nations in love
good vibrations\textsuperscript{226}

**Conclusion**

In its point of departure the chapter critically addressed the common nation-centric approaches to Croatian rock music that only focus on the manifestations of *will of the people* in 1971 and 1989/1990, reducing thereby the eighteen years from 1971 to 1989 to a uniform period of suppression of the Croatian national identity. In this context, the primary interest has been a specific *Yugoslav* Socialist Self-Representation created through everyday life in relation to the country’s unique position in the divided Europe of the Cold War years. In the nation-centric interpretations this Self-Representation is left out.

The discussion have shown that the sense of *growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia* of the 1970s and the self-image of Yugoslav “*trećost*” in the Cold War Europe, divided between two opposing blocs, played central importance for Yugoslav Socialist Self-Representation at least until the mid-1980s. In this regard, the discussion of the first section, based on the early Prljavo kazalište has indicated that those growing up in the 1970s Yugoslavia, grew up with a belief that they were living in the best of all worlds, which allowed critical production of meaning and different interpretations, not allowed in the Eastern Bloc countries, and yet at the same time provided better social security that it was the case with the Western Bloc countries. Although helped by the general optimism of the prosperous 1970s, this self-image could not be created without the country’s political mythology.

\textsuperscript{226} Jura Stublić & Film, ”Dobre vibracije,” *Zemlja sreće* (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1989).
From this point of departure, in the following section I have discussed the phenomenon of Yugoslav “trećost” in relation to the situation that developed during the civil unrest in Poland in the summer and autumn of 1980. In relation to this issue, I have focused analysis on the geopolitical articulation in the songs of arguably the most important band that developed from Yugoslav New Wave, Azra. The band’s engagement in the situation in Poland indicates a widespread support for the reforms in the Communist East during the formative period of the pan-Yugoslav youth culture that is at the centre of this thesis. This discussion has shown how the process of the construction of a meaningful identity required a historical perspective on the Yugoslav “trećost,” stressing again the role of the political myths in the construction of such identity through a dialogue between the past, most notably the Soviet-Yugoslav split, and the present situation in Poland in the early 1980s. Finally, the discussion showed how the crisis in the 1980s affected the self-image of Yugoslavia as the best of all worlds.

However, as the discussion in the chapter’s last section has shown, this development did not mean that the common Yugoslav experience of growing up in Communism disappeared with the crisis. The case of Polet’s comment on the rise of nationalism in the late 1980s indicates that this self-image was still, in the late 1980s, an important element in the construction of personal and collective identities. Moreover, the same case revealed that despite the general trend of ethnicization of the Croatian (and Yugoslav) rock several important agents of Zagreb New Wave assumed pronouncedly antinationalist position. Most notably Polet and Jura Stublić and his band Film.

Lastly, Polet’s comment concerning Yugoslavia/Croatia and Europe rushing each in own direction – respectively into the 19th and the 21st century – should be underlined. The view presented clearly indicates that Polet, which very much defined the pan-Yugoslav youth culture since it started brewing with the emergence of New Wave in Zagreb, now saw this development as moving in the wrong direction. This direction was the direction of the national, while the preferred direction – for Polet’s journalist – was rather the “non-national” one.
“This Is a Country For All of Our People.” Yugoslavness and “Anationality” of the Belgrade New Wave Scene

At the centre of this chapter is the rock scene that emerged with or from New Wave in the Yugoslav and Serbian capital of Belgrade. In this respect, the chapter’s primary interest is what can be called “anationalist” Yugoslavness of this scene. In analysing the revival of nationalism in Serbia in the 1980s, some scholars have pointed out how the Serbian nationalists accused the members of the scene for Yugoslavism and anti-Serbianism. As Veljko Vujačić explains, the nationalist were especially concerned with “the Serbian ‘anationalists’ of Yugoslav persuasions.”

In this respect, Eric Gordy points out in his work on Serbia during the reign of Slobodan Milosević that the growing popularity of Yugoslav identity, i.e. those declaring as “Yugoslavs,” suggests that people were seeking and finding an alternative to narrow national identity, and “Yugoslav” identity constituted one of those alternatives. As we saw in the previous discussion, the rise of this phenomenon was closely related to urbanisation, education, secularisation and the associated modernising processes. In this respect, it is hardly surprising that by the time of the 1981 census, almost one-eighth of all declared “Yugoslavs” in the country lived in Belgrade – the country’s capital and largest city and its biggest university centre. This was a clear overrepresentation in relation to the city proportion in terms of total population, which was below 5% or only one-in-twenty.

Given that popularity of Yugoslav identity and rock music was most widespread among the same portions of the population, it is not surprising that the rock scene that emerged with or from

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228 As Veljko Vujačić puts it, the Serbian nationalist saw Serbian “antinationalists” of Yugoslav persuasions as especially ominous, because “their excessive care for the rights of other nations is in fact a peculiar form of ‘anti-Serbian chauvinism.’” Veljko Vujačić, *Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sociology, University of California, 1995, p. 249.


230 There were 153,515 declared “Yugoslavs” among 1,087,915 Belgraders. The corresponding numbers for the whole country were 1,219,024 and 22,427,585. The city’s two universities were home for more than 76,000 students. *Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Nacionalni sastav stanovništva SFR Jugoslavije. Knjiga I. Podaci po naseljima i opštinama*, pp. 11-13 & 57-339; *Atlas Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije*. Ed. Ivan Bertic (Zagreb: Liber, 1987), p. 115.
New Wave in the Yugoslav and Serbian capital Belgrade time and again proved itself as not only pronouncedly antinationalist, but also rather “anational.” As such, it was from the beginning opposed to both the intellectual nationalist opposition that emerged in the early 1980s and to the later regime of Slobodan Milosević. Seeking ultimately to explain the “anationalist” Yugoslavness, the following chapter focuses on this anational character and the antinationalism of the scene.

The methodology of presentation is conceived in accordance to my argument on identity-formation process, presented in the introduction. Here I have argued that “identity” should not be equated with an explicit self-identification as a member of a particular group. Rather, our personal and collective identities emerge in a double movement of bonding and bordering, through a process of strengthening solidarity around common “we” and separating that “we” from significant “others.” From this point of departure, the chapter is divided into two sections. One dealing with bonding and another with bordering. This distinction between bonding and bordering should be understand as a strictly analytical distinction, as in practice, they are intermixed. Thus ultimately, in the conclusion I return to this distinction and offer some general comments concerning the “anationalist” Yugoslavness of the scene.

The first section stresses the interurban character of Yu-Rock, and pays special attention to the close contact that the Belgrade rockers had with other scenes in the country, most notably those in Zagreb and Ljubljana. This contact was indeed very important for the whole Yu-Rock scene. It became more intensive and intimate with the arrival of Punk and New Wave, and lasted throughout the 1980s. In this section, I contrast this development with the development among the political opposition in the Yugoslav republics, which were moving more and more apart, becoming ultimately rather hostile to each other. The section reveals that the contact between the scenes was very intensive and rather intimate; indicating that the youth in these cities rejected the politics of nationalism pursued by the critical intelligentsia.

The second section, concerning symbolic bordering, highlights antinationalism of the scene. Given that social actions are always larger than themselves, speaking to larger issues and vice versa, the section proceeds by setting out the context of the rising nationalism in the 1980s’ Serbia. This is followed by the discussion concerning the antinationalist agency among some of the central
members of the scene. Similar to the first section, the logic of presentation is conceived to contrast the scene’s antinationalism with the intellectuals’ nationalism.

“Belgrade in Zagreb” and “Zagreb in Belgrade”

In describing the revival of nationalism in the 1980s Serbia, Jasna Dragović-Soso stresses the link between Serbian and Slovenian critical intellectuals. According to her argument, the Belgrade critical intelligentsia, which had been most vocal in the criticism of the constitutional decentralisation of the 1960s, sought to establish a closer collaboration with critical intellectuals elsewhere in Yugoslavia. From the beginning they were rather disinterested in building any alliance with the opposition in Croatia. They did so because they perceived the Croatian opposition as being anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav, ever since the rise of the maspok in the late 1960s.

The Serbian attitudes towards the Slovenian critical intellectuals were quite different, and there were at least three reasons for that. First, the Serbian intellectuals stressed “the historical friendship” between the two peoples, meaning that there was no fratricide during the Second World War as in the case with Croats. Second, Serbia and Slovenia did not have any territorial quarrels or minority problems with each other. Finally, being the two most liberal republics at the time, the possibility to mobilise for a common action as Serbia and Slovenia was much better than in case with Croatia, which was, as we saw in the previous chapter, experiencing much harsher suppression of any kind of opposition. However, despite some initial success, in the next five years the relations between the Serbian intellectuals and their Slovenian counterparts developed rather in a direction that Dragović-Soso aptly has described as “marching together, moving apart.”

Here, in describing the development in the early-to-mid-1980s Slovenia, Dragović-Soso stressed that whereas the alternative movements that will be discussed in the next chapter mostly focused on social rather than national issues, critical intellectuals raised the national question in conjunction with their efforts to promote democratisation. The critical intelligentsia initiated a

revision of history, concerning mostly the communist period – what Dragović-Soso calls “a process of demystifying the past.”233 In their revision they stressed Slovenia’s connection to Central-Europe and distanced themselves from the Balkans, that is, Yugoslavia. In this historical revisionism, Slovenian intellectuals were not any exception in Yugoslavia. In fact, their Serbian counterparts went much further. Thus, Dragović-Soso argues that although the revision of the communist past affected all parts of Yugoslavia, it took on the most extensive and most radical character in Serbia, leading to an emerging anti-Yugoslavism that went beyond anything that had been witnessed in the post-Second World War Yugoslavia.234

I will return to this revision of history in Serbia in the next section. Here, my task is rather to draw attention to rising gap between critical intellectuals in Yugoslavia and to the interpretation of history based on this development. My point is that if judged by generalising from the example and agency of this minority that chose direct confrontation with each other, we can get an impression of the level of ethnicization in the Yugoslav society of the mid-1980s that does not correspond to the situation in the field.235 In other words, the fundamental question here is the extent to which this generalisation represents the life of the bulk of young Belgrades, and urban youth more generally. In this regard, Yu-Rock presents an indeed very interesting subject for analysis. Thus, in the following section, I will pay special attention to the intensive contact between scenes in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.

In this respect, a theoretical point needs to be highlighted. The theories of popular music emphasise that popular music is never only a source for the pleasure for its audience or for musicians. Rather, in their lives musicians and the audience alike use popular music for different personal and social purposes. Hence, popular music is a site or an arena for the negotiation of conflict and struggle over personal and collective identities. Moreover, although musical texts are very important for both musicians and artists, there is no direct link between the meaning of texts and the identity of the artists, because the sense of identity is created out of and across the processes whereby people are connected together through and with music. This is an important point in

235 I can hardly stress enough that I fully acknowledge the importance of critical intellectuals in shaping populations stances on Yugoslavism and nationalism, but as emphasised in the introduction they need to be complemented with the studies from below, in order to tell a broader story.
relation to Yu-Rock because it is commonly held that a connection between Yugoslavia’s three principal political centres, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana,\textsuperscript{236} was never better or stronger than in the period when Punk and New Wave dominated Yugoslav rock.\textsuperscript{237}

This however does not mean that such connection was not present or good prior to the rise of Punk and New Wave. Already from the 1960s in Yugoslavia there emerged a common rock scene with a “healthy rivalry between republican centres,” as sociologist and one of the central figures of the 1980s’ Yu-Rock, Pankrti’s Gregor Tomc, has recently put it.\textsuperscript{238} However, it was with the rise of Punk and New Wave in the late 1970s that the situation started accelerating and the communication between local scenes, became more intense and more intimate than ever before. One of probable reasons for this was that concerts were now held much more often than before, as Ines Prica stressed in her work on punk movement in Belgrade. Punk rock also introduced a more intimate relationship between the bands and the audience. Playing in small clubs the physical distance between the performer and the audience vanished and communication became pronouncedly direct.\textsuperscript{239} Very illustratively, Dejan Cukić, leader of the Belgrade New Wave band Bulevar (Boulevard), explained in 1980 to \textit{Džuboks} that the difference between earlier rock bands and New Wave bands was that New Wavers liked to be with their audience and that was the major reason why they played music.\textsuperscript{240}

In this respect, the close connection between Punk and New Wave should be kept in mind. Punk arrived in Yugoslavia approximately at the same time as it did in the non-English speaking countries in Western Europe, with the first bands – among others the aforementioned Pankrti, Paraf, Prljavo kazalište and Azra – being formed in 1977. It is noteworthy that all these bands came from the north-western corner of the country, from Slovenian and Croatian capitals Ljubljana and Zagreb

\\textsuperscript{236} According to Sabrina P. Ramet politics in both Tito’s day and for several years after his death was largely shaped by these three cities. Not even the decentralisation of the 1960s and 1970s affected their domination, but rather accentuated it, reinforcing their position of dominance even further. Sabrina P. Ramet, “Nationalism and the ‘idiocy’ of the countryside: the case of Serbia,” \textit{Ethnic and Racial Studies} Volume 19: 1 (1996), p. 76. The same dominance of this troika was a case with the first Yugoslavia – not least during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.


\textsuperscript{238} Branko Kostelnik, \textit{Moj život je novi val. Razgovori s prvoborcima i dragovoljcima novog vala} (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2004), p. 36.


and from the two major urban centres in the north-western part of Croatia, Rijeka and Pula.\textsuperscript{241} During the next two years punk bands simply mushroomed up, with bands now also being formed in the eastern and southern parts of the country (in cities like Novi Sad in Vojvodina, Belgrade and the capital of Macedonia, Skopje) and the first punk rock records being released. During 1979 punk rock reached its peak, giving up slowly for the supervening New Wave.

In contrast to Punk rock, New Wave sounded more diverse and was thus attractive for a much broader audience. As the discussion in the previous chapter showed, this division between Punk and New Wave should be taken with a grain of salt, as – not only, but especially, in Yugoslavia – the two terms are essentially interchangeable. This was the case not least because some of the first punk bands, like Gregor Tome’s Pankrti, had an incentive impact on the arising New Wave scene, while other bands either started as punk bands but evolved eventually into New Wave or mixed punk and New Wave in their repertoire.\textsuperscript{242} Finally, \textit{Džuboks, Polet} and \textit{Mladina} all intermixed the terms when writing about Punk and New Wave. In fact, it can be argued that the name of the legendary Yugoslav Punk/New Wave compilation that appeared in 1981 tells it all – \textit{Novi punk val}, that is, \textit{New Punk Wave}.

When it came to the communication between the local scenes, the practice of two or more bands playing concerts together needs to be mentioned. They not only did it more often now than ever before, but came often from different republics, and not only from the scenes within same republic. Thus, these concerts had the necessary potential for strengthening the sense of community across the republican borders. The concert reviews from youth magazines show that, in the initial phase until 1979, it was mostly bands from Ljubljana and the three Croatian cities that played together.\textsuperscript{243} However, from 1979, with the genre’s geographical spreading from the north-west towards the north-east, we now see bands from Zagreb and Belgrade or Belgrade and Ljubljana playing together. Moreover, there were even concerts where bands from several different cities performed together – at one occasion five bands from three different cities performed together in a fourth city, connecting thereby the scenes of four cities, in three different republics and one

\textsuperscript{241} These bands were Pankrti and Lublanski psi (Ljubljana dogs), both from Ljubljana, Prljavo kazalište and Azra from Zagreb, the aforementioned Parafi from Rijeka and Problemi (The Problems) from Pula.

\textsuperscript{242} As we saw in the previous chapter, this was the case both with Prljavo kazalište and Azra.

autonomous province. These are far from the only examples and this recital of inter-republican concerts can go on and on. Yet, the point is that more or less all bands associated with Punk, New Wave and their musical heirs played concerts and did gigs with bands from republics others than theirs.

The similar practice of bands from different cities and republics performing together was common at rock festivals held across the country until its very last days. These festivals developed from the festivals of zabavna music that emerged during the 1950s and early 1960s. As Ljerka Rasmussen puts it, the festivals of zabavna music emerged “as the single most powerful public forum for the presentation, production and definition of Yugoslav popular music,” serving as a measure of popularity and the centre-stage for the affirmation of songwriters, composers and above all singers. The festivals of zabavna music laid the foundations for the development of the sense of community in Yugoslav popular music, playing a vital role in strengthening of the interregional links. Radio-broadcasted and accompanied by the festival records, they were creating the unifying experience among Yugoslavs. With television’s live coverage in the latter 1960s even stylistically more regional festivals were turned into “national events.” Thus, in the 1960s the festivals became not only cultural manifestations, but Yugoslav cultural manifestations and as such manifestations for Yugoslavism, as one source in Petar Luković’s portrayal of the makers of Yugoslav popular music culture put it.

Rock festivals of the 1970s and 1980s continued this tradition. In considering Yugoslavism of the rock festivals, it is important to remember that they took place in the period in which, as Dejan Jović puts it, Yugoslavia was witnessing a struggle between the forces of integration and of

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245 Sometimes this connection was not only/directly related to the genre, or subgenres, but rather to other issues like gender. In this respect, a 1985 concert played by at the moment probably best three female bands in the country, Ljubljana’s Tožibabe(Tattletales), Kakadu (Cacadu) from Opatija, outside the city of Rijeka in Croatia and Boye (Colours, but also a pun involving the addition of a feminine plural suffix to the English “boy”) from Novi Sad. As Mladina wrote: “musically, the three bands had nothing in common, but gender.” David Tasić, “Yu-rock. Žensko vprašanje,” Mladina 21, 6.6.1985., pp. 38-39.

246 Zabavna music, meaning “entertainment music,” was a term generally used in Yugoslavia as an equivalent of western term pop music. In the beginning zabavna music was interchangeably referred to as “entertainment,” “light” and “dance” music. However, during the 1960s the term zabavna music became a semi-official term covering all non-classical and non-folk music.


polarisation. In this context, participation of bands from different republics at all of the big four festivals that made the core of Yu-Rock festivals is very illustrative.\footnote{These four festivals were: 1) \textit{Omladinski festival Subotica} (Youth Festival Subotica) held from 1961 in Vojvodina’s second largest city of the same name; 2) \textit{Zaječar Gitarijada} (Zaječar Guitar fest) held in the East Serbian town of the same name since 1966; 3) \textit{YURM} – YU [Yugoslav] Rock Moment hosted in Zagreb and evolved from the rock-evenings of the oldest Yugoslav festival of popular music, Zagreb Fest - Zagrebački festival zabavne muzike (Zagreb festival of Popular Music), and \textit{Boom festival} that was hosted in different cities in the period from 1972-1978 and finally 4) \textit{Novi Rock} (New Rock) held in Ljubljana from 1981.} A review of the winners and/or the participants’ lists indicates that all four of these festivals still in the last decade of the federation’s existence had a pan-Yugoslav character.

Festival records from the oldest of these four festivals, \textit{Omladinski festival Subotica} (Youth Festival Subotica), present an interesting source in this respect. The festival started in 1961 as one of the “great” festivals of \textit{zabavna} music, but transformed itself in the early 1980s – that is with the New Wave – into a festival corresponding better with the musical tastes of younger generations. Symbolically, the festival ceased to exist in 1991 – the same year as Yugoslavia fell apart. Until then, every year the festival was accompanied by a record of the same name, making it exceptionally attractive for the performers to participate and compete at the festival. The annual festival records for the last three festivals (respectively 1988, 1989 and 1990) comprised musicians from all Yugoslavia’s republics (as well as from autonomous province of Vojvodina).\footnote{Petar Janjatović, \textit{Ex-YU Rock enciklopedija 1960-2006} (Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2007), p. 303.} It is nevertheless noteworthy that Kosovo was completely absent from these festivals. In fact, a Kosovo rock scene appears to be non-existing. This is not unimportant in relation to one of the central arguments of this thesis that unifying forces like Yu-Rock were a rarity in Yugoslav society, where ethno-religious, linguistic and economic differences hindered development of pan-Yugoslav identities. Therefore, it is very indicative that the province, which was seen as the most troublesome in the country, did not have a rock scene at all!

Just like their predecessors, rock festivals of the 1970s and 1980s served as a measure of popularity and the centre-stage for the affirmation of songwriters and musicians. However, potential success was far from the only gain that artists could attain by participating at “Omladina,” as the Subotica festival was popularly called. The festival served as a platform for developing close friendships between participants. An interesting example are bands Idoli and Električni orgazam from Belgrade and Film and Haustor (Lobby) from Zagreb, respectively. These bands met at the Subotica festival in 1980, that is, the year of the President Tito’s death. After meeting each other at
the festival, Idoli and Film played together on several occasions in the years to come. They even became so close that they went together on an Adriatic tour during the summer, when much of the urban middle class from all over the country spent their summer vacation along the coastline.

In addition, as the aforementioned Zagreb’s record label Jugoton was number one New Wave label in the country, all four bands recorded in Zagreb. For the Belgrade bands the result was, as Idoli’s Vlada Divljran explained in Polet in March 1982, that he very often travelled from Belgrade to Zagreb, as he “lived in Belgrade and recorded in Zagreb.” The same year, a few months later, the frontman of Električni orgazam, Srđan Gojković Gile, responded to Polet’s question to comment on music of Paraf, Prljavo kazalište, Pankrti and Azra, that he could not give an objective answer, because they all were his friends.

In the context of being the country’s two major cities, the relationship between Belgrade and Zagreb’s bands was important not only for those two cities’ scenes. Rather, as Haustor’s Darko Rundek recently explained, “this relation Zagreb-Belgrade” was very important for the whole Yu-Rock scene. The sources indicate that there was a strong link between the two scenes. During the 1980s, both cities hosted a number of events in which the bands from one city would perform as guests of the bands from other city. Addressing each other, these events were symbolically called: “Belgrade in Zagreb ‘Greetings from Belgrade’” and “Bolje vas našli. ZGB u BGD (Welcome! Zagreb in Belgrade).” What they produced was a strong sense of community between these two cities. Given that individual and collective identities emerge in a double movement of bonding and bordering, this was a very clear example of “bonding,” that is, strengthening the solidarity between the two cities around the collective “we: Belgrade and Zagreb.”

As this was the country’s two largest and most important cities, the message stressing the symbolic community between them can never only concern Belgrade and Zagreb, but also attain a

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257 Dragan Kremer, “Bolje vas našli. ZGB u BGD,” Polet 312, 10.5.1985, p. 27.
broader Yugoslav frame “we: Belgrade and Zagreb, Yugoslavia.” In other words, the symbolic community between the cities inevitably expresses their Yugoslavness, without the need to even mention Yugoslavia. Finally, it should be underlined that although these examples cannot tell the whole story of group identities, they nevertheless indicate a rather strong sense of community between Belgrade and Zagreb bands, demonstrating that the bond between these two scenes was defined by musical tastes and preferences rather than by their member’s presumed ethno-regional affiliations or the republic of origin.

This sense of community even got its symbolic lyrical expression in 1989, when Električni orgazam's Srđan Gojković Gile released a solo record, including a song called “Zagreb.” As the lyrics show, this is a song about the ultimate friendship between friends from Belgrade’s (Gile and Goran Čavajda Čavke, also from Električni orgazam) and Zagreb’s (Massimo Savić from Dorian Gray and music rock producer and musician Ivan Piko Stančić, who worked with almost everybody associated with New Wave in Zagreb and Belgrade) rock scenes. It is an affectionate depiction of the city and nightly wandering around it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serbian Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanjam Zagreb grad</td>
<td>City of Zagreb in my dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celu noć i ceo dan</td>
<td>All night long, all day long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saćam se, razmišljam</td>
<td>Remembering, thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sve je bio jedan dan</td>
<td>One single day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čavke i Masimo</td>
<td>Čavke and Masimo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forte fortissimo</td>
<td>Forte fortissimo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ja i Piko hodamo</td>
<td>Me and Piko are walking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hodamo jer moramo</td>
<td>Walking ‘cause we have to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tramvaji su zaspali</td>
<td>Trams are asleep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bele snove sanjaju</td>
<td>White dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brije Zagreb grad</td>
<td>Freezing Zagreb city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zima osamdeset šest</td>
<td>The winter of ‘86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zauvek ostaje</td>
<td>In my mind forever 258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that actions and expressions do not exist in a vacuum, but occur in a particular context and attain their meaning in that context, it is reasonable to argue that the song is not only about friendship between musicians from Belgrade and Zagreb. In order to understand the broader meaning of the text, we need to contextualise it by placing it in relation to the larger issues as well as other texts. In this respect, it is important to underline that the LP was released in 1989, that is, the time of the nationalist upsurge and euphoria in Yugoslavia. From this perspective, a Belgrade New Wave band singing about their Zagreb friends and declaring love to the city in the last lines, all that released on an LP with a title *Evo sada vidiš da može* (*Now you see it is possible*) is very symbolic. Finally, “Zagreb” was contemporaneous with Yugoslavia’s last rock and roll film, *Kako je propao rokenrol* (*The Fall of Rock and Roll*). This film connected some of the central personalities of Zagreb and Belgrade’s New Wave, including Srdan Gojković Gile who made the music for the film. Because the film very much supports several arguments presented in this thesis, it is important to pay closer attention to it.

*Kako je propao rokenrol* is a rock and roll comedy and an omnibus film, consisting of three independent stories, tied together by a Master of Ceremonies of sorts named Zeleni Zub (Green Tooth), played by Dušan Kojić Koja of Disciplina kičme. Koja, who once was a member of Šarlo akrobata, also made a significant part of music for the film, along with Vlada Divljan (ex-Idoli) and Srdan Gojković Gile of Električni Orgazam. In this way, the three most important bands of the Belgrade Alternative Scene (BAS), as the Belgrade’s New Wave scene was called by its contemporaries, were united in the film. In fact, they were reunited, as these three bands constituted a trio that recorded the legendary 1981 New Wave compilation *Paket aranžman* (*Package Deal*).

This New Wave connection does not stop here, as two of the three stories were directed by former *Polet* journalists, Goran Gajić, who is best remembered as the journalist who made first interviews with Idoli, Šarlo akrobata and Električni orgazam and Zoran Pezo, who made first interviews with Haustor and Film.²⁵⁹ Moreover, Gajić and Pezo are also remembered for being engaged in the aforementioned visits in the early 1980s, in which Belgrade New Wavers guested Zagreb and vice versa. Gajić and Pezo were informing *Džuboks*’ readers about these events.²⁶⁰ In addition, there is an interesting *interfilmic* New Wave referentiality that needs to be mentioned. It concerns Koja, who is the main feature that binds this film (*Kako je propao rokenrol*) and the 1981

film *Dečko koji obećava* (*The Promising Boy*). *Dečko koji obećava* is a filmic symbol of Yugoslav New Wave, featuring music from many of the most prominent New Wave bands. In *Dečko koji obećava* Koja plays character named Pit, not much different from the character of Zeleni zub in *Kako je propao rokenrol*. This means that Koja appears in two different films in characteristically very similar roles. This *interfilmic referentiality* and the common cultural experience shared by *Polet*’s journalists and the BAS musicians very much resembles Martin Pogačar’s definition of Yuniverse, that is, the specific symbolic Yugoslav cultural universe.261

Yet, as the construction of a meaningful identity demands a perspective on the music as a dialogue with both past and present, we should also consider the meanings that arise when *Kako je propao rokenrol* is placed in relation to its contemporaneous texts. In this respect, it is very evincive that the film is contemporaneous with *Polet*’s critical articles on the rising nationalism in Croatia. These articles include the discussed text dealing with Prljavo Kazalište’s concert and their song “Mojoj majci (Ruža hrvatska),” as well as the interview with the band’s leader Jasenko Houra, in which the leader of Prljavo Kazalište argued that Zagreb rock music scene was falling behind the scenes in the West. As we saw in the previous chapter, *Polet* connected this “fall of rock and roll” with the rise of popularity of folk music in the Croatian capital.262

In this context, it is interesting that *Kako je propao rokenrol* makes the same connection. The only difference is that *Kako je propao rokenrol* deals with the situation in the Serbian capital Beograd. Thus, in the first of the stories, we are presented with a failed rocker, who want to prove to his father – a singer and producer of the Newly Composed Folk Music (NCFM) – that he can sell more records than father does. In order to do so he becomes a mysterious masked NCFM singer known as (Yugo) Ninja. The story ends with the rocker eventually accomplishing his task – what is presented symbolically on the map of Yugoslavia, starting with small ninjas faces spreading from town to town until the whole Yugoslavia becomes a ninja-like face. What this symbolism shows is the ultimate triumph of the NCFM and the destruction of all its musical alternatives.

It is noteworthy that the main character in the third story is played by Branko Đurić Đuro, who is associated with New Primitivism – a specific Sarajevan kind of New Wave that will be dealt with in the thesis’ last chapter. Here, it should be mentioned that the story and thus the whole film ends with Đuro performing a song with a very symbolic chorus, having it that:


Finally, in relation to the four scenes that this thesis is dealing with, as well as in the context of the discussion of this section, it is quite noteworthy that the film had its premiere in Belgrade and Ljubljana, what leads me to the relationship the Belgrade rockers had with the scene in the Slovenian capital. In this regard, I want to draw attention to a few very illustrative examples. They should be seen in relation to the development among the intellectual opposition in these two Yugoslav republics, which were throughout the decade moving more and more apart from each other, becoming ultimately rather hostile to each other. In contrast to this, the relation between the scenes in these republics became closer and more intimate than before, while the bands, the audience and the press showing much more desire to approach each other than the political opposition. In fact, using Dragović-Soso’s terminology, Belgrade and Ljubljana New Wavers were both “marching” and “moving” together.

As described, it all started with punk rock introducing a more intimate relationship between the bands and the audience. According to the punk pioneers Pankrti’s Gregor Tomc, as a novelty in Yu-Rock, at their concerts in Belgrade, the audience would sing refrains from the band’s songs in Slovenian. Similar observation could be made about Džuboks, which now started publishing Slovenian bands’ lyrics in Slovene. This meant that not even the language was barrier as before (or after). Arguably the oldest Ljubljana New Wave band, Videosex, sang mostly in Serbo-Croatian, while Zoran Predin, the leader of Lačni Franz (Hungry Franz) from Slovenia’s second city, Maribor, introduced a practice of explaining the lyrics in-between the songs in Serbo-Croatian.

In the second half of the 1980s, the Belgrade students’ periodical, Student, was rather very enthusiastic about the Slovenian scene, including the emerging independent recording. Symbolically in this context, Dragan Ambrozić wrote in early 1987: “Do Slovenians really have to

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268 In one of his articles on the scene, Dragan Ambrozić argued that Ljubljana Hardcore punk bands were “the real Yugoslavia.” Dragan Ambrozić, “Rock ‘n’ roll. Hardcore, ili: Šta se stvarno dogadja?” Student 7/8, 31.3.1987, p. 18.
do it all (for us)?” Finally, examples from Petar Janjatović’s YU Rock Encyclopedia shows, some musicians moved across the republican borders in order to play with local bands. Most notably, a drummer of an early Belgrade underground rock band Kazimirov Kazneni Korpus (Casimir’s Castigation Corpus), Dragoslav Draža Radojković, moved to Ljubljana to play in the arguably most provocative band of the decade, Laibach. It should not remain un stated that Laibach – to which I will return in the next chapter – was sometimes viewed as nationalist and a proponent of the Central-European discourse described in the beginning of the section.

These examples clearly show a rather high level of openness among the members of the Yu-Rock community and a strong will to engage across ethnic and administrative borders. This engagement would stay strong until the very last days of Yugoslavia. It is quite noteworthy that at the dawn of the 1990s, Srdan Gojković Gile formed a duo with Vlada Divljan (ex-Idoli), with a project resulting in two records covering Yugoslav children’s songs in rock versions (and a number of children’s theatre pieces). On the third record, released in 1991, Zoran Radomirović Švaba from Elektični orgazam and Ivan Piko Stančić, the aforementioned musician and producer from Zagreb, also appeared. Symbolically the record was named after a 1960s Yugoslav rock song “Lutka koja kaže ne” (an adaptation of the original song “La Poupée Qui Fait Non” by Michel Polnareff). Given that communities always were constructed symbolically by the meaning that their members give to them, this project indicated a strong sense of community among the Yu-Rock community in the time when Yugoslavia was counting its very last days.

Finally, concerning the argument that the sense of identity is created out of and across the processes whereby people are connected together through and with rock music, I have drawn attention to the concert activity. In the same respect, it should be mentioned that several bands were caught in the dissolution and the wars of Yugoslav succession while still touring what once was one country. One of them, the aforementioned noise rock pioneers, Disciplina kičme, were performing in the Istrian towns Koper/Capodistria in Slovenia and Pula in Croatia in a very tense situation after Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence in summer 1991, which was followed by the

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ten-days war in Slovenia and the escalation of a full-scale war in Croatia. Similarly, in April 1992, as the war was breaking out in Bosnia, while touring the republic, Partibrejkers were almost caught in Sarajevo, which would be completely besieged just a few days later and remained so for the next three-and-a-half years. These two examples clearly illustrate to which extent the war among Yugoslav peoples was unimaginable for those growing up in the 1960s and 1970s and participating in the pan-Yugoslav youth culture of the 1980s.

In fact, one of the most important bands that emerged from the BAS, Ekatarina Velika (Ekaterina the Great), caught this very well on their 1991 song “Idemo” (“Let’s Go”). In its first verse, the song depicts pleasant everyday situation of a couple waking up together, before the girlfriend announces that the war has started:

Ona sanja da sam oprao ruke, She is dreaming, that I’ve washed my hands
Da sam obrijan, da sam lep. That I’ve shaved, that I’m handsome
Toplo je na jastuku, u polusnu. It’s warm on the pillow, half asleep
Miriše na doručak. It smells like breakfast
Prijatan glas iz druge sobe se javlja, A nice voice from another room arises
Kaže da je počelo. Saying it has started

In the latter verses, we are presented with the war with references to blood in the river and burnt villages:

Nismo znali da je kocka bačena. We didn’t know that the dice were rolled
Nismo znali da je srušen most. We didn’t know that the bridge was knocked down
Reka blista ispod čizama, The river sparkles beneath the boots
Čista voda, malo krvava. Clear water, a little bloody
Nismo znali da su sela spaljena. We didn’t know that the villages were burned down
Nismo znali da je vatra greh. We didn’t know that the fire was a sin

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271 This proved to be the band’s last concert as the band’s leader Dušan Kojić Koja left for London, UK shortly after. Ante Perković, Sedna republika. Pop kultura u YU raspadu (Novi liber/Glasnik, Zagreb-Beograd, 2011), p. 53.
273 Before it changed the name into Ekatarina Velika, the band was called Ekatarina II (Ekaterina the Second).
However, the band is not passive, as it rather calls for action, announcing indeed what they would soon become – one of the central anti-war bands in the whole country:

Naše ruke nisu vezane, Our hands are not tied
Naše ruke nisu bludnice. Our hands are not sinners
Idemo! Let’s go!

“Do You Believe Me, or You Think for Yourself?”

The previous section demonstrates that Yu-Rock, and the Belgrade rockers, offered an alternative to the rising nationalism in the country, functioning as a force of integration to the last days of Yugoslavia. For this reason, the Serbian nationalists did not offer much sympathy for the Belgrade rockers. The nationalists’ attitude towards rock and roll came very clearly to expression in Dobrica Ćosić’s diaries written during the 1980s. Dobrica Ćosić is a writer and the very central person of the new Serbian Nationalism of the 1980s. In the diaries, he directed his criticism towards the Belgrade rockers in a very particular way:

[Yugoslavism in its “evil incarnation” is] “an expression of a political parvenu mentality, of snobbery of a part of rock-and-roll generation, of the cosmopolitanism of liberal intellectuals; of legitimate and ‘progressivist’ and ‘democratic’ mask for anationality and anti-Serbianism.”

This quotation provides a very interesting frame for this section’s analysis of the scene’s “anationalist” Yugoslavness by linking rock and roll, cosmopolitanism and “anationality” to Yugoslavism. However, before proceeding to this discussion, some further comments on the context concerning the rise of nationalism in Serbia in the 1980s need to be set out.

In discussing the Yugoslav breakup, several scholars have emphasised the importance of economic hardship in the 1980s for the upsurge of nationalism in the country.\textsuperscript{276} In this regard, it should be mentioned that the country suffered heavily under the Second World War and was prior to the war one of the least developed countries in Europe. The (re)building of the country’s economy after the war was interrupted already in 1948 with the socialist countries’ economic blockade following the Soviet-Yugoslav split. However, after five years of economic stagnation, from the mid-1950s Yugoslavia experienced rapid modernisation, a steady rise in the standard of living and two and a half decades of uninterrupted economic growth, with one of the highest growth rates in the world during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{277} The feeling of living in a functioning and increasingly prosperous country boosted Yugoslavs with optimism, satisfaction and self-confidence.\textsuperscript{278} With the economic prosperity of the 1970s, the controversies related to the constitutional decentralisation of the late 1960s seemed to have lost their importance. Thus, it seemed that in accordance to the communist authorities’ expectations, economic development and the accompanying modernising processes seemed to be weakening the political force of nationalism.\textsuperscript{279} However, by the late 1970s, the first signs of the economic crisis became apparent, and by the early 1980s the country was in a serious economic crisis. The optimism of the 1960s and 1970s was replaced by gloom, pessimism and resignation.\textsuperscript{280}

In this situation the economic downturn was increasingly being identified with a particular republics or a region (most notably Serbia, Kosovo and the Krajina region in Croatia). The consequence was the deepened sense of dissatisfaction: in the crisis-ravaged regions people started

\textsuperscript{276} For instance, this argument is central in the following works: Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia. Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (London-New York: Verso, 1993), Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington D.C. 1995) or John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), as well as in Patrick Hyder Patterson’s very innovative analysis focusing on the rise of consumerism and Yugoslav (consumerist) dream, as the central integrative factor in the Yugoslav society, Patrick Hyder Patterson, Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011).


seeing themselves as victims of unfair development policies, while in the more well-off regions (especially in Slovenia) dissatisfaction was centred on their presumable exploitation by transfers of wealth to the poorer regions.\textsuperscript{281} In this atmosphere the intellectuals increasingly began questioning previously widely accepted political myths about the resistance movement during the Second World War, socialist revolution, Yugoslav exceptionalism and \textit{Yugoslavism} itself.\textsuperscript{282}

Thus, in the early 1980s, with the rise of discontent with the country’s economic situation accompanied by the country’s political mythology losing much of its explanatory authority among Yugoslav populace, the country experienced the emergence of historical revisionism, examining and reconsidering the basic principles of the society. The Yugoslav media dubbed the situation “the outburst of history” in the early-to-mid-1980s, while historians, like for instance Jasna Dragović-Soso, have since ascribed it a central role in the revival of nationalism in 1980s Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{283} As mentioned in the previous chapter, this emerging historical revisionism concerned mostly the communist period. It affected all parts of the country, yet, as Dragović-Soso argues, it took on the most extensive and most radical character in Serbia. In this situation Serbia experienced an emerging anti-Yugoslavism and the rise of nationalism that went beyond anything that had been witnessed in the post-Second World War Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{284}

The Serbian revisionist historiography questioned the official narrative of the NOB, according to which all national groups of Yugoslavia had made an equal contribution to the war effort. Stressing that Serbs bore the brunt of the war, the revisionists once again addressed the controversies of the constitutional decentralisation of the late 1960s, embodied in the 1974 Constitution. As they saw it, the Constitution unjustly punished Serbs, leaving them without autonomy in the areas where they (either historically or at the moment) constituted the majority in the republic of Croatia, while at the same time awarding Albanians, whom they saw as being on

\textsuperscript{284}Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘\textit{Saviours of the Nation’. Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism.} (McGill Queens University Press, Montréal, 2002), pp. 77-78.
“the wrong side” during the war, with a full autonomy in the republic of Serbia.\textsuperscript{285} Arguably the most radical view was presented by Kosta Čavoški, a professor at the University of Belgrade’s Law School. In 1986, he addressed the very principles of the designing of the Yugoslav federation at the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in 1943. Arguing that by giving autonomy to Vojvodina and Kosovo, it left Serbia “proper” with borders similar to those of the occupied Serbia during the Second World War. Čavoški hence drew a parallel between the treatment of Serbs by Nazi Germany and the Yugoslav Communists.\textsuperscript{286}

Yet, the overwhelming sense of disappointment with a common state among the intellectuals was probably best expressed by Dobrica Ćosić, who was, as already stated, the very central person of the new Serbian Nationalism and often called “the Father of the Nation.” In his 1982 article collection, Ćosić implied that Yugoslavia was a wrong solution for Serbs from the beginning, and that they should have created a greater Serbian state at the end of the First World War, instead of creating Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{287} Combined with this “outburst of history,” the grievances about uneven economic development, presumably most unfavourable to Serbia and the Serbian populated areas in other republics, enhanced the idea of Serbs being victims of their own Yugoslavism.

It is rather noteworthy, that the issues addressed in the leaked 1986 \textit{Memorandum} of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) correspond quite precisely to the views expressed by Ćosić and Čavoški.\textsuperscript{288} The appearance of the \textit{Memorandum} and its Slovenian counterpart, \textit{The Contribution for a Slovenian National Programme} publicised a few months later in early 1987, present the central point in Yugoslavia’s contemporary history and a milestone for the rise of nationalism all over Yugoslavia. The appearance of these two competing national programmes marked the final rift between Serbian and Slovenian intellectual oppositions and initiated rapid \textit{ethnicization} of Yugoslav politics and cultural life. However, while by the mid-1980s the Serbian

\textsuperscript{285} This view is in particular associated with Kosta Čavoški. See Jasna Dragović-Soso, \textit{‘Saviours of the Nation’. Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism}. (McGill Queens University Press, Montréal, 2002), p. 85.

\textsuperscript{286} Jasna Dragović-Soso, \textit{‘Saviours of the Nation’. Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism}. (McGill Queens University Press, Montréal, 2002), pp. 84-85.


This maxim is not to be confused with the one from 1989 interview, in which Ćosić expressed that “Serbs (always) win in war and lose in peace.” Slavoljub Đukić, \textit{Čovek u svom vremenu. Razgovori sa Dobricom Ćosić} (Belgrade, 1989), pp. 236, 336 – here from Mahmutčehajić, ibid.

\textsuperscript{288} For this reason, Ćosić is generally assumed to have been the principal author of the Memorandum.
critical intelligentsia – with its rather bold anti-Yugoslavism – had set the stage for a protracted nationalist conflict in the country, the readings of Belgrade’s youth culture indicate the presence of a rather very direct and open critique and massive rejection of the politics of nationalism pursued by the critical intellectuals. Focusing on the bands that emerged from the BAS, the remainder of this section will explore this rejection and criticism.

Probably the best starting point is the 1987 song “Zemlja” (“Country”) by Ekatarina Velika. It was released on one of the most successful alternative albums in Yugoslavia, symbolically entitled Ljubav (Love), turning thereby EKV, as the band’s name was commonly shortened, into a mainstream band. It was written by yet another of the leading personalities of Yugoslav Punk and New Wave, the band’s frontman, Milan Mladenović (ex-Šarlo Akrobata), who would later became a symbol of the anti-war movement in Belgrade and Yugoslavia. As a recent study of Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav popular culture emphasises, “Zemlja” needs to be recognised as “one of the biggest patriotic, or better said, peace anthems of Yu-Rock ever.”

The first verse of the song very much supports this argument:

Ovo je zemlja za nas
This is a country for us
Ovo je zemlja za sve naše ljude
This is a country for all our people
Ovo je kuća za nas
This is a house for us
Ovo je kuća za svu našu decu
This is a house for all our children
Pogledaj me, o pogledaj me
Take a look at me, oh look at me
Očima deteta
With the eyes of a child

Two things instantly come to mind in this verse: cosmopolitanism and pacifism. Cosmopolitanism is clearly expressed in the lines “the country for all our people” and “the house for all our children,” while a strong flavour of pacifism is added in the last two lines (“Look at me, oh look at me / with the eyes of a child”). Finally, they are both linked to the title, “Zemlja” (“Country”), which, although not stating it directly, clearly refers to Yugoslavia. This is anything

but innocent message in the period of rising nationalism and its exclusivist rhetoric, which stands in stark contrast to a message of the country being for all its people.

In the context of the intellectuals’ nationalist rhetoric, it is important also to consider a broader context of rock music culture. The relationship between youth rock culture and nationalism in Late Socialist Yugoslavia corresponded largely to those in the West. Travelling around the country, visiting concerts and festivals, meeting peers from other republics fostered a sense of community among musicians and their fans. Still, Yugoslavia’s multinational composition made the country exceptional, as the universalist rock ethic, standing clearly in contrast to nationalism and ethnic intolerance, corresponded to the proclaimed policy of equality among Yugoslav national groups and the ideological axiom of “brotherhood and unity.”

This was one of the probable reasons why the Yugoslav socialist state did not only tolerated rock music, but also engaged actively in its promotion from the very beginning. The result of this Yugoslav particularity is that it is analytically impossible to determine the extent to which the cosmopolitan and antinationalist character of Yu-Rock had to do with the country’s identity policy. Seen from another side, the same thing could be said differently: it is hard to infer if it was rock music’s inherited universalism, its international origin and attachment to the international music trends that “protected” Yu-Rock from falling into nationalist exclusionism. However, the point is precisely that this distinction was unimportant for the Belgrade rock community, because the Belgrade rock community equated its Yugoslavism with cosmopolitanism. “Zemlja” is clearly an example of this practice. Moreover, pacifism of the band – which would become even more pronounced in the subsequent years – should be placed in the context of militarism expressed not least in Dobrica Ćosić’s maxim of Serbs winning in war and losing in peace. I will return shortly to the band’s pacifism. Here, I want to stress yet another point concerning cosmopolitanism and the “anationalist” Yugoslav persuassions of the band’s – or rather of its leader and songwriter, Milan Mladenović.


292 This is an argument that can among others be associated with Zoran Janjetović, who has argued that this is an indeed quite important characteristic of Yugoslav rock and roll. Baker’s book shows that in her work on post-Yugoslav Croatia that rock can easily become exclusivista and nationalist. Zoran Janjetović, Od “Internacionale” do komercijale: Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011), p. 165.
Given that only singular human narrating bodies can tell the stories of group identities and given that Milan Mladenović is one of the central personalities of the rock scene that emerged from the BAS, Mladenović’s life story also presents an interesting subject in the context of this study. A child of the so-called mixed-parentage, Mladenović was born in Zagreb. After six years, the Mladenović family moved to Sarajevo, where Milan spent another six years, before finally moving to Belgrade and becoming one of the leading personalities of the city’s emerging alternative scene in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, EKV released their three first, more alternative, records on the Ljubljana label ZKP RTV Ljubljana.

Thus, all four cities and their rock scenes that I discuss in this thesis are connected in the life story of Mladenović. Living and working in different Yugoslav republics is probably what made Mladenović so pronouncedly “anational” and cosmopolitan Yugoslav. What is even more interesting is that the life story of Azra’s Branimir Johnny followed similar pattern, as Štulić was born in Skopje, Macedonia and lived there seven years before moving to a small town close to Zagreb and finally to Zagreb during his teens. Štulić’s Yugoslavism and cosmopolitanism were discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, in the next chapter we will see that one of those alternative bands in the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana, that was most strongly opposed to the rising Slovene nationalism in the late 1980s, also shared this cosmopolitanism. The band was called Borghesia and was formed by two students from the city of Pula in the Croatian part of Istria, who moved to Ljubljana to study. Although it is hard to infer actual reason for their cosmopolitanism from their life stories, if there is a relationship, however, it is reasonable to hypothesise that moving between different regions of the country made these musicians more sceptical of the nationalist exclusiveness. Thus, if Milan Mladenović’s life story tells us something about the Belgrade rock scene and Yu-Rock more generally, it is certainly a story of the “anationalist” and cosmopolitan Yugoslavness. Although being a symbol of antinationalism, Mladenović was far from an exception among the Belgrade rockers.

293 Before EKV, Mladenović was a member of the legendary BAS band Šarlo akrobata.
294 ZKP RTV LJ stands for “Založba kaset in plošč Radiotelevizije Ljubljana” (Literally, Publishing label for tapes and LPs RTV Ljubljana.
A year after “Zemlja” had been released, another band strongly associated with the BAS, the aforementioned Električni orgazam, sent a similar message in one of their biggest hits ever, “Igra R’N’R cela Jugoslavija.” In the song, the band did not only link rock and roll and Yugoslavia, but also related it to the rising nationalism in the country, warning against the nationalist mobilisation that was on the way. This comes most clearly to expression in the following lines:

Neka tvoja glava bude samo tvoja briga,  
Let your mind be only your concern,  
Nedaj da joj govore, neka sama otkrije.  
Don’t let anybody tell you, discover by yourself.297

These lines concern very much the band’s rejection to subsume to nationalist discourse that was sweeping through Yugoslavia at that moment. In an interview to Polet, the band’s leader, Srđan Gojković Gile explained that despite the title, the song was not only about dancing to rock and roll, but was indeed very political, with lyrics clearly showing the band’s commitments.298 The logic of connecting rock and roll, Yugoslavia and this rejection, clearly indicate the band’s “anationalist” Yugoslavness. This impression is further strengthened when seen in relation to their engagement with Zagreb bands, discussed in the previous section. There is little doubt left that it was actions like these that made Dobrica Ćosić address the “snobbery of a part of [the] rock-and-roll generation,” which he accused for “anti-Serbianism” and “evil Yugoslavism” and which he defined by its “anationality.”

Yet another example of the same “snobbery” is the 1989 song “Hipnotisana gomila” (“Hypnotised Crowd”) by the garage rock band Partibrejkers (a transliteration for Party breakers) – yet another central band that emerged from Belgrade New Wave scene. Being one of the band’s most popular songs, it could hardly be clearer in its message and needs to be presented in its entirety:

Mi ne idemo nikud i ne radimo ništa  
We are not going anywhere or doing anything  
Mi smo jedna velika hipnotisana gomila  
We are one big hypnotised crowd  
Al’ ja znam ključ ja poznajem tu bravu  
But I do know the key I do know the lock  
Otključaću i staviću ti svašta u glavu  
I will release the lock it and put all kind of ideas in your head

The chorus asking, “do you believe me, or you think for yourself,” clearly indicates the band’s stance against nationalist mobilisation (“I can wake you up”) that was under the way in 1989. This mobilisation came as a culmination of the development that started with first mass rallies in Serbian towns and cities and the leaking of the SANU Memorandum in 1986, followed by Slobodan Milošević’s ascendance to power in 1987, before ending in “the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution.” “The Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution” refers to the “happenings of the people.” Despite their name these “happenings of the people” were in fact organised protests, which resulted in the replacement of the regional governments in Vojvodina and Montenegro with Milošević’s political allies. Rejecting to side with the nationalists, warning against nationalist manipulation, and touring the country to it very last days, indicate that Partibrejkers remained undeclared and “anational” to the very last days of Yugoslavia.

In the early 1990s, Along with Rambo Amadeus (aka Antonije Pušić), several members of these three bands became the most vocal critics of nationalist exclusiveness and militarisation of the Serbian and Yugoslav society. They engaged actively in different anti-war actions and created a band on its own, Rimitutuki (an obscene name), with the purpose to urge pacifism in early 1992. The band performed on a truck driving around in Belgrade’s streets and anti-war concerts. They

302 The name of the band has clear connotations to the English equivalent “Fuck You!” sending a clear message to the nationalists.
recorded a very popular anti-war song, called “Slušaj ‘vamo (Mir, brate, mir)” (Listen here [peace, brother, peace]), having it that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nećemo da pobedi</th>
<th>We don’t want</th>
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<tr>
<td>Narodna muzika</td>
<td>Folk music to win</td>
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<tr>
<td>Više volim tebe mladu</td>
<td>You young, I love you more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nego pušku da mi dadu</td>
<td>Than the gun which could be given to me ³⁰³</td>
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The lines “We don’t want folk music to win” are very interesting, as they – as a text – “speak to” larger issue concerning identity-formation and the sense of community. Given that people’s consciousness of community is encapsulated in their perception of community boundaries and given that these boundaries are themselves largely constituted by people in interaction and are thus symbolic in character, we can conclude that Rimtutituki’s significant “other” is folk audience, which is now in the early 1990s increasingly linked to the militant nationalism. In this respect, I have argued initially in this chapter that personal and collective identities emerge in a double movement of bonding and bordering through processes of creating solidarity around common “we” and separating it from “others.” These processes are always intermixed. Thus, in order fully to comprehend symbolic construction of community we also need to pay attention to the movement of bonding, that is, constructing and strengthening a common “we.” In this context, it is quite noteworthy that the lines very much resemble the closing lines of the closing song of the film Kako je propao rokenrol, which I have discussed in the previous section: “We don’t want to! We won’t give up! We will never surrender!” In fact, they could be seen as a continuous to each other: “We don’t want folk music to win! We won’t give up! We will never surrender!”

This intertextual reading needs however also to be placed in a broader context of rock/folk opposition. In this respect, it is rather interesting that the Belgrade scene always was most strongly opposed to any “folklorisation” of Yu-Rock. Thus, as Polet put it in 1985, while the bands belonging to the Sarajevo scene overtly flirted with it and the Zagreb scene was almost completely indifferent to folk, the Belgrade scene saw folk as a danger for rock and roll’s urban identity.³⁰⁴ In fact, the overall impression of Ines Prica’s ethnographic study of the youth subcultures in 1980s Belgrade is that the whole Belgrade rock scene was rather defined in opposition to folk audience. In

this situation, the specific political development in Serbia during the late 1980s and early 1990s should be highlighted. As both Predrag Marković and Eric D. Gordy argue, in this period a major political shift occurred. It meant that the previously dominant urban-oriented communist elite was replaced by a more rural-oriented and nationalist one. With this shift the rock scene in Belgrade became marginalised, but never lost its open and antinationalist character.

The project Rimtutituki very much supports this argument. It culminated in the autumn of 1993, when Rimtutituki and the full line-up of Ekatarina Velika and Partibrejkers performed together with the Zagreb band Vještice (The Witches) in Prague and Berlin. Vještice was formed in 1989 and was composed of ex-members of the New Wave bands Haustor, Azra and Film. In this way, three of four central bands of the Zagreb New Wave scene and two of three central BAS bands were (re)-united, similarly to the project around the film Kako je propao rokenrol four years earlier. This project around the 1993 concerts was meant to break the blockade that emerged during the wars of the Yugoslav succession and was entitled symbolically Ko to tamo peva? (Who’s That Singing Over There?). The question, “who’s that singing over there,” refers to the Yugoslav cult film of same name from 1980, the time when Yugoslav New Wave was at its peak. Moreover, it also refers to the previously discussed Azra’s song of the same name, “Tko to tamo pjeva.” With the concerts, the project basically asked the same question as Štulić asked in eleven years earlier: “What next, brother?”


307 Vještice were: Srđan Žljebačić Saher (ex-Haustor), Boris Leiner (ex-Azra, ex-Haustor) and Mladen Juričić Max (ex-Film). Thus the band was composed (in 1989) by the big three of Zagreb New Wave.

308 “Tko to tamo pjeva” and “Ko to tamo peva” are respectively the Croatian and the Serbian dialectic versions of the same question and intelligible for all Serbo-Croatian speakers.
Conclusion

Based on the preceding analysis, it is possible to argue – borrowing Vida T. Johnson’s wording in her description of Yugoslav film – that *Brotherhood and Unity* promoted by the Communist authorities indeed did take root within Yugoslav rock music culture.\(^\text{309}\) So did the Yugoslavness among the members of the Belgrade rock scene. This Yugoslavness was not seen or experienced as “a national sentiment in the common sense of word,” but rather “a sense of community,” as Predrag Matvejević puts it in the previously discussed *Jugoslovensko danas. Pitanja kulture*.

Thus, although the Yugoslav rock culture was to a certain level built and sustained independently of the state as communication within the Yugoslav rock community – musicians and fans alike – in many ways took place beyond the state’s effective control, Socialist Yugoslavia’s identity policies nevertheless affected it to a substantial degree. The Belgrade rock scene that emerged from the BAS had an a-national character and proved itself to be strongly opposed to Serbian nationalism. For this reason, its antinationalism and “anationalist” Yugoslav persuasions were closely related.

The chapter shows that the scene served as a force of integration, struggling against the fragmenting forces of nationalism until the last days of Yugoslavia, and continued to do so, even after the country’s dissolution. However, as we saw in the case of EKV’s song “Idemo” and the touring bands being caught in the escalating war operations, the members of the scene were rather surprised by the war, indicating that there is a problem in an assumption that nationalism has ingrained itself in Yu-Rock even before the wars of the Yugoslav dissolution.

I approached the scene by highlighting the double movement of bonding and bordering that the identity-formation process consists of. The analysis has shown that the scene constructed solidarity around common “we” not defined by ethnicity or territory but rather by musical tastes. Its allies were to be found among rock scenes that emerged from Punk and New Wave and their enemies among the growing folk music scene.

Moreover, in separating its “we,” Belgrade New Wavers clearly defined the “other” as nationalists. Through this process of separating themselves from the rising nationalism, their system of references was most often Yugoslav. Against these conclusions, it is reasonable that the Belgrade scene was most of all defined by its “anationalist” Yugoslav persuasions.
Of all Yugoslav republics, Slovenia was commonly thought as being most at odds with the multinational state. As we saw, the 1985-86 research showed that Slovene youth was least likely to give primacy to their Yugoslav affiliation above the national one. Similarly, of all four cities discussed in this thesis, the proportion of those who chose to declare under the category “Yugoslav” at the 1981 census was lowest in Ljubljana. Yet as Stef Jansen’s definition of the concept of “Yugoslavness” implies, Yugoslavness was not always openly “Yugoslavist.” Rather, it was much more about “open [inter-ethnic] boundaries” and the opposite of nationalism and nationalist exclusiveness. Thus, Yugoslavness should not be equated with Yugoslavism. From this point of departure, the following chapter deals with the rise of nationalism in the 1980s Slovenia and the Ljubljana rock scene’s responses to it. It concerns Yugoslavness as a discursive antinationalist space, as Jansen defines it. In this respect, the chapter proceeds from three utterances from the 1980s concerning Yugoslavism, nationalism and the relationship between them.

The first utterance is from an interview with Goran Bregović, the leader of Bijelo dugme and widely assumed the most important personality of Yu-Rock. The interview is from 1989 and very

311 “Yugoslavs” comprised 3.9% of Ljubljana’s population. The corresponding numbers for other cities were 8.8% for Zagreb, 14.1% for Belgrade and 20.4% for Sarajevo. However, even this percentage in Ljubljana meant that proportion of “Yugoslavs” was 50% above the Slovenian average. Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Nacionalni sastav stanovništva SFR Jugoslavije. Knjiga I. Podaci po naseljima i opštinama, pp. 11-13 & 57-339.
313 Among Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav rock critics Yu-Rock is seen as unimaginable without Bregović. For instance, according to Ante Perković, Bregović can be seen as the Godfather of New Wave, as the whole Yu-Rock scene was measured against his Bijelo dugme. Similarly, Petar Luković ends his port portrayal of Yugoslav Estrada with
much about the situation in Yugoslavia at the time, not about music. In the interview, Bregović – probably the most pronounced Yugoslavist on the Yu-Rock scene – touches a very important issue concerning identity politics in Socialist Yugoslavia. Talking about rising nationalism in the country, he warned against uncritical acceptance of the authorities’ definition of nationalism, because, as he explained, there was a widespread praxis in Socialist Yugoslavia to label any criticism directed to the communists as an expression of nationalism. When it came to Yugoslavism, things got even more complicated, because, as Predrag Matvejević put it in 1982, when speaking about the subject, there was “a well-known closed circuit, in which fear of unitarism [was] used in order to justify nationalism, while attacks on nationalism serve[d] as an alibi for unitarism.” A year later Mladina’s Mile Šetinc advanced similar criticism against pressing the Yugoslav national question into “a simplified dilemma of either nationalism or unitarism.” According to Šetinc, much of the debate about Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia in the early 1980s was about Slovenia’s “republican particularism” – defined by the author as a republic-based market and etatism – being major obstacle to a greater Yugoslav unity and even its integrity. In the interview, Šetinc attacked the defenders of Slovene nationalism, who claimed that the Slovene nationalism was a form of defensive nationalism. Turning this argument about aggressive/defensive nationalism upside-down Šetinc argued provocatively that nationalism that did not have muscles had teeth.

These three utterances stress the complexity of the issue concerning nationalism in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, and as stated before, more than well define the discussion set up for this chapter. Although focusing on Slovenia, the chapter deals with the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia in general. The first of the two sections making up the chapter concerns the relationship between the ethnic character of migrations in Late Socialist Yugoslavia and the rise of ethnic intolerance in Slovenia, as well as the Slovenian rock music culture’s reactions to this development. As Matvejević has argued, the rise of ethnic intolerance in Slovenia was conditioned by the increase in number of Yugoslavs moving to Slovenia in search of work and a better life, from the less

developed South-Eastern parts of the country. In this situation, the Slovenian rock scene – at that time dominated by punk rock – stood up against ethnic animosities and intolerance and proved itself as being pronouncedly antinationalist. However, that did not save the bands connected to the local scene in Ljubljana and their audience from accusations of being nationalist – in a manner very much resembling what Bregović told to the Polet’s journalist in 1988. The major difference was that in Yugoslavia of the 1980s even the music tastes and preferences could easily be confused for nationalism.

In the second section I turn to the so-called alternative scene in Slovenia’s capital Ljubljana that developed from the punk movement. Here I discuss the relationship of this scene to Yugoslavia and to the other local scenes in the country. The section is critical to the interpretations according to which Slovene nationalism was exclusively built on the momentum of the alternative sector – a sector that was seeking democratisation of the country but was isolated from other Yugoslav republics and therefore forced to seek its own path to democracy. I would argue that these interpretations uncritically accept the premises of the defenders of Slovene nationalism – premises not dissimilar to those Šetinc criticised in his 1983 article. Moreover, these interpretations fail to recognise that far from all pro-democratic forces and movements merged into the nationalist politics of the late 1980s. And the Ljubljana Alternative Scene (LAS) was exemplary in this regard.

“Ohm Ljubljana, You Are Yugoslavia”

As put forward in Chapter I, in the discussion about the Slovene youth’s attitudes concerning the relationship between Yugoslavism and national affiliation, it is very important to acknowledge that the vast majority (of no less than 97.6%, according to the 1981 census) of Yugoslav Slovenes lived in Slovenia, meaning that Slovenes were to a much larger extent concentrated in their “mother” republic that it was the case with Muslims, Croats, Serbs and especially Montenegrins. Of Yugoslavia’s six nations, only Macedonians came close to Slovenes, with 95.9% living it their

318 The corresponding numbers were 81.6% for Muslims, 78.0% for Croats, 75.9% for Serbs (59.8% without Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomous provinces) and 69.2% for Montenegrins. Ruža Petrović Migracije u Jugoslaviji. I Etnički aspekt (Belgrade: Radiša Timotić, 1987), pp.136-140
“mother” republic. However, while Macedonians – just like Montenegrins and Muslims – in search of work were moving out of their “mother” republic and towards more developed regions of the country, Slovenes were concentrating even more in Slovenia, the richest of all Yugoslav republics. Nevertheless, despite Slovenes getting concentrated in Slovenia, the population of the republic was actually diversifying and the proportion of Slovenes was falling. In fact, this ethnic aspect of migration was yet another of Slovenia’s particularities among Yugoslavia’s republics and provinces and needs to be elaborated, because it very much affected identity-formation in the republic.

Regional differences in economic development in Yugoslavia and the uneven rate of the development of different regions resulted in the three less developed republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro) and the autonomous province of Kosovo having a negative migration balance, with more people moving out of than moving into these regions. In contrast, the three more developed republics (Croatia, Serbia-proper and Slovenia) and the autonomous province of Vojvodina had a positive migration balance. This migration development had some important ethnic characteristics. In Croatia, Serbia-proper and Vojvodina the majority of the net gain in the period between the censuses in 1971 and 1981 were “immigrants” belonging to the largest ethnicities in these regions – that is Croats in the case of Croatia and Serbs in the case of Serbia-proper and Vojvodina. In contrast to this, in Slovenia, Slovenes made up only 4% of the net gain. The prime reasons for this were 1) that due to its level of development and very low rate of unemployment, the inter-republican migration to Slovenia was much bigger (in relative

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319 Several of the smaller nationalities (Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians), living predominantly in Vojvodina, had concentration over 90%. Ruža Petrović Migracije u Jugoslaviji. I Etnički aspekt (Belgrade: Radiša Timotić, 1987), pp.136-140.

320 In 1981, Slovenia’s GDP/inhabitant was 78% above Yugoslav average and almost six times higher than that of the country’s poorest region, Kosovo. “Pregled po općinama,” Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije, ed. Ivan Bertic (Zagreb: Liber, 1987), p. 235.

321 These numbers were as follows: In Croatia there were 30,938 Croats out of total net gain of 48,354; In Serbia-proper the corresponding numbers were 52,614 Serbs out of total of 58,339 and in Vojvodina 27,268 Serbs out of total of 27,335 “immigrants.” Ruža Petrović Migracije u Jugoslaviji. I Etnički aspekt (Belgrade: Radiša Timotić, 1987), pp.136-140.


323 There were 0.9% registered unemployed, while 66.3% of the active population (age 15-64) were employed. The corresponding numbers for Yugoslavia were 5.4% and 40.1%, with unemployment ranging from 2.6% in Croatia and 9.8% in Macedonia, and the percentage of employed from 21.4% in Kosovo and 47.1 in Croatia – showing how big difference was between Slovenia and the rest of the country. “Pregled po općinama,” Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije, ed. Ivan Bertic (Zagreb: Liber, 1987), 227-240.
terms) than to the other three regions and 2) that majority of Slovenes were already living in the republic, meaning that the inter-republican migrants were to be found among non-Slovenes. With the exception of the neighbouring regions of Istria and Rijeka-Kvarner in north-western Croatia, this was very much a Slovenian peculiarity.

Not unlike in the rest of the country, the largest part the “immigrant” population was unskilled workers and their families. The result thereof was, however, somewhat different in Slovenia than in the other republics and autonomous provinces, where “immigrants” shared presumed ethnic affiliation with the “indigenous” population. Given that ethnicity is not a fixed or innate category, but something mobilised and activated in particular circumstances, or in Gerd Baumann’s wording “a social construct that mistranslates relational difference into absolute and natural difference,” it makes sense to argue, as Predrag Matvejević did in 1982, that “in Slovenia the proletariat [was] more Yugoslavian than Slovenian.”

This ethnicization proved to be an important issue in the early 1980s’ Slovenia, as the growing number of migrants moving to Slovenia from the less developed regions of the country provoked a debate about their influence on Slovene culture and identity – not unlike similar debates in Western Europe in the 1980s. In the debate some viewed the unskilled immigrant workers – who in fact were the real “proletariat” in the Slovenian society, working primarily in factories and other forms of production, as well as in the service sector in the touristic areas – as a threat to Slovene language, which, as we saw, always was an important issue in the northernmost Yugoslav republic.

The result thereof was the rise of ethnic distrust and intolerance directed toward “Southerners” or “Bosanci” (slo. for Bosnians), as all migrants from the South often were called without differentiating between ethnicity or the region or their origin.

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324 The numbers of “immigrants” should be seen in relation to the total population, which was, according to the 1981 census, as follows: Serbia 5.7 mil.; Croatia 4.6 mil.; Vojvodina 2.0 mil. and Slovenia 1.9 mil. “Pregled po općinama,” Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije, ed. Ivan Bertić (Zagreb: Liber, 1987), 227-240.

325 It is noteworthy that both Serbia-proper and Vojvodina would have negative migration balance, without strong “immigration” of Montenegrins, which were often seen as a part of a same corpus “Serbs and Montenegrins,” indicating that the ethnic aspect of migration was not exclusively economically determined, but nevertheless further emphasise Slovenia’s exceptionality.

326 The case of Istria shows the limits of “analytical nationalism,” taking republics and provinces as ready-made units for analysis – Croatia in fact had both regions with strong out-migration (Krajina region) and strong in-migration (Zagreback region), with especially Serbs moving out of the Krajina towards Serbia and especially, but not exclusively, Croats moving towards Zagreb from outside Croatia.

327 Gerd Baumann “Culture: Having, Making, or Both?” in The multicultural riddle, rethinking national, ethnic, and religious identities (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 90.


In accordance with my analytical focus, stressing the necessity to approach the issue of nationalism (also) from below, I want to draw attention to the case of two bands, both very popular in the punk scene in the Slovenian capital in the early 1980s. Their examples are very illustrative here – not only in relation to the “immigration” and the rise of ethnic intolerance, but also in regards of the scene’s reaction to this development. These bands are Via Ofenziva (Via Offensive) from Ljubljana and Kuzle (The Bitches) from a mining town Idrija. In this regard, I use a 1983 documentary about the leader of Via Ofenziva, Esad Babačić Car, and two songs of Kuzle to illustrate the point. Babačić, the main protagonist of the documentary is a young punk musician in the early 1980s Ljubljana and a son of Bosnian “guest workers.” The documentary focuses on his personal story in relation to both his “immigrant” background and to his participation in the punk scene in the city. It has an indeed very cosmopolitan and antinationalist title: Vsek otrok je lep, ko se rodi – Esad Babačić-Car (Every Child Is Beautiful When It Is Born – Esad Babačić-Car). In fact, in several ways, Babačić’s life story can be seen as exemplary for immigrants and their descendants and could be as well situated in Copenhagen or Brussels. Yet at other points, it is clearly a Ljubljana and a Yugoslav story.

Being raised by a mother, an illiterate housewife, and a father, an unskilled worker in Ljubljana’s bakery factory, Babačić himself dropped out of secondary school and started working in the same factory, where his father works. This job is far from the most important component of his identity. What shapes his life much more is his participation in the city’s punk subculture. His subcultural identity as a punk makes him a “black sheep” in the immigrant community, which sees punk as closely related to hooliganism. On the other hand, a greater society is sensitive to Babačić’s “guest worker” identity. As he tells us, he could always feel that his name was an issue for his teachers, especially those belonging to the older generations, what in the end, he claims, made him drop out of school. Quite contrary, as he puts it, “the young are cool, they understand, ..., they don’t care.”

Although it can be argued that this interpretation of the age gap is generalizing, popularity of Via Ofenziva allows us to argue that at least in the punk subculture Babačić’s ethnic/immigrant background is not as important as his belonging to the punk subculture. His participation, and especially his popularity in the scene means that the members of the scene see Babačić as “one of them.” They all belong to the same subculture.

\[330\] Although being from Idria, the band was very close to the Ljubljana scene and can, in fact, be viewed as part of it.

While being a punk seems to be his most explicitly expressed form of self-identification, Babačić is also explicit in regards of his Yugoslavism. This is most pronounced in one of his recitations:

O Ljubljana, saj si Jugoslavija
oh, Ljubljana, you are Yugoslavia,
o, Ljubljana, saj si domovina
oh, Ljubljana, you are motherland
o, ljublančanka, zakaj ne ljubiš me
oh, Ljubljana girl, why do you not love me
zakaj kolneš me
why do you curse me
o ljublančanka, saj sem Jugoslavija.
Oh girl from Ljubljana, I am Yugoslavia.

Babačić recites these lines towards the end of the documentary, after his life story has been told. Immediately before the recitation we see the images of young punks dancing in the legendary Ljubljana punk disco, Disco FV. Here, Babačić is present as well. The next scene shows him sitting in an immigrant club, surrounded predominantly by middle-aged and older men, and reciting. This order of narration connects Babačić’s different identities, not only the subcultural (punk) and the ethnic/immigrant, but also the local (related to Ljubljana scene) and the Yugoslavian one. In fact, his punk and Yugoslav identities are merged into one—as punk tended to have strong local affiliation, which was not only the case in Yugoslavia, he is a Ljubljana punk, and as Ljubljana is Yugoslavia, he is a Yugoslav punk.

Babačić’s Via Ofenziva had the unfortunate fate, so typical for many Yugoslav rock bands: On the top of their popularity some of bands’ members were conscripted to the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA). When returning back from the service, they would experience other members being conscripted. Hence, when all members finally came out of the army, too much time would have passed and the band never managed to start playing again. One of the bands that shared the same fate was the aforementioned Kuzle. Yet before that, the band managed to leave a strong mark on the Slovenian and Yugoslav punk scene. In the early 1980s, in the situation in which they could sense a rise of xenophobia and ethnic intolerance, Kuzle explicitly and boldly addressed the issue in one of their most popular songs, “Vahid,” inspired by the US punk band The Ramones. Vahid is typical Bosnian-Muslim name and the song is conceived as being sung by Vahid, as follows:

This basically “boy loves girl” song contains several clearly antinationalistic and anti-chauvinistic messages. They were addressed both towards those who considered “Bosnians” for a lower caste (“Don’t tell me everything’s OK, when her old man is kicking me out for not being like him!”) and towards the system that was supposed to build on national equality (“So what if I’m not a Slovene?”).

"Vahid" was included on the compilation of the Slovenian punk bands, *Lepo je... v naši domovini biti mlad – novi punk val* (*It is Nice... to be Young in our Homeland – New Punk Wave*), a follow-up of the aforementioned *Novi punk val 1978-1980*. The first compilation, *Novi punk val 1978-1980*, was released in the early summer 1981, including bands from four northern Yugoslav cities: four bands were from Ljubljana, two from Rijeka and one from Zagreb and Pula each. The recording of the second, all Slovenian, compilation, *Lepo je... v naši domovini biti mlad – novi domovini biti mlad – novi punk val* (Ljubljana: ZKP RTV Ljubljana, 1982).

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punk val, began in July and was finished by the end of September. The release of the compilation would however have to wait until the following year.

The reason for this was the so-called “Nazi punk affair,” which refers to a situation which arose during the autumn of 1981. It started when a populist weekly newspaper connected two otherwise completely separate events and then linked them to the punks. One event was some swastika graffiti appearing in Ljubljana and other the maltreating of some pupils by their classmates. The newspaper’s conclusion was that this was a work of Nazi punks. A moral panic was created and spread throughout the Yugoslav media, reaching the consensus that there was no place for punk in Yugoslav socialist society.334 A large scale police action followed. More than a hundred members of the punk scene were systematically picked up during school time in front of their professors and classmates and brought to the police station where they were intimidated, and sometimes even beaten for the purpose of forcing them to sign statements accusing them of affiliation with Nazi activities. Three persons ended being arrested officially, spending several months on remand in prison under suspicion that they were trying to organise a National Socialist Party of Slovenia.335

Subsequently, when the charges against the arrested were dropped, the damage had already been done. The presumed link to Nazism provoked a widespread condemnation of punks in Yugoslav media and society in general. One of the things that (the Slovenian) Punks were accused of was that they were being xenophobic against the “immigrants” from other republics.336 Such accusations, as the Kuzle example shows, were not only totally misconstrued, but did enormous injustice to the punks, as they in fact were one of the first voices attacking the rising xenophobia in the early 1980s’ Slovenia.

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As for Kuzle, they did not stop with “Vahid.” In their “Če se rodiš cigan” (“If You Are Born A Gypsy”), the band attacked bigotry in Socialist Yugoslavia, hidden behind the mask of equality:

Nobeden ga ne bo maral  No one likes him
In garat bo moral prav vsak dan  he’ll have to sweat up all day
In še tisto pofušano plačo  and his fucked-up pay check
Bo zvečer s hinavci zapil  will at night drink away with hypocrites

Addressing prejudices against and discrimination of Roma minority in these lines, Kuzle disclosed the anomalies of Yugoslav socialism, preaching equality but closing eyes to the discrimination:

Prijatli mi pravjo, bejš k psihiatru.  My friends tell me go to a psychiatrist.
Zakaj se sploh sekiraš, sej to ni tvoj problem?  Why are you worrying, it’s not your problem?337

This is indeed a very good example of Yugoslavness, which was not openly “Yugoslavist,” yet by stressing tolerance and anti-nationalism sought to strengthen sense of community among Yugoslavs of different ethnic affiliation.

The fundamental question here concerns the extent to which the anti-nationalism and the call for better inter-ethnic tolerance expressed in a subcultural movement represents the more general attitude, held in the broader Slovenian rock scene and among Slovenia’s populace, or at least among its urban youth. Sources very much indicate that it did. Firstly, ever since the appearance of Ljubljana’s progressive rock band Buldožer (Bulldozer) in the mid-1970s, a band that is a synonym for the rock underground of Yugoslavia, had Slovenian rock scene been on the underground or alternative side. This was especially the case with the scene in the republic’s capital Ljubljana, which was widely viewed as not only being the number one centre of “the alternative” in the country, but also perhaps too (and only) alternative.338 For example, when reviewing YURM ’85, Polet wrote that “Ljubljana, as it [could] be seen every year at YURM, [had] problems in building

337 Kuzle, “Če se rodiš cigan,” Še pomnite tovariši? 1980-82 (Ljubljana: Radio Študent,).
338 In this regard it is useful to underline that the Ljubljana scene was not defined geographically, but rather according to the musical genre. Ljubljana’s scene was associated with Radio Študent, which played and recorded alternative – ubacil Kuzle and Šund (Trash), yet another popular band from Idrija, were hence part of the Ljubljana scene. In the mid-1980s it was common to divide the broader Slovenian scene between Radio Študent and Radio Kopar (Slovenia’s major port not far from Italian Trieste), which was more pop and mainstream rock oriented.
an intelligent popular culture of middle ground.” *Polet’s* argument should not be understood as if Ljubljana did not have a good rock scene. On the contrary, *Polet* rated “the unofficial” scene in the Slovenian capital as one of the best in the country, coupled only by the scenes in Skopje, Novi Sad and the “unofficial” scene in Rijeka.\(^{339}\) Being among the best scenes in the country and yet being exclusively alternative or “unofficial,” meant that the Ljubljana scene in many ways defined Yugoslavia’s alternative rock and was, in fact, *Yugoslavia’s alternative*.

Second, the results of the aforementioned 1986-1987 sociological research indicate a high level of inter-ethnic tolerance among youth in Slovenia – even seen from the perspective of presumably worsening inter-ethnic relationship throughout the 1980s due to both “the nationalist turn” in Yugoslav society and the economic crisis. In regard to the results of the research, it should be mentioned that it arranged the answers based on nationality of the respondents, not their republic of dwelling. However, given that the majority of Slovenia’s population was Slovene, and that the vast majority of Slovenes were living in Slovenia, the results given for the young Slovenes should not deviate radically from the results for the Socialist Republic of Slovenia.

Likewise, when speaking of nationalism in Slovenia, the commentators were in fact speaking of nationalism among Slovenes. The results of the research showed that Slovenes were rather quite tolerant toward other nationalities. In fact, when it came to the approval of ethnically heterogeneous marriages or openness toward other nationalities, Slovenes were some of the most tolerant among Yugoslavs. In relation to the question on interethnic tolerance, only 14% Slovenes did not approve ethnically heterogeneous marriages, surpassed only by Yugoslavs by nationality (10%) and Croats (12%), while the average for all nationalities in Yugoslavia was 18%. To the statement, “openness toward the other nations does more harm than good,” 15% of Slovenes responded positively. Only the category marked as “others,” i.e. smaller ethnic groups, living primarily in the very ethnically mixed and commonly considered very tolerant autonomous province of Vojvodina had smaller proportion of positive responses.\(^{340}\)

Despite Slovenes being among the most tolerant nationalities in the country, the particularity of the Ljubljana scene being “the alternative” time and time again made the Yugoslav audience confuse the stances of the Slovenian youth concerning musical genres for nationalism and inter-


ethnic intolerance. Probably the best example thereof was the situation that developed at the fifth *Novi Rock* festival in 1985. *Novi Rock* (*New Rock*) festival was established in the summer of 1981, at the time when punk peaked in Ljubljana – not only as a subcultural movement, but also as a public phenomenon. Held at Križanke, an open-air concert location in central Ljubljana previously reserved for concerts and events of “high culture,” *Novi Rock* attracted a crowd of 4.000 eager to see Kuzle and other Slovenian punk bands, as well as Lačni Franz and Marko Brecelj from Buldožer.\(^{341}\) Organised by the Yugoslav punk pioneer Igor Vidmar, under the patronage of Yugoslavia’s only independent radio station Radio Študent (Radio Student)\(^{342}\) and with support from the official Radio Ljubljana, in the next couple of years *Novi Rock* would establish itself as the centre-stage for the affirmation of new punk, New Wave and alternative rock acts. As such, borrowing Ali H. Žerdin’s wording, *Novi Rock* could be seen as the fourth “liberated territory, settled by the punk community.” The other three were Radio Študent, Ljubljana's student cultural centre ŠKUC and the theoretically informed magazine for culture and social questions *Problemi* (*Problems*), which shortly before the first *Novi Rock* was held released a special issue on Punk – *Punk Problemi*.\(^{343}\)

When in 1985 organisers of the festivals announced that they had invited very popular mainstream rock band Plavi orkestar (Blue Orchestra) from Sarajevo as guests of the festival, some of the members of the Ljubljana scene started protesting. On their just released debut record *Soldatski bal* (*The Soldiers’ Ball*), Plavi orkestar deliberately integrated folkloristic elements from all over Yugoslavia in their music. Although the band’s chief intention with this integration was to promote what could be called “non-national” Yugoslavism\(^{344}\) and its idea of “unity in diversity,” this integration earned the band, among a part of the Yugoslav rock community, a pejorative attribute of being a Newly Composed Folk band (NCFM).\(^{345}\) In practice, this meant that differences concerning music taste easily could be (mis)interpreted as relating to the attitude about the band’s Yugoslavism. Besides, as it will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Plavi orkestar’s

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\(^{342}\) Ljubljana’s Radio Študent (Radio Student) was the first independent radio station in Yugoslavia or any socialist country, established in 1969 on the top of the 1968 student demonstrations.


\(^{344}\) This subject will be discussed more in detail in the next chapter.

\(^{345}\) According to Tomislav Wruss, it was especially in Belgrade that Plavi orkestar was criticised for flirting with folk and folklore. Wruss attributes this critic to the *rising* popularity of the Newly Composed Folk Music in Belgrade. Tomislav Wruss, “Plavi orkestar: Soldatski bal. Dvosjekli mač,” *Polet* 315, 31.5.1985, p. 29.
advocacy of the “revolutionary” Yugoslavism through reanimation of the legacy of the Second World War Partisan revolution should be mentioned here – not least in the context of the authorities’ attempt to demonise Punk subculture during the “Nazi punk affair,” which despite charges being dropped, as Gregor Tome puts it, “had real world consequences” for punks in Ljubljana.  

Meanwhile, just before the festival, some listeners called Radio Študent, threatening that they would not let Plavi orkestar “do in Slovenia what they did with the rest of Yugoslavia.” In this regard, not all listeners had the same agenda: while some focused on Plavi orkestar’s political programme, calling the band “Crveni orkestar” (“Red Orchestra”), others emphasised folklore elements in Plavi orkestar’s music, linking the band to NCFM, which was in Ljubljana associated with the “immigrant” community or “Bosnians.” While these anonymous radio massages produced tensions and insecurity prior to the concert, not a single problem occurred at the festival. Instead, the band attracted the largest crowd of all bands participating at the festival, proving that it was as popular in Slovenia as elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

For the concert and in order to express their stance, Radio Študent produced badges shaped as linden leaf – that is the symbol of Slovenia – with the inscription “Poslušam Plavi orkestar – nisem nacionalist” (“I listen to Plavi orkestar – I am not a nationalist”). However, not all participants were equally enthusiastic about this issue. Bands belonging to the Ljubljana hardcore-punk scene demanded Plavi orkestar’s concert cancelled, because they saw the band as falling outside Novi Rock’s concept due to the entertaining character of Plavi orkestar’s music. Moreover, the notoriously anti-commercial hardcore-punks declined to perform at the festival, because they did not want to perform on the alternative night. They asked for their own hardcore-punk night, but were turned down by the organisers. These actions stirred up a controversy about hardcore-punks

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348 Ibid.
being nationalists. Commenting on such accusations, Mladina’s Dušan Peterc warned against the praxis of too hastily labelling things nationalist. While criticising the hardcore scene for intolerance and exclusiveness towards different tastes, Peterc nevertheless argued against this logic, according to which not listening to, or not liking the music of, Plavi orkestar was automatically equated with being nationalist.355

In regards of the large majority of the festival’s participants – including Radio Študent, musicians and the audience – it is important to remember that people’s consciousness of community, as Anthony Cohen has argued, is encapsulated in their perception of community boundaries and that these boundaries are always symbolic, defined by the meanings that people give to them. The episode showed that the Slovenian rock community, by defining its boundaries along the symbolic division between nationalism and anti-nationalism, saw itself as opposed to nationalism. It was only the much smaller group of the subcultural hardcore-punks that still insisted on the community boundaries defined in relation to musical tastes, symbolically ordered along the divide line between popular, that is, entertaining and commercial, versus subcultural. This argument should be seen against the more general tendency among Yugoslav urban youth in the mid-1980s discussed in the previous chapter, according to which music genre meant more for them than their presumed ethnicity. It is therefore possible to argue that the hierarchy of values in the Slovenian rock community in 1985 was ordered as follows: anti-nationalism, musical tastes or genre preferences and finally, ethnicity as the lowest in this hierarchy.

In the same respect, it is also important to remember that actions, utterances and expressions do not exist in a vacuum, but occur in a particular context, and attain their meaning in that context. This means that when the context changes, the meaning changes as well. This is what happened immediately before the Plavi orkestar concert. In this situation the very antinationalist ethic of rock and roll was attacked. As a reaction to this development the festival organisers initiated the action of linden leaf badges with the inscription “Poslušam Plavi orkestar – nisem nacionalist.” In doing so, they altered boundaries of their symbolically constructed rock community, connecting thereby Slovenia and Plavi orkestar into one – an antinationalist ideal of Yugoslavism.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the sequel that this episode got a few months later. It happened when Ljubljana punk pioneers Pankrti – who also played at Novi Rock ’85 –

performed together with another Sarajevan band in the Croatian capital Zagreb. The band was Zabranjeno pušenje (No Smoking), known as the central proponent of New Primitivism, a subcultural movement widely assumed as the trademark of the 1980s Sarajevan and Bosnian popular culture. In the 1980s Yugoslavia, Zabranjeno pušenje was often considered as one of the most politically provocative rock bands of the decade. This was not unlike Pankrti, which was often viewed as being the most political band in the country. Both bands would occasionally stir up the political establishment with their provocative lyrics and performances. As for the Zagreb concert, where Pankrti’s self-conscious and conceptual straightforward punk rock met Zabranjeno pušenje’s mix of garage rock and post-punk spiced with complex story-telling, the politics were present in the hall even without the bands. The reason was the “war” between Ljubljana and Sarajevo rock scene that started few months earlier at Križanke. This was caught accurately by Polet’s journalist Jasna Babić, who used the concert to comment on the situation relating to the Novi Rock episode. Very much in spirit of the bands, she wrote satirically:

It’s no secret that the joint performance by Ljubljana’s “Pankrti” and Sarajevan “Zabranjeno pušenje” at the “neutral” scene of Zagreb’s “Moša Pijade hall” had a certain political goal: to reconcile youth of two “feuding” republics, and to manifest brotherhood and unity of Slovenian and Bosnian “nations.”

After discussing the issue of “feuding” republics needing reconciliation, Babić turned to the more general state-of-things in Yugoslavia and in particular to the widely accepted assumption of Yugoslav youth’s disinterest in the country’s politics. Commenting on the issue, Babić concluded that the concert was concrete evidence that youth do not identify exclusively with “false values,”

357 On several occasions Zabranjeno pušenje stirred up the political establishment with their provocative lyrics. Probably the best know of them was an episode in the late 1984 at the concert in Rijeka, where the band’s singer Nele Karajlić announced that they had to interrupt the performance because “the Marshall had died.” He was referring to the well-known label of guitar amplifier, yet the press subsequently blew the episode out of proportion interpreting it as an attack on President Tito, who was in Socialist Yugoslavia commonly referred to as “Marshall (Tito).” In Karajlić’s wording, “Crk’o nam je maršal,” the verb “to die” was used in the form, which is in Serbo-Croatian used when speaking about animals. When used in this form for the humans it is considered derogatory, what was highly problematic when coupled with “Marshall (Tito).” After the episode, the band experienced their concerts being cancelled, while they were unofficially excluded from the press with no possibility to defend themselves - all this despite the fact that Zabranjeno pušenje was voted the best new rock act throughout the country. “Iz prve roke,” Mladina 6, 14.2.1985, p. 41.

Original text: Nije tajna da je zajednički nastup ljubljanskih Pankrta i sarajevskog Zabranjenog pušenja na “neutralnoj” sceni zagrebačkog RANSA Moša Pijade imao određen politički cilj: izmiriti omladine dviju “zavađenih” republika, odnosno manifestirati bratstvo i jedinstvo slovenske i bosanske “nacije.”
that they are not “nationally awaken,” that they do know what it can and what they want, and that they are very much present in Yugoslavia’s political life. To understand Babić’s comment it is useful to turn to Clifford Geertz’s famous statement that social actions always are larger than themselves, as they speak to larger issues and vice versa. Accordingly, Babić’s main argument was that for the youth being apolitical was their way to avoid subsuming “the nationalist turn” that was under way in the mid-1980s Yugoslavia. This act of avoidance was indeed very political. The title of the article was carefully chosen for that purpose, stating clearly: “Politički skandal apolitičnosti” – “The Political Scandal of Being Apolitical.”

What happened at Novi Rock ’85 and in Zagreb a few months later should be seen in a broader context of Yu-Rock. The city’s rock scene (LAS) reached its peak sometime between 1984 and 1986, making Ljubljana the true capital of Yu-Rock. In the aforementioned argument about development of a common Yugoslav rock scene and rock market, with a “healthy” rivalry between republican centres, Pankrti’s Gregor Tomc has also argued that multiculturalism and differences in style encouraged creativity which enclosed national cultures could not produce. This is very indicative for the scene in Ljubljana, which, as we will see in the next section, by the late 1980s had lost most of its vitality and creativity.

362 An indeed very interesting illustration of this point is that Polet – which was ever since it started advocating New Wave in the late 1970s, one of the most important voices defining Yu-Rock – in its annual chart of ten best domestic records for 1985 included five records associated with the LAS (four individual bands and one compilation composed of several Ljubljana bands). Quite noteworthy in the context of this thesis, among the remaining five records/bands there were two bands from Belgrade and Zagreb each and one band from Sarajevo. "Deset najboljih domaćih LP-a," Polet 340, 27.12.1985, p. 23.
“The Little Man Wants to Cross the Line”

One of those who was not only intimidated but also heavily beaten during the police operations related to the “Nazi punk affair” was Esad Babačić Car. As a comment, or rather protest, Babačić wrote a song “Proleter” (“Proletarian”). The song turned the symbol of the “Proletarian” – praised in Socialist Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the Socialist world as an incarnation of the struggle against the oppression and injustice – against Socialist authorities. In this 1982 song, Via Ofenziva’s most popular, he asked:

Kje si zdaj proleter
kje je zdaj tvoja puška
kje so zdaj tvoje roke
proleter
Where are you now proletarian
where is now your rifle
where are now your hands
proletarian

The song was typical for the “second wave” of punk bands that emerged in the period 1981-1982, and was very much marked by the police repression, as the new punk bands became more political and direct in their lyrics than it was the case before the affair. In the subsequent years, this “second wave” of punk bands experienced dissolution into a wider alternative scene. “The alternative” itself developed under the banner of punk, but encompassed a wide variety of genres from experimental and industrial to the more pop oriented New Wave, which only developed in Ljubljana several years later than in other Yugoslav cities, including Slovenia’s second city Maribor. In the context of this study, this development of “the second wave” of punk and “the

365 Via Ofenziva, “Proleter” (Ljubljana: ŠKUC, 1983)
366 As Oskar Mulej has noticed, the “second wave” punk bands such as O!KULT, Otroci socializma (Children of Socialism), and Via Ofenziva “combined different genres and styles (including recitations), differing greatly from the original punk rock. This was coupled by more direct political lyrics, quite unimaginable back in 1977.” Oskar Mulej, “We Are Drowning in Red Beet, Patching Up the Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Punk Subculture in Ljubljana in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s,” East Central Europe 38, 2011, p. 385; Ali H. Žerdin, “Kratki kurz zgodovine panka,” Punk je bil prej, 25 let punka pod Slovenci, eds. Peter Lovšin, Peter Mlakar and Igor Vidmar (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba/Ropot, 2002), p. 46.
367 For the development of “the alternative” see Tomi Gračanin, “Vspon in padec Slovenskega novega popa,” Mladina 1, 9.1.87, p. 42.
alternative” is important because several scholars have argued that punk and “the alternative” did not only dominate the Slovenian capital’s musical life in the 1980s – in many ways, it also played an important role in defining political discourse and changing the general atmosphere in Slovenian society. According to Josef Figa, punk rock was the first manifestation of civil society and a bellwether of the democratisation process in Slovenia.\(^{368}\) Similarly Tomaž Mastnak has argued that the story of democratisation (and independence) of Slovenia began with the emergence of Punk movement.\(^{369}\) And indeed punk did initiate the formation of the so-called “alternative scene,” which intimately engaged into the so-called New Social Movements (NSMs) that mushroomed up in the 1980s Slovenia. The NSMs designate numerous non-mass based social movements (peace, sexual, ecological, human rights, spiritual etc.) that facilitated the development of democracy in Slovenia. It has been argued that this process had a broader Yugoslav dimension, in which the conservative, antidemocratic forces in Slovenia allied themselves with the opponents of democratisation in other republics, while no comparable alliance of Yugoslav democratisation forces ever came into existence. Thus, the struggle gradually took shape as a conflict between Slovenia and Yugoslavia, leading eventually to Slovenia’s break from Yugoslavia and establishing of the independent Slovenia.\(^{370}\)

I will argue that although there is much evidence pointing in the direction of pro-democratic forces in Slovenia becoming more isolated and increasingly forced to seek their own path of democratisation, the advocates of the argument may understate the extent to which Slovene nationalist forces were pushing forward the issue of national sovereignty. By doing so, they leave us with the impression of Slovenia’s independency being, in practice, won by the alternative movements. My argument is that if seen from the perspective of the Ljubljana Alternative Scene – which was, as indicated, intimately engaged with the NSMs – this development may leave a considerably different impression.


Before I move to “the alternative,” some further comments on the general context must be put forward. The merging of the part of the alternative sector into the nationalist politics in the mid-to-late 1980s should be seen in the context of the general liberalisation that Slovenia experienced from the mid-1980s. As Jasna Dragović-Soso points out, by 1988 Slovenia had no political prisoners and a virtually free media.\textsuperscript{371} Although it may sound provocative – in particular if judged by the different outcomes the two developments would get subsequently – this was not unlike the situation in Serbia in the initial period of the reign of Slobodan Milošević. Dragović-Soso offers a powerful argument that shortly after Milošević gained power in Serbia, he allowed an unprecedented liberalisation of the Serbian cultural scene. This development triggered many liberals to lend their support to Milošević in the initial period of his reign.\textsuperscript{372} The result was a merging of liberals with both nationalists and Milošević’s communists. This is not radically dissimilar to the development in Slovenia under Milan Kučan. A 1989 interview with Martin Krpan, one of the pioneers of Ljubljana New Wave, supports this argument. In the interview, Krpan complained that the Slovenian youth did not go all the way in their struggle for democratisation, as they promised. Instead, he said, Kučan befooled both the leadership of the League of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS) and “the whole alternative.”\textsuperscript{373}

Thus, what we need here is rather a third category – the one of nationalist intellectuals. In fact, \textit{Mladina}’s Miha Kovač, who was one of those that were very active in the alternative movements, pointed out already in a 1988 interview that there existed three positions or ideological currents in Slovenia at that time: the conservatives associated with the League of Communists of Slovenia, the traditional intelligentsia that controlled the most important cultural institutions in the Republic, and the alternative movements assembled around \textit{Mladina} and partly emerged through a critique of the traditional intelligentsia’s draft of the Constitution in 1987.\textsuperscript{374} According to Kovač the first ideological camp, conservatives, were generally not overly interested in political democratisation, but insisted that it was a matter for each republic to determine. This position would

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{372} Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘\textit{Saviours of the Nation’}. \textit{Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism}. (Montréal: McGill Queens University Press, 2002), pp. 210-211.
\item \textsuperscript{374} The most vocal among the intelligentsia was Writer’s Union. In this context it is noteworthy that, as Jasna Dragović-Soso has argued, Yugoslav Writers’ Union was the first of all Yugoslav organisations to dissolve. See Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Intelectuals and the collapse of Yugoslavia: the End of the Yugoslav Writes’ Union” in \textit{Yugoslavism. History of a Failed Idea}. Ed. Djokić, Dejan. (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), pp. 268-285.
\end{itemize}
inevitably lead to the transformation of federal Yugoslavia into a confederation, and eventually to the creation of independent states, something Kovač, as a member of the alternative movements, saw neither as desired nor realistic. Quite different from the conservatives, the traditional intelligentsia emphasised the notion of human rights – something strongly approved by Kovač – but was, at the same time, completely disinterested in Yugoslavia. In fact, already at that time, in the preamble to the drafted Constitution, this second ideological camp treated Slovenia as a state on its own. Kovač strongly disapproved this disposition, invoking the notion that the whole Yugoslavia ought to be more democratic and tolerant and that the insistency on the values of pluralism and human rights should not be reduced to Slovenia only. 375

In this interview we see that in 1988, the alternative movements, as represented by Kovač, did not support the nationalist policy of the intelligentsia. In this respect, the central question concerns how popular the nationalist agenda was in pushing for the Slovenian independence among the populace and among the members of the Slovenian rock community, in particular those involved in the LAS. Research done on the views of the population indicates that it was not very popular prior to the drafting of the Constitution, but had nevertheless gained strength by the end of the decade. Based on their research concerning the issue of independence from Yugoslavia, Rudi Klanjšek and Sergej Flere argue that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not driven by popular “longing” for mono-national states, but was rather a result of “political entrepreneurship” of the minority elites. Klanjšek and Flere base their research on the data from two different surveys: one conducted in 1985-1986 among Yugoslav Youth, and one from 1989-1990, conducted among the general population. In regards of Slovenia, they emphasise that the earliest of the surveys showed that, save for Kosovo Albanians, there was not a substantial difference between Slovenia or Slovenes and the other republics or nationalities concerning agreement with the statement “The preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia as a whole.” It is interesting that the percentage of Slovenes favouring independence, as late as in 1985-1986 – that is at the time of Novi Rock incident and the time when the LAS was at its peak – was lower than that of Macedonians, Croats and Montenegrins, as well as Albanians, who were substantially more in

favour of independence than other Yugoslavs. However, by 1990, as the latest of the surveys showed, opinion among Slovenes in Slovenia had turned in favour of independence.

When it comes to the LAS, sources point strongly in a direction of the scene sharing the antinationalist and pro-Yugoslav attitudes of the alternative movements, as represented by Kovač. However, sources also indicate that in keeping its antinationalist line, the LAS found itself caught between rising Slovene nationalism and the anti-pluralist conservatives elsewhere in the country. The example of the two central bands of the scene, Laibach and Borghesia, is very illustrative in this regard. In 1988 members of Borghesia explained to Mladina’s Primož Pečovnik how in the course of two years, the situation in Yugoslavia became completely reversed from what it used to be. While the band’s performances previously had been problematic in Slovenia, but not in Serbia or Bosnia, in 1988 the situation was changed, so that precisely the opposite became the case. Notwithstanding, as we will see shortly, liberalisation in Slovenia did not let Borghesia lend their support to nationalists – on the contrary. The same could be said about the scene’s arguably most important band, Laibach. Probably the most provocative band of the 1980s Yu-Rock, Laibach became so infamous for the Slovenian authorities that they were banned from performing in the republic in June 1983, forcing it thereby to creatively emigrate to other Yugoslav republics or to Western Europe.

The changing atmosphere in Slovenia in the second half of the decade meant that in 1987, for the first time in almost four years, the band was again allowed officially to perform in Slovenia’s capital city. Being allowed to perform again did not mean that Laibach stopped going against the


377 Table 2. Mean level analysis: agreement with the statement “Each nationality should have its own state?” in Rudi Klanšek & Sergej Flere, “Exit Yugoslavia: longing for mononational states or entrepreneurial manipulation?” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity Vol. 39: 5, 2011, p.800.


379 According to Mladina, Laibach was “the basic constitutive element, synonym and the most vital sign of Ljubljana’s alternative culture.” Gorazd Suhadolnik, Mladina 5, 7.2.1985, p. 41.


381 However, in December 1984, the band performed a “secret” concert in Ljubljana under the umbrella of now the informally formed art collective “Neue Slowenische Kunst.”
flow and thereby provoking the authorities in Slovenia.\textsuperscript{382} In fact, by the end of 1980s Laibach turned against the dominating nationalist paradigm in Slovenia. In the early 1990s, after the anti-communist alliance DEMOS won the elections, and just as Slovenia claimed independence from Yugoslavia, Laibach and Neue Slowenische Kunst\textsuperscript{383} symbolically claimed themselves to constitute a state, the NSK “State in Time.”\textsuperscript{384} In 1993, the band released an album containing their earliest recordings and live performances, symbolically, yet for that time provocatively, entitled \textit{Ljubljana-Zagreb-Beograd}. Ideologically, throughout the early 1990s Laibach defied the new Slovene nationalist discourse, according to which Yugoslavia was inimical to the Slovenian national culture and interests, by pointing out that only “in the safety of the lap of Yugoslavia” did Slovenia attained material prosperity with respect to other European nations.\textsuperscript{385}

Laibach was far from the only critic of Slovene nationalism in the LAS. The band’s promoter from its early days, and the most central person of the formative period of Ljubljana’s punk movement, Igor Vidmar, was one of the first to formulate such criticism. In an interview with \textit{Polet} in late 1987, Vidmar attacked Slovene provincialism and the cultural policy, which according to him, although proclaiming opening to Europe, was indeed “turning more and more towards the

\textsuperscript{382} Laibach’s stance on the issues of nationalism, “Slovenism” and “Yugoslavism” was perplexing and even contradictory. On the one hand, Laibach claimed in 1985, that they – by using historical films describing the birth of the Second Yugoslavia – did not seek to degrade the power of the government, but instead to exploit it in order to provoke its restoration. On the other hand, the band called for a radical revision of national history and attacked the established “truths” of official collective memory. By emphasising Austrian/Habsburg component of Slovenia’s history, Laibach provoked deconstruction of the official Yugoslav history. For this reason, Laibach is sometimes viewed as being a part of Slovene nationalist discourse that sought de-Yugoslavization and Central-Europeanization of Slovenia. I will argue that such readings are based either on selective interpretations or on misunderstandings of Laibach’s relationship to Yugoslavia. As we will see in the chapter’s last section, when Laibach in the late 1980s and early 1990s started engaging more actively in the broader Yugoslav issues, they did in a manner very different from that of the new-emerging nationalist elite. For Laibach’s use of historical films, see Dejan Kršeć, “Tutanj bubnjeva u noći,” \textit{Polet} 337, 15.12.1985, pp. 12-13.

\textsuperscript{383} Neue Slowenische Kunst (New Slovenian Art), shortened NSK, was an art collective uniting musicians, performance artists, painters, designers and philosophers, established in Ljubljana in 1982 and closely associated with Laibach.

\textsuperscript{384} They went onto releasing passports and opening embassies/consulates.

\textsuperscript{385} An interview from \textit{Mladina}. The original text accessed through: Laibach, \textit{Excerpts from Interviews} 1991-1995, \url{http://www.laibach.nsk.si/l31.htm} The text:

“The Slovenians, as former German farm hands, adhered to a victorious coalition in World War II, and were consequently free from the frustrations of guilt and defeat. Safely in the lap of Yugoslavia, we were able to consider the key issues of our common metaphysics unburdened and with certain (self-) critical historical distance. The favorable liberal - communist climate and innate discipline made it possible for the Slovenians - in spite of the socio-economic blockades of the socialist self-management system - to reach enviable spiritual and satisfactory material prosperity with respect to other European nations.”
national, regional and defensive.” As the single most important figure on Ljubljana’s rock scene in the 1980s and in his capacity as a chief organiser of the Novi Rock festival, Vidmar was responsible for the true Yugoslavisation of the festival in 1987.

Hence, in the year that brought the Slovene National Programme, Vidmar and other organisers of the festival decided to change the concept of the festival. Previously conceived as a festival at which only Slovenian bands entered the competition, while bands from the other parts of the country performed as guests at the festival. In 1987 the concept was altered so now bands from all parts of Yugoslavia entered the competition. Mladina responded by calling the article about the festival simply “Jugoslovanski [Novi Rock 87]” (“Yugoslavian [Novi Rock 87]”). According to Vidmar himself, the reason for this Yugoslavisation was that the Ljubljana music scene needed to be broadened, in order to avoid further stagnation. However, this utterance should also be seen in relation to the criticism of the nationalist provincializing agenda that Vidmar expressed in the same interview. Here again we have Yugoslavness and cosmopolitanism melting into each other, without need to express any explicit Yugoslavism.

A couple years later, in 1989, another pioneer of Ljubljana Punk movement, Pankrti’s singer, Peter Lovšin, released a debut LP with his new band Sokoli (Falcons). One of the guests that appeared on the LP was Šeki Gayton, former drummer of Zabranjeno pušenje – the band that Lovšin’s Pankrti performed together with four years earlier in Zagreb. Notably, the LP included songs with lyrics in Serbo-Croatian – an action that needs to be seen in relation to the undoubtedly largest issue in Slovenia at the time. Less than a year before the release, a political trial – known as the Trial against “the Four” – sparked great nationalistic uproar in Slovenia. The reason was that the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) decided to conduct the trial against four Mladina journalists, held in the military court in Ljubljana, in Serbo-Croatian. Along with the so-called “Rally of Truth,” to which I will return shortly, this was probably the single most important event in the process of national homogenisation among Slovenes.

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388 The competing bands were: Miladojka Youneed from Ljubljana, Grč (Cramp) from Rijeka, Roderick from Osijek, SCH from Sarajevo and Mizar from Skopje.
390 In the years that followed the festival would broaden even more, by inviting guests from the alternative scenes in USA, UK or elsewhere.
What this event had done to this process is very indicative in the Polet interview with Franci Zavrl, one of the four convicts of the trial. After claiming his Yugoslav orientation (that is, as argued, his Yugoslavness) and invoking the notion that the whole Yugoslavia ought to be democratic – resembling very much Miha Kovač’s argument – Zavrl attacked equation of Yugoslavia with JNA and its anti-pluralist and anti-democratic agenda. However, that struggle was probably already lost at that time, as the Slovene nationalists, JNA and Milošević’s supporters had secured themselves the right to define Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism. The result thereof was that Yugoslavness lost its appeal for the majority of Slovenes, including much of the alternative sector. This development was rather typical for nationalism, as several scholars have shown in their work, arguing that nationalism is all about destruction of alternatives.

In his depiction of the destruction of Musical Alternatives in Serbia during Milošević reign, Eric Gordy quotes Belgrade musician and anti-war activist Rambo Amadeus, declaring that “rock and roll in Serbia died the moment Slobodan Milošević appeared.” In an interview for Start in February 1990, not unlike Rambo, Borghesia claimed that Milošević helped destroy the LAS. Accordingly, the appearance of Milošević on the Yugoslav political scene provoked national homogenisation “wiping out all political differences in Slovenia.” People were now persuaded that the danger exclusively came from “outside,” meaning that all internal struggles with political establishment and cultural provincialism rapidly perished, so all energy could be directed toward the “external” enemy. This utterance should be seen in relation to the one expressed in Polet, done few weeks earlier. Here, the band’s members drew attention to the total politicisation of everyday life, which destroyed the channels through which the scene potentially could renew itself, adding that: “Mladina used to live a great deal on rock. Today it lives exclusively on politics.” From here the members went on explaining that also Radio Študent was not what it used to be, and that there was a total discontinuity with the earlier period. They emphasised that the absence of media that would promote rock music was crucial: “There is no scene without media,” they claimed, concluding that without media the “YU-New Wave boom” would have never occurred.

Between these two *Polet* interviews, with respectively Franci Zavrl and Borghesia, the second most important event of the “homogenisation” of Slovene politics occurred – the so-called “Rally of Truth” (Miting istine). “The Rally of Truth” refers to the episode in December 1989 in which supporters of Slobodan Milošević unsuccessfully attempted to organise a rally in Ljubljana following the practice from Serbia and its autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo and even Montenegro. As described in the previous chapter, in these rallies Milošević’s supporters overthrew regional governments and replaced them with those being loyal to Milošević.

Borghesia responded to this development with the LP *Resistance*, criticising the upsurge of nationalism and nationalist rhetoric very directly – most notably in the song “Konflikt” (“Conflict”):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slovene</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adrenalin šiba po žilama</td>
<td>Adrenalin rushing through the veins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besnilo i luđilo hara masama</td>
<td>Rabies and madness are raging through the masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na linč! Na linč!</td>
<td>The lynching! The lynching!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čuju se voždovi</td>
<td>The leaders are speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oštre se noževi</td>
<td>Grinding the knives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaos i bezumlje</td>
<td>Chaos and frenzy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zub za zub</td>
<td>A tooth for a tooth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oko za oko</td>
<td>An eye for an eye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na linč! Na linč!</td>
<td>The lynching! The lynching!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flagelanti s parolama u rukama</td>
<td>The flagellants with slogans in their hands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Željni klanja</td>
<td>Thirsty for slaughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutaju iz grada u grad</td>
<td>Roaming from town to town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao besni psi laju</td>
<td>As the furious dogs barking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iz ustiju cedi im se pena</td>
<td>From their mouths sipping froth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oči je pokrila teška mrena</td>
<td>Eyes are covered by the heavy cataract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zub za zub</td>
<td>A tooth for a tooth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oko za oko</td>
<td>An eye for an eye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na linč! Na linč!</td>
<td>The lynching! The lynching!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Milošević’s speech and some comments on the so-called “Rally of Truth” were included on “Konflikt,” while the song “Discipline” was built on a political kitsch song, a panegyric to

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Milošević, sung by children. By the contemporary critics, these two songs were praised as being musically the best songs on the LP and the LP itself as one of the best new releases at the time.  

However, in respect to its political content, Ritam’s Dragan Ambrožić argued that, by criticising Milošević directly and openly, while at the same time offering an encrypted massage about dissolving of liberal political thought in Slovenia, Borghesia did itself a “disservice.” It fell in the same trap as the rest of “the Ljubljana’s alternative,” convincing “people that they are right in their assumption that the danger for them is coming from somewhere else and not form their local rulers.” Stressing that he did not disapprove Borghesia’s political engagement, but the way it was done, Ambrožić as well criticised Borghesia’s claim that Milošević helped destroy the LAS, claiming instead that “the only damage that Milošević could have done was concerned and concerns Serbia.” Although there was a real risk that “Konflikt” could “help” Slovenian audience recognise the danger coming from “outside” and eventually facilitate further national homogenisation, Ambrožić failed to recognise that Resistance was at least as much addressed to the Serbian audience, and, in fact, to the audience across Yugoslavia.

To understand this, we should again evoke the theoretical assumption of intertextuality which stresses that a text only can communicate its meaning when situated in relation to other texts. In this context, another song from the same LP should be mentioned – a cover of Šarlo Akrobata’s “Mali čovek“ (“The Little Man“). Along with the aforementioned Električni orgazam and Idoli, Šarlo Akrobata, was the core of the early 1980s Belgrade Alternative Scene, best known for the arguably most legendary Yu-Rock compilation of all times, the 1981 Paket aranžman. With this song Borghesia symbolically allied itself not only with the BAS, but with the whole Yu-New Wave boom, while at the same time sending a clear political massage to the Yugoslav audience with “Konflikt” and “Discipline.” Moreover, all three songs should be seen in relation to the text of the interview for Ritam on the occasion of the Resistance release a month earlier, in March 1990. Here, the members of Borghesia expressed their grievances over radio stations in Slovenia not playing domestic Yu-Rock music any more.

In this respect, “Mali čovek” is very symbolic, not least in having it that “the little man want to cross the line/wants to cross it but he doesn’t dare.” In addition, despite their international

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399 In relation to the previous chapter’s discussion on cosmopolitanism, in which I drew line between Borghesia and Milan Mladenović, it should be mentioned here that the original version “Mali čovek” was sang by Mladenović.
success, the band’s members saw Borghesia “in the continuity of the Ljubljana scene and in that manner as a part of Yu-Rock scene.” If we recall Esad Babačić Car and Via Ofenziva, one of those “second wave” punk bands that announced coming from “the alternative,” this Borghesia’s utterance could hardly be more apt. First, because there indeed is a continuity of Via Ofenziva’s “Proleter” in Resistance, and second, and through that, there is a very strong resemblance between what Borgesia claimed here in their 1990 interview and Babačić’s recital “Ohm Ljubljana, you are Yugoslavia” seven years earlier.

This being said, probably the most important comment on Resistance is the one in which both Polet and Ritam criticised Borghesia’s political messages for being outdated already by the time of release, serving rather as delayed comments. Although their agenda was somewhat different, they could not describe nationalist mobilisation in the late 1980s Yugoslavia better. In this period nationalism and national identities move so suddenly to the centre stage of the political and social life, that even artists, which are usually first to sense changes, could not adapt.

Conclusion

Because Slovenes were commonly seen as being most at odds with Yugoslavia, valuing their Sloveness over Yugoslavness, this chapter has approached Yugoslavness of the punk and alternative rock scene in the republic’s capital by focusing on its antinationalism. This antinationalism should be seen in contrast to critical intellectuals, who repeatedly raised the national question throughout the 1980s, contributing to the common perception in Yugoslavia as Slovenes being at odds with the multinational federation.

The chapter revealed that when seen from the perspective of the Ljubljana rock scene the picture of Slovenes’ attitude to Yugoslavia was somewhat different. This was the case both in the early and late 1980s. In the early 1980s, while Punk dominated the scene, punk musicians were among the first to raise their voices against nationalism and intolerance in the Slovenian society.

400 Drago Borić, „Borghesia,“ Ritam 12, pp. 28-29, Mart 1990, p. 29.
Nonetheless, the widespread praxis in Socialist Yugoslavia to label any undesirable currents in society as nationalism, could easily lead to musical tastes being confused with nationalism. In this situation Yugoslavness was often expressed through anti-nationalism and the call for tolerance, without necessarily being pronouncedly Yugoslavist. Most notably, in the case of Novi Rock, when organisers, participants and audience put aside their difference in musical tastes in order to declare their Yugoslavness by emphasising anti-nationalism.

When it came to “the alternative” that dominated the scene in the second half of the decade, the chapter has reflected critically on the interpretations equating the LAS with the movement for Slovenia’s independence. The chapter has revealed that, when approaching it from the scene, this development may leave a considerably different impression. As the chapter has demonstrated, the rising nationalism in the late 1980s Slovenia and Yugoslavia sought to destroy its alternatives, including the alternative scene in Ljubljana. The destruction was however never total, as the example of the two leading bands of the LAS, Laibach and Borghesia, indicates.

The analysis indicates that approximately at the same time (between 1987 and 1989), as Slovenia was experiencing a “nationalist turn,” Yugoslavness at the scene was reaching its peak. In this situation, but also after 1989, some of the central personalities and bands of the scene responded by taking an indeed rather open Yugoslavist position. One of the results was an example of Yugoslavisation of Novi Rock in 1987. Others were singing in Serbo-Croatian or evoking common Yugoslav historical and (popular) cultural experience. Thus, based on the chapter’s discussion, I will argue that the 1980s Slovenian rock was neither nationalist nor anti-Yugoslav.

Finally, an interesting conclusion concerning the relationship between Yugoslavness and cosmopolitanism should be emphasised. We saw in the case of Igor Vidmar, how the ideas of Europe and cosmopolitanism were seen as being rather opposed to the idea of national. Vidmar criticised provincialism of the Slovenian cultural policy for turning towards the national, while proclaiming opening to Europe at the same time. This left the impression that he as one of the most central personalities of both Punk and “the alternative” movements and the chief organiser of Novi Rock perceived rising nationalism as retrogression.
In the previous chapter, we saw that in many ways Slovenia was often viewed as being most at odds with the multinational federal Yugoslavia. Quite to the contrary, Bosnia and Herzegovina – to which rock scene I turn in this chapter – was commonly thought as “Yugoslavia on smaller scale” and a kind of a cultural melting pot of Yugoslavism. The capital cities of these two republics stood therefore in sharp contrast to each other in the common perception, as being, in Gregor Tomc’s words, “the weakest [Ljubljana] and the strongest [Sarajevo] link in the chain of Yugoslav cultural continuum.”

We saw also that the rock bands from Ljubljana and the city’s youth culture were often unjustly accused of nationalism or by the end of the decade of anti-Yugoslavism, while the expressions of Yugoslavness among the members of the scene are rarely recognised among the scholars. Once again, quite differently from Ljubljana, the Sarajevan rock scene and youth culture have been recognised for their pronouncedly Yugoslavist orientation and their pronounced anti-nationalism. Thus, in dealing with Yugoslavness and antinationalism of the youth culture in the Bosnian capital in the 1980s, the following chapter does not pretend to bring new insights concerning the scene’s Yugoslavist orientation. The intention is rather to offer a different reading of antinationalism and Yugoslavness of the scene. In this respect, Pavle Levi’s study of Yugoslav film presents an interesting point of departure. In his interpretation, Levi argues that in the Bosnian capital, citizens of different ethnic and religious affiliations “lived together side by side, in unity, all their lives, learning to enjoy and take pride in their diversity rather than to fear it.”

Not having any objections to this argument, I however find Levi’s intertextual interpretation of the relationship between Partisan film and the city’s youth culture problematic because it divorces this culture from its ideological context and misinterprets its position within the dominant socialist culture. Thereby,

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Levi fails to realise the close relationship between the country’s political mythology and identity-formation in the city.  

In this context, it is important to remember, as Gregor Tomc has explained it, that different political backgrounds of federal republics generated, at least to a certain extent, different interactions of youth cultures with respective dominant cultures, producing in turn to a certain extent varying degrees of urban youth autonomy. In accordance with this argument, Tomc concludes that “hypothetically speaking, the Slovenian scene was probably the most autonomous one, while Sarajevo scene was the least autonomous one, with all the other scenes falling somewhere in between.” This argument should not be read as an invitation to assume that the absence of nationalism and pronounced Yugoslavness among the Sarajevan youth were results of Bosnia and Herzegovina being the most dogmatic republic, ruled by hardliners and with no critical media. As argued before the relationship between the youth cultures and the dominant socialist culture was not one-way. In order to construct meaningful identity, the members of the Sarajevo scene appropriated elements from the larger dominant socialist culture and the country’s political mythology that gave the significance to their social and political experiences and deeds.

From this point of departure, the first of the chapter’s two sections deals with the relationship between Partisan film and the 1980s rock culture in Sarajevo. Being one of the most original Yugoslav cultural expressions, Partisan film had very strong cultural implications in the whole Socialist Yugoslavia. Still, nowhere did that come so clearly to fruition as in the Sarajevan youth culture of the 1980s. Although the section is sensitive to the inherently self-referential character of popular culture and the rather universal popularity of the popular culture of the Second World War, it however stresses the specificity of Yugoslav War films. From here, I move to demonstrate that the values and norms – most notably those concerning brotherhood and unity – inculcated on the

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406 The argument concerning the claim that Ljubljana’s scene was more autonomous than the one in the country’s capital Belgrade can nevertheless be disputed, because Belgrade was prior to mid-to-late 1980s, as among others Tomaž Mastnak argues, by far the most liberal capital city in the country, with much broader possibilities for developing autonomous culture than it was the case elsewhere in the country. Tomaž Mastnak, “From Social Movements to National Sovereignty,” in Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 93 et seq.
Yugoslav popular culture of the Second World War became an inseparable part of Sarajevo youth culture in the 1980s. I have focused my analysis on the specific Sarajevan alternative rock scene that emerged in the early 1980s and the bands most closely connected to this scene.

The primary interest in the second section is the multi-ethnic character of Sarajevo and its image as a “miniature Yugoslavia.” In accordance with the first chapter’s discussion on the phenomenon of people listing their nationality as “Yugoslav-undeclared,” the section approaches their relatively high proportion in Sarajevo as a highly visible structural characteristic of interethnic relations in city. Thus, the section reveals the specific everyday Yugoslavism in Sarajevo structured around the ideas about “unity in diversity” and the “non-national” ideology promoted by the Communist elites. Ultimately, the chapter seeks to highlight *brotherhood and unity*, not as ideological slogan but as a lived experience of the city’s inhabitants and thereby explain the pronounced Yugoslavness of the scene in relation to Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology.

“Das ist Walter”

As we saw in the discussion concerning the influence of Socialist Yugoslavia’s political mythology on the early New Wave scene in Zagreb, *the People’s Liberation Struggle (the NOB)* was depicted as a mutually integrated struggle against the Axis powers’ occupation and an on-going socialist revolution, *the NOB and the Socialist revolution*. In this depiction, the plurality of local resistance movements was lumped together under a single grand narrative, according to which all national groups of Yugoslavia were presumed to have made an equal contribution to the war effort. In this way the NOB was linked directly to its central ideological axiom of “brotherhood and unity.” As a patriotic ideology, “brotherhood and unity” sought to generate a sense of community among Yugoslavs. In practice, this meant that the NOB served as Socialist Yugoslavia’s founding and integrative myth.

However, youth of the late 1970s and 1980s, which this thesis deals with, were born too late to have any direct experience of the war, including even that related to destruction or poverty felt in the immediate post-war years. These generations’ collective memory of the National War of Liberation was to a large extent shaped by popular cultural images, most notably Partisan films. The filmic representations of the NOB should be seen from this perspective. Yet, there is nothing exceptionally Yugoslav in this. Despite all its particularities, Partisan film should be placed in the
context of the rather universal phenomenon of the popular culture of the Second World War. Few historical events, if any, have resonated as fully in modern popular culture as the Second World War. Stubbornly attracting a wide audience, leaving a rich legacy in a broad range of media, from film, TV, visual arts, architecture, music to literature, the popular culture of the Second World War has become a cornerstone of its afterlife and remains today an easy point of reference for exhortations about public behaviour. Nevertheless, as the following section will show, in dealing with the legacy of Partisan film in the Sarajevoan and general Yugoslav youth culture of the 1980s, we need to pay attention to the Yugoslav specificity. In other words, although in several ways, Partisan film can be seen as exemplary for the universal popular culture of the Second World War, it was at the same time a very particular Yugoslav phenomenon.

Notwithstanding that most partisan films resembled war films produced in the West, Michael J. Stoil argues that the former aimed at educating the mass audience in the origins of the socialist regime. In the beginning, partisan films consciously imitated the style of Soviet “antifascist films.” According to Stoil, “the purpose of the [Soviet] antifascist film is essentially a political one: to create or enrich the ‘myth’ of antifascist resistance as the birth struggles of the new socialist societies.” In Yugoslavia, where widespread resistance was a historical fact, the primary focus in partisan films had been to romanticise and idealise the Partisan campaigns. Besides, due to Yugoslavia’s distinctive war experience, partisan films should be distinguished from the films with Soviet-thematic perspectives, which dominated in other newly formed communist states. Based on this experience, the final for Yugoslav filmmaking in the immediate years after the liberation was the development of a socialist consciousness and patriotism, which were presupposed to bring Yugoslavia’s national groups closer together. This idea was based on the solution to the national question offered by the Communist Party and blazoned in its slogan of “brotherhood and unity.” The central founding myth of a new, Socialist, Yugoslavia being reborn from the ashes of the old one and characterised by brotherhood, unity, and a victory for all Yugoslav peoples, was diligently reproduced in partisan films. As Daniel J. Goulding has convincingly demonstrated in his work on Yugoslav cinematography, most partisan films of the period were built on a structural model which begins by affirming Partisan-led local initiatives in specific locales, involving the distinctive

nationalities of the region, and builds organically to an affirmation of the epic all-Yugoslav character of the War of Liberation.\textsuperscript{408}

However, the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav split subsequently had an enormous impact on Partisan film. From being asserted as offering the best prospect for illuminating the path which Yugoslav cinematography should follow, Soviet film was now criticised for its “revisionist” tendencies.\textsuperscript{409} The major impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav split was that it opened the door for more Western films in Yugoslav cinemas.\textsuperscript{410} From then on Western films have dominated Yugoslav cinemas, shaping the audience’s taste thematically and stylistically, and exerting thereby a strong influence on Yugoslav filmmaking. In practice this meant that, in order to attract the audience, partisan films were now forced to introduce more and more aesthetical elements from American films – most notably in the context of this study, the American Westerns.

In this respect, one film needs to be singled out. This is Hajrudin Šiba Krvavac’s 1972 \textit{Valter brani Sarajevo} (\textit{Valter defends Sarajevo}). A synonym for Partisan-Western, this film is inspired by true events concerning the Sarajevo underground resistance and its leader Vladimir Perić, known by the code name “Valter.” Historian Robert J. Donia explains that Perić was born in the Serbian town of Prijepolje in 1919 and that he joined Communist party in 1940, while working in a bank in Belgrade. Shortly after, he was transferred to the banks’ branch in Sarajevo. In Sarajevo, Perić was active in the resistance movement from the very beginning, and from 1942-1943 he served as deputy political commissar with a Partisan unit in Eastern Bosnia until regional leaders appointed him secretary of the Sarajevo committee of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{411} He was also among the last Sarajevans to lose his life in the war. Perić was killed by a German hand grenade in the battle on the very day of Sarajevo’s liberation, April 6, 1945.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{409} Probably the best example of such attacks was Vicko Raspor, one of the leading personalities of the Yugoslav film community and hence very close to the Communist authorities. Raspor asserted that “harmful influences on our film can originate not only from the West but also from the East.” See Vicko Raspor, “Problemi naše filmske umjetnosti i zadaci saveza filmskih radnika Jugoslavije,” in \textit{Reč o filmu} (Beograd: Institut za film, 1988 [reprinted from \textit{Filmska kultura} no. 1 (1950), p.3]).  
\textsuperscript{410} In the first two years following the split, the number of imported Soviet films plummeted, while the number of imported Western movies increased. According to Predrag Marković, in the period from 1944 to 1948 Yugoslavia imported 192 feature films of Soviet origin. A year after Yugoslavia imported “only” 18 Soviet films, comparing to 19 American. Accordingly, Soviet film attendance fell by more than 70% from 1948 to 1950 and never really recovered again. \textit{Predrag J. Marković, Beograd izmedju istoka i zapada 1948–1965} (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1996), pp. 442-443, 453.  
\end{flushright}
Valter brani Sarajevo depicts the events surrounding a sabotage action against the German army in late 1944. At that time Sarajevo had become an important refuelling post for the Germans, who were withdrawing their tank divisions from the Balkans in order to defend Germany from the advancing Soviet and American armies. Knowing that the mysterious resistance leader, Valter, poses a real threat to this action, the Germans try to infiltrate the resistance movement to catch and eliminate Valter. However, they fail to do so, resulting in a forced retirement of the German colonel who is responsible for the operation.

In its depiction of the Second World War, Valter brani Sarajevo falls in line with the set of emancipatory ideas of fraternal solidarity among the Yugoslavs. The two most important scenes of the film most clearly illustrate this. The first is the film’s central scene, in which a Nazi officer invites the parents of some fallen resistance fighters to claim the bodies of their children. Sarajevans of all ethnicities – Muslims, Serbs, Croats and Jews – unanimously step forward, thwarting thereby the German plan to identify and execute anyone who had any connection to the resistance movement. In this act the private loss of the individual parents becomes a public one, what makes the film not only a story about unsuccessful German attempt to catch Valter, but also a personification of strength and defiance of the city. The second scene impregnated with the ideals of “brotherhood and unity” is the film’s closing scene in which the colonel that is forced into retirement discusses the unsuccessful attempt to catch Valter with a Gestapo officer:

Colonel: Merkwürdig! Seit ich in Sarajevo bin, suche ich Walter und finde ihn nicht. Und jetzt, wo ich gehen muss, weiss ich wer er ist. (Impressive! Ever since I came to Sarajevo, I have been trying to trace Valter, but I couldn’t find him. And yet, as I am leaving, I have finally found out who he is.)

Gestapo: Sie wissen wer Walter ist?! Sagen Sie mir sofort seinen Namen! (You know who he is?! Tell me his name right away!)

Colonel: Ich werde ihn Ihnen zeigen... Sehen Sie diese Stadt? Das ist Walter! (I will show him to you... Do you see this city? This is Valter!)

This is pronounced as the camera provides panoramic view of Sarajevo implying that Valter is not an individual inhabitant of the city but rather the city itself or, figuratively speaking, all inhabitants of Sarajevo regardless of their ethno-religious affiliation. On the completion of the dialogue, uplifting, heroic music brings the film to its end.
Given that it was one of the most original Yugoslav cultural expressions, Partisan film had very strong cultural implications in Socialist Yugoslavia. This argument is originally put forward by Predrag Marković, who also argues that partisan films “attained the almost impossible: to express very discreet ideological massage through the irresistibly charming heroes borrowed from Western films.” It is noteworthy that Marković’s argument resembles quite much the definition of the relation between ideology and political mythology that I operate within this thesis. Thus, while having much validity, Marković’s argument on “attaining almost impossible” should be taken with a grain of salt, because this relationship is rather universal, and thus far from impossible.

Although this was a pan-Yugoslav phenomenon, nowhere did Partisan film leave such strong mark as in the Sarajevan youth culture of the 1980s, making Partisan film cultural capital that every citizen of Sarajevo had to have. This connection makes the Sarajevan youth culture an interesting subject for the study of the identity-formation in relation to the country’s political mythology. To begin with, a theoretical note concerning Partisan film as a cultural capital of the city’s youth needs to be stressed. Namely, “[i]f personal identity involves a constant struggle against the impositions and assumptions of others,” as Theodore Gracyk argues, “then it also seems to depend on appropriations from a larger cultural apparatus that is beyond our individual comprehension. That cultural apparatus includes popular culture and mass media.” The story of the most important cultural expression associated with the city in the decade, New Primitivism, is a telling example here. The following slight digression to the movement’s origin, style and aesthetics will serve to a later point on the relationship between political mythology and identity.

New Primitivism was a loosely organised movement that expressed itself primarily in musical and radio/television form. It emerged as a sub-cultural way of life in central Sarajevo’s neighbourhood of Koševo in the early 1980s. Soon it developed as an artistic movement, best known for the music of bands Elvis J. Kurtovich & his Meteors, the aforementioned Zabranjeno pušenje, Bombaj štampa (The Bombay Post) and Plavi orkestar and finally Crvena jabuka (Red Apple), which I will return to in the next section; and for its radio and television comedy show the Top List of Surrealists (Top lista nadrealista – TLN) – a sort of Yugoslav Monty Python show,

ridiculing the political situation in Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1980s this originally quite small alternative scene would become a central paradigm of Bosnian popular culture, closely associated with the widely popular *Youth programme* of Radio Sarajevo and the growingly self-confident youth press.

It is important in the context of this study that its contemporaries often described New Primitivism as a delayed New Wave. According to Boro Kontić this delay was caused by specific Sarajevan mentality that shackled its musicians. He continues arguing that while in the other music centres of Yugoslavia local bands were supported and promoted, in Sarajevo they could only expect problems from local scene and media. However, he concludes that in the end this usually had a positive outcome, because if a band could make it in Sarajevo, it could make it anywhere, as Kontić puts it.

Apart from the problematic term “mentality,” Kontić’s assessment should be taken seriously. Few people knew the city’s alternative scene as well as he did. From 1979, he hosted *Primus* – the most popular youth programme on Radio Sarajevo. *Primus* was quintessential for New Primitivism. Not only did it introduce Yugoslav New Wave to Sarajevans, it was also the programme where TLN emerged with Kontić as its early producer. Finally, *Primus* was a base for the latter Radio Sarajevo’s *Youth Programme* with Kontić as editor-in-chief. Finally, despite all similarities, including the focus on the local, the immediate and the present, that it shared with New Wave and Punk, New Primitivism distinguished itself by being exclusively Sarajevan phenomenon with a

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415 At the time when New Wave already had culminated in Zagreb and at was just about to reach its highest in Belgrade – in the spring of 1981 – Polet described Sarajevo’s New Wave scene as “(almost) non-existing.” Fikret N. Mujičić, “Sarajevska rock scena. Vjetrovi Miljacke lahori Jahorine,” *Polet* 1.4.1981, p. 20.

Two years later Polet introduced an article on New Primitivism by stating that “significant turmoil had happened on Sarajevan rock scene.” According to it, there were now at least 20 significant active bands in Sarajevo. Goran Marić, “Polet interview: New Primitives! Menadžer i vođa vodeće grupe: Malcolm Muharem Elvis J. Kurtovich!” *Polet* 235, 17.Svibnja 1983, p. 17.

And indeed, according to *Mladina*’s Piotr T. B. New Primitivism experienced its boom in 1982 and by 1984 – a year when Sarajevo hosted the Winter Olympics – rumours were already spreading among the local alternative scene that the time of New Primitives was over. At the same time, the two most prominent New Primitive bands Elvis J. Kurtovich & his Meteors and Zabranjeno pušenje released their debuts. Now, Yugoslavia’s most popular rock magazine *Džuboks* described the latter as Yugoslavia’s most important new rock act. *Džuboks* was not alone in its enthusiasm for Zabranjeno pušenje, as the band was voted “band of the year” for 1984 all around Yugoslavia. See Piotr T. Barbabegović, “Glasbeno pismo: Valterji, Anarhisti in Čejeni,” *Mladina* 44, 13.12.1984, pp. 38-40; Vlado Pandža, “Zabranjeno pušenje. Primitives long live now,” *Džuboks* 181, Okt. 1984, pp. 12-13 and Senad Avdić, “Popuši ga sad, popuši ga sad. Kome sve to treba,” *Polet* 297, 25.1.1985, pp. 6-8.


distinguished local style and aesthetics. Thus, quite differently from New Wave which was considered being Yugoslav-wide phenomenon, New Primitivism was limited to Sarajevo. Indeed, New Primitivism was the trademark of the 1980s Sarajevan and Bosnian popular culture.

Even though Elvis J. Kurtovich & his Meteors was the first band associated with the movement, Zabranjeno pušenje was by far the most artistically significant. Zabranjeno pušenje's musical style is a mix of garage rock and post-punk, yet what distinguishes the band is that it introduced complex story-telling, which was unknown in punk, as punk mostly uses short, yet effective, paroles and verses. In the context of the discussion whether or not Sarajevo’s youth culture was less autonomous from the dominant socialist culture than it was the case with other centres of Yu-Rock, it is very interesting that Zabranjeno pušenje, as a one of the politically most provocative bands in the 1980s’ Yugoslavia, devoted its debut album to Valter – not to the actual person Vladimir Perić Valter, but to the symbol of Valter that integrating moral and ethical values presented through the protagonists of Hajrudin Šiba Krvavac’s film.

References to Krvavac’s film are very explicit in at least three ways. The first and the most pronounced is the record’s title, *Das ist Walter*, that is, the film’s concluding line, pronounced by the German Colonel acknowledging that Valter indeed is Sarajevo. Second, the record’s cover shows a surrealist painting of Sarajevo from the same position this line is pronounced. Third and arguably most important, the aforementioned closing dialog between the German officers and the follow-up music are directly reproduced in the album’s intro theme. This is immediately followed by the song “Anarchy All Over Baščaršija.”

Pavle Levi has offered a very interesting interpretation of the connection between this intertextual opening of the album and its first song as its musical “supplement.” According to this interpretation, this musical “supplement” strips the reified socialist wrappings of Valter’s multiculturalist Yugoslavism and aligns it instead with the spirit of absolute freedom and ideological negation (i.e. anarchy). The ideal of *brotherhood and unity* is thus still preserved but no longer as a function of the state-sponsored dogma.

I will argue that this interpretation suffers from a depoliticised Yugo-nostalgia, meaning that it seeks to preserve the ideal of *brotherhood and unity*, as a positive effect of the common Yugoslav (popular cultural) experience, but at the same time gives under its urge to divorce it from political

418 The only notable exception was the band Dinar from Bosnia’s second largest city Banja Luka.
419 Baščaršija is the old Ottoman part of the city.
ideology that lies behind it. One probable reason is that political mythology, as a link between ideology and the population, is missing in his interpretation. As argued previously, political ideology uses political mythology in order to make the ideological message more easily accessible to the populace by stressing narratives through which the populace orients itself, feels about its own social and political world and acts in it. In this context, the identity-building function of political myth becomes more important than the explanatory one, as it provides the members of the community with significance.

To understand this we need to place Sarajevan youth culture in relation to the broader Yugoslav youth culture. As some scholars working on New Primitivism, have stressed, the movement was very much about the exploration of identity. This includes Levi, who points out that despite their Yugoslavness never being questioned, the primary reference frame of Zabranjeno pušenje and New Primitivism was rather Sarajevan and Bosnian. As we saw, New Primitivism drew upon the local, Sarajevan, socio-cultural milieu for its philosophy and its praxis. Its poetics was poetics of the local, which manifested itself in an alleged anti-intellectualism, the manipulation of prejudices about Bosnia and Sarajevo being backward and primitive and the use of local icons and lexical properties, most notably from the Muslim milieu in the Sarajevo suburbs. With this focus on local icons and lexical properties the New Primitives attacked “the dominant culture’s hypocrisy of privileging non-local cultural experience as the national cultural foundation,” as Dalibor Mišina puts it. The ultimate goal was to establish a new socio-cultural relationship to the rest of the country. However, what is more important, it was still done from within the dominant culture, by appropriating from the larger cultural apparatus that included Partisan film.

In this context and in order to conclude on the point concerning the identity-building function of political myth in the case of New primitives and Zabranjeno pušenje, I want to bring yet another


example of musical reference to Partisan film on Das ist Walter. This is the closing song on Side A, “Neću da budem Švabo u dotiranom filmu” (“I don’t wanna be a Swabian in a subsidised film”), which has several very clear connotations to Partisan films – and should be presented here in its entirety:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Srpski</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slavni režiser je u našem gradu</td>
<td>A famous director is in our city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snima novi film, kažu bit' će dobar</td>
<td>Making a new movie, they say it will be good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strani glumci, prijemi i lova</td>
<td>Foreign actors, receptions and cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nema sumnje, smiješi mu se Oskar</td>
<td>No doubt, an Oscar coming his way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebat će on i mnogo statista</td>
<td>He will need a lot of statists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Za masovne i grandiozne scene</td>
<td>For massive and grandiose scenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iako kažu da on dobro plaća</td>
<td>Although they say that he pays well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamo neće, neće biti mene</td>
<td>I will not be, will not be there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neću da budem Švabo</td>
<td>I don’t wanna be a Swabian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U dotiranom filmu</td>
<td>In a subsidised film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neću da budem statist</td>
<td>I don’t wanna be a statist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U životu i u kinu</td>
<td>In the life and in the cinema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neću da budem Švabo</td>
<td>I don’t wanna be a Swabian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Švabo da budem neću</td>
<td>Swabian, I don’t wanna be, no way!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neću da budem okupator</td>
<td>I don’t wanna be an occupier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ima neki davo u mojoj psihi</td>
<td>There is something in my psyche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neću da budem Švabo</td>
<td>I don’t wanna be a Swabian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kad ne mogu biti Prle niti Tihi</td>
<td>If I cannot be Prle or Tihi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neću da budem Švabo</td>
<td>I don’t wanna be a Swabian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Švabo da budem neću, nema Boga!</td>
<td>Swabian, I don’t wanna be, no way!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glavni glumci bi htjeli</td>
<td>The main actors would like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da su na pravoj strani</td>
<td>To be on the good side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ja da budem Švabo</td>
<td>Me being Swabian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A oni partizani</td>
<td>And they partisans 424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just as in the previously discussed case of Prljavo kazalište singing about growing up with partisan films, this song has nothing to do with the Second World War. It is all about the 1980s, and

yet, it shows in several ways how the world view of Sarajevan youth was caught up in the system of references to the past presented in partisan films, even when ironic, as “Neću da budem Švabo u dotiranom filmu” certainly is.

A listing of a “famous director,” “foreign actors,” “Oscar” and “grandiose scenes” in the opening verse offers a quite explicit reference to the 1969 *Bitka na Neretvi* (*The Battle of Neretva*). Being probably the most famous partisan film ever, *Bitka na Neretvi* distinguishes itself by being nominated for the Academy Award for the Best Foreign Language Film and, according to common perception in Yugoslavia, not winning it only because it was produced by a socialist country. At the time of its release, *Bitka na Neretvi* was by far the most spectacular Partisan film and there is little doubt, if any, that this was also what the director Veljko Bulajić was aiming with his film – to produce a big war film, which could be measured against Hollywood produced war films, not least in its grandiosity. The cast included several acclaimed international actors, a.o. Yul Brynner, Franco Nero and Orson Welles. Finally and quite noteworthy, *Bitka na Neretvi* had its premiere in Sarajevo.

The chorus that also gives the title to the song, “I don’t wanna be a Swabian in subsidised film”, follows the verse. Here, the relevance to partisan film could hardly be clearer. The noun *Swabian* does not refer here to the lingo-historic region in Southern German states of Württemberg and Bavaria. Rather it is a reference to the term commonly used in Partisan film, and in broader Yugoslav discourse, to distinguish between terms “German” referring to state and nation and “Swabian” referring to the German occupier’s forces. This is clearly expressed in the second chorus of the song, in which “Swabian” is replaced with “occupier.” Given that punk-rock’s vision of the world is not complex and revolves strictly around two poles: we (good) and they (evil), the song leaves no doubt which pole was reserved for the partisans. Indeed, in the song’s last verse they are identified as Prle and Tihi. Prle and Tihi are main protagonist of Partisan action-film *Otpisani* (*The Written-Off*) released in 1974; a smash hit TV series of same name shown in the period 1974-1975 and the 1976 film *Povratak otpisanih* (*The Written-Off Return*). These were along *Valter brani Sarajevo*, probably the most popular filmic representations of the partisan resistance movement in the 1970s. Situated in the occupied Belgrade, they tell the story of urban youth resistance in the 1940s in a manner that the 1970s Yugoslav youth easily could identify with. What is interesting

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425 In fact, as a recent documentary on Yugoslav popular culture shows, this idea is still widespread in the states that emerged after Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Igor Stoimenov (dir.), *Robna Kuća* (RTS, 2009), episode 1-2 Partizanski film.
here is that in its appropriation of Prle and Tih on the album called *Das ist Walter*, Zabranjeno pušenje links Belgrade and Sarajevo. By doing this, their otherwise distinctive local Sarajevan and Bosnian reference frame now embraces broader Yugoslav system of references. The result is that Zabranjeno pušenje and New Primitivism’s unquestioned affiliation with their city, Sarajevo, becomes at the same time the expression of *Yugoslavness*.

Zabranjeno pušenje may be the first, but it was far from the only Sarajevan band explicitly appropriating Partisan film heroes’ moral and ethical norms of behaviour in their musical texts and performances. Indeed, no band or musician went as far in this appropriation of Partisan film’s morality and ethics as Plavi orkestar. By its contemporaries the band was seen as a part of “the big three” of New Primitivism – the other two being Elvis J. Kurtović, which is sometimes considered as an “ideological” founder of the movement, and Zabranjeno pušenje. In fact, among contemporary rock critic the band had a reputation of being the movement’s intellectuals.426 Nevertheless, even before its first recording was released, the band moved away from New Primitivism, most notably by integrating folkloristic elements from all over Yugoslavia in their music and subsequently on their follow-up record by deliberately developing their own performative and aesthetical concept that is today often designated as New Partisanism due to the strong references to “Partisan revolution.”427

Nonetheless, already on their debut record *Soldatski bal* (*The Soldiers’ Ball*) from 1985 – the debut, which became the bestselling debut in Yugoslav history428 – Plavi orkestar started advocating a “revolutionary” *Yugoslavism* through reanimation of the legacy of the Second World War Partisan revolution and deliberate integration of the folkloric idioms from all parts of Yugoslavia.429 Yet, it was on the 1986 follow-up *Smrt Fašizmu!* (*Death to Fascism!*) that the concept integrating morality and ethics of “revolutionary” *Yugoslavism* in bands performance and aesthetics was fully developed. According to the band’s leader and vocalist, Saša Lošić Loša, the title of the record

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428 Misirlić (2004), p. 120.
429 As Nails Ceribašić observes, it was a general practice in Socialist Yugoslavia’s cultural policy to interpret all specific characteristics of the different regions to be “the property of all the peoples of Yugoslavia.” Nails Ceribašić, “Heritage of World War II in Croatia: Identity Imposed upon and by Music” in *Music, Politics, and War: Views from Croatia*, ed. Svanibor Pettan (Zagreb: Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, 1998), p. 127.
could as well be *Bitka na Neretvi* or *Devojački most (Maiden Bridge)* as it “indeed was a Partisan film converted into music form.” The only thing that Plavi orkestar added to the atmosphere of Partisan film was love, something that was omitted in the films themselves, according to Lošić. This title is in fact rather very important in the context of the band’s Yugoslavism. “Death to fascism!” is the first half or the revolutionary greeting slogan of the partisan resistance movement “Death to Fascism! Freedom to the People!” that was diligently reproduced in partisan films. Like in the case of *Das ist Walter*, the title of the record should be seen in relation to the opening song, “Fa, fa fašista nemoj biti ti (jerbo ću te ja draga ubiti)” (“Fa, Fa, Fascist Don’t You Be (Because I Will Kill You, My Dear)”). Similarly to the previously discussed “Moj je otac bio u ratu” by Prljavo kazalište, this song is very much in line with the official interpretation of the Second World War history. It starts with the sound-images of aircrafts flying over and dogs barking, with the immediate follow-up by the lyrics:

Sjećaš li se draga kraljevića Petra,  
do you remember, my dear, the king Peter,  
ostavio zemlju na nogama od vjetra?  
who left the country in such a hurry?  

Tako si ti draga ostavila mene,  
It’s how you left me, my dear  
da mi glava trne i srce da mi vene  
with my head hurting and my heart full of pain

The opening, combining the sound-images and textual reference to the royal family’s flight to London, symbolically represents the occupation of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the war. When related to the title of the LP *Smrt Fašizmu!* a meaning clearly indicating the “revolutionary” Yugoslavism comes to mind.

A number of interviews with Lošić shows that the band’s Yugoslavist orientation was a consciously chosen and planned socio-cultural project, developed as a reaction to the trend of

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430 This is yet another very popular Partisan film from 1976.  
433 The battle cry “Death to Fascism. Freedom to the People!” was together with “Brotherhood and Unity” probably the most used slogans in the Yugoslavia’s partisan movement as well as in Socialist Yugoslavia’s popular culture of the Second World War.  
434 Plavi Orkestar, “Fa, fa fašista nemoj biti ti (jerbo ću te ja draga ubiti),” *Smrt fašizmu* (Zagreb: Jugoton, 1986).
fragmentation and *ethnicization* of Yugoslav cultural space. Similarly, after the release of the band’s debut, the band’s manager Malkolm Muharem explained in an interview for *Mladina* that both the band and the record were all-*Yugoslavian*, as the band was strongly opposed to the raising ethnic and regional enclosure in Yugoslav society. In practice, the band combated rising nationalism on different levels, musical as well as lyrical.

The way they did it musically, by integrating folkloristic elements from all over Yugoslavia in their music, resembled very much the cultural policy of the immediate post-war years. In these years the Communist leaders – committed to national diversity, propagated as a strength rather than weakness – urged ensembles and radio stations to incorporate musical production from all of Yugoslavia’s national cultures into their repertoires as a means of fostering *brotherhood and unity* among Yugoslavs. According to Naila Ceribašić, the ruling discourse in these years interpreted all specific characteristics of the different regions to be “the property of all the peoples of Yugoslavia”. Yet, it was not only in this folkloristic aspect that Plavi orkestar acted in an easy recognizable manner of *brotherhood and unity*. On the immediate musical level *brotherhood and unity* and the all-encompassing cultural experience were expressed through an eclectic approach to musical genres, with guests on their debut LP ranged from Ivan Fece Firči from the discussed alternative rock band Ekatarina Velika to folk singer Nada Obrić.

Lyrically, the band’s most direct expression of *Yugoslavism* come to fore in their probably biggest hit from the 1985 debut, a song called “Stambol, Pešta, Bečlija” (“Istanbul, [Buda]Pest, Wiener”). As an invocation of “brotherhood and unity” that emphasises the principle of the all-encompassing cultural experience, according to which all specific historical characteristics of the

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437 According to the band’s manager Malkolm Muharem, the all-encompassing of different regional traditions made Plavi orkestar popular in all parts of the country (Malkolm Muharem’s name and job as manager of all important New Primitive bands alluded to the legendary punk manager Malcolm McLaren). Melita Zajc and Mojmir Ocvirk, “Mi smo zgodovinski hybrid. Plavi orkestar,” *Mladina* 29, 12.9.1985, p. 8.

438 However, music that did not match proclaimed interpretation of history or overemphasised the past of a constituent ethnic group was excluded. The reason for this was a denial of any continuity with the pre-war Yugoslavia as well as a promotion of the CPY as the only party that could stand above ethnic rivalries and insecurities. See Svanibor Pettan, “Music, Politics, and War in Croatia in the 1990s: An Introduction” in *Music, Politics and War: Views from Croatia* (Zagreb: Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, 1998), p. 11 or Dean Vuletić, “Generation Number One: Politics and Popular Music in Yugoslavia in the 1950s,” *Nationalities Papers* 36.5 (2008), p. 865.


different regions were (re)interpreted to be the property of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, this song is basically built around the story of genuine friendships between friends from different parts of Yugoslavia. The differences between these parts are accentuated by using easily recognizable cultural references.\textsuperscript{441} To illustrate the point I present the song here in entirety:

\begin{quote}
Kad sam bio vojnik ja  
im'o četu drugova  
čovjeka do čovjeka  
ruku da za svakoga.

Imao sam drugara  
\hspace{2cm} I had a comrade  
uža sinjska krajina  
vina, blitve, pršuta  
ikad kraja pričama.

Bilo Stambol, Pešta, bečlija  
\hspace{2cm} Whether from Istanbul, Budapest or Vienna  
svi su ljudi ovde isti,  
Stambol, Pešta, bečlija  
\hspace{2cm} all people here are the same,  
svi su ljudi ovde dobri.

Imao sam drugara  
dole preko Vardara.  
\hspace{2cm} from over the Vardar.  
duša je od čovjeka  
\hspace{2cm} sweetheart  
spojila nas mastika.

Imao sam jarana  
gore ispod Višnjika  
\hspace{2cm} Up below Višnjik  
Mezili smo dana dva,  
\hspace{2cm} We were having a feast for two whole days,  
šljivka dušu otvara.

Im' o sam burazera  
\hspace{2cm} I had a bro  
negdje oko Bečjeja  
\hspace{2cm} from around Bečej  
meka duša, pogača  
\hspace{2cm} soft and good soul, homemade bread  
al vatra je u žilama.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{441} This includes names of well-known geographical places, typical food and drinks for certain regions and the regional lingual references for the words with a basically same meaning.
Moj drug ispod triglava
posvadi nas slovenka
suze roni gora sva
ne govore brata dva.

Svoga druga ne,
ne daj nikome.

My comrade from below Triglav
Slovenian girl made us fight
a whole mountain was crying
‘cause two brothers fell apart

Don’t give up your comrade
for anything.442

According to Lošić, as he put it in an interview for Duga, the last lines of the song, “don’t give up your comrade for anything,” projects clearly the idea of Yugoslavism.443 What he meant is that this message of friendship without borders unites Yugoslavs despite all differences between them. The same idea is also behind three well-known guest singers, who sing in their different regional accents. One of them was Zagreb New Wave musician Jura Stublić of Film, whose music and close relationship with the Belgrade bands were discussed in Chapters II and III.444 Last but not least, the chorus “whether from Istanbul, Budapest or Vienna; all people here are the same; …; all people here are good” emphasises the ideal of Yugoslavia encompassing all its differences, including different past (respectively Ottoman and Austro-and-Hungarian).445

While Lošić’s and Plavi orkestar’s example indicates that their Yugoslavness was conditioned by what Eric Gordy has called “ideological attachment to the ‘non-national’ ideology promoted by the Communist elites,”446 the same cannot be said about Dr. Nele Karajlić, Zabranjeno pušenje or TLN, which was rather anti-institutional and anarchistic. Nevertheless, their appropriation of morality and ethics from Partisan films indicates that they both drew heavily on the same larger cultural apparatus that was possibly beyond their individual comprehension. Thus, whether they were critical of it (Zabranjeno pušenje) or not (Plavi orkestar), they both emerged from the

444 The other two were Pedja D’Boy from Belgrade and Aki Rahimovski of Parni valjak, which “Macedonian” identity is often accentuated, despite Rahimovski’s band was from Zagreb.
445 It is as well quite interesting that the song opens with the verse referring to the comradeships developed during military service. Studies like Eugene Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen have depicted in details how important was conscription for the nation-building process. Seen from the perspective of Plavi orkestar’s Yugoslav orientation, the song serves more than well as a mean of de facto principle of the all-encompassing cultural experience, helping to strengthen the imagined community among Yugoslavs.
dominant socialist culture. Moreover, they both emerged from a specific Sarajevan multi-ethnic space, which I turn now to in the discussion in the second section.

Before that, I want to stress that this argument should not be read as appropriation of the popular culture of the Second World War was an exclusively Sarajevan phenomenon. As we saw in the discussion on the Zagreb scene, the phenomenon had a broader Yugoslav frame. In fact, even the Ljubljana’s Alternative Rock scene of the 1980s, which was often considered as being most at odds with any kind of reanimations of Yugoslavia’s revolutionary past and most autonomous from the dominant socialist culture. As we saw in the previous section, bands belonging to the city’s hardcore-punk subculture were openly hostile to the idea to let Plavi orkestar perform with them in 1985, calling the band “Crveni orkestar” (“Red Orchestra”).447 Hence, clearly indicating their stance on Communist ideology, the subculture’s “official” hardcore-punk fanzine was, nonetheless, named Vrnitev odpisanih, that is, Povratak otpisanih (The Written-Off Return) in Slovene.

“From the Vardar to Triglav, All around My Buddies”

In his 2002 book on the relationship between nationalism and religion in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, historian Vjekoslav Perica has presented a very interesting argument for brotherhood and unity being Socialist Yugoslavia’s civil religion.448 According to this argument, brotherhood and unity was conceived as a counterweight to ethnic nationalism that tore the country apart and incited hatred, causing bloody massacres during the Second World War and was therefore sanctioned by the state as the highest patriotic value and became Yugoslav civil religion. As a civil religion with its fundamental beliefs and rituals, brotherhood and unity was espoused by large number of Yugoslavs. Without this popular patriotic commitment, that is, faith in brotherhood and unity and the “Yugoslav spirit” the loose multi-ethnic Yugoslav federation might have not been possible. It was this faith that kept the country together and not force and manipulation used by the Communist Party or Tito. Moreover, it even facilitated the development of a new-nationality, the

448 Vjekoslav Perica, “United We Stand, Divided We Fall. The Civil Religion of Brotherhood and Unity” in Balkan Idols. Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 94 et seq.
so-called “Yugoslavs by nationality.” What was special for Yugoslavs by nationality was that they declared no religious affiliation. Instead, they were believers in the Yugoslav civil religion of *brotherhood and unity*. To support his argument Perica refers to the research done by several sociologists of religion, showing that very few Yugoslavs by nationality ever attended church or prayed, with almost half of them declared as atheists, while at the same time they declared greater affinity for attendance at official patriotic rituals.\(^{449}\)

Perica’s ideas about Yugoslav civil religion are not novel. Already 20 years before Perica published his book, in 1982 sociologist Esad Čimić argued that some Yugoslavs experienced Yugoslavness as it was a religious category.\(^{450}\) Six years later, sociologist of religion Sergej Flere argued that (the new) Yugoslavness was a form of secular religiosity, closely bound to other forms of political mythology in Socialist Yugoslavia and motivated equally by utopian political tendencies, different myths and unclear conceptions of Yugoslavism as “imagined community.” These conceptions were unclear because Yugoslavism was a very complex and stratified idea, containing different, often incomplete, stands about Yugoslav unity meaning only political or ethnic and cultural community.\(^{451}\)

Čimić’s and Flere’s studies are some of those studies initiated by the explosive rise in number of declared Yugoslavs at the 1981 census, which I discussed in the first chapter. There I also emphasised that Sarajevo, the city that is at the centre of analysis in this chapter, had one of the highest proportions of inhabitants declaring as Yugoslavs of all cities in Yugoslavia. According to the census results, more than 20% of Sarajevans chose to declare “Yugoslav” in place of an ethnic identity in response to the census questions on nationality.\(^{452}\) Based on the statistics from this census, John R. Lampe argues that Sarajevo, in spite of large number of educated Croats and Serbs moved out of Bosnia during the 1970s, "instead of becoming more Muslim city, rather became the most Yugoslav city of all republic capitals in the country."\(^{453}\)


It is as well noteworthy that Centar Municipality, which encompassed the neighbourhood of Košćevo – a birthplace of New Primitivism, topped the list, with approximately one in four citizens opting as Yugoslavs. *Nacionalni*
As I also have argued in the thesis, the number of people identifying as “Yugoslavs” continued to grow through a better part of the 1980s. Several surveys had indicated this growth. For instance, a 1989 survey showed 14% Bosnians would have declared as “Yugoslavs,” what presents almost a doubling from 7.9% at the census in 1981.\textsuperscript{454} Given that the younger generations most often declared as “Yugoslavs” and given that the proportion in Sarajevo had already passed the 20% mark in 1981, it is not unlikely that “Yugoslavs” could easily constitute the largest nationality among the city’s youth in the late 1980s.

Among those declared Yugoslavs we find the leader of the country’s arguably most popular rock band Bijelo dugme, Goran Bregović. Widely assumed number one rock group in Yugoslavia, this band left an immense influence on the whole Yugoslav popular music, its pop, rock – mainstream and alternative – and even folk. As nationalist rhetoric gained ground in Yugoslav society, in late 1988, Bregović enunciated that he was \textit{nationally-undeclared Yugoslav} and that he saw Yugoslavia, as an idea, as being more “civilised than the dominant insistence on the particular [Yugoslav] nations.”\textsuperscript{455} While the concepts of civilisation and has certain analytical and especially normative weaknesses, Bregović insistence on \textit{Yugoslav} being nationally undeclared and contrasting it with opting nationally, indicates that his Yugoslavism was at least partly a result of an ideological attachment to the “non-national” ideology promoted by the Communist elite. Bregović’s attitude towards the Communists expressed in another late 1980s interview supports this argument. Here, Bregović told rock critic Petar Luković that “the very fact that there [was] social security and free education, [was] enough to have reasonable sympathies for the party in power.”\textsuperscript{456}

Bregović’s Yugoslavism came as much into fruition in his band’s music. For instance in 1983, when, on the top of the ethnic riots in the early 1980s Kosovo, Bijelo dugme released a song in Albanian called “Kosovska” (“Kosovo Song”). The purpose of writing a song in Albanian – a song that would become a big hit in whole Yugoslavia – was to teach (non-Albanian speaking)

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{454} Dusko Sekulic, Garth Massey, Randy Hodson: "Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia" in \textit{American Sociological Review} Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb. 1994); p. 89
Original: Jugoslavija kao ideja mi je civilizovanija nego inzistiranje na nacijama na način na koji mi na njima inzistiram.
\end{flushleft}
Yugoslavs a few words in Albanian and thereby, at least symbolically, break the linguistic barrier and instead promote the inter-ethnic communication and understanding. A year after the band opened their seventh eponymous LP with the Socialist Yugoslavia’s national anthem “Hej Slaveni” (“Hey, Slavs”), before naming their eight LP released in 1986 symbolically Pljuni i zapjevaj moja Jugoslavijo (Spit and Sing, My Yugoslavia). The LP distinguished itself by featuring a real Partisan war hero Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, singing an old revolutionary song Padaj silo i nepravdo! (Down, Might and Injustice!). This song served as an introduction to the title song “Pljuni i zapjevaj moja Jugoslavijo,” what indeed very much resembled what Zabranjeno pušenje had done with Das Ist Walter and “Anarhija all over Baščaršija” just a few years earlier.

The message of “Pljuni i zapjevaj moja Jugoslavijo” could hardly be put more clear - not least when seen in relation to the rising nationalism and de-Yugoslavisation among the intellectual opposition described in the previous chapters:

Jugoslavijo na noge! Rise up Yugoslavia!
Pjevaj – nek’ te čuju! Sing – let them hear you!
Ko ne sluša pjesmu, Whoever doesn’t listen to this song,
slušat’ će oluju! Will hear a storm!

Finally, two years later in 1988, guided by the same antinationalist logic of promoting the inter-ethnic communication and understanding as in “Kosovska,” Bregović merged the Croatian national anthem "Lijepa naša domovino” ("Our Beautiful Homeland") and a traditional Serbian song "Tamo Daleko" ("Far and Away") in a single song. Both those songs were otherwise labelled nationalist by the LCY and with the rising nationalism posed a potential reason for inter-ethnic clashes and mistrust. In an interview for Sabrina Ramet, Bregović explained the logic behind this merging of the two songs, stressing the importance of creating the dialog where it did not exist.

458 Svetozar Vukmanović “Tempo” was one of the leading personalities in the Partisan resistance movement and a member of the Central Committee of the LCY.
Even if Bregović and Bijelo dugme were exceptional in their insistence on the interethnic dialog and their distinctive Yugoslavism, this Yugoslavism cannot be understood unless placed in a specific Sarjevan and Bosnian context. For variety of reasons, Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered the most Yugoslav republic: its multiethnic composition, not being dominated by any single nationality, geographical location in the middle of the country and last but not least being place strongest associated with the National War of Liberation (including the filmic representations of it, like the aforementioned Bitka na Neretvi). Being Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital and largest city, Sarajevo was commonly thought as a symbol of the country and the miniature representation of Yugoslavia’s multi-ethnic universe. This image of a “mini Yugoslavia” culminated with the Winter Olympics, which were held in the city in 1984. During the Olympics – when Yugoslavia finally for a short while actually became “the centre of the Universe” – Sarajevo was the country’s face to the world.

Not surprisingly, two years after the Olympics, this image of a mini Yugoslavia got its lyrical expression in the song “Cijela Juga jedna avlija” (“Entire Yugoslavia One Courtyard”). This was a major hit by a band called Merlin.\textsuperscript{461} The influence of Bijelo dugme was present both in musical style often described as folk and roll style typical for the so-called Sarajevo School of Rock and in their pronounced references to Yugoslavia. In this context, it should be mentioned that the song is contemporary to “Pljuni i zapjevaj moja Jugoslavijo.” Although not as directly political, but rather addressed to a girl, song has a same Yugoslavian message and resembled cosmopolitanism of Azra, EKV and Borghesia:

\begin{verbatim}
Šizi Beograd, šizi Novi Sad
Tuzla, Sombor, Zagreb, Titograd
Cijela Juga jedna avlija
Srbi, bosanci, crnci i albanci
Nikad u mom gradu nisu bili stranci
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
Belgrade is dancing, Novi Sad is dancing
Tuzla, Sombor, Zagreb, Titograd
entire Yugo(osl)va one courtyard
Serbs, Bosnians, Blacks and Albanians
were never strangers in my city\textsuperscript{462}
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{461} The name Merlin alludes to Marilyn Monroe, as Merlin stands for Serbo-Croatian transliteration of the actress’ name. This comes to expression on the cover of Merlin’s debut, which was conceptualised so it juxtaposed the picture of Marilyn Monroe and the first half of the title, \textit{It is Difficult with You}, on the front and the picture of young female Partisan hero Marija Bursač and the second half of the title, \textit{but Even More So without You}, on the back.

\textsuperscript{462} Merlin, “Cijela Juga jedna avlija,” \textit{Teško meni sa tobom (a još teže bez tebe)} (Sarajevo: Diskoton, 1986).
By reciting a series of Yugoslav cities and stressing the inter-ethnic coexistence in their own city, Sarajevo, Merlin links the city and Yugoslavia in a way that every Yugoslav easily would recognise Sarajevo being “Yugoslavia condensed into one city.”

In respect of this common image of Sarajevo as “Yugoslavia on a smaller scale,” Dalibor Mišina has offered an interesting interpretation. In this interpretation, Mišina explains how Sarajevo was commonly considered a model of what the whole country was supposed to be – multicultural, open, and unsuspecting of the “others.”463 From here, Mišina argues that this was the reason why any change in the nature of Yugoslavia’s socio-cultural orientation was first sensed within Sarajevo’s cultural milieu. Perceived danger to the city’s (and thus also Yugoslavia’s) multicultural harmony, Sarajevo’s musicians was first to respond to the climate of increasing de-Yugoslavisation of both immediate and national socio-cultural space.464 Not fully convinced by this argument – in particular why would the change in the nature of Yugoslavia’s socio-cultural orientation be sensed in Sarajevo before elsewhere – I will offer a somewhat different interpretation of the song and its socio-historical context.

In this regard, it is very useful to draw attention to the one of the opening sentences in historian Robert J. Donia’s Sarajevo. A Biography in which the author argues that “[o]n the spectrum between experience and imagination expounded by Benedict Anderson, Sarajevo is more an experienced than an imagined community.”465 In practice this meant that Yugoslavism in Sarajevo was experienced and not imagined. It was for this reason that in the mid-1980s, it became common among the Sarajevan bands to link Yugoslavia in their songs to the subjects (most usually love) that did not have any real connection to Yugoslavia.466 Commenting on this development Ante Perković writes that the way these bands linked Yugoslavia to different themes in their songs was at the border to bizarre.467 Although Perković is certainly right in his assessment, I would argue that the very fact that it made sense to bring Yugoslavia related issues in rather banal love songs tells a great deal about Yugoslavness of Sarajevan youth culture in the mid-1980s.

466 Probably the best example is Hari Mata Hari, another Sarajevan band that entitled their 1986 LP Ne bi te održala ni cijela Jugoslavija (Entire Yugoslavia, could not help you). The title song was indeed a love song without any real connotation to Yugoslavia, as such and the lyrics had it: “Entire Yugoslavia, could not help you; if I find out that you cheated on me.”
argue that it will not be wrong to describe this Yugoslavness as a kind of a banal everyday Yugoslavism, unquestioned and fully incorporated in the Sarajevan youth’s way of life.\footnote{Although clearly anti-nationalist, this Yugoslavism resembles fairly much what Michael Billing defines as banal every-day nationalism, a nationalism that is opposed to the more extremist variants of the phenomenon.}

As we saw in the case of Plavi orkestar and its song “Stambol, Pešta, Bečlija,” this Yugoslavism was closely related to the ideological axiom of “brotherhood and unity,” which emphasised the principle of the all-encompassing cultural experience and the genuine friendships between friends from different parts of Yugoslavia. While Plavi orkestar may have done this in order to combat rising nationalism in the country, another Sarajevan band, who, just like Plavi orkestar, started as a New Primitive band but moved in the direction of more classical pop-rock, came up with a rather banal love song invoking friendship across the inter-republican borders in 1988. The band was Crvena jabuka and was at the time of the release of the song, called “Ako, ako” (“If and If”), one of the most popular pop bands in Yugoslavia.\footnote{Petar Janjatović, Ex-YU Rock enciklopedija 1960-2006 (Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2007), pp. 46-48.} In the context of the previous discussion on \textit{ethnicization} of rock music in Yugoslavia, Crvena jabuka was the example that Jasenko Houra of Prljavo kazalište presented as one of a few, if not the only, still all-Yugoslav bands at the time when he was interviewed by \textit{Polet} in 1989.\footnote{Mate Bašić & Zoran Simić, “Jasenko Houra: Ja ne mogu biti ban!” Polet 416, 10.11.1989, p. 30.}

“Ako, ako” accentuates the idea of friendship across the borders in the chorus, having it that:

\begin{verbatim}
Od Vardara, moja raja
Do Triglava, nema kraja
From the Vardar, my buddies
to Triglav, all over\footnote{Crvena Jabuka, “Ako ako,” Za sve ove godine (Sarajevo. Diskoton, 1987).}
\end{verbatim}

What is important here is that the band used common reference to Yugoslavia as an entity demarcated on the basis of territory and not ethnicity, as the Vardar is a river in Macedonia and Triglav is the highest peak of the Julian Alps in Slovenia. This reference was easily recognisable by every Yugoslav because the phrase “Od Vardara...Do Triglava” was also used in the early 1970s Neofolk song “Jugoslavijo” (“Yugoslavia!”). In fact, it is not an exaggeration to claim that “Jugoslavijo,” which was commonly called “Od Vardara do Triglava” (“From the Vardar to Triglav”), was Yugoslavia’s unofficial national anthem, most probably preferred by the majority
of the Yugoslav population to the more ethnically defined “Hey Slavs.” Starting with the verse “Od Vardara pa do Triglava” (“From the Vardar to Triglav”), the song was very much in spirit of *brotherhood and unity* stressing unity across national, religious and linguistic lines.

As for Crvena jabuka, this all-Yugoslav reference could be one of the plausible reasons for the band’s all-Yugoslav popularity. Finally, although Houra claimed Crvena jabuka to be an exception in regards of all-Yugoslav popularity, the band’s Yugoslavness was by no means an exceptional in Sarajevo. In fact, as Ante Perković puts it, “as a kind of a black box serving the purpose of preserving all parts of the story, Sarajevo literally stayed in Yugoslavia until [its] the last moments.”

The development of Sarajevan youth media both supports this argument and tells more about the character of Yugoslavism in the city’s youth culture. Until 1987 Bosnia and Herzegovina was generally considered as being one of the most dogmatic republics, ruled by hardliners and with no critical media. Only after the sense of economic crisis became omnipresent and after the political scandals shook the political elite, did civil society and critical journalism begin to appear.

Following the same pattern as in Slovenia, where different civil initiatives within youth organisations became the herald of civil society, Sarajevan semi-independent students’ organisation, the University Conference of the Alliance of Socialist Youth started work in the beginning of the 1988. As it did not have a public outlet, it founded its own periodical – calling it symbolically *Valter*. This provoked a chain-reaction among the already existing Sarajevan media. The official youth periodical, *Naši Dani*, was first to join *Valter*’s critical journalism and by the end of 1988, these two periodicals were the highest circulating Bosnian periodicals. Together with Radio Sarajevo’ *Youth Programme*, which was from the very beginning closely associated with the Sarajevan alternative scene (Boro Kontić, TLN, musical programmes promoting Yugoslav New Wave and alternative music), *Naši Dani* and *Valter* made up the core of Sarajevo critical journalism in 1989. Meanwhile, changes also occurred in the official daily newspaper *Oslobodjenje* (*Liberation*), where the LCY’s officials no longer dared to appoint editors against wishes of

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473 It was the so-called Agrokomerc affair of 1987 that made the Bosnian economy collapse, causing a major political destabilization. The Agrokomerc affair was a basically banking scandal involving political top of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
employees. In the years to come all these media kept an antinationalist line – even after the nationalist parties won the elections in November 1990.

According to Polet’s Hajrudin Redžović, “due to the multiethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which condemned Sarajevan journalists to Yugoslav orientation,” Sarajevo’s journalism was assumed as the most objective in Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s. In the context of the rising of new ethno-nationalist dogmas and the nationalist enclosure, such Yugoslav orientation meant that Sarajevan journalism became the most open. This Yugoslav orientation and openness came also to expression in the case of YUTEL (short for Yugoslav Television). Conceived as a pan-Yugoslavian TV programme, representing the federal government, YUTEL was transmitted from Sarajevo and not from the federal capital Belgrade, as it might be expected. Established in 1990, the concept of YUTEL’s programmes was to show different points of view. The idea with YUTEL was to fight nationalist atomisation that was taking place in the Yugoslav media space.

Transmitting until the start of the war in Sarajevo in April 1992, YUTEL is today best remembered for the big Peace concert organised in Sarajevo on July 28, 1991 - the YUTEL for Peace (YUTEL za mir). The concert was transmitted live, but could however only be watched by the audiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, as the channels of Yugoslav television network in other republics refused to broadcast it. Some notable participants were Ekatarina Velika, Crvena jabuka, Plavi orkestar, Hari Mata Hari, Merlin, Goran Bregović of Bijelo dugme and several leading protagonists of TLN, including Dr. Nele Karajlić.

The concert was part of a larger anti-war movement, which was active in Bosnia in the period from the break of the war in Croatia in 1991, supported wholeheartedly by the Sarajevan media. It organised a number of big peace rallies attracting thousands of demonstrators in different Bosnian-Herzegovinian cities. It culminated in the beginning of March 1992, when, according to Dušan Janjić, large demonstration in Sarajevo forced nationalist to call off the beginning of the war.

During the next month, as the war was approaching Sarajevo, tens of thousands demonstrated in front of the Bosnian Parliament, calling for the nationalist rhetoric and ethnic violence to come to an end.480 During the demonstrations Valter had again been resurrected to personify unity across ethno-religious differences in Sarajevo, as the demonstrators were shouting the slogan “We are all Valter!”481 In doing so, they were not only expressing their belief in the multi-ethnic coexistence in the city, but also reflecting the interethnic relations structured around “open [inter-ethnic] boundaries in a mosaic nationality in a mass,” that is, according to Stef Jansen’s definition of it, Yugoslavness that was only sometimes openly “Yugoslavist.”

A research done by the Sarajevo University just a few month before the war started indicates that nationality still at that point played a rather minor role in the lives of the city’s youth. The research was carried out in late 1991 and concerned the interethnic relations among Bosnian students. It showed that nationality did not play an important role in choosing partners and friends, with only one-out-of-ten respondents rejecting a possibility to marry someone of different national affiliation. Moreover, the same proportion (one tenth) responded that nationality was an important base for friendship.482 It is therefore possible to argue that prior to war in the 1990s Sarajevan youth was largely unconcerned with ethnicity. In other words, brotherhood and unity was unquestioned and incorporated in their way of life. The still relatively high proportion of Yugoslavs at the 1991 census, with more than 10% of Sarajevans opting “Yugoslav” on the question of nationality, indicates the same – that ethnicity was still dynamic, inconstant, floating and, above all open to individual strategies and negotiations.483

482 The research was conducted among students of three Bosnian universities - Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar. It showed that only 11.9% of students felt that "nationality is an important criterion for friendship." In contrast, no less than 72.4% expressed the stance that it did not play any role. Similarly, on the question concerning the conclusion of the marriage between persons of different nationalities, 45% replied that they without forethought would marry a person of different nationality than their own. Additional 22.7%, who would prefer a spouse of the same nationality, would still be ready to do so. Finally, only 10.5% responded that they could never do it. Dušan Janjić, "State-Political Identity of a Multietnic and Mutliconfessional Community: Outstanding Issues" in Ex-Yugoslavia: From war to peace, eds. Radha Kumar & Josep Palau (Madrid: HCA, 1992), pp. 198-199.
This however did not mean that the sense of cultural decline, seen in the other scenes, was not present in Sarajevo in the late 1980s. A 1989 utterance from one of the discussed musicians, Dino Merlin (aka. Edin Dervišhalidović) of Merlin, clearly indicates this sense and serves more than well as a final comment in the chapter. In a 1989 interview carried out in Polet, Dino Merlin commented on the state-of-things in Yugoslav rock music by resorting to the common explanation pattern of defining Yu-Rock in its relation to Western Europe. Asked about which period he saw as “the golden era” of the Yugoslav rock, he answered that it was the years when Šarlo akrobata still existed, years of early Prljavo kazalište. According to him, these “were the years when Juga was closest to Europe – culturally, economically, in the terms of civilisation (sic!).”484 Thus, he explained that Yugoslavia indeed was “closest to Europe” and “most European” in the early 1980s, a period when Yugoslav youth culture was emerging from New Wave. In the context of the discussed subject relation to this emergence, it is noteworthy that although Dino Merlin equated Europe with Western Europe, never was Yu-Rock more intensively engaged in Eastern European issues than in the early 1980s. Moreover and interestingly enough, never before were Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana closer to each other than in those same years when New Wave was music of the time. Those were also the years when the number of Yugoslavs by nationality was steadily growing, not least in Merlin’s own city Sarajevo. Finally, it should be emphasised that Yu-Rock was most ingrained among younger more educated urban population, that is, the segment of population which according to Sergej Flere, was led by the “utopian ideological aspiration towards single human community, in which all societal relations would be free of any division of interests, conflicts and struggles, and would thus present a move towards non-nation.”485


Conclusion

Based on this chapter’s discussion, it does not come as a surprise that in the late 1980s ethnic homogeneity woke suspicion in the city and not vice versa. The aforementioned interview with Dino Merlin illustrates this point very well. In the interview Dino Merlin complained to Polet’s journalist that in some media his band had been vilified as being ethnically homogenous. Dino Merlin went on defending the band’s ethnic composition as something that they never really thought of. However, the point here is not whether this was right or not, but rather that as late as 1989 ethnic homogeneity was so uncommon among Sarajevan bands that it needed to be explained.

Thus, the discussion in the chapter indicates that the Sarajevan youth of the 1980s was largely unconcerned with ethnicity. Their lives were rather structured around their “non-national” Yugoslavness and an everyday Yugoslavism based on the lived experience of *brotherhood and unity*. This would remain so until the last days of Yugoslavia, what the symbol of Valter discussed in the chapter clearly indicates. This symbol also indicates that the youth culture in the Bosnian capital emerged within the dominant socialist culture, most notably under the influence of the specific Yugoslav war films, depicting partisans struggle during the Second World War. However, the appropriation of the morality and ethics of these films did not go one-way. Rather, in negotiating their personal and collective identities, struggling against the impositions and assumptions of others, Sarajevan youth appropriated references from the larger cultural apparatus – including those concerning partisan films.

The readings of the Sarajevo School of Rock and the popularity of the formal self-identification as “Yugoslav” indicate a widespread move among the city’s youth towards a non-nation. The antinationalist agency of the city’s rock scene resembles very much Dejan Jović’s argument of Yugoslavia witnessing a struggle between the forces of integration and of polarisation in the 1980s. Most notably the case of Plavi orkestar, whose whole concept of “revolutionary” Yugoslavism was conceived as a protest against fragmentation of Yugoslav cultural and political space.

Conclusion

“There has recently been a rapid growth in interest in everyday life and popular culture in Socialist Yugoslavia. There have emerged new trends in the history of socialism, which critically address the persisting interpretative genre of “real” life under socialism – a genre that generalises from the example and agency of the minority political elites, leaving out narratives of feelings, experiences and practices of ordinary people. The new cultural history of socialism throws light on everyday life in the margins of society, seeking to include these long neglected narratives and thereby broaden our understandings of what life in Socialist Yugoslavia was about. The intention of this thesis was to contribute to these recent trends by examining Yugoslav rock music culture as a prism for identity-formation in the Late Socialist Yugoslavia. The main question focused on the pronounced antinationalism and Yugoslavness of this culture, and in particular on the issues related to its agency, origin and causality. Thus, in the analysis I have emphasised the socio-politico-historical context, in which the Yugoslav youth culture emerged and functioned, seeking ultimately

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487 Ekatarina Velika, “Par godina za nas” on Samo par godina za nas (PGP RTB, 1989).
to explain how the Yugoslavness of this culture was caught up in the system of references to the country’s specific geopolitical position and its nationality policies. In this final chapter, a conclusion on the discussions and observations made in the preceding five chapters, I will present the most important results reached through the analysis.

Considering the issues of agency, the analysis has shown that despite substantial differences in the degree of urban youth autonomy in different cities, the pan-Yugoslav youth culture that evolved under the influence of New Wave emerged within the dominant socialist culture and was very much dependant on appropriations from a larger cultural apparatus that was beyond individual comprehension. Most notably this apparatus included the popular culture of the Second World War, connecting thereby the country’s political mythology with the 1980s rock music culture. The appropriations from the popular culture of the Second World War were most widespread in the early period, and therefore, at Zagreb scene, and in Sarajevo in the mid-1980s, but were however not reserved to this period or limited to Zagreb and Sarajevo. In fact, as we saw, even the hardcore punk band associated with the underground scene in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana, which were commonly seen as being most at odds with the authorities and farthest away from the dominant socialist culture, did the same appropriations from the popular culture of the Second World War. All this meant, as we saw in the chapter dealing with the early New Wave scene in Zagreb, that the idea of growing up in Socialist Yugoslavia was conceived as growing up with Partisan films depicting the People’s Liberation Struggle and the Socialist Revolution. These films were an important part of young Yugoslavs’ cultural capital and were used in the construction of meaningful identities even when the references from the films were used in contemporaneous context and not directly related to the idea of the People’s Liberation Struggle and the Socialist Revolution, as in the case of Prljavo kazalište or Zabranjeno pušenje.

Dealing with the scenes in the Serbian and Slovenian capitals, the thesis has highlighted the anomaly of the studying the interethnic relations in everyday life by generalising from the example and agency of the minority political opposition that chose direct confrontation with the system and with each other. The chapters on these two scenes revealed that when seen from the perspective of the youth cultures in Belgrade and Ljubljana, we are left with a quite different impression. For example, we saw that bands from one republic continued touring and engaging with the bands and audience from other republics until the last days of Yugoslavia, serving thereby as a force of
integration in the dissolving Yugoslav society. We saw also that several of the most important rock bands that emerged from New Wave chose to confront nationalist intellectuals. At the same time the chapters have demonstrated the rapidity by which nationalism rose to a central stage of everyday life in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One example was Borghesia, whose political comments were deemed outdated by the time of release of their 1989 record, indicating a sudden move of nationalism to the centre stage of the political and social life. Another example was the touring Belgrade bands being caught in the escalating war operations in 1991 and 1992.

Concerning the antinationalist agency in Yu-Rock and the sense of general ethnicization of the Yugoslav society in the 1980s, the thesis has revealed that, with the exception of Sarajevo, all scenes experienced either marginalisation or ethnicization in the last years of the decade. However, neither marginalisation nor ethnicization was ever complete. Several central agents on all scenes took action against rising nationalism. This happened on several different levels. On the one hand, as we saw in the case of Polet’s article on the Pankrti-Zabranjeno pušenje concert in 1985 or in the case of Film’s Jura Stubić singing about “good vibrations and the nations in love” in 1989, some agents turned against the general trend of ethnicization by a rather depoliticising agenda of rejecting to participate in the dominant nationalist discourse. On the other hand, bands like Partibrejkers, Električni orgazam and Borghesia openly warned against nationalist mobilisation and manipulation, or, as in the case of Ljubljana punk pioneer Igor Vidmar, who criticised nationalist provincializing agenda. Finally, several bands (EKV, Bijelo dugme, Borghesia, Laibach, Plavi orkestar) chose to confront nationalists and fight back de-Yugoslavisation of the country’s cultural and political space.

In this respect, it is indeed very interesting that several agents defined nationalism as retrogressive – like Polet in Zagreb, Rimtutituki in Belgrade, Igor Vidmar in Ljubljana and Goran Bregović in Sarajevo – and/or opposed to the idea of Europe – like Polet and Vidmar and Dino Merlin in Sarajevo. This idea of Europe is also interesting because it was used to define the state-of-development in Yugoslavia. Thus, as we saw, the years around 1980 were seen as “the golden age of Yu-Rock” and the time when Yugoslav Punk was “the best Punk East of England” and when even the Western media showed interest in Yugoslav bands like Pankrti, Prljavo kazalište and Električni orgazam. In contrast, the late 1980s brought a strong sense of decay and of Yu-Rock now lagging more and more behind Europe, while at the same time being marginalised with the rise of nationalism and popularisation of the Newly Composed Folk Music. Yet, quite interestingly, as the
discussed sources show, at the same time when *ethnicization* of the Yugoslav society was occurring, the New Wave generation – in particular those more highly educated – and the younger generations that grew up in the 1980s with the fully-fledged pan-Yugoslav youth culture now identified more strongly with Europe. Given that Europe was perceived as being opposed to nationalism, representing a move towards the non-national, this identification was a kind of substitute of a previously popular “Yugoslav” identity, which served as an alternative to the narrow national identity.

This idea of Europe as non-national and opposed to nationalism, as well as its significance as a benchmark for the level of development is directly linked to the issue of origin of the Yugoslav youth culture. It concerns with the specific time in which it emerged, the country’s nationality policies and its unique geopolitical position. The discussion on the political and historical context, in which this culture emerged, has shown strong resemblance between this emerging phenomenon and the explosive rise in the number of people identifying as Yugoslavs. It has shown that both phenomena were most widely spread among the younger, more urban, and more highly educated portions of the population. This indicates an open character of both “Yugoslav” identity and the youth culture that developed in the early 1980s. Johnny Štulić’s self-identification and Kuzle’s songs very much support this argument. So do the different events in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, at which the local bands were hosting bands from different cities and republics, becoming ultimately close friends.

In relation to the issue of origin, the analysis has revealed an interesting chronological coincidence between these two phenomena – rising popularity of self-identification as “Yugoslav” and the pan-Yugoslav youth culture – and the general sense of optimism in the prosperous late 1970s. In this situation a self-image of Yugoslavia as the best of all worlds was created, influencing strongly the emergent youth culture. Although this image would be shaken with the prolonged crisis in the 1980s, the youth culture would not lose its Yugoslavness defined in the late 1970s. In fact, the number of young Yugoslavs preferring “Yugoslav” identity, presented in the 1985-86 research, indicates that the sense of community among Yugoslavs was still growing.

In addition, the analysis has revealed an interesting coincidence between the death of the country’s president, Josip Broz Tito, New Wave as a herald of changes in the Yugoslav society and
the engagement of different Yugoslav New Wave bands in Poland. Occurring in the formative period of the pan-Yugoslav youth culture, on the top of the general optimism of the prosperous 1970s, these developments helped create an image of Yugoslavia and its New Wave and Punk movements being “the centre of the universe.” Most importantly, they helped create a common cultural experience and an easily recognisable value-laden reference point, as we saw in the interview with Jasenko Houra, in which he commented on the state-of-things in Zagreb’s rock scene in respectively the early and the late 1980s. We saw the same explanation pattern in Borghesia’s comment on the “YU-New Wave boom” or Dino Merlin’s longing after the time when Šarlo akrobata still existed. Yet, nowhere were these references as many and as strong as in the film Kako je propao rokenrol, which as we saw, symbolically connected all four scenes that this thesis is dealing with. The inherently self-referential character of popular culture came also to fruition in the examples of Borghesia, who recorded a legendary New Wave song “Mali čovek“ in a time when country was dissolving and in a 1993 project that united members of the most central New Wave bands from Belgrade and Zagreb. As we saw the project was named “Ko to tamo peva,“ after a cult film from the New Wave period, but also Azra’s 1982 song, addressed to Tito. This interfilmic and intertextual referentiality indicates that in those few years (for Yugoslavs) around 1980 there has emerged a fully formed common Yugoslav (popular) cultural universe and a pan-Yugoslav youth culture.

Finally, in relation to the issue of causality of Yu-Rock’s Yugoslavness and antinationalism, the thesis has shown that although Socialist Yugoslavia did not advocate creation of a supranational Yugoslav identity, but rather discouraged it as much as possible, throughout the 1970s – a period in which the New Wave generation grew up – the country experienced a rather explosive growth in the number of people identifying as “Yugoslavs-undeclared.” In contrast to Dejan Jović, who has argued that this phenomenon emerged in the first place as a reaction against general trend of fragmentation of Yugoslav political and cultural space that started 20-30 years before, I have argued that it had more to do with education, urbanisation, secularisation and the associated modernising processes.

Moreover, I have offered an argument that the emergence of this phenomenon was also an indicator of ethno-national identification being only one among several relevant forms of identification in 1970s and 1980s Yugoslavia, especially in the cities in ethnically mixed regions,
where relatively high proportions of *Yugoslavs by nationality* became a highly visible structural characteristic of interethnic relations in the country. It showed that in the periods of balanced interethnic relations, ethnicity and identity were dynamic, inconstant, floating and, above all, always open to individual strategies and negotiations. When sometime in the late 1980s, the interethnic relations worsened drastically and the ethnic borders became increasingly closed, the number of people claiming Yugoslav nationality plummeted.

The development in Yu-Rock supports this argument. As we saw the pan-Yugoslav youth culture originated in the same period in which the popularity of “Yugoslav” identity began to rise substantially. It is therefore quite noteworthy that there are indications enough pointing in the direction that in the same time when the rock scenes that emerged with New Wave were increasingly being marginalised, the number of people preferring “Yugoslav” identity began falling. This allows us to conclude that there is a strong connection between the two phenomena. This development was quite rapid. It was also rather complex, corresponding very much to Jović's argument that in the last period before the country's collapse, Yugoslavs witnessed a struggle between the forces of integration and of polarisation. However, the results of this analysis indicate that the Yugoslavness and even open Yugoslavism at all the four discussed scenes were to a certain level a reaction to rising of nationalism, and not the other way round, as Jović argues.

In fact, it seems that Jović's argument has most validity in relation to the discussion on the Sarajevo scene in the mid-1980s. One possible explanation is that here Yugoslavism was most closely related to the “non-national” ideology promoted by the Communist elites. In the Chapter I, I argued that Jović’s definition of Yugoslavism corresponded most closely with this definition. Moreover, I have also argued that Yugoslavness should not be reduced to any kind of Yugoslavism. As the thesis demonstrates, Yugoslavness was about tolerance and was based on the idea of the existence of a *Yugoslav* miniature universe filled with diversities, yet interconnected by a collective fate. As such, it was only sometimes openly “Yugoslavist,” but always the opposite of nationalist segregation and exclusiveness. Thus, Yugoslavness most often assumed a distinctively tolerant, antinationalist and cosmopolitan character, as in the utterances, actions, songs and names of Branimir Johnny Štulić, Milan Mladenović, Merlin and Borghesia. And it was most about “open [inter-ethnic] boundaries” and “anationality,” as in the songs and actions of Crvena jabuka, Kuzle, Električni orgazam, Polet, Plavi orkestar, Jura Stublić and EKV.
This was one of the probable reasons for Yugoslavia’s particularity that makes it very difficult to determine to which extent was the cosmopolitan and antinationalist character of its rock music culture defined by the country’s identity policies – or if it was rock and roll’s inherited universalism and its international origin and attachment to the international music trends that made Yu-Rock antinationalist and cosmopolitan. In this respect, the thesis has demonstrated that there are too many and too strong references that they should not be ignored in any study of the sense of community in the 1980s Yugoslav rock music culture.
Summary

The thesis examines the sense of Yugoslav-ness in the Yugoslav rock music culture in the specific socio-politico-economic situation of 1980s Yugoslavia. The main question in the thesis focuses on how this sense of community was caught up in the system of references to the country’s specific geopolitical position and its nationality policies, including the state-organisation, political mythology and identity politics. In this respect, the primary interest is the relationship between different conceptions of Yugoslavism and the development of a pan-Yugoslav youth culture that emerged with the arrival of New Wave into the country in the late 1970s.

The study is carried through micro-historical analyses of the local rock scenes in the country’s four principal rock centres: Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana. The scenes are used as empirical platforms for discussing broader issues, not necessarily limited to any individual scene. The thesis draws upon identity theories that emphasise dynamics and relationality of “identity” and approaches popular music as an arena for conflict and negotiation of cultural and political identities. Methodologically, the thesis is based on the theoretical assumption of intertextuality, stressing that a text can only communicate its meaning when situated in relation to other texts, as the meaning always “arises” between texts.

The thesis demonstrates that although Socialist Yugoslavia did not advocate creation of a supranational Yugoslav identity, but indeed discouraged it as much as possible, the sense of Yugoslavness and pronounced antinationalism of the Yugoslav youth culture did not emerged independently of Socialist Yugoslavia’s nationality policies. Rather, they were inextricably connected to a larger, over-arching, web of knowledge and ideas to which they related and depended very much on appropriations from a larger cultural apparatus that sometimes was beyond individual comprehension and that was closely related to these policies.
Resume


Analysen er udført ved mikrohistoriske undersøgelser af de lokale rock scener i landets fire hoved rock centre: Beograd, Zagreb, Sarajevo og Ljubljana. Disse scener bliver brugt som empiriske platforme for bredere diskussioner, der ikke nødvendigvis er begrænset til en bestem scene. Afhandlingen trækker på identitetsforskningen der fremhæver identitetens foranderlighed og relationalitet og griber popmusikken an som et rum i hvilket konflikter om og forhandlinger af kulturel og politisk identitet udspilles. Metodisk er afhandlingen intertekstuel. Det betyder at analysen tager udgangspunkt i antagelsen om at en tekst kun kan kommunikere sin mening i forhold til andre tekster, dvs. at meningen opstår imellem teksterne.

Afhandlingen viser at, selv om det socialistiske Jugoslavien ikke var fortaler for dannelsen af en supranational jugoslavisk identitet, men tværtimod prøvede at modvirke dette så meget som muligt, opstod den udprægede jugoslaviske fællesskabsfølelse og antinationalisme i den jugoslaviske ungdomskultur alligevel ikke uafhængigt af landets nationalitetspolitik. Disse var snarere bestemt af et større videns- og idefelt og relaterede til og afhæng i stor grad af tilegnelser fra det større kulturelle apparat der var tæt knyttet til landets nationalitetspolitik.
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